Reducing Violent Crime and Addressing Homelessness in Albuquerque, New Mexico 

Guest blog by Raul Bujanda, IPP ’26

One of the biggest lessons I learned from the Implementing Public Policy program is that understanding a problem is very different from being able to solve it. In public safety, we are used to identifying a problem, developing a plan, assigning resources, and expecting results. That approach works when the problem is fairly clear and the solution is known. It becomes much harder when the problem involves human behavior, politics, limited resources, different agencies, and competing expectations from the community. 

The PDIA process forced me to look at the problem differently. Instead of immediately asking, “What is the solution?” I learned to spend more time asking why the problem exists and what is keeping us from making progress. 

Another important lesson was the value of breaking large problems into smaller pieces. Violent crime, homelessness, behavioral health, addiction, repeat offenders, and public disorder are connected, but they cannot be solved through one initiative. Trying to solve everything at once can actually make implementation harder. Smaller interventions give us an opportunity to learn what works, what does not, and what needs to change before expanding an approach. 

My implementation challenge focused on reducing violent crime and improving public safety in Albuquerque while developing a realistic and humane approach to homelessness, behavioral health, and visible disorder. 

As Executive Director of Public Safety for the City of Albuquerque, I work across the Albuquerque Police Department, Albuquerque Fire Rescue, Albuquerque Community Safety, and the Office of Police Reform. I quickly realized that many of the challenges we face do not belong to one department. 

A person experiencing homelessness may interact with police, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, community safety responders, hospitals, treatment providers, courts, and nonprofit organizations, sometimes repeatedly. At the same time, neighborhoods and businesses expect the City to address crime and disorder and keep public spaces safe. 

The problem was not simply a lack of effort. A major part of the problem was coordination. Each organization could be doing its job while the overall system was still not producing the outcome we wanted. 

The fishbone exercise was probably one of the most useful parts of the course for me because it forced me to move beyond the symptoms of the problem. 

Our analysis identified several contributing areas: coordination and governance, the justice system, homelessness and behavioral health, staffing and resources, data and technology, and community and environmental conditions. 

That helped me see that what initially looked like a crime problem was also an implementation and coordination problem. 

For example, police can arrest a repeat offender, but the long-term outcome may depend on prosecutors, courts, treatment providers, housing availability, or other organizations outside the police department. Similarly, Albuquerque Community Safety can connect someone experiencing homelessness with services, but if appropriate treatment or housing is unavailable, that individual may return to the same location and the same circumstances. 

The Triple-A analysis also helped me think differently about what I could realistically influence. I had authority to bring APD, AFR, ACS, and the Office of Police Reform together, but authority alone did not guarantee results. We also needed acceptance from employees, community partners, elected officials, businesses, service providers, and other stakeholders. Finally, we needed the ability, including staffing, technology, data, services, and operational capacity, to actually carry out what we were asking people to do. 

Our early iterations reinforced this. We began looking at specific locations and operational problems rather than discussing homelessness or crime only at the citywide level. One example involved examining conditions around Robinson Park and bringing APD and ACS together to better understand what was happening and what each department could realistically contribute. 

That experience led to another important lesson. We needed clearer short-term objectives. Saying we want to “reduce homelessness” is not an operational objective. Asking what we can change at a specific location over the next 24 hours, week, or month creates something we can act on and measure. 

That thinking has carried into our broader approach to problem locations. Instead of simply moving people or increasing enforcement temporarily, we are looking at the entire environment: crime, repeat calls for service, behavioral health needs, outreach, property conditions, businesses, and the physical environment. We can then bring the appropriate departments and outside partners together, assign responsibility, measure results, and adjust. 

The process also showed me how much we still do not know. My earlier analysis identified uncertainty around long-term coordination, political and organizational support, staffing, technology, data sharing, and our ability to adapt quickly. I no longer see those unknowns as a reason not to act. They are reasons to start small, learn, and adjust. 

The biggest change for me is resisting the urge to immediately develop a large solution. 

My background in law enforcement taught me to assess a problem, establish objectives, develop a plan, and execute it. I still believe strongly in accountability and execution. PDIA does not replace those principles. It adds another step before them. 

I now spend more time decomposing the problem and asking what we actually know, what we assume, and what we still need to learn. 

I also think more about whether we have enough authority, acceptance, and ability to implement an idea before launching it. A good idea without those three things can become another plan that looks good on paper but never produces sustainable results. 

I am already using the approach in Albuquerque. 

We are bringing departments together more consistently, focusing on specific problems and locations, and asking what measurable change we expect from the resources we deploy. I want our teams to become comfortable testing an approach, evaluating the results, and changing direction when the evidence tells us something is not working. 

That requires a different leadership mindset. Changing a strategy should not automatically be viewed as failure. If we learn quickly and use that information to improve the next iteration, the process is working. 

I also want to continue breaking down the silos between public safety agencies and our external partners. Police, fire, community safety, prosecutors, courts, behavioral health providers, housing organizations, businesses, and community groups all see different parts of the same problem. Bringing those perspectives together gives us a better chance of understanding what is actually happening. 

My advice is simple: do not wait for the perfect plan. 

Public sector leaders are often expected to have answers. Sometimes the better approach is admitting that we do not yet know enough and creating a process that helps us learn. 

Start with the problem. Break it down. Talk to the people closest to it. Look at the data, but also understand what is happening on the ground. Identify what you can control and where you need partners. Try something small enough that you can see whether it works. Measure it. Learn from it. Then adjust. 

I would also encourage practitioners not to underestimate relationships. Many implementation problems cross organizational boundaries. Authority can get people into a room, but relationships and trust are what keep them working together when things become difficult. 

Finally, stay focused on outcomes rather than activity. In government, it is easy to measure how many meetings we held, how many people we contacted, how many calls we answered, or how many operations we conducted. Those numbers matter, but they are not the final measure of success. 

The better question is whether conditions actually changed for the people and communities we serve. 

That is probably the most important lesson I will take from this program. Complex problems will not be solved by one leader, one department, or one plan. Progress comes from understanding the problem, taking action, learning from what happens, and being willing to adjust until we begin producing better results. 

This is a blog series written by the alumni of the Implementing Public Policy Executive Education Program at the Harvard Kennedy School. 33 Participants successfully completed this 5-month hybrid program in September 2026. These are their learning journey stories.