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SUMMARY:Crisis to Transformation: Policy Lessons from Ukraine
DESCRIPTION:Online \n\n\n\n\n\nAbout the Talk\n\n\n\nUkraine is a live laboratory of reform under pressure. Wartime disruption\, combined with the momentum of EU accession\, is creating an opening for deep systemic change. The question is no longer whether to act\, but how: How can we deliver lifeline reforms in a volatile\, complex environment? How do we protect and grow human capital while institutions are still adapting? And what can Ukraine’s resilience teach other democracies about preparing for future shocks? \n\n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAnastasiya Dyakova\, Policy Researcher and Founder & CEO of Dignity Online \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nArtem Shaipov\, Team Leader for Legal and Policy Advice\, Strengthening Ukraine’s EU Alignment in the Rule of Law\, GIZ \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJohannes Uhl\, Implementation Manager\, Strengthening Ukraine’s EU Alignment in the Rule of Law\, GIZ \n\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Recording\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\nSalimah Samji Welcome everyone to our session titled Crisis to Transformation: Policy Lessons from Ukraine. My name is Salimah Samji. I’m the Executive Director of Building State Capability and I will be your moderator for today’s session. I’m really excited to announce and introduce our speakers today. Our first speaker will be Anastasiya Dyakova. She’s a policy research and founder and CEO of Dignity Online. Our second speaker will be Johannes Uhl. He is an implementation manager strengthening Ukraine’s EU alignment in the rule of law at GIZ. And then we will have Artem Shaipov\, who is the team leader for legal and policy advice on the strengthening Ukraine EU alignment in the Rule of Law at GIZ. Both Artem and Anastasiya are both alumni of our Implementing Public Policy executive program. And we’re really excited to have alumni of ours at this session. So the session is gonna be each of our presenters\, our speakers is gonna do a short presentation and then I will ask them a few questions and then we will open it up for your questions. So please\, as they speak and you have questions\, put them in the Q&A and we will get to them towards the end of the presentation. So with that\, I’m gonna invite Anastasiya to kick us off with her presentation. Welcome Anastasiya. \n\n\n\nAnastasiya Dyakova Thank you\, Salimah. Hello\, dear participants\, and big pleasure and honor for me to be here today and to share with you experience from Ukraine\, right now based in Kiev. So it’s really our experience. So let’s start. Since February 24\, 2022\, air raid sirens have sounded in my city for more than 2\,100 times\, lasting in combined totally more than 2\,500 hours. That when we calculate it\, it’s more than 100 interrupted days when you should be in bomb shelter and you cannot do anything. This means that you cannot plan anything in your life. An alarm may be going in the middle of your night forcing you to wake up immediately. As this night happened in my life\, and run to a shelter. It may stop you on the way to dropping your children off at school. It may interrupt the training session you are running or our today event. Because when the sirens sound\, everything should stop. And everyone must move underground. It may cut your doctor appointment or even a surgery. It may stop a concert or force passengers to leave a train in the middle of the journey because Russian forces are now targeting civilian trains. This means that people should leave their train and they should wait in the field and forest until the straight pass. Commercial aviation has been suspended for more than four years. So you cannot fly from Kiev to Warsaw that previously took two hours. Now you should use two trains that will take you more than 24 hours to get from Kiev to Warsaw. You cannot even plan a grocery run on the weekend because if the alarm sound while you’re in the store\, you must leave immediately. Living with a radical uncertainty about even the next moment\, not we are not talking about the next year\, even the next moment\, the next minute of your life\, has become the new normal for Ukrainians. Moreover\, the new normal as well is keeping a supply of water at home as Russia destroyed. Knowing how to set up a tent inside your own apartment\, as this winter a lot of people in Ukraine already know. To keep warm when Russia destroys the central heating\, owning a large portable power station for when the grid doesn’t work. And if you run a business\, even own your own generator for your coffee shop or for small shop\, because the enemy is systematically destroy our energy infrastructure\, heating system\, and water supply. The new normal as well means choosing an apartment\, not by neighborhood\, price\, or proximity to work\, but by the size of the bathroom\, because when you no longer have the strength to run with your children to a shelter in the middle of the night\, as this night\, the bathroom became your refuge. Choosing by floor\, because below the fifth is safer\, or by location\, mapped by where the strikes have been further. The new normal means as well having a will drawn up in your thirties\, as I did. Offering paid mental health day to your employee after a night in metro as a shelter\, as my team did this night. Maintaining an emergency vocation plan for your team. Having a company policy to compensate staff whose home have been destroyed. We had such case in our team last year. Running a dedicated emergency communication channel. And choosing your office not for its culture or design\, but for whether it has a generator. Because the office has become a resilience hub\, a place where your team can always count on electricity\, water\, internet and heating. From 2017 to 2021\, I worked in the office of the President of Ukraine. And in 2024\, I completed my master’s degree at the London School of Economics where my dissertation examines social investment trends and their practical implementation and addressing Ukrainian’s wartime labor market challenges. As you can imagine\, we have a lot. Human capital and the longevity economy have become my deepest professional passion. And the impact of Poli-crisis on both\, including geopolitical fragmentation\, as we see this year and previous one\, ecological disruption\, technological transformation and the global demographic agent is now my primary area of research. So I would like to move from the individual and organization level we just explored to the national human capital challenges facing countries at war\, because I really believe this experience holds lessons far beyond Ukraine borders. I genuinely hope\, but cannot fully convince myself\, that Europe will escape further Russia aggression\, especially given the scale of military preparation we are witnessing in Belarus and beyond. In an area of accelerating geopolitical fragmentation and military escalation\, the lessons Ukraine is living through may become relevant for more countries than any of us would wish. We have already seen how Ukraine’s wartime experience has become directly relevant beyond our borders\, most recently as countries in the Middle East sought to learn from our military lessons during the US-Iran conflict. But military knowledge is the only one part of what war teach us. Ukraine’s experience of managing human capital under conditions of active war may provide equal\, if not even more\, valuable experience. Because I really believe that no nation can win or prosper or lead globally without a strong\, resilient human capital base. What’s the impact of a long-lasting war on the human capital? Let’s scale up. To the national level\, to the whole country. Since the full-scale invasion begun in February 2022\, a large share of Ukrainian workforce has emigrated or been internally displaced or joined the armed force or been lost to occupation and captivity. By January 2026\, approximately 5.9 million Ukrainians has become refugees\, mostly in Europe. Represented 14% of the pre-war population. But what’s even more critically from this nearly 6 million\, 75% of them are working-age women and children. The demographic foundation of future population grow the primary drivers of consumer demand and an irreplaceable part of the labor force. So it’s much less people in the country who can work and who can buy and support businesses. Furthermore\, 4.6 million people are internally displaced. It’s creating enormous pressure on housing\, health care\, education in receiving regions and generating significant structural unemployment. As skilled and professionals profiles of displaced workers from one region to another region doesn’t fit each other. War also fundamentally reshapes society’s demographic composition. Ukraine has experienced a sharp decline in the number of children\, driven by mass emigration\, as I already mentioned\, and a collapse in birth rate. The working-age population is shrinking through emigration and wartime casualties. Older people\, who are much less likely to emigrate\, now represent a growing share of those who remain. Ukraine currently holds the world’s highest mortality rate and together with it the lowest birth rate. The result is a demographic structure of profound fragility. So what do we have? We have 10.7 million workers supporting 10.2 million pensioners\, 1.7 millions veterans and 3.6 millions of people with disability. So you understand that 10 million people who work support 10 million pensioners\, nearly 2 million veterans and 3.6 million of people with disability. It’s an incredibly big pressure on budget. War has also fundamentally transformed the role of Ukrainian women in society and economy. Many have become solo breadwinner overnight\, working full-time while simultaneously caring for children. As well alone\, and their older relatives. And in many cases\, managing businesses\, their partners previously run together because their man and husband moved to army. This shift is not temporary. It’s reshaping the labor market\, family structure\, and social policy needs for generation. And as well\, we have a really high level of divorces. As the impact on children has been equally profound. BAR has disrupted schooling on a massive scale\, resulting in significant learning losses\, the breakdown of social connection between different children and their relatives\, and repeated displacement. Many Ukrainian refugee children are simultaneously enrolled in schools in their host countries and attending Ukrainian online schools. That created double academic pressure that few academic system and real children really can survive. We are absolutely seeing children spend more time online than ever in any way during COVID pandemic. Why it’s happened? Using a digital space children try to escape from the violence and instability of their offline reality. This has direct implications for their development\, mental health\, and future productivity. Veterans represent a not critical and growing demographic. Most are of working age\, but they carry long-term needs for health care and social support that will shape public spending for decades. Ukraine’s national strategy is rightly working to adapt the labor market to this new reality. But the scale of the challenges is significant\, and the policy infrastructure is still catching up. Older citizens who we already mentioned\, however remain the most underinvested group in the Ukrainian society. This is a paradox because evidence consistently show that people aged 50 and above face greatest barrier to employment and require targeted risk-killing programs and active efforts to address workplace discrimination. I would argue that longevity economy approach one that actively integrate older workers into the labor market rather than treating them as a fiscal burden could become one of the most important pillars of Ukrainian long-term resilience. The need is concrete. The Ministry of Economy estimated that 4.5 million additional workers will be required for the reconstruction efforts alone. All the Ukrainians who remain in the country are an underutilized resource that Ukraine cannot afford to ignore. With each passing year of war\, the share of refugees willing to return\, of course\, declined. The state has therefore begun to explore alternatives\, attracting foreign workers\, deepening engagement with the diaspora without requiring them physical return\, and deploying a range of instruments from investment bond and expert exchange programs to even dual citizenship. None of these are simple solutions\, but they reflect a necessary rethinking of what human capital strategy looks like when your people really spread it across countries and even continents. And underlying all of this in the fifth year of full-scale war and the 13th year of Russia occupation of Donbas in Crimea is a mental health crisis that can no longer be treated as a secondary concern. Be honest\, you are not robots. We are ordinary people living under extraordinary and really sustained pressure. The evidence is clear. Mental health challenges have a direct and measurable impact on workforce productivity\, economic output\, and the long-term capacity of human capital to drive recovery. I want to close with a broader reflection\, because what’s happening in Ukraine is not an isolated story. We are living through the era with the highest number of simultaneous armed conflicts since the Second World War. And war doesn’t not only destroy life\, it restructures entire economies and societies in ways that resonate generations. Increased defense spending crowds out investment in everything else\, from green transition and education to infrastructure and social protection. Moreover\, labor market shift as military production scale up and absorb workers from other sectors. The combination of rising defense budget and political instability drives inflation and erodes living standards. Long-term planning becomes just nearly impossible for governments\, forcing government into expensive and less effective scenario-based approaches that consume resources really without providing certainty and real result. War also diverts attention and funding away from the ecological crisis while simultaneously accelerating environmental damage through weapons manufacturing\, emissions\, and the direct ecological destruction of combat operations. It’s a compounding harm that rarely appear in the same policy conversation. So\, in recent years\, not a single international monetary fund meeting has begun without a new global crisis\, even as the previous one remained really unsolved. We are living in the age of the Poli-crisis\, and it’s our new reality\, and the defining challenge of this era is that most governments are managing only one of these crises that are directly in front of them. Ukraine is focused on war\, the United States is grappling with the transformative and now militarized implication of the AI. Australia is already hosting the world’s first climate migrants forced from their homes by rising seas and extreme weather. Japan has spent decades confronting demographic aging as it is now one of the fewest countries with active longevity economy policy in place. Each of these governments see only one wave\, but there are four of them – war\, AI\, demographic aging and ecological crisis. And they are all moving forward and toward every country simultaneously. When they converge\, the impact on human capital\, on economies\, on societies\, and ultimately on the social contract between government and the citizens will be tectonic. The question is not whether this conversion is coming. Is it in which government we’ll see it’s in time? And whether they will have the framework\, the tools\, and the political courage up before the waves arrive. That’s the question I have dedicated my work to. And I believe it’s one of the most important policy challenges of our generation. Thank you. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful\, thank you so much\, Anastasiya. I think it’s really wonderful that you’ve painted this context for us of from what a day-to-day life looks like in the Ukraine today from hearing the sirens and leaving the grocery store or leaving wherever we are to its impact on the demography\, to education\, to the labor market\, to the future\, to mental health. And thank you very much for that. We’re now gonna move to Johannes to be able to share his presentation. Johannes\, welcome. \n\n\n\nJohannes Uhl Yeah\, thanks a lot. And thanks a lot to Anastasiya for painting this very tangible picture of what the reality in Ukraine currently is like and what we see in our day-to-day work with our teams on the ground as we say in Kiev and other places in Ukraine. What I would like to do is to also widen this picture a bit because I think what we’ve just heard is a very drastic account\, a very fitting account also of what we can also see across news and across the discourse that are happening. But there’s even more to that. And this is what we are working on what is our day to day activities. And this is that we see that the crisis is not only about destruction\, it’s also about the opportunities for change that it brings about\, and we conceive Ukraine also as a really good and live laboratory of transformation under pressure. We see these different levels of crisis response of different levels of transformation that are happening. If you look at the immediate needs\, the safety needs\, the infrastructure needs\, dealing with the chaos\, that is of course\, also already a level of transformation\, but you have more layers to that. You have the midterm change\, the functional change of systems\, of institutions\, and then also the long-term transformational level\, where it is about yeah\, the systematic\, sustainable\, long term building back better\, if you will. And what the prices in Ukraine really shows us is that there is an opportunity to develop\, especially this long term\, sustainable change. We have seen over the past four years\, an incredible amount of support to…To Ukraine and one of the key elements here is the EU accession process. As you know\, Ukraine has submitted an application for membership in the EU\, which was granted and the process is now ongoing\, but that in itself already creates a huge challenge\, a huge task for policy makers and international partners. And this is something that we are supporting the Ukrainians that we’re working on with our team in Kiev\, supporting the country in moving forward with the proposal that is needed to move to the European family and to be a member of the European Union. And I would like to use this as an example of how the adaptive engagement and how our approaches are a good case for this. A new reality and that this can be also a lesson learned for others when it comes to these transformations in crisis. What we see when it come to the reforms that are needed and that are required in order to move Ukraine closer to the EU\, and a huge amount of policy making demands. We have a long list of requirements that are needed. In essence\, it is about aligning the Ukrainian law with the European standard of European law. And that then translates into more than 500 individual items alone in the top of the rule of law\, judicial reform\, fundamental rights\, anti-corruption and so on. And the stakes are really high about this. And what Ukraine has decided to do is to come up with a roadmap and to break this down into actionable items. But at the same time\, of course\, accomodate the resource strategies that are there inevitably because of the process that the country is in and the dire situation that the company is in. So we have on the one side\, a very formalized set of requirements that is imposed on the country and there is a contextual given. On the other side\, there are all the political states and geopolitical realities that have to be accommodated. We’ve had lots of discussions within the EU over the past month and years\, with supporters of Ukraine moving for as big as possible accession… Particularly also some\, yeah\, accelerated procedure\, something that others have been very much opposed and using the institutional metrics and yeah\, to slow down things for whatever political interest there is to gain. And then\, of course\, we are talking about a very complex and very long term process\, where the rules of the game can also change while we go into that. So\, the core task and the task of the Ukrainian partners really is to find a way to manage this in an active manner\, but at the same time\, accommodating for these challenges. And as I said\, we have created jointly with our Ukraine partners\, this roadmap\, which is really about creating ownership across all the stakeholders that are responsible to really break everything down into additional items and reform packages. And at the same time\, also create the feedback loops that are necessary. Because\, of course\, these kinds of reforms\, we’re talking about systems-level change\, we talking about the change of mindset in institutions\, we’re talking about unlearning a lot of things that have been established for decades\, if you will\, and this doesn’t come across\, and then this doesn t work. So\, I don’t know if you wanted to build a house or a bridge\, it’s really about being adaptive in these circumstances\, and this is why we support that in creating feedback loops and creating a monitoring structure that is very robust and creates tangible outcomes\, honest outcomes\, honest feedbacks that the stakeholders and the decision makers are then being given. And what we get up then is a very complex structure of working groups of specialized\, you get some specialized teams that work on these aspects. So for example\, we have work dealing with specific elements of the judiciary for how cases are being treated. Then we have others that are dealing with specific elements of fundamental rights\, data protection\, the exchange of information internationally and by dividing all of this into these very small and tangible units and have a uniform structure behind it\, we are able to make the problem tangible\, we’re able to make the problem adjustable to a certain extent\, and also tangible in terms of monitoring. Important is this approaching the stakeholders in a comprehensive manner. It’s not just about giving factual input\, it’s not just about providing information and insight\, which is relevant\, but it goes beyond that. It goes also to recall the exchange\, and that is talking to others\, to peers in other circumstances. To learn the language\, to learn what it’s actually about\, what is the goal\, to see it\, to feel it\, and also to build networks beyond the formal processes of the environment and to get new ideas from exchange with academics\, for example\, civil society with the influential decision makers and thought leaders\, so that the reforms can be approached in a very comprehensive manner and seen also as an opportunity for creating this additionality that really people don’t always think about. Do I have to tick this box and how can I kind of fulfill the requirements that I have here on paper but really approach it in a manner that is creative and that also creates additional benefits. We’ll leave it there. I think we will have some Q&A later on for discussion. And back to you\, Salimah. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful\, thank you very much\, Johannes. And now I’m gonna turn it over to Artem to provide his comments. Artem\, welcome. Thank you. \n\n\n\nArtem Shaipov Yeah\, thanks so much. It’s always a pleasure to be back at the Kennedy School\, even if virtually. And many thanks to Salimah and the team of the Building State Capability Program for the invitation and for putting this event together. In my presentation\, I’ll give you a macro picture and then zoom in to the rule of law sector building off what Johannes just mentioned\, and also provide some insights into the efforts to develop a community of practice in Ukraine related to implementing adaptive iterative problem-driven approaches to policy implementation. And I’ll conclude with some lessons learned and recommendations for practitioners. When it comes to the macro picture. And that’s something that Anastasiya highlighted\, and Johannes mentioned in their remarks\, war increases complexity exponentially. And as we know\, policy work\, especially when it comes to reforms\, it’s something that is related to a lot of complexity in the context. And in the context of war especially\, you know\, planning horizons\, shrink and short-term sometimes prevails. However\, in the context of Ukraine\, the EU integration effort provides an institutional development anchor that actually helps Ukraine to better conceptualize and receive some sort of institutional scaffolding for building state capability through a comprehensive reform agenda. And in that sense\, Ukraine is very lucky to have the EU accession perspective as this kind of institutional anchor and scaffolding for the reform effort. When it comes to some insights into the wartime policy reality\, especially when it comes to the early days and months of war\, first thing people think about\, you know\, immediate safety and especially after the full-scale invasion began\, there was a bit of uncertainty to pose it very mildly when it come to the future. And programs need to be developed and policies implemented in this kind of context as well for the country to continue running. When it comes to midterm functionality and the need to restore or rebuild systems\, this is where the first order of change comes into play. And when it comes to the long-term transformation focus\, this is where\, as Johannes put it\, building back better and rebuilding the country and making sure that the second order of change can be achieved. This requires this kind of long-term approach. And going back to the EU accession context\, this is what Ukraine gets in its efforts to join the EU\, this longer-term perspective\, institutional. Scaffolding that I keep talking about. And it’s critical to ensure this transition point from traditional linear reforms to more adaptive\, iterative\, and problem-driven approaches. And in the context of war\, especially traditional linear reforms\, policy approaches\, they fail and they fail very fast. And that’s something that we’ve learned through practice. When it comes to the promised zoom into the rule of law sector\, so building on what Johannes mentioned\, and just to give you a couple of examples of some comprehensive instruments that we have in place for the respective sector-specific reform. For instance\, there is the rule of law roadmap that Johannes mentioned\, plus we also have the comprehensive law enforcement reform strategy and action plan\, anti-corruption strategy and action plan\, and that amounts to hundreds and hundreds of policy implementation measures. And in this context\, it’s critical to build trustful partnerships with Ukrainian institutions. In the case of our program\, we are privileged to have a really fantastic professional connection with the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office\, who is responsible for the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The Minister of Justice of Ukraine who is leading the coordination effort it’s critical to develop this set of partnerships and understanding of what needs to be done and what sequence\, what the institutional arrangements should be put in place in order to enable such a massive reform agenda implementation. And it’s also critical to understand that the York session effort\, it’s a marathon\, you know\, if we can use this term\, it’s definitely not a sprint when it comes to institutional change\, and it requires a lot of policy implementation work. When it comes the need for developing this community of practice\, providing you with some insights into what myself\, in particular\, what I’ve been doing to promote problem-driven iterative approaches to policy implementation building on the online materials of the Building State Capability Program. I’ve been focusing on conveying the concepts\, the basic concepts of building state capability and problem driven iterative adaptation at Ukrainian schools of public administration. That’s something that\, and especially those of you who had the privilege of going through training at the Building State Capability Program at the Kennedy School\, that’s something that we owe to society. We need to spread the word about such approaches and advance the doing development differently course through our work when it comes to our practitioner side of things\, but also sharing the insights and lessons learned with people. And in addition to that\, what I would like to flag\, and that’s something that might encourage other people to do the same in their respective countries. I about a year ago launched a podcast series on policy and action. To bring in policy practitioners\, policy makers\, civil society activists in a dialog about how a real change happens\, you know\, what works\, what doesn’t work\, what are the lessons learned and in the context of Ukraine\, it’s something that provides a selection of case studies when it comes to implementation of numerous reform initiatives ranging from\, say\, medical reform to public administration reform and other aspects of policy implementation work in Ukraine. And in conclusion\, just to give you a couple of lessons learned from my side. And echoing what Johannes mentioned\, crisis indeed creates not only a challenge\, but also creates opportunities\, and it accelerates change. And that’s another reason why traditional approaches\, they don’t work in this kind of context\, when the change has been accelerated due to the demands of war. That kind of massive challenge. We really need to stay problem-focused\, adaptive\, and make sure that we can iterate until we really solve the problem at its root causes. And it’s critical to navigate complexity through specific\, timely set\, adequate structures that could help us limit uncertainty when it comes to institutional engagement and dealing with bureaucracies in respective institutions\, making sure that people working on change are aligned and well resourced and supported. It’s also critical to ensure local ownership. And in the case of Ukraine\, the government of Ukraine who is in the driver’s seat\, and it’s supported by the people of Ukraine and civil society\, businesses\, and international development partners to enable this massive transformation of the country. And of course\, it’s critical to understand that reforms\, they don’t equal strategies and plans or even adopted laws. It’s a process of continuous adaptation and institutional cultural change. And in the case of Ukraine\, the EU provides this institutional scaffolding\, which I mentioned earlier\, for this kind of change. And it’s critical to move from control-focused approaches to facilitated emergence. In the context of change in Ukraine\, it’s visible through analysis of different industries\, for instance\, when the feedback loops in the context of Ukraine are very short\, people can really iterate solutions and adapt to the changing context of the war and institutional transformations. And it’s critical to support coordinated learning systems as opposed to just formal strategies and plans. So this institutional learning is key for success in this fluid political context. And we really need to embrace complexity and uncertainty and keep learning to navigate it and share our learning. And I’m very pleased to have this opportunity to share some insights with you and glimpse into the Ukrainian context. And my final message to you\, if you can please consider visiting Ukraine. To witness how the country at war is changing real-time and very fast. Of course\, there is a risk\, but being a Ukrainian living in Kiev\, I’m telling you\, it’s the risk worth taking. Thank you so much. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful\, thank you very much. I will now just ask you a question and I’d like the three of you to be able to respond to this. All of you have talked about uncertainty\, living with complexity\, et cetera. And I was wondering if each of you could just pick some features of this complexity in your policy context and explain to our listeners how you’re managing it. So some concrete examples from each of your. Anastasiya\, why don’t we start with you? \n\n\n\nAnastasiya Dyakova Yeah\, I think I will start from personal complexity\, right? Because we all live in this context. So sport\, sleep\, when you don’t have a bomb alarm\, really support and meeting with friends and meditation is really my base and don’t have toxic relationship in your team or with friends or with colleagues. But in the organization\, how we work with complexity\, we have additional weekend every month. Friday is our additional weekend. We have mental day off that’s paid. And we have only one day in office. So all the rest of the day team choose whether they want to go to office or they don’t want. So we really try to make our work as flexible as we can because we understand that different people have different contexts as well. We have families where husband is fighting in army and his wife working in our team. We have team members where their friends already were killed in battlefield. Some who have a husband or brother in captivity. So it’s really a different situation. And when you work with team in such a conflict context\, you should as well understand people\, it’s not ordinary people like in 2020 or 2019\, who come to work and they should just do their task. There are a lot of things\, a lot of context that they bring to office. And everyone is really different. So for me\, as a head of the organization\, it’s a big challenge to combine different people\, some of them internally displaced\, some of the refugees would work remotely. So it’s really challenging. But adaptivity to different people in different contexts and their level of resource as well\, because none of them have 100% resource. It’s a really important leadership role and leadership understanding. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful. Thank you\, Johannes. \n\n\n\nJohannes Uhl Yeah\, well\, I think first of all\, the key is to have a second set of microphones and speakers and audio is better now\, sorry for the glitches previously. Joking aside\, I think one important element here is also to look at the resources that you have at hand in terms of the stakeholders and the actors that are involved. And what we do as an institution\, for anything that we do in our global operations\, we don’t conceive necessarily of what we as project management\, but actually the first course that people take when they join us. It’s called creating and maintaining systems of cooperation. And I think this is the key here\, that we think of what we do as not only executing a predefined plan of something that is there\, but think of it as an interaction of stakeholders of actors of people with different interests\, of course\, with different capacities\, with different backgrounds and conceive of the day-to-day work essentially as Venn diagrams to see where is the overlap that I can work with and that is conducive to whatever I have on my desk as task. And that of course then has a lot of underpinning with a very structured approach to that in terms of stakeholder analysis\, in terms of mapping interests and relationships\, in terms of assigning certain goals and certain effects\, certain aims that you want to achieve to certain stakeholder groups and have a well-defined and well-sharpened toolkit at hand and knowing when to use what. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Artem\, go ahead. \n\n\n\nArtem Shaipov Yeah\, and if I may\, yes\, essentially you first of all need to learn how to apply which tools to which context to manage the complexity a bit better because complexity has to do with a lot of uncertainty that I was talking about in my presentation and in the context of war as we discussed\, uncertainty surges. And in our case\, for instance\, through our program work. We have supported\, for instance\, in the context of the rule of law roadmap implementation that includes 500 plus measures. So essentially\, it’s a massive fishbone diagram on paper. And you really need to navigate this complexity of implementation. And in our case\, we have supported the Minister of Justice in setting up and conceptualizing the coordination and monitoring mechanism that is essentially a set of snowflake groups where you have people at the top at the political level coordinating the political aspects of this work\, then technical level comes in with multiple groups focusing on specific aspects of work\, coordinating and communicating needs to international technical assistance programs. And this is our approach to manage the complexity of this task in the rule of law context in Ukraine. But of course\, as Johannes mentioned\, it also requires constant communication and coordination at various levels\, not only kind of formal working groups\, but also informal working contacts\, professional communication throughout this whole process. That is critical to better manage the complexity that we are dealing with. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. I really like the thread from all of what you guys have talked about is the flexibility\, meeting people where they’re at\, whether they’re people on your team or they’re stakeholders\, understanding their interests and just being really flexible and being ready to pivot and change. I’d like to ask you another question and then I’ll open up to any questions that you listeners may have. If listeners\, you have questions\, put them in the Q&A and we’ll get to those. So my second question is\, you know\, there’s been loss in funding from organizations like the USAID. Can you speak to what the consequences have been to that loss of funding and what are some ways forward to be able to make\, to close that gap\, if you will? Thank you. \n\n\n\nAnastasiya Dyakova Maybe I will start\, may I? Yeah\, first of all\, I think it’s a geopolitical field\, right\, and level. And we understand that globally\, in a lot of cases where USA left\, China came. So it’s mean as well changes in superpower role\, and such element as like a soft power shift as well. But moving from like international context to more national context\, For a lot of Ukrainian NGOs\, it was really a nightmare. So some of them just closed. They left people without work for the next day. And when you live in war\, it’s really\, really big challenge. Some of the organizations had to scale down their programs and projects. But it’s not the same situation as in other countries\, because take into account that Ukraine in war\, more than 50% of our budget is spent for defense. So government institutions really rely on us and on civil society sector in supporting different initiatives. For example\, in our organization we provide a huge capacity building support on children online safety and preventing child sexual abuse and exploitation\, we train civil servant from teacher and school psychologist\, fellow enforcement and prosecutors. So\, government really needs this support from civil society sector\, but civil society sector to work need financial support as nearly 100% now come from abroad. So it really shakes the whole system and last winter was a really nightmare for everyone. Thank you and I’m really happy to pass to colleagues. \n\n\n\nJohannes Uhl Yeah\, maybe I can continue here from kind of the other side of the of the value chain\, if you will\, for those who don’t know\, GIZ is essentially the German equivalent of USAID. So of course\, this has this had a huge impact on us as well\, again\, on these three levels. So we had this immediate survival response\, if you will\, because we saw that a lot of our partners that we work with\, especially in civil society\, were not able to act anymore because literally from one day to the other\, they were stripped of a large part of their funding. So that\, of course\, then also led us to reprogram certain things\, the German government to reprogram certain things to account for these gaps and that of course then has created the need to rethink certain elements of what we have been doing and then on the more structural level of course many of our activities and many of our programs have also relied on other elements of the value chain to be covered by the American funding. We see this for example in the Buffalo area that a lot of this structural support infrastructure that was provided in terms of IT equipment and so on\, that was something where the country relied heavily on American support and that means that in a certain way we had to open up and to kind of fulfill these gaps as well and adjust our approaches\, our standards in that regard. And when it comes to the long-term perspective\, of course\, it also has an impact on how we do things on a global scale. Because\, as Anastasiya has already said\, there is now a completely new power balance in this regard. There are new actors coming in with different interests and different approaches and different kind of preconceptions to that kind of work. That we want to create cooperation with and have to create a cooperation with. And then again\, I think if we look at the more narrative element of this\, of course\, the decisions that were taken by the American administration already have an impact on how these policy fields are discussed also in our domestic context in Germany. And so there is much more pressure on us to justify why we are doing what we are doing to justify the the efficacy of that. And it’s also an opportunity here again\, the crisis is an opportunity because it gives us the reason\, occasion to reflect on what we may have thought of as being the ultimate truth\, which of course it never is. There is no such thing and that gives us the opportunity to innovate and to reflect critically on what were doing as well. \n\n\n\nArtem Shaipov If I may come in as well with my reflections. A big part of the problem with the USAID withdrawal had to do not only with the funding\, but also with the timing. It came unexpectedly and without any transition period and of course it left a huge void in in the whole sector\, or set of sectors rather\, that benefited from USAID support\, and a silver lining to this all is that\, in particular\, again\, thanks to Ukraine’s path towards the European Union\, countries in the EU and other European countries that are outside of the EU really stepped up to provide Ukraine with It’s vital\, and this is not a figure of speech\, truly vital support in the context of war. And some countries really prioritized the support for Ukraine. And of course\, in the global context of aid\, this is something that Ukraine has been criticized for when you know people say You know\, some other countries are lacking funding\, and Ukraine has been prioritized. Of course\, you know\, being Ukrainian\, I am biased in this kind of situation\, but the main point here is that for the country at such a massive war\, full-scale modern warfare\, I believe it’s justified. And this kind of support is very critical to have\, and it’s important that European countries stepped up to fill in the void left by the USAID withdrawal. And from what I see\, this effort to fill the void is still ongoing. So the amount of funding that Ukraine was denied hasn’t still been matched when it comes to international development support\, and it’s still a work in progress\, of course\, for the country of war and the country that needs to be rebuilt from scratch sometimes. When I said this\, I was thinking about my home city\, Bakhmut\, which has been ruined\, in shatters\, it has to be rebuilt from scratch. We require a lot of support to make sure that the country can thrive one day in the future. Thank you. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful\, thank you. We’ll take two questions. I will ask the first one and then the second one. The first question is really about both building back better and the longevity income. And the question is\, what would be a genuinely transformative narrative? And for the longevity economy\, how would it be genuinely transformative? For example\, rethinking all system levels\, dimensions from values\, norms\, power structures\, to infrastructure\, and tackling root causes. Maybe I’ll ask both questions and then you can choose to answer these questions. We have a second question on\, Johannes talked about the fact that Ukraine will also need to de-learn a lot of successful institutional change. Can you give an example? Those are the two questions. Thank you. \n\n\n\nAnastasiya Dyakova I can start about longevity\, maybe. I shared the name of the book\, but I’m not sure if everybody were able to see it. The Longevity Imperative: How to Build a Healthier and More Productive Society to Support Our Longer Life by Andrew G. Scott. I really recommend this book\, so it’s more about how the system should be changed. But there are a lot of different levels. So it’s not only about older people. It’s more about how we get older. It’s about saving\, about building relationship\, preventive health care\, right\, and testing. So the whole system should be changed because we cannot first of all afford pension because people now live 20 years more in comparison for how many years this financial system were expected. But moreover\, we have less people at the labor market. So we need more people to work. And the last point is that going to pension increase dimension risks are really significant. So it’s even better for people to work. So I can discuss the longevity for hours. So I just will stop here at these ideas and recommend you the book because I’m really crazy passionate about the topic of longevity economy and I really believe that it’s one of the silver bullets for the Ukrainian economy. \n\n\n\nArtem Shaipov If I may step in responding the building back better question\, when the full-scale invasion broke out in Ukraine\, there were a lot of discussions to kind of conceptualize the reconstruction effort. Essentially\, if not from day one\, you know\, from day 30th\, that’s for sure. And I was part of many of those. And one of the key narratives that emerged is that indeed\, we don’t need to just rebuild what was there in the first place. We need to kind of just re-create\, rethink how our country should look like and use this opportunity for renovation as an opportunity to transform the country for something substantially better. Not just rebuild the buildings back or the industries that were there before the full scale invasion. And that’s something that people keep thinking about in the context of Ukraine. And the country continues to kind of reinvent itself. And when it comes to our position\, as you could probably already have observed\, I have observed the positioning of Ukraine in the international arena has been changing throughout this full-scale war\, and the country continues to reinvent itself. When it comes to our positioning\, our domestic efforts to rebuild\, to reconstruct\, even under the conditions of war. Because when we have occupied territories\, of course\, we need to consider the additional challenges with the occupied territories. But when we’re talking about the Ukrainian government-controlled areas\, and that’s why invited people to come and see first-hand\, because new industries are emerging. Not only in defense tech\, but also in other things that Ukraine is innovating in and reinventing itself. So that’s something that has been constantly on everyone’s radar in Ukraine. But when it comes to the international development context and what would be the better motto for international development\, something instead of building back better\, we need to think about that. And I would welcome your suggestions\, colleagues. \n\n\n\nJohannes Uhl And let me just give a quick reply to Barbara’s question regarding what to unlearn. I think there are many examples for this. Just one thing that comes to the top of my head right now is this concept of multi-level governance\, which becomes especially relevant now in the EU accession process\, but it has already been before. I mean\, we have worked for almost decades already\, on the decentralization reform in Ukraine\, so giving more power from the central government levels to municipalities to local level\, and follow the principles of subsidiarity there. And of course the same will be mirrored now as Ukraine joins the EU and as certain competencies will be transferred to the supranational level in this regard. And I think this is something that not only Ukraine for that matter\, there’s a lot of other examples for this centralized way of thinking that is something that has to be unlearned to a certain extent. And I think then there are many other examples\, but this could be then continued for hours. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful. I’ll do one final question. Are there concrete plans to use PDIA or adaptive approaches in GIZ’s work in the Ukraine? \n\n\n\nJohannes Uhl Well\, you could say that there are. Not under that name. We don’t claim that copyright here\, but we have\, as I mentioned\, already quite a comprehensive\, very well-developed system. How we manage projects\, it’s called Capacity Works which is something that GIZ has developed with experts many years ago\, and it’s very well established\, and this is something that we adapt to the context that provides already some adaptability by focusing on the cooperation\, by focusing on the stakeholders and in designing our processes in innovating internally\, we are always adapting in this regard as well and coming up with new ways of doing things\, both when it comes to our core products\, which are these support activities that we provide to our partners\, but also our internal mechanisms\, our internal administration. \n\n\n\nArtem Shaipov And if I may add to Johannes’ response\, as long as there are people in GIZ who are trained and understand problem driven iterative approaches\, I would say\, and I’m a recent person at GIZ. I joined the company about 11 months ago. But I see a lot of openness to problem driven iterative adaptive approaches\, that’s how the company operates\, that’s our development approach. And even if when it comes to corporate terminology\, it’s not called PDIA\, but in its essence\, it’s very similar and I’m very happy that I have gone through the Building State Capability program to be able to implement my knowledge and apply my skills. In the international development context in Ukraine at GIZ. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji Doesn’t matter what you call it\, it matters that you do it\, right? And I think what you’ve all shared is with uncertain\, we already live in an uncertain world. And I that complexity is continually expanding day by day. You have the additional context of war and flexibility\, being able to pivot\, to learn quickly\, to\, I like the build back better\, new things\, right\, to be more innovative. To meet the moment is really very exciting. I’d like to thank you listeners for joining us this morning and to our presenters\, Anastasiya\, Johannes\, and Artem for giving us a real good understanding of what’s going on and some ideas of how they’re managing policymaking in the Ukraine. Thank you very much. We really appreciate your time. Thank you.
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/crisis-to-transformation-policy-lessons-from-ukraine/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260206T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260206T235900
DTSTAMP:20260910T222605Z
CREATED:20260129T204643Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260910T222605Z
UID:29613-1770336000-1770422340@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:From Ideas to Impact: The Practice of Policy Implementation
DESCRIPTION:Online \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\, Faculty Director of Building State Capability and Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development at HKS \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Executive Director of Building State Capability \n\n\n\nAbout the Talk\n\n\n\nThere is no shortage of ideas for tackling development challenges\, yet far too many fail where it matters most: in implementation. Policies often falter not because they lack ambition\, but because they overlook local context\, underestimate political realities\, or fail to adapt as capabilities on the ground evolve. This webinar\, led by Matt Andrews and Salimah Samji\, explores policy work as an iterative process of learning\, adaptation\, and coalition-building\, advancing the broader argument that successful public policy implementation is not a one-off achievement\, but a dynamic\, ongoing process. \n\n\n\nThis webinar was hosted by HKS Executive Education and includes topics covered in the executive program Implementing Public Policy. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nJessie DeLano Hello\, and welcome to today’s Harvard Kennedy School Executive Education faculty webinar\, From Ideas to Impact: The Practice of Policy Implementation with Professor Matt Andrews and Salimah Samji. I’m Jessie DeLano\, Program Director at HKS Executive Education. And it’s wonderful to have so many of you joining us from all around the world. As many of know\, Harvard Kennedy School Executive Education serves as a platform for current and aspiring leaders to deepen their skills\, broaden their perspectives\, and tackle some of the most pressing challenges of our time. By bringing together accomplished practitioners and our world-class faculty\, we aim to foster the exchange of knowledge and ideas to inspire impactful leadership across the globe. Our speakers today are Matt Andrews and Salimah Samji. Matt is the co-founder and faculty director of Building State Capability and the Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development at Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He has worked in over 50 countries across the globe as a civil servant\, international development expert\, researcher\, teacher\, advisor\, and coach. Salimah is the co-founder and executive director of Building State Capability and an instructor at Harvard Kennedy School. She has more than 20 years of experience working in international development on the delivery of public services\, implementation\, transparency and accountability\, strategic planning\, monitoring\, evaluation\, and learning. Together\, they lead the HKS Executive Education program\, implementing public policy as a blended on-campus and online program that spans this coming May through September. Before we begin\, I want to remind everyone that this session is being recorded and will be sent out in our follow-up email to all of you. You can submit questions during the webinar through the Q&A function\, and we’ll address as many as we can after the presentation. Thank you all for joining us. And with that\, I’ll pass it over to Matt and Salimah. Welcome everyone. \n\n\nMatt Andrews Thank you\, everybody. It’s really great to be with everybody\, and thank you for joining. And it’s an amazing thing to see people from all over the world\, from many\, many countries\, some of whom I have been lucky enough to see and some I would hope to visit in the future. So we are always just so impressed\, so amazed\, so happy to see people who are interested in this concept of getting things done\, implementing policy work. Many times we see people with great ideas all over the world to solve problems that need to be solved. Finding that those ideas don’t necessarily translate into action\, they don’t necessary translate into results. We at the Building State Capability Program and with colleagues at the Harvard Kennedy School have been working on this now for the last two decades to try and understand what it gets in the way of implementation of success and of impact when we are doing policy work. Why do we seem to have so many great ideas and yet those ideas don’t translate into the action that we want them to? We have been experimenting for a long time. Our experimentation usually involves kind of a research\, which we call action research\, where we embed ourselves or our research teams with groups of policy workers throughout the world to see how work is really done and where work really runs into difficulty. Where we’re not trying to be theoretical only\, we’re trying to do applied learning and applied theory where we can really get an experience of what the real process of getting things done looks like to try and understand where that process runs into difficulty and then to address it. It’s been really interesting to be in this journey and as Jessie said\, I personally have worked in over 50 countries\, and most of the work has been embedded in teams trying to do things. And we’ve learned an incredible amount about what it takes to go from ideas to activity and to impact. I’m going to tell a few stories about this today to offer a simple message about how we understand the challenge of implementation and the challenge of doing policy work. We understand this as a very simple model that we can take all across the world in all sorts of sectors. We work in the US\, we work in Latin America\, we work in the Pacific\, we work in Africa a lot\, we work in Europe. We work in rich countries\, we work in not so rich countries. We work small places and big places. And we found that our understanding has developed into a kind of a stable equilibrium as to how things work. So let me give you a simple understanding of things is I think that a lot of people emphasize what they’re doing more in policy work than anything else. And the time that we spend doing policy work and trying to solve problems is often focused very much on identifying that what\, identifying the idea\, identifying the thing that we think will change the world\, the thing we think is gonna be the response. Whether it’s creating a new law or whether it is creating a new incentive mechanism or a new training mechanism\, or maybe a new governance regime\, or maybe it’s a new subsidy program. We spend a lot of time hiring firms\, consultants\, talking in conferences to identify what we want to do\, what we think needs to be done. In the last 20 years a lot of people have started to realize that you know that’s only part of the story and we need to also be answering the question how are we going to do it. So part of this challenge is how do you move from the what to the how? And when you get to the how\, you say\, well\, what are the processes that we put in place? What are the mechanisms? What are the tools? What are the strategies? What are tactics? And those are really important questions about how that I would say we found people spend a lot less attention on. Now\, it’s really important because when you’re trying to implement the what\, what you’re going to find is that there’s a lot of challenges\, there’s a lot of difficulties. And the how that you choose to walk through is gonna be very important to determine whether you can actually address those challenges as you move along. What we find is in many places\, the how\, that is put in place\, is fairly rigid. We often call it the plan and control mechanism. And it’s like… Writes a very long proposal that gets into your budget\, or that gets approved as a project\, and that looks very smart\, that is very detailed\, that has a very detailed theory of change with a lot of assumptions. Then you lock that in through your budget and it’s fairly rigid\, fairly difficult to change. And then 10 days in\, 11 days in the political support you thought that you had evaporates. Maybe the money that you thought that you had turns out it’s going to take three months to get to you rather than three weeks. Maybe you find that the procurement process that you thought that was going to work in two or three weeks works in six or seven months. Maybe you found that the community members who had said\, gee\, we really want that now say\, hey\, but we didn’t want that. We want something else. And you run into all of these difficulties\, but you’re too rigid and your plan is too hard to change. And so you actually can’t adjust and you can’t adapt. And so what we find is that one of the challenges is when we get so tight on the what and we have a how that doesn’t let us move enough\, we find that we actually end up producing things and doing things that can’t actually deliver even on the ideas that we had. And this is one of the major observations that we have across the world is that many of the ideas we have don’t get there because the process doesn’t allow us to deal with the challenges that we run into along the way. It’s really interesting because oftentimes when people are doing the plans\, they’re trying to in the plans deal with the risk of any of these challenges. And they say\, well\, what we’re going to do is we’re gonna make sure that none of that stuff happens to us. Well\, here’s the tough thing is that when we look at policy work across the world\, whether it’s done through a project in a developing country\, or whether it’s down through a budget\, or however it’s done we find that the one thing that is true is that you will run into difficulties\, you will run into challenges. And so you need a how. You need a process that gets you working through that. Now\, over the years at the Kennedy School and at Building State Capability\, we’ve developed a mechanism called Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation\, PDIA for short. And all this is a process that allows you more leeway to learn and to adapt as you move through the policy work. Adapt on the idea that you have\, adapt on the process that you put in place\, so that you are going to be more able to respond to the challenges that you face. We find it’s a very\, very flexible model. It’s a model that works across the world. And one of the things that you’re going to learn in IPP is how to work in this model\, how to work in this process. It is an answer to the question of how do I do this that we think travels well across the world\, that gives people the flexibility as well as the focus to get things done. So one of the challenges is how do we think beyond what am I doing to how am I doing it? That isn’t quite enough and one of those lessons we learned with PDIA was taking a new process to a place is only half of the battle because the process has to be inhabited by people. And actually implementation is all about people. Delivery is all that people. Ideation\, coming up with the what\, coming up what we want to do\, that’s really about ideas. And that sometimes can be about data and can sometimes be about analysis. And yes\, there are people involved\, but usually it’s kind of small numbers of people. When you get to implementation\, you’re talking about lots of people And you’re talking about people working together\, sometimes in a coordinated way\, sometimes in an even thicker collaborative way\, where coordination is usually we know what we’re doing and we’re just making sure everyone does their job. Collaboration means we’re learning as we go and we need to be able to move and adapt and we able to engage with each other in a much more fluid way. So we’ve actually found even in the PDIA process\, which is very much designed to be flexible\, We found that… If you don’t pay attention to who you’re working with\, you get lost. So it’s not just about what\, not just about how\, it’s very much about who. And we speak about the who in many ways. We say that when we work with folks\, the first who we work is whoever comes to our courses. Wherever you are sitting in your system\, some people are sitting at the top of the system and they’re the minister\, some people in the middle of the the system and they are mid to senior bureaucrats and some people are new in the system. And\, you know\, we have people come in\, they’re teachers\, they’re frontline service providers. Or they\, you now\, a few years ago\, we had somebody who was a fire chief in a local fire department out in the West Coast of the US. We have people who are working at the grassroots and who are engaged in NGOs or engaged even sometimes in private organizations and trying to do public policy work with people on the ground. Whoever you are\, first thing we work with is those folks\, right? You bring yourself to your policy work and we need to understand where you’re sitting\, what can you do? How do you authorize yourself? How do your strengthen yourself? How do learn how to manage your time better? How do how to learn how manage yourself better? How do to learn to manage confidence better? How do manage to balance the travails and the difficulties of work with your own personal health? And that’s gonna be something that we focus on a lot in the IPP\, because it’s important to people don’t focus on enough. The second who is\, well\, who’s your authorizer? Everybody’s authorized by somebody\, right? And what we want to do is we want to make sure that everyone understands who their authorizer is\, what space that person provides for them to work\, whether you are being authorized by a principal or by a teacher and your space is really small and it’s just a classroom and I’m going to tell a story about this in a second or whether you are working at the top of government and you’re authorized by the prime minister and I’ll tell another story about that. You need to understand what is my space for authorization and then you need to learn how do I engage with my authorizers and how do i engage with authorizes in ways that build and grow that space for authorization. Because when you go from ideas\, oftentimes\, the space you need to generate an idea is usually quite small. It’s usually a technocratic space\, probably tied a little bit to a high level political space. But then we take that into the real world and we say\, okay\, now we want that idea to grow. And now we start to say\, hey\, we need to get more people involved in implementing. And they’re only gonna implement that if they buy into the idea\, if they think it’s a good idea\, if they think that they actually can pull it off. Now we have to start engaging with those folks because one of the things that we learn is there’s a lot of incentive mechanisms that don’t necessarily run in the positive direction of change\, for instance. So we need to be working with those and working out how do we grow that\, and we need to be building our space for authorization. So\, we think about ourselves\, we thinking about our authorizers\, and then we think\, you know\, about the work of these and the people we have to work with\, the people that we have learn from\, the citizens and the firms who are going to use or not use the ideas and the products and the policies that come out of our work. And so we go from saying\, okay\, let’s think about ourselves. Let’s create a team that we can work with. Let’s engage with our authorizers. And then let’s build a big network of folks that we learn from\, that we test with\, that we experiment with\, that can walk with\, that we generate more resources from\, that we build resilience through. And this is essentially what the IPP program is about. It’s about saying\, come here with an idea\, a what\, and then let’s think about the process\, a how\, and then let’s work together on the people\, the who. And it’s one of the reasons why in the course\, and Salimah will share this more as we move on\, in the course we don’t just wanna have people come for a week because we want you to learn ideas and learn some of the tools\, but we want to take them home and try them. Because this work and learning is not something that happens in a classroom\, it happens in the real world. So\, it’s why our course is a course that is hybrid\, where some of it is here and some of is you doing things at home. It’s why it goes over long periods of time because we wanna be walking with you while you try things so that you can ask questions and so that can turn any of the ideas about how you engage or who you engage with into fitted ideas to your context and to you and to your work. So what I wanna do is just share a few ideas and a few stories\, and I’m going to ask as we go through that\, Salimah just in the chat put some links to these stories into the chat. We like very much for everyone we work with to tell their own story\, so we’re not telling it for you. Sometimes we do this through podcasts and interviews\, and the first interview is going to be with a really\, really great friend of our program called Christy who is from Belize. And you’ll see an interview with her in the chat. And Christy essentially came onto our radar a number of years ago when she and some colleagues asked for some help with some ideas that they have. And Christy was focused on a really big and important what in Belize\, which is a fairly small country in Central America. And that what was about inclusive education\, where there were a lot of folks who had learning disabilities\, maybe physical disabilities\, who didn’t have easy access into the education system. And Christy had been given a role of trying to deal with that\, trying to make the system more inclusive. The first conversation I had with Christy was saying\, you know\, she said\, we need a new law. We need to get a law that requires that schools and teachers make their classrooms and the schools more inclusive\, more accessible for folks who at the moment can’t get into the school system. And it was a very interesting conversation that the first conversation I had where I said to\, okay\, you know\, are you\, are you the minister of justice? Can you pass a law? And the answer was no. And so part of this was kind of saying\, okay who are you? You aren’t somebody who’s going to be able to act immediately on that what. That is a what that you’re not authorized on. So let’s start somewhere differently. Let’s say\, what’s the problem? And let’s say who am I? Or who are you and how can you create some space to pursue that problem? So Christy then said\, Okay\, well\, you know\, let me bring some friends. And this is one of the things that we do is we work with teams. And she had one friend who was a principal in a school. She had a couple of people who were working with us who were worked for Christy at the time and who were like counselors to schools who could help with kids who were struggling. And we had a team of I think maybe five or six people at the beginning and they said okay we have access to one school because we have a principal who will open that school and we can try some new things. We have a teacher there who’s willing to try something new and they identified that instead of starting with the law they would start with trying to see in the school who would be interested in doing some work on inclusive training. And they did this partly because we said what’s the problem and the problem isn’t just that you lack a law. They said well the problem is that teachers don’t know how to do this. Teachers don’t necessarily understand who has special needs. Teachers don’t understand that there are things that they can do\, that there’s ways that they could be working with those folks. School principles are not open. There’s a stigma around this and they started to kind to break up the problem and see oh\, This isn’t going to be solved by just having a law\, we need a lot of other things going on. And so Christy came in and she said\, okay\, um\, you know\, this is the space that we can play in. It’s not that big\, but we’re going to start in this one school. And so they created a thing called the inclusive corner in the school where they started to say\, Hey\, here’s some of the signs of kids who might have some issues\, kids who not need some help. Does any of your kids in the class have these signs and teachers would go and they would have a look with these things. And then they’d say\, you know\, if you’re concerned\, if a kid is tilting his head\, or if the kid is struggling to hear\, if the kid is acting out\, why don’t you invite us and we can kind of come and observe that child. And we can see if we can be helpful\, because there’s there are things to be done. And they made it very open\, because this is about people and we don’t want to force the process we want to invite people. And\, and some teachers\, a teacher came and said\, Yeah\, I have a kid who’s struggling. And Christy and a couple of their friends went and observed in the classroom\, and they recognized that what looked like a kid who was misbehaving was a kid who couldn’t hear properly. And so they started to engage with that\, and they found a pragmatic solution. And in many cases\, we’re looking for a pragmatic solution\, a solution that we can actually act on. Because there’s many times that we go back and we find a solution that we don’t have the money for\, we don’t have the people for\, we don’t have the training for\, and it sits on the shelf because we can’t do it. In this one\, we said\, okay\, instead of saying\, we’re gonna get some technological solution that probably would be much better\, but we can access\, we’re just going to make sure this boy is at the front of the class\, that we can speak to him\, that we can make sure that he hears. And we make sure\, that\, you know\, if he’s not hearing that we explain things to him more than once\, twice. And pragmatic ways empower people because people start to say\, I don’t need a fancy what I can get a what I could get an idea that is mine\, that is our context that we could do. So they started to do this. And\, one teacher asked\, then two teachers asked\, within a couple of months\, they had engaged in 50 classrooms. And all of those teachers were saying\, hey\, you know\, we do have kids who need help and we’re just impressed that we actually can find ways to help. And because of that\, they start to say\, we’re up for this\, we’re up for this challenge. Because sometimes people don’t want to jump into your idea because it’s beyond them\, because they feel it’s going to disempower them\, it’s gonna reveal what they can’t do rather than empower them with what they can. And so after a while they started then creating an online inclusive corner where any teacher in the country who needed help could sign up and say\, hey\, I have this kid in my class and could someone come and help me? And this started to grow. And as it started to grow more principals started to say\, would you come into our school? So you’re not just in one school or in one classroom\, now you’re in a district. And now you’re kind of growing. And more people are saying this is a real thing for us. After a while\, Christy and her team started to grow as well. And they did the first nation-wide analysis of how many people in the country\, how many children in the county seem to be struggling. Now\, this again is not bringing a first world solution to this. This is creating an idea that’s local. They didn’t have a way in which they could actually diagnose kids properly\, because they didn’t have enough psychologists for that work. What they could do\, however\, is they could go to teachers and say\, tell us when you have concerns about this. And they managed to identify\, we think we have this number of kids who might need this kind of help. And they didn’t label kids. They just said\, we need this help. Now\, what this allowed them to do is it allowed me to go to the Ministry of Finance and say here’s the amount of money we need. Here’s some help we need. And within two years\, Christy and her team had developed a network of teachers and network of principals\, a financial allocation\, and most importantly\, they had a law that got passed that said schools need to be more inclusive. So this is a way in which you say\, hey\, you can start with an idea\, but what we need to do is we need to find a way which we can start bringing that idea into the world\, and sometimes we make it smaller\, we make more practical\, and then we need to mobilize the who. We need to build our authorizing environment\, we need build our own confidence\, we need our network of folks. And we don’t necessarily begin at the end\, but we work our way towards a solution that works. This is how you make solutions happen and solutions that are real in the world. So the second example is gonna be from Papua New Guinea. And I’m not gonna go into a lot of detail with it\, but I think Salimah will put the link to some of the work that we’ve done there. And I just want to raise the example because we’ve been working for a number of years with an NGO that is working on specifically youth-related issues. And it’s called The Voice Inc. And I use the example because we don’t only work with governments\, we don’t only work teachers\, we work with people in the private sector\, we work people who are in the nonprofit sector as well. And in this case\, we had some folks who engaged with us from 2016 in some of the work that we were doing and said\, can you help us? Help us to build connections into our system so that we can help to generate ideas that are useful in governments\, in communities that people actually don’t just talk about\, that people act on and people use. And one of the things that has been wonderful working with the folks in PNG is that this NGO started to invite people from the government\, to invite people from civil society\, and invite people just from communities to be part of teams to address problems that they had. So instead of being an NGO that was writing papers on what the country should do and what the government should do to solve problems\, they said\, let us be the ones who create a process and who invite people into the process so that we can build relationships and we can help people develop trust and we’ll help people together get the right answers to the problems that they have. And again\, this process has involved sometimes in becoming smaller in terms of looking at the problems and growing together. And they’ve done this in incredible ways in areas related to youth policy\, in areas\, related to violence against women. And it’s been a very\, very exciting journey to be with them. And I think you’ll see some of the blogs from them. The last group I wanted to speak about was one where we weren’t starting from the bottom\, we weren’t starting from middle\, we were starting from top. We worked in Albania\, this is now more than a decade ago\, and we had the prime minister invited us in and said\, you know\, we’re trying to grow a sector\, which is our clothing sector\, but it’s in decline and it’s having a really tough time. And we don’t really know how to address this because we’re not fully understanding why this sector is in decline. Is a very important sector for them at higher\, it employed a lot of people\, it\, it got them a lot of foreign exchange. So this was a really big problem. Now\, in this one\, the first conversation is with the Prime Minister. So the level of authorization is big\, right? You can\, you can work\, you can do a lot things\, people would say\, Oh\, this is great. You can run with big ideas from the beginning. But actually\, when we got the team together\, we couldn’t run with big ideas from the beginning\, because they didn’t know what to do. And the big ideas were ideas that were coming from the outside that they had actually already tried and hadn’t worked. So even in this case\, you had a lot of authorization\, but you didn’t have a lot know-how. And so they needed to learn. So we got a team and the team started to engage with firms. And this is again\, remember\, it’s about the who. So the team\, we said to them\, hey\, let’s start to build your network. Because when you start to engage\, with people\, you start learn. And when you start to learn\, you start to develop new ideas. And so what you have is your idea starts to change and to become more focused with your community. When you start to talk to people\, you also start to build relationships. And now you create places in which you can locate those ideas when they are good ideas and you can try them and you could experiment with them. And so the team started to learn and they started to engage with firms and they start to built trust with firms. And when they got an idea and they said\, Hey\, we think that this might be helpful. Could you try this? Could you experiment with this for us? So you’re taking the idea and in real time\, because you have that answer to the who and because your process is experimental and you can learn\, you could try things and you could learn really rapidly. So they started off and they\, at the beginning\, identified between 30 and 50 problems that they had to address. And you think\, wow\, that sounds huge. They’re never gonna solve this problem. Well\, as they started to work with firms and they started to try new ideas\, small ideas\, ideas that were accessible\, ideas that didn’t require a new budget item\, they didn’t required a big political conversation\, the firms started to build relationships and trust with them. And the firms started to say\, hey\, we have a partner here. And what you started to realize that in public policy\, one of the problems that we have oftentimes is not the lack of ideas\, it’s lack of relationships. It’s that the citizens haven’t really seen us working with them and they don’t feel that whether we in the private sector or whether we in the public sector or the nonprofit sector\, they don’t necessarily feel that we are together and they don’t therefore give us their time\, give us the effort\, give us their space in which to work. So as they started to build these relationships\, they said\, okay\, we’ll try your idea. We’ll give it a go. And they started trying the ideas out. As this happened\, they started learning more ideas. And within seven months you started to see that the sector started to recover that all of the issues whether you counted them as 30 to 50 and why there’s a little difference in my head is that it depended how you how you package them together they solved all of the problems the sector starting to grow the sector grew for the next six or seven years all the way up until they hit COVID you know for the clothing sector across the world COVID was a very big disruption. But it grew while other countries around were seeing that their clothing sectors were in decline. And people said\, oh gee\, wow\, they must have had great ideas. And I say\, no\, they started with the who\, with a good how\, and they generate out ideas that fit. And this is the story. No matter what you’re doing\, whether it’s in the education sector in Belize whether it’s  working on youth issues or issues to do with violence against women in Papua New Guinea\, whether it’s issues to with economic growth in Albania\, whatever it is\, you need to have a process\, a how\, and you need a way of mobilizing people\, the who\, that allows ideas to emerge and to find places where they can grow and where they make a difference. This is what we work on at IPP. We spend a lot of time with people\, we spend a lot of time with process. You come with your ideas\, and we grow the ideas\, and we ship the ideas. And we sometimes make the ideas smaller so that we can allow them to really make a difference. So thank you for your time. We like telling stories. We believe we learn through stories. And we believe that stories can also be inspirational. But now I’m gonna hand over to Salimah to tell you a little bit about the area we work\, who we work with. And what some of the substance of the IPP course actually is. Thank you so much\, Salimah. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you\, Matt. Welcome\, everyone. We’re really excited to have you here today with us. And I wanna just pick up from where Matt left off. He gave you three stories\, Belize\, Papua New Guinea\, and Albania. And these are three examples of work that we’ve been doing. To give you a sense\, since our founding in 2012\, we have actually worked with over 4\,800 practitioners in 157 countries. So those are three example you’ve heard\, but we have a lot more. In 2019\, based on the work that we were doing in Albania\, Sri Lanka\, and other places\, we thought\, how can we bring this work back to Harvard and teach it in executive education so that we can bring it to more people? And we created our program\, which I’m gonna talk a little bit about\, which is called Implementing Public Policy. I’m going to share my screen. So Implementing Public Policy\, we first started in 2019. And the idea was\, as you’ve heard Matt say\, these things\, there’s three steps\, right? There’s the what\, and the what can be an idea. The what can a problem. There is a how\, we need a process. And then there’s a who. There is people that we need to mobilize\, whether that’s a team\, whether that your authorizers. Whether it’s mobilizing even more people in your environment to be able to get things done. And so the reason of trying to link all of these things together\, we thought it can’t be a one-week program. Come to Harvard for one week\, and then all of a sudden\, you will be able do these things. In our own experience\, we saw that that is not how it happens. You need to be to work on this in real time\, in your context. So that you run into these challenges and we can work through them together. So in IPP\, there’s four phases and I’m gonna walk you through each of the phases and explain to you what we do in this program. But before that\, when you apply\, you need a problem because there needs to be a what. So everyone who applies to the program brings their own challenge. And as Matt had already said\, there is a variety of problems that we have worked on. We like to say that we’re problem agnostic. PDIA\, we’ve used PDIA on all sorts of problems and people have used it in their churches\, in their marriages. If there’s a problem\, then there is an opportunity to use it. So we are problem agnostic. And I just wanted to share with you some examples. And these are real problems that people\, participants in our program have actually worked on. And you can see there are countries\, there are cities. We’ve got Rhode Island in the U.S. They’re across\, and I’ll show you a map at the end to kind of show you where our alums are. But this is just to show you the types of problems people bring in\, whether it’s mental health in Kenya or it’s low student participation in STEM careers in the Dominican Republic\, urban innovation in Amsterdam. Whether it’s EU\, the separation that people make often of developed developing is something we don’t find in our work. All governments have problems\, whether it’s the US\, whether it’s\, the EU\, whether it’s Papua New Guinea. The nature might be different\, but everyone has these challenges. And so we have people from all over the world who come to our program. Okay\, so the program starts with three weeks online. So you start with a problem that you’re gonna work on in this five month period. And in those three weeks\, what we do is we first start to dissect what is the problem\, right? What is the nature of the problem? Is it a simple problem? Is it a complicated problem or is it a complex problem? Because oftentimes what we end up doing is we use plan and control or a very rigid plan-based approach to a complex problem\, which is a real mismatch of your management method with the problem that you have. So we spend the first three weeks identifying how many unknowns do we have? What do we need to learn? What do know? Mapping out our problem to be able to really determine is it complicated? Is it complex? What management method are we currently using for this problem? And then the second phase\, everyone comes on campus for one week. And in that\, it’s really a pressure cooker environment. There’s not a lot of time\, there’s a lot time for fun too\, but there’s lot of work that happens in that one week on campus. And this is where we really go in to the how. So it is full on process\, but it is\, we generally tend to use a very experiential nature. You can also see you bring your problem and we will kind of show you the processes. So in that week\, we allow you to try PDIA and we walk you through each of the steps you share with your peers. You talk about it and you kind of learn how do I do a fishbone diagram? How do I use the AAA change space analysis? For those of you who know PDIA\, you know what these terms mean. And in that one week\, you learn all of the how skills. You also learn a lot about leadership. Leadership is extremely important. And while a lot of participants\, regardless of where they are in their environment\, they are leaders and everyone is an agent in and of themselves. And sometimes they don’t see themselves in that light. So we do a lot of work with them to see how there is this thing called multi-agent leadership. And there are leaders across the spectrum. It’s not just a director or president or prime minister that’s a leader. There’s multiple leaders across the board and you are one too. So those are the kinds of work that we do. But we also know that in the world of complex problem solving\, you can’t solve the problem alone. So while we might train these individuals in the classroom. The key thing when they go back home\, you see there’s 14 weeks of action learning\, once they leave campus\, people are very excited to come to campus and they’re like\, oh\, this is great. They’ve got their photo ops\, but we tell them the real work begins when you go home because you have changed\, but your context has not changed. How are you going to do the who\, right? It’s not just you\, you need to mobilize the team. So we help them with teaming. There is an art to teaming\, So we help teach. How do you team? We help them with authorization. How do you delegate up and down? How do you build trust? It is all this who people skills that are really\, really foundational. We also spend that time talking about burnout\, because self-care is extremely important. All these people working\, whether it’s from an NGO\, or the private sector\, or government on public problems. Burnout is real. How do you avoid that? So we spend time talking about all of these and the participants come to the program in that action learning period are doing things. They’re taking steps. They’re talking to people. They’re uncovering things that they didn’t understand. Picking up on the Papua New Guinea example that Matt started with\, one of the teams that found out that\, actually there’s a lot of\, they were working on gender-based violence. They found out that there’s a lot of NGOs doing that. Yeah\, but they’re not talking to each other. So by talking to others\, engaging with others\, you start to understand the lay of the land and ideas of what you can do. We don’t like the word solution. It means that there’s\, it sounds like there is one and oftentimes in the world of complex problem solving\, there isn’t one solution. There is a variety of them and they iterate. So in this phase\, they’re learning about people\, they’re learning about relationships\, and they’re learning about iteration\, taking action\, learning from the action so that it’s not coming up with this grand plan of six months where we’re going to do this in six months and then we’re gonna check in. It’s we’re gonna do things every week or every two weeks. Stop\, reflect\, and learn. What did we do? What did we learn? What are we struggling with and what’s next? That’s the PDIA iteration check-in tool. And that allows this continuous level of learning. So you move from this idea of you say something you’re going to do in six months\, it doesn’t happen. That looks a lot like failure to we’re taking these shorter sprints of one week\, two weeks. We find out we didn’t have the data. We found out this doesn’t exist. So what are you going to about it? Okay. We’ll collect the data\, we’ll go find it. We will do something. And you are constantly taking action and making progress. So in six months\, you might actually achieve what it is that you want it to do. But you didn’t know at the beginning of the process how this works. That’s the third phase of the program. And then upon the end of the program\, when everyone gets their certificates\, everyone joins our community of practice. Now this is something that is extremely special for us because the people who come to this program really care about public problems. And our idea about creating a community of practice is\, and we now have it for not just IPP\, we have a community of practice of everybody that we have trained in any of our PDIA programs and we have several of those programs over the years that we run\, but this is a space where we hope that people can meet each other. We have a lot of alumni across several programs in Nigeria\, for example. Can they all meet together? Can we do\, and we do monthly sessions. So it’s a space that we’re really hoping to activate. We just created a new platform last year and we’ve added members. And this year we’re really focused on engagement. We have community moderators and that’s another really special element of the IPP program. I wanna show you how many alumni we have from around to give you a sense of how many people have taken IPP since 2019. So we’ve been running it for seven years. What we started last year was allowing teams to join and Jessie can share more about that\, how that works. But as you can see\, 84 countries and we have 418 alumni who’ve taken the IPP program. So\, I just want to go back to it’s\, if we’re talking about from ideas to action\, which was the title of our session\, it’s not just the what. You can’t get the idea and say\, yay\, it’s going to happen. No\, it is also the how\, but it’s not just that. It is a hundred percent about the who in our experience we see over and over and over again people and their programs die on authorization. That is the people part\, the politics part is something that you have to actively engage with to be able to make progress. So I will stop there. And Jessie\, maybe we can take questions. \n\n\nJessie DeLano Right\, yeah. Well\, thank you so much\, Matt and Salimah. Matt\, I’ll invite you to bring your camera back on as well. So we’re gonna move on to the question and answer portion of this webinar. So thanks to everyone who has submitted their questions. We’ll answer as many as possible. And if you haven’t yet\, please use the question and answer function to submit your questions. Okay\, so the first question we have is\, people is important in PDIA. How do you identify all relevant stakeholders to a problem? If it’s iterative\, what’s the initial approach? \n\n\nMatt Andrews Great question. So\, you know\, in practice\, you do this in different ways in different places\, because you’re starting in different places. And\, you know\, I think what I would say is first thing for us is\, you know\, we engage with the person who comes and says\, I have a problem. And we say\, let’s talk about who you are\, and how you fit into the system. And what you can see\, and who you can engage with\, and what your reality is\, and how you understand this\, and what are you willing to do to solve this right? So we start there\, we start at that place. I think a lot of other people start somewhere else and they say let’s do an analysis of all the people in the system and we say look if we can just work with this folk and this person can mobilize themselves and then iteratively they can grow their community that’s how we’re going to solve things. Sometimes I think we start off and we say create a picture tell me who has influence\, tell me who has impact\, tell me who has this and that and it’s really a lot of guessing\, it’s a lot of guesswork. And\, but then we get this kind of analysis of stakeholders in this map and we think\, well\, this is really meaningful and it’s a lot less meaningful than we think sometimes. So we want to start off and say\, who are you? And then we say\, okay\, who’s your authorizer? And tell me what that person can authorize. Do you have to authorize this? How do we think about that? And then\, we start to say\, who could be who you work with? Who could be in your team? And we’re trying to create that kind of\, that human mechanism that is going to move things along. And then we iterate by constantly coming back and saying\, okay\, you know\, is your authorization space growing? Are you bringing more people into this? Every week\, we have you or every two weeks\, we’ll have you communicate with someone new and say\, who don’t you know? And who do you need to get hold of? And what do you to learn from that person? So we’re not against sitting and mapping out what you think your stakeholder space looks like. It’s not a bad idea. But we also are very much for saying that we want a stakeholder space that you’re engaged with\, not that you are observing from a distance. And so the iteration is useful to say\, let’s start from you and maybe two or three people around you and your authorizer\, and then let’s grow that. When you come to the Kennedy School\, we’ll speak about you and your authorizer. You\, your authorizer your team\, you\, your authorizer and your team and your network. And this is how we grow things through the process. So it’s not just about looking and saying\, who do we think are the people in our system? It’s like\, let’s engage with people and let’s build a system where people are really\, really working\, they’re really connected to each other. \n\n\nSalimah Samji I would just add\, start with what you have and take small steps. It’s people are\, you don’t go straight with a contentious boss or whatever. That’s just not gonna work for you. You’re gonna work with who you have and what you have and keep in mind where you wanna go\, small steps\, that’s really key. \n\n\nJessie DeLano Right. Great. Thank you so much. Another question we received\, what tool do you recommend for us to identify the problem? That’s the most challenging part for a lot of folks. \n\n\nSalimah Samji So we have a toolkit that I will put a link in the chat where you can kind of see how PDIA unfolds and the tools that we like to use. But we particularly have two in the problems. And I think it’s problem construction. Those of you who know PDIA and problem deconstruction. The construction part\, people think it’s like\, it’s a waste of time. Why are you asking me what the problem is? Of course\, we all know what the problems is. And the reality is actually\, no\, that’s not true. Because people think about the problem in different ways. You think that it’s unanimous and you all agree\, but the reality that in our experience of over a decade is that’s true. And so what is the problem? Why does it matter? To whom does it matters? Who needs to care more? What does problem solved look like? These are basically the questions in problem construction. They help you peel a problem down. Because oftentimes when you ask people\, everyone says\, oh\, we’re problem driven\, but really they’re solution driven. And so they frame their problem as a lack of a solution. Oh\, we don’t have a law. That’s a\, a law is a solution to\, but what policy problem is it the solution to? The\, you know\, if we could hire two teachers or X number\, that that’s going to solve our problem. That is not a problem. So our way of determining whether it’s a problem or not is ask yourself\, can you come up with at least three possible solutions to your problem? If you can’t\, it’s not a real problem. And that’s why you peel the question of why does it matter if you say this is the problem? Why does it not matter? And you keep asking and you peel the layers of what is the problem. Because we find identifying the problem is a real challenge. People think that it’s easy\, but it really isn’t. It’s a process. The second is once you know what your problem is\, we like to use the five whys and the Ishikawa diagram to be able to break the problem down into its root causes. And again\, that is something that we are very inclusive about. You don’t do it alone\, you do it in a team. So you get multiple perspectives. And we like use the word shop your fishbone diagram to others\, going to them and asking them. What do you think is missing in my fishbone diagram? Because there aren’t three causes to your problem\, there’s probably a lot more. And in some courses we’ve done\, people have done a fishbone diagram that fills a whole table in a conference room. Yeah\, because these are complex. No wonder they’re still sitting around as problems. But that just allows as a visual\, and we like the fishbone diagram as a vision\, because it shows the complexity of the problem. And it’s\, you know\, it’s a visual to say\, yeah\, one thing is not going to solve this problem. \n\n\nJessie DeLano Great\, so just building off of that\, how do you entertain experimentation in this course? Suppose one changes completely the what in the middle of the course. \n\n\nMatt Andrews It happens a lot. And it happens a lot because that’s the reality of doing this work. When people are changing the what\, they’re not changing the what because\, you know\, it’s in some arbitrary way. They’re changing the what because they learn. And experimentation is really about trying things and learning. And one of the things that we often find is that people want to learn about the what. Right? So an experiment is often\, oh\, We try to learn about the solution. We try and make sure the solution is right. Oftentimes what people learn about is the how and the who. And very\, very commonly the key learnings are about the people in your system. How much political support do I really have? What are citizens or firms or teachers\, what are they actually able to do in their classrooms? And oftentimes when we start with a solution\, And then we kind of say\, okay\, let’s step back from the solution and identify a problem. And then\, we’re gonna start to experiment. We start to learn that people see the problem differently\, that people have different appetites for the solution than we thought about\, that people different capabilities than we’d thought about. And that halfway through the process\, because of that learning\, because we’re experimenting\, and experimenting is not necessarily in a scientific way\, creating an experiment with a solution and seeing how it works. It’s more trying things and seeing how the world responds and what the world tells you about itself. We often find people coming back and saying\, hey\, we got the problem wrong. Hey\, we care about the problem in that way\, but we found out that actually people have a different way of thinking about it. Oh\, people are not capable of doing that. Sometimes they come back and they say\, we can do much more. We found that our system is capable of doing more. So the iteration here is we identify a place\, an entry point to which we can start working. We identify an idea that we can start working on. And then we try that idea and we come back and we say\, what did you do? What did you learn? What are you struggling with and what’s next? And that iterative process is designed to get us constantly learning about the who\, the how\, the what\, the whole system. And so when people come back and if they say\, well\, we actually think that we’ve got the problem wrong or our idea was completely wrong. It’s not that it’s a statement of despair. It’s a statement of enlightenment. We’ve learned more. And because of what we learned more\, we’re doing a pivot to what is really going on or what we really think we can make some progress on. And that’s a very important part of this process. And it’s a very important part of adaptation. We don’t adapt narrowly. We adapt broadly based on real learning. In the policy literature and also the learning literature. We talk about learning in multiple dimensions\, not just learning based on\, you know\, well\, is my thing right or wrong? No\, we want to learn about our system\, and that’s what happens. \n\n\nJessie DeLano All right\, so here is another question. In the case where a system is already operational within an existing framework\, but further iteration is desired and resistance is encountered\, how would you solve for that? \n\n\nSalimah Samji That’s a really broad question. So one of the things that\, you know\, we have participants come and they say\, oh\, we want to work on corruption. Okay. Corruption means a lot of things in a lot of places. So that’s really when you want to narrow things down. A lot of these things work in context and particular local situations and environments. And so understanding that becomes really a key place to start. So when people say\, and it’s not that we say\, oh no\, we can’t work on corruption. No\, no\, no. We say\, yeah\, yeah. Bring it on. Let’s work on it. So while others say\, oh\, the project failed on politics. We’re like\, bring it on\, bring on the politics. We’re gonna deal with that. Cause that is\, that’s why you go back and do the 14 weeks of action learning. Hit against the wall\, learn\, because you have to figure it out. Who else is gonna do that? Or are we just gonna tolerate failure after failure after failure and blame it on politics? We kind of need to own up on that. So it’s really about narrowing down what is the problem and these tools help you with that. And as you break the problem down\, you’re sharing it with your authorizers. You are including them in the process of understanding the problem. Not selling a solution. A lot of times we find solutions are the ones that want to be owned\, right? Everybody wants to say\, it’s my idea. Can I get like my name attached to that? And that’s when you have a lot of problems. But problems\, nobody wants to own them. Everyone’s like\, it is not my problem. You can deal with it. That’s where we start. So it’s on the problem that we create coalitions. We get people’s feedback. What’s the cause of this? How do you feel about that? What does the problem do for you? Because we have found in our experience\, when you get people to work together and understand the problem and the complexity together\, they will be ready to co-solve the problem with you. Even in our experiences\, people that the team that’s working on talk to outside\, they say\, can you come back to me and keep this such a great conversation? I want to know what you’re doing and what you are thinking. So you kind of build the snowflake of multiple teams that are working on this\, and you grow the space to be able to do that. I think it’s\, we like things to be granular and specific and not\, I know development is full of these vague statements\, but vague is not helpful. Specific is extremely helpful in being able to answer that. Matt\, I wanna know what you would say to that. \n\n\nMatt Andrews I think dealing with resistance\, dealing with opposition\, dealing with complexity\, dealing with all sorts of interests a lot of people\, they’ll say to me\, well\, what happens if you have to deal with that? And I’m like\, you always have to do with that. Like that’s my answer is like that’s why. That’s why we don’t just focus on what and it’s also why we just focus on how we focus on who. And\, and everybody brings themselves to this work. And so everybody brings interest\, because a lot of policy work involves change. One of the things we know about change is the change involves\, involves risk and it involves\, you know\, it involves resistance. And\, so the PDIA process allows us to learn our way about incentives\, resistance\, behavior and to work with people along this way. And this is where it’s actually quite different from a lot of other policy work. And a lot other policy we make assumptions about people. We make assumptions about whether they support us or whether they don’t. And we often treat their behavior in\, I think\, a very transactional way. And so we create mechanisms in our policy work to try and give them the right incentives to work with us. But their behavior changes. You know\, I found in politics\, for instance\, you know\, a lot people will say\, Well\, this person supports us. And they do. And then in my experience\, oftentimes\, the politician who supported us on day one\, didn’t actually know what we were doing. And when we started to actually have some success\, and things started to look like it’s really good\, they said\, Oh\, is that what you’re doing? I don’t\, I don’t support that anymore. And so what we wanna do is we wanna constantly\, constantly through our iteration\, constantly be building relationships\, constantly be listening\, constantly be learning\, constantly be finding out where’s the resistance growing\, where are we having some breakthroughs\, who is surprisingly supportive of the work\, who is not. And because we’re iterating\, we can constantly be stopping and starting. We speak about building our stairway to success. And building our stairway to success\, a key part of that is constantly ensuring that we have legitimacy\, which means support. And we don’t treat it as something that we have and then we\, or we don’t have. We treat it is something that grows\, that ebbs and it flows\, and that we need to constantly be paying attention to and working with it. And that’s part of the PDIA process. It’s one of the reasons why you constantly are stopping reflecting because these things are part of the work.
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/from-ideas-to-impact-the-practice-of-policy-implementation/
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SUMMARY:"Ask Me Anything" featuring Lant Pritchett
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeaker\n\n\n\nLant Pritchett\, Research Director\, Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP)\, BSC Associate\, Former HKS MPA/ID Faculty Director \n\n\n\nAbout the Talk\n\n\n\nDuring this “Ask Me Anything” session\, Lant Pritchett addressed the audience’s most pressing questions on international development. Pritchett offered a provocative reframing of the current crisis in international development. Rather than viewing recent funding cuts and institutional collapse as a demand-side problem\, Pritchett argues that the demand for people who can effectively help governments achieve development has never been higher. The financing model for development\, however\, has collapsed. Pritchett draws a sharp distinction between development work and charity work. Development involves helping countries accomplish a four-fold transformation: building a higher-productivity economy\, cultivating a more capable state\, establishing a more responsive polity\, and advancing equality and social cohesion. Charity work\, on the other hand\, mitigates the consequences of development’s absence. The post-1990 drift of development institutions toward financing humanitarian work was always politically unsustainable\, and the current changes represent the end of that financing model rather than the end of development itself. The shift may restore clarity about what it means to be an effective development professional. \n\n\n\nThis event was not recorded. \n\n\n\nSpeaker Bio\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLant Pritchett is LaMP’s co-founder and research director. Lant is a world-renowned development economist who has spent the last 30 years applying economic principles to complex problems of systems change. Lant worked with the World Bank from 1988 to 2007\, living in Indonesia 1998-2000 and India 2004-2007. He taught at the Harvard Kennedy School from 2000 to 2018\, where he was the Faculty Chair of the MPA/ID Degree program. He has published over a hundred books\, journal articles\, working papers and has over 38\,000 citations on development topics from education to economic growth to labor mobility.  \n\n\n\nLant has a track record of translating visionary ideas in practical realities at national and global scale. Lant’s early work in 2006 calling attention to a growing learning crisis in the developing world and the need for an emphasis on achieving early foundational learning. His suggested replacement for learning targets was reflected almost exactly in the 2015 Social Development Goals and more recently in the World Bank’s goal to eliminate learning poverty. Lant’s work\, together with David Dollar\, assessing the impact of foreign assistance on achieving development goals called for “selectivity\, not conditionality” as a way to channel foreign assistance led both to substantial changes in World Bank practices and the founding of a brand-new development agency\, the Millennium Challenge Corporation\, explicitly adopting the principle.  \n\n\n\nHe graduated from Brigham Young University in 1983 with a B.S. in Economics and in 1988 from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a PhD in Economics.  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/ask-me-anything-featuring-lant-pritchett/
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SUMMARY:Lessons in State Capacity from Delhi's Schools
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeaker\n\n\n\nYamini Aiyar\, Visiting Senior Fellow\, Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia and Watson Institute\, Brown University \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome to the Building State Capability talk series. I am Salimah Samji\, and I’m the executive director of Building State Capability. I am really excited to welcome Yamini Aiyar today. Yamini is a senior fellow at the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia and the Watson Institute at Brown University. She is also formerly the president of the Center for Policy Research in Delhi. She comes to us today to talk about her really great Oxford University Press book on Delhi schools. Welcome\, Yamini. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Thank you\, Salimah. It’s such a pleasure to be here and especially to be in conversation with you. The bit that Salimah didn’t tell you is that we are\, I first\, I think my second job when Salimah had just come out from the Kennedy School in Delhi\, we were office mates at the World Bank and have continued to be friends and collaborators since. So I can’t be more excited than to have a chance to talk about my work with you because it all started with you too. \n\n\nSalimah Samji We definitely have a history. Wonderful. So what we’re gonna do in today’s talk is I’m gonna have a conversation with Yamini and then we’ll open up to Q&A. There are two mics on the side. When you ask your question\, please make sure it ends with a question mark and keep it short\, but also introduce yourself\, tell us what program\, what school you’re at\, and that would be really helpful. So without further ado\, this book is on education\, right? So\, in 2005\, Pratham’s status of education report came out and showed that 50% and has happened for a decade after that and then every two years after that. And the consistent result has been that children can’t read. Like basic foundational learning is just not there. Fifth graders cannot read second grade sentences. And then\, you know\, the NEP 2020 report also showed\, this is like many years later\, that 50 million children in the country are lacking foundational literacy and numeracy\, right? So it’s in this backdrop of education\, your work before Delhi is happening in Bihar. So I was wondering if you can take us to Bihar in 2010. And you know\, this is. In 2005\, Bihar had a new chief minister\, Nitish Kumar\, who came with a big promise on the policy of education\, really wanted to strengthen education in his state. It’s been five years\, lots of experiments have happened\, lots of learning happening in education in Bihar\, and you are in Bihar. Why don’t you start us off there? \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Thank you. So I think what was just an important kind of addition to what you’re saying\, from the late 1990s onwards\, the Indian government\, particularly at the national level\, began for the first time really to embark on a policy agenda for mass education. So the real puzzle in India has always been that. For a relatively\, for a new and very\, very poor nation\, the choice at the national level was to invest much more in building higher education institutions\, particularly the Indian Institutes of Technology and Indian Institutions of Management as two good examples\, but didn’t embark on a national effort for school education\, mass education\, and even basic literacy. Of course\, India is many countries in one\, different states have done different things. So there were parts of India\, education is a state subject\, school education was a state subject and then kind of became a shared concurrent subject between a state and center. And some states made a lot of rapid progress\, but at a national scale\, we hadn’t yet moved in this direction. And that big step takes place in the 1990s. But it kind of followed the global narrative\, which was access. So the main emphasis was on building out the infrastructure of school education system. So literally the school starting from scratch\, school buildings to hiring teachers and bringing schools to children to ensure that every Indian had access to a government public schooling system. This was\, of course\, checkered in many parts of the country\, not least of all the state of Bihar\, which is one of the poorest states in the country. And it’s funny we’re talking about Bihar today because it goes to the polls tomorrow for the first round of its elections. Nitish Kumar\, the Chief Minister from 2005\, stays on as Chief Minister in 2025\, so it’s been 20 years in the process. He has allied with every political party that there possibly can be. And the shine that he had back in 2005 has diminished significantly even though he still remains chief minister of the state. So it’s also a story of kind of the shifting nature of Indian politics. Coming out of in the 1990s as the government of India began to pump in more resources into building the education infrastructure\, Bihar was broadly considered to be a significantly laggard state. It didn’t do much. In fact\, the big interesting puzzle there was why is it that despite the government of India offering money to the state and other parts of the country\, particularly poorer states that were dependent on the government of India for resources were busy building schools and hiring teachers\, Bihar was doing nothing. Just an interesting nugget. One of the reasons for this has to do with the peculiarities of the nature of social mobilization in Bihar in the 1990s. Bihara was one of the states that was really the home of lower caste political mobilization. And when the chief minister at the time and the political party came to power\, the big challenge they had to face was in trying to disrupt the upper caste dominance that was the bureaucracy. The education system was putting in money and had certain rules on teacher qualifications. Given the nature of the caste system it was largely more likely that upper caste teachers would be qualified to come into the education system and absent a kind of sincere political vision the easy choice was just not to hire. So in some senses\, one of the most powerful elements of Indian democracy\, its ability to really give access to the most marginalized and discriminated sections of society through democracy\, access to state power\, also created a kind of complex notion\, impact on the process of development. Teachers weren’t hired. Schools weren’t built. Do nothing was the approach more than anything else. So when Nitish Kumar comes in\, the nature of his social coalition\, he represents one other element as part of the caste structure\, but also came in partnership with the BJP government that is now at the head in Delhi\, and they represent the upper caste. So that social coalition enabled Nitish Kumar to do a lot more. And he made education one of his big planks. And the first thing he had to do was to build the infrastructure for education. That’s why I went into this long story\, not just because it’s interesting\, but also because it gave the context of where we were. In 2010 in Bihar\, a lot of very serious\, so there was all this money that was sitting in the center that the previous regime had not used\, they were then able to access this money and start building out\, so they built the schools\, they hired the teachers\, they had one of the most interesting and rapid successes in reducing the percentage of out-of-school girl children through a lot innovation that was big\, innovative mobilization efforts\, including a very important scheme called the Mukhyamantri Cycle Yojna\, which was essentially handing out bicycles to young girls who finished Middle school so they could go to secondary school so that they would have access to schools and in fact this has kind of become in all parts of North India a big scheme that got replicated from those from the Bihar experiment. So the first foundational step had been built. And in many other sectors too\, you know\, from no governance to little governance movement had happened. And the challenge that confronted Nitish Kumar when he comes back in his second term\, now with a landslide majority and a lot more expectation\, was to take the system forward from there because we had learned again and again\, it was visible in Bihar too\, that building the infrastructure for education is only the first step. Ensuring that students come is an important second step\, but the second and a half part of that is to ensure that there’s teaching and learning\, right? Like it’s great to have the building\, it’s good to have a teacher\, hopefully the teacher is showing up occasionally\, but then what happens? And we learned again\, and the other report that you mentioned is again really important because it played a really significant role and it took a long time\, the better part of 10\, 15 years of serious advocacy and coalition building. To shift the policy conversation away from the challenge just of infrastructure to recognizing that infrastructure while necessary is not sufficient. And we need to think about what is happening inside the classroom. So in 2010\, a lot of opportunity opens up for experimentation. And like many chief ministers\, and I’m sure we’ll talk about it at some point in the course of our conversation\, one of the\, you know\, it’s both good and bad\, but\, doers\, when new political parties come in and you have these doer chief ministers who want to reform\, they open up for a lot of nonprofit organizations and academics\, a whole range\, the whole self-development world to show up. I used to joke with colleagues in 2010. That if you wanted a job in international development\, all you had to do was to just stand in Patna airport\, you would get picked up. Somebody or the other was from J-PAL to what was then DFID\, to the world. Everyone was there\, as were we. It was an exciting place to be because there was so much happening. And Pratham\, the NGO that is the mothership of the ASAR report\, was working with the state government\, doing a lot of experimentation around this question of learning. And their basic framework was this. The structure of the classroom is around age and grade. So if you are seven\, you are in class two. If you are eight\, you move on from there. But the nature of how children access the education system and the way in which teaching and learning takes place or doesn’t take place means that by and large\, and many of you have probably read and studied a lot of the RCTs that have brought this out. In a big way\, the classroom itself has a very multiple and dynamic structure of learning. You will have the first two rows that are close to curriculum level and the last two rows that can barely recognize letters. And so they were trying what they now call teaching at the right level\, forms of remedial training\, which was to group students by their learning level and it helped them try and catch up to where the curriculum expects you to be. Lant’s paper\, which always has a nice title so you don’t need to read the paper\, but you must since you’re students\, but he kind of summarized it really well in the title of a paper that said the negative consequences of an over-ambitious curriculum. The curriculum is here\, the classroom is here in lots of complicated multiple ways\, and the first two rows that the teachers teaching kind of are nodding their heads and taking their notes and copying from the blackboard and everybody else is lost because the system is designed to teach to the first row is not to the back of the classroom. And this was the kind of theory of change that can we bring everybody closer to where curriculum level is expected? And in fact\, the challenge is not even the curriculum. It’s basic things\, students sitting in class five can barely recognize letters or recognize numbers\, forget doing basic levels of arithmetic. So an RCTU accompanied one of the experiments\, which was around a summer camp. And the summer camp took students\, grouped them by level\, trained government school teachers with all with a kind of more interactive type of pedagogy not the boring stuff there many Indians here they’ve all done probably CBSE ICSE so we all in the same game we know how to memorize but our critical and conceptual learning happens outside of the structure of the school if it happens at all I’m sure it’s happened for all of you because you’re here. I can’t say I learned anything\, but I can memorize really well. And so it goes. So the teachers were given these alternative pedagogical materials. And in the summer camp\, the RCTs found that there was a significant improvement in foundational literacy among students that attended the camp. Now the students go back into school because ultimately the summer holidays have to end and the teachers go back to school and the second part of the experiment was to see how much of this gets incorporated in the structure of the classroom and how much of this actually rolls through not just the students that attended the summer camps but more broadly for the classroom. And they found that there was absolutely no progress\, right? This is an RCT that I’m sure many of you would have\, it’s probably part of your classroom or work here as well. And I was\, and like all good academic publications\, the paper gets published 10 years later. But Pratham was smart enough to say\, this is really useful for us to have a serious evidence-based conversation with a group of policymakers. So\, and we don’t care when AER actually goes through its review and publishes it\, let’s take this. And Michael Walton\, who used to teach here\, was then with me actually at the Center for Policy Research and he was involved in this particular RCT. So he\, me\, Rukmini Banerjee\, Pratham\, we all landed up in Patna to share the findings. I was just a fly on the wall\, observing what was going on. And we walked into this room. The education minister\, newly elected\, is sitting there. And the chief secretary\, one of the most important\, the big boss\, the most-important IS officer was sitting in the room. The education secretary\, and sundry others. And it’s very rare to walk into a government office and have such a serious senior group of people sitting in the room. And they looked at Michael and said\, Doctor\, because\, you know\, give us the diagnosis and give us the medicines also. This is Bihar. Everybody has exciting ways of telling a story. So Michael then kind of sits up and then and puts on his PowerPoint presentation another 10 minutes go\, because no one could figure out how to put the huge TV that had just newly arrived in the Bihari government\, just to also give you a sense of how it had kind of been upgrading itself to more 21st century. Finally\, somebody showed up\, the TV comes on and Michael starts making his presentation. You know\, we go through the numbers and they were not surprised by anything that we saw and the conversation really starts\, really begins. And this\, you know\, if we started at five by now\, it’s like eight o’clock at night. And we had all taken a flight from Delhi early in the morning and had been planning a really good dinner. But dinner time was passing by. And finally\, we left there at ten only because we were exhausted\, not because they were tired. They wanted to continue the conversation\, but at the heart of it was the critical question that motivated the work I did since\, but I think also is the biggest challenge that confronts our debates on state capacity. We know how to do the mission. So we know how do the summer camps. This is the chief secretary at some point just had heard everything and he was just like\, okay\, look\, we know to do this in a mission mode in a summer camp\, we can align everything\, we can mobilize. It is when it goes back into the classroom\, when it becomes routine. That the whole thing breaks down. And really the challenge that they asked the doctor\, whose medicines were really about\, you know\, take this pill for seven days and all will be well. But they were asking for a long term\, you know\, good health\, go from the allopathic medicine to Ayurveda and stop eating the chocolates and be healthy. And that’s really where the whole thing sort of hit. And there were two important things to come out of this. It’s very easy and there is also evidence and truth to it\, so it makes it even easier to legitimize\, the view that we can’t get things done because the teachers are incapable or they are not accountable\, they don’t show up. Lant has this wonderful paper on the flailing state right like the head knows what to do but the arms and legs not able to pass it down all the way to the sinews and in our imagination in fact in our lived experience and how we talk about the state\, you know\, the devil is always the guy on the front lines the teacher who’s not showing up absenteeism rates indeed are high the doctor who shows up only rarely and when he does there’s a 50 percent chance that you’ll get diagnosed for diarrhea or you’ll get over-medicated. The block development officer who wants bribes before they put you into the list for benefits\, and so on and so forth. And I thought in this conversation\, something else was going on too. All of this is true. And we often think of our solutions to state capacity from that point of view. But here’s the same teacher who doesn’t show up and is lazy and is apathetic\, but is also being able to do something different given an opportunity. And then she goes back to the system and somehow things don’t happen. So is this the flailing state story alone or is the flailing state story just about the frontline that is corrupt and doesn’t show up and doesn’t want to do things or is there something else about the structure of the system that is making the same actor behave very differently in two different settings. And that really for me became the real puzzle. So when we talk about state capacity in India Is it just about three kind of things you need to do to monitor better\, to shift the incentives for the frontline by using carrot and sticks kind of methods that we all know and are familiar with or is there something more systemic over here that we need to get to the heart of? So Bihar kind of by the way now is in a somewhat depressing situation in the sense that all the the excitement of those days no longer resonates in today’s Bihar. And I think part of the problem was precisely this\, that you can build\, you can go from zero to one\, but to go from one to 10\, you have to really get to the heart of the systemic things. And there are many parts of that systemic thing\, including social inequality\, caste\, all of these are crucial elements that shape how citizen state relations play out. But there’s one bit that we don’t talk about at all\, which is the black box of the system of the bureaucracy itself. It is spoken about largely in the context of the ways of the IAS\, Vishnu is here. He’ll tell you much more about that. But very rarely\, he’s one of our shining IAS office stars of the Indian Administrative Service\, but very little is spoken about all the others who really are what we as citizens encounter on a daily basis\, the teachers\, the doctors\, the block development officers. What is the context in which they operate and why is it that they only function well when you exit them out from the system and fail when you put them back in? \n\n\nSalimah Samji Fascinating thing that you realize that the same person behaves very differently in two different settings and there’s something about the system that’s not allowing these gains that an RCT\, gold standard\, tells you that yes\, this is an effective strategy\, but when you try to do it within your larger system\, it doesn’t happen. So fast forward to Delhi 2016. You now have the opportunity\, new government again\, this time it’s Delhi\, and key focus on foundational learning. And this is when you embark\, which is kind of the bulk of the book of this approach. You used ethnographic study as a lens to look at this. Can you share that study design? Why choose that as a way to study and better understand this thing that you had already seen in Bihar? \n\n\nYamini Aiyar So\, you know\, at the heart of this question that the Bihar education bureaucracy and policymakers were asking was a question that emerges quite routinely even in our conversations about RCTs which is how do you embed change in a long-term sustainable way? And the answer often is\, you can’t embed change because the incentives are not aligned\, the political will disappears\, the bureaucrat shifts and it all falls back to square one. And in some ways\, you could argue\, I mean\, of course there’s a lot of debate about what’s the right technocratic set of policy\, instruments you need to address this problem of learning\, that debate continues\, it’s a live one\, it is a dynamic one\, and it’s an important one. But over the years\, the RCTs had actually built up a fairly robust evidence base to tell us that when it comes to the challenge of foundational literacy numeracy\, moving a child from not being able to recognize letters\, to recognizing letters\, to being able form a full sentence\, to being able read a paragraph\, to having basic comprehension in a short period of time. Teaching at the right level works. You can see by the shifts. So in a way\, teaching at right level gives you at least the beginnings of some type of evidence base. And in every single experiment and over the 10 years\, the Pratham J-PAL partnership is really exciting because of the way in which it uses\, Prathom uses the evidence. To innovate each cycle round and in each point there’s a new RCT that tells you what’s happening\, right. So one of the big learnings from Bihar was you can get things done outside of school what do you do inside the school so then there was another experiment in Uttarakhand that was just with training in Haryana there were there was some efforts for training that included the mid-level of the bureaucracy and so on and so forth and every level you get this kind of range of evidence. But at the end of each of these stories was the same question\, which is\, as one IAS officer put it\, India is like this burial ground of pilots. At one education meeting\, I was sitting. He made this kind of grand statement\, and as IAS officers do\, left the room. But I thought\, ooh\, nice little quote. I’m going to use it at some point and made a note of it. So there is great value to these grand statements\, too. And so that was kind of on my mind. We went back into Bihar in 2012. When one district in Bihar called Jehanabad had begun to try to entrench this teaching at the right level through more active training of the mid-level bureaucrat\, grassroots level bureaucrat or mid-management bureaucracy of Bihar. There was a position called CRCC\, Cluster Resource Center Coordinator so they were doing a lot of active training on the CRCC with the district magistrate\, the IAS officer\, playing a very important role. And then they scaled it up in the state. But by the time we got to see what was going on\, the program had disappeared. And the standard story was political will\, Nitish Kumar\, who had kind of been spearheading it through the chief minister’s office. Politics had come in the way. In fact\, he had resigned from his chief minister post. And so\, you know\, while hearing these stories\, I was kind of thinking to myself\, The evidence base and the rigorous quantitative evaluation techniques are not going to be able to get me to understand the heart of what’s actually happening inside of the bureaucracy. When we went and spent some time in Jehanabad\, conversations with the CRCCs and the BDOs were beginning to open up something new for me. In two ways\, I’ll just give you two quick anecdotes. One was: Just in talking to the frontline management. And then we went around to different parts of the country and had similar conversations. There was\, you know\, as the conversation would move forward from the problem to the solution\, I often would ask\, so what do you think\, you know you can do about all? Because of course everyone has an opinion. I mean\, more than an opinion\, everybody has an opinion and is also able to identify where the source of the problem is and the source the problem never you\, it’s always somebody else. And in the course of this kind of response\, they said\, and I open the book with this story actually\, which gets repeated everywhere. If the government wants\, they can do lots of things. Now\, you know\, it’s a nice statement to make. If anybody above me wants to do lots of things\, everything can change\, those with power. But you’re looking at this frontline officer\, and they are in the state partly because of the power of the state. And they excude power in every way\, right? Like they’ll show up like three hours late\, the Ray-Bans will come off\, three minions are carrying their bags\, someone with their lunchbox\, someone with the briefcase\, someone will their mobile phone\, they’ll sit down\, they’ll press the bell\, three more people will come\, some orders will be given\, I mean it’s all and you know the citizenry who’s hanging around are told to please leave the room because you know\, the boss is here and then the boss has to meet the Delhi people who have come and the Delhi madam sits down and ask the main questions. But you’ve shown me all this power! And yet you kind of when I’m asking you what is it that you think you can do\, you’re actually reflecting power somewhere else. And it’s very easy to dismiss this as yet another way of legitimizing your ability to do absolutely nothing. But I thought there was something a little bit more to it because I don’t know if any of you were to come to me and I’m in a powerful position and talk to me that I would be willing to admit to you that I’m actually totally powerless. Every boss is completely powerless\, but no one likes to admit it. Why is it so legitimate for these officers to consistently speak of themselves as powerless? And I only got that because I was talking to them. So\, method\, right? Like\, obviously\, there are some things that quantitative methodologies are really useful for\, and rigorous RCTs give you an ability to understand at a very granular level how change can happen in terms of the technocratic choices of things that you can input into a system\, but it cannot tell you about the system. And the second thing that it doesn’t tell you is how the system is reacting and responding. So when we went back to Jehanabad a year after this experiment happens\, and we went to these CRCCs who were mobilized to be part of this process\, they’re all sitting\, they’re very excited to chat. And they’ll open their Godrej cupboards in which their diaries were\, they all had to maintain a diary as part of the training and they’d open out their training diaries. They’re very excited and proud to show all the work that they had done in their diaries\, but it stops the day that the bureaucrat leaves and the program kind of loses its energy. So then there’s empty pages. And you ask\, you know\, why is it that nothing else happened? And\, you know\, you start getting a new story of how performances are internalized and understood\, which is very much about responding to what is asked for rather than…And again\, here\, this is not a story of the lazy person or the apathetic and incompetent person. It is a story or somebody who has internalized that performance is about something that is told to me to do when I’m given the order\, I’ll do it and I’ll it really well. But there’s a passivity that’s baked into it. Again\, which I only got by sitting\, observing\, listening and trying to take it a little bit more seriously than my instinct was giving me to take\, which is to say\, as we all think\, oh\, the government is bad. Private sector is good\, it’s kind of we operate in a certain type of binary\, at least the Indian elites do. So for me\, the question I was trying to answer\, how do these ideas get embedded in systems? What is it about the system that is resisting and distorting\, but also thinking of itself as a third party in this whole process of implementation that is causing this to then you know\, create a vicious cycle. And I recognize that none of this can be answered by coming in and even doing a one-shot qualitative survey\, semi-structured interviews is what we are always told. You can always put them as a side to a quantitative questionnaire and maybe we will get some insight\, my economist colleagues would always say. And I thought\, no\, there’s something else that I want to do\, but I was waiting for a sign. I live in Delhi. And in 2016 a new political party comes and rather intriguingly different to even Bihar\, it makes education one of its big political platforms and you’re driving in the city\, you’re stuck in traffic jams for hours and hours and half your life goes away in that\, so you listen to the radio a lot and the deputy chief minister who was also the education minister at the time was on radio talking about things like foundational literacy numeracy\, which is rare to hear on radio of a politician. So obviously something more was going on over here and we got lucky because I was part of a think tank. It’s based in Delhi. The Delhi government in its early days was really interested in feedback. Eventually\, you know\, politics takes over\, but in the first few rounds there was some energy and interest. And so they were looking for somebody who would sit and document to do feedback. So they came to us. And we\, as a policy think tank\, this couldn’t be better because you want to partner with governments. So here was an opportunity. And they were really\, they had other people doing RCTs. There was some CCTV camera thing that an RCT was to be done on. And I was not interested in any of that. But because they were interested in feedback\, it meant that we had access into the schools to sit and listen. So it opened up the opportunity and it was very clear. You could do what\, you know\, apart from giving them feedback\, we could do whatever research we wanted to do. So we then started looking to see what are the most sensible ways of designing method that will help us get to these embedding questions that we wanted to ask and do it by listening. And so we adopted ethnographic methods. Because we live in Delhi\, I mean\, research location helps. We were here\, we had the infrastructure of one organization. We were able to build up teams. People came and went\, but you still were able to keep a steady\, solid team over a period of three to four years. It’s easy access\, you could be home in the morning and in a school 45 minutes later and back in office by lunchtime. So it allowed us to innovate as well over time\, even in response to government questions. So they wanted to do a teacher survey on time use because a lot of teachers said\, we are not able to do things because there’s too much administrative burden. And the politicians and the bureaucrats said\, but actually\, if you think about it\, it’s not that much\, but let’s get some evidence. So we had experimented in Bihar with time use surveys of frontline workers. So using our ethnographic lens to say\, actually\, let’s do this quantitatively. How can you actually see what is it that a bureaucrat\, frontline bureaucrat does over the course of a day? So by following them\, but in a structured and rigorous way. So we brought the time use in both to respond to a government demand\, but also it contributed a lot to our survey. So we mixed things up quite a bit. And because we were doing feedback with government\, it meant that we were in constant conversation with them\, which helped both our understanding of how reformers are thinking. But also then we could apply some of that to changing things on the ground. So a unique position of being in your living working and breathing in your research site which is very rare also helped us develop this much more kind of qualitative and ethnographic method of studying the state and I think there’s something to be said here to study the state quantitative tools will only get you so far and really being embedded gives you deeper insight. \n\n\nSalimah Samji And I think what makes this particularly unique is that it wasn’t an evaluation. You are not bound by how many times\, I mean\, we’ve seen this plenty. Oh\, we know this isn’t working\, but we can’t change it because then we’re gonna like tarnish this evaluation. So you’re actually functioning for your paper as opposed to what’s really happening on the ground. And when you take this position of we’re going to over a period of three years and I think it’s 337 classroom observations\, eight schools\, 105 days. Of school observation\, 200 teacher surveys and 2\,000 circulars that you evaluated\, it allows you to really put that learning lens. We’re here to listen\, to learn\, to understand. I’m not in here to write a paper that’s gonna be published. I’m here to just understand why is it… That when a teacher does this outside of the school system\, it works. Same teacher\, but when they come into the system\, something is broken. What is going on here\, right? And I think that’s really\, really powerful. And what I also really think is\, and people don’t do research like this before. How many of you have heard of Judith Tendler? Oh my God\, zero. Okay. People don’t do research like this anymore. Judith Stendler was at MIT\, development in the tropics is what she wrote. Good governance in the top. Thank you. Good governance and the tropics. And then Albert Hirschman\, how many of you have heard of him? Great\, thank you. These are like development projects observed. These are people who used the power of observation to really understand how bureaucracies worked. And so this I think really is in line with that kind of learning. So you’ve observed all of this. What are some of the things that you learned from the teachers? They’re the ones in the system. What did you learn from the head of the school? What did your learn from students? It’s all of these stakeholders that you’re spending time with and that you are talking to. What is coming out in these three years? \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Before I answer your question\, just one thing to add to what you said about method and studying the state and literature gaps that we have. As I went about trying to find a better way of framing the puzzles that I was confronting\, I started looking around at the literature on the Indian state. And actually it’s really surprising how\, so A\, we don’t have any serious public administration as an academic discipline. So there is very little that we have\, that actually studies bureaucracy through a rigorous academic lens in terms of the\, so there’s a lot of documentation amongst the historians about the state. The political scientists are really interested in an interest. So there’s lot of stuff on the grassroots state from the point of view of kind of seeing the state and seeing like a state. The economists are really interesting in understanding how development projects are implemented. So it applies that lens. But there really isn’t any rigorous work except for bureaucrats’ memoirs and some fiction writing that gives you a granular understanding of the nature of the state itself\, who these people are\, what they are. The context in which they operate. So then I looked at the literature outside of India\, and actually the public administration literature outside of the India is quite robust on thinking about this differently. So Herbert Kaufman’s forest rangers? And I was trying to understand the puzzle in an era before mobile phones\, GPS\, tracking systems\, Foucaultian panopticons that are what administration looks like today. The forest rangers showed up in the middle of nowhere and did their job. And like the big puzzle was why and how did that happen? Right. There’s not there’s no thinking like that\, at least when it comes to thinking about the Indian bureaucracy. Good governance in the tropics takes\, you know\, one municipal government in Brazil and tries to understand how worker motivation\, worker incentives were changed\, not through kind of private sector tracking and performance incentives and withholding salaries\, et cetera\, But really through a completely different set of things to kind of push intrinsic motivation. You know\, street level bureaucrats\, Lipski’s work\, there is\, you know\, which has spawned a huge literature globally in political sociology about the frontline bureaucracy. Nothing rigorous like that in India. So in a sense\, I found that there’s this huge gap and what I was also trying to do while understanding this challenge of education\, also trying build this body of\, you now\, building\, sort of seeking to do some field building by trying to bring this into our conversations on state capacity. So what did we find? The bureaucracy sits in a particular context and you’re never going to reform outside of that context. When we talk about policy and the urgency of reform\, particularly when it has to do with transaction intensive frontline tasks\, where it’s not just the fiat of our government circular that will change a rule and suddenly things get implemented. So that works if you want to\, If your goal is to ensure that money goes into a bank account\, you build up the… Kind of public digital infrastructure. You ensure everybody opens a bank account and you transfer money. Boom\, you’re done. You can argue that’s state capacity. I don’t think so but people do. When it comes to a classroom\, I mean I can transfer all the money you want\, but in fact the structure of the classroom and what actually happens is very much about the relationship between us right now and our relationship in this minute will be very different to our relationship when we go out and it’ll be very different today to very different tomorrow. These are transaction intensive tasks that are very local\, very context specific\, but they also shape by a broader system. And so when you’re trying to change things\, ultimately the change agent is not the minister or the secretary of education\, it is in fact the teacher and the headmaster who are the people in this context who are supposed to actually implement these ideas. So how did each person respond and in what way? Well\, the first thing’s first\, in a government particularly\, and we kind of looked at the colonial history of paper in the Indian bureaucracy\, nothing moves without a circular\, nothing moves with out a file\, we could not enter the system\, we could enter the school without a file. Once your name is on a file you’re a really empowered individual. The whole movement of the right to information was premised on this notion. If this file can be made transparent to citizens\, citizens can mobilize to ask questions and make claims on the state. And I caricature a little bit\, but the average day of the school would operate with the headmaster coming in\, putting on the computer\, clicking onto the MIS system to see what the circular of the day is telling him or her to do. And in our time use\, you can see how this shapes patterns of behavior. And I’ll tell one story because it’s funny more than anything else. But we were in the state of Madhya Pradesh\, not Delhi\, but same pattern gets played out there\, waiting to meet the block education officer who showed up eventually looking very Harris because he had received an order. The order now comes via WhatsApp from his boss\, the district education officer who no doubt received this order from his both and his boss to ensure that all schools had undertaken as mandatory surya namaskar exercise for yoga in the yoga class of the attendance period\, which is a zero period at the start of the school day. This was very important to the political project of the government at the time. And so instead of doing anything else he had spent the whole morning even while we were sitting there making phone calls to find out did it happen yes no put the phone down and call up his boss 10 schools done 20 more to be done so I mean the order kind of shapes your day. We maintained a database of about 8 000 orders that were received over the and this is not by no chance no means exhaustive of the orders that was issued to the schools\, we analyzed about 2000 of them\, the order creates order within the bureaucracy\, it structures the bureaucracy in a particular way\, it gives everybody a sense of what they need to do and so they respond to what is said in it. We did a textual analysis of the orders and shouldn’t be it’s a hierarchical structure. You’re ordered to do things\, you’re not gently asked to do anything. And for a system that doesn’t have any enforcement practice\, the order itself becomes a very funny kind of legitimization of setting limits and constraints on what you can and cannot do. So your day is structured by this order. And when the reformers were trying to introduce this idea of flexibility in the classroom. So one of the big pieces of reform was to say\, for a year\, we’ll take a grade and reorganize grade by level of learning so that students that were closer to curriculum could be taught in a particular way. Students that were further from the curriculum could be thought in a particularly way. And this had its own sets of problems which I’ll come to shortly\, but the reformers felt that we should\, part of kind of motivating and energizing the teacher was part and parcel of this\, so they wanted to write these orders in less coercive and more kind of encouraging ways. But the system didn’t know what to do with it. So when these orders would come which said and or you can do x\, you can do y\, the teachers were scratching their heads going but what are we supposed to do? As one teacher said if you’ve told us that we have to drive with the GPS and then you suddenly shut the GPS off\, how are you supposed to allow us to function? Now this is actually a really important insight\, because in a lot of where…So\, if the reform\, so one of the things that you find a lot is every time the government has tried to decentralize by empowering the frontline\, you get huge unspent balances. Or as Manish Shishodiya\, the education minister\, used to say\, when he first walked into schools\, he would ask the head of schools\, what is it that you want me to do? I can give you an untied fund of X amount of money to do improve infrastructure\, do whatever you want for your school. And the headmasters wouldn’t say anything. So now you could interpret this as just apathy and laziness\, but it could also be a system that is so designed to following orders that when you free it up\, that becomes more tyrannical than the order itself. So\, challenge number one\, right\, a system that is deeply hierarchical\, when it has to organize reforms around things that require more\, you know\, a local knowledge feeding back into how\, or local dynamics feeding back and shaping action\, it finds itself somewhat stuck. And cultures of bureaucracy designed this a lot. So organizational culture became a very central piece of how I began to think about this. That hierarchical organizational culture also shaped the structure of the classroom. It isn’t that policy makers have never cared about how students learn in class and what happens. There’s been a lot of debate about this. If you go back to our policy documents from the 1950s onward\, you will see a sameness in this puzzle. But the classroom itself is interpreted within this hierarchical frame. So it’s a very disciplinarian kind of structure. The teacher also only recognizes accountability on the back of very easily identifiable sets of things\, which are parts percentages. And syllabus completion. Those are easy to monitor. The teacher is given\, a lesson plan is handed over. There’s a syllabus that has to be run through. Manisha Shodiya’s whole mobilization effort was around the idea that the classroom is now a victim to the syllabus\, the textbook and the examination\, and we need to break this. But this is how the classroom is structured. So the teacher is now getting mixed messages because the order is saying\, you can do things differently. The classroom is designed for something else and the middle management is still not clear how they could administer in a more flexible context. So it’s administering exactly the way it’s supposed to. And then there is a larger question of the broader social consensus in which the classroom has also organized. So we were in a school once during a parent-teacher meeting\, which is also a really big part of the reform\, encouraging parents in my work\, we can talk about it later\, but I bracketed society because I wanted to understand the black box of the school itself. The biggest issue was that parents came marching into the headmaster’s office and you tested our children. This was done to figure out what…as a learning assessment\, where are students in the classroom\, but you gave them this test without telling them in advance\, so of course they’re not going to be prepared and you never told us the marks\, what kind of school is this\, right? So the relationship between schooling\, the examination is a very much very deeply baked into how we think about the school system and how students do in the exam. So the teachers are also seeing\, when we ask teachers what is a good or a bad student\, it was always defined in terms of students who could pass the exam and students who were duffers who couldn’t pass the exams. There wasn’t no space to think about how you teach. And in all of this\, it kind of creates this very important cognitive dissonance inside the classroom. When you ask a teacher why are children not learning\, she will tell you many things and most of them have to do with the system in which she is locked. Some of it has to do with society\, the social distance between teacher and student is vast\, particularly in the public system. So she will say\, ultimately\, these are kids from poor backgrounds\, they don’t know how to study\, they won’t even think about making sure all the textbooks are in their bag when they come to school\, although my kid has the same problem\, but that’s separate. And so it’s always something else. And then she’ll tell you when she’s done things like these summer camps and changed how she teaches\, she sees shifts. But when you switch it back\, saying\, OK\, so what of that can you bring into the classroom? She goes back to talking about the system of the classroom\, the societal and the bureaucratic system in which she is. So reforming the classroom with all these teaching at the right level ideas is not fear that you can do through the order\, because the teacher has fully not internalized it. Her impetus in the classroom is very different. And then above them is the middle management. The middle management that the reformers in this instance particularly didn’t like because they were also they came from an activist background. The political party itself came through an anti-corruption movement. They wanted to bypass the middle management and go straight to the teacher. But the middle managements impulse is completely different. The context in which they become bureaucrats is completely different. They are also part of a hierarchy in which they have no flexibility. So they don’t know that they can’t give it. They don’t how to give it. To bypass all of this\, they created a mentor-teacher structure. Now\, a hierarchical system is suddenly told you have to mentor. Mentoring is really hard. I mean\, as academics\, we know that it doesn’t come naturally for your PhD supervisor to mentor you. It requires a very different set of skills. But the organizational culture is not designed to actually nurture those skills\, but even more importantly\, it doesn t know how to transmit it. So I’ve now created a cadre of mentor teachers and they all come in for training. I don’t quite know how to train them because I don t know what it means to mentor. So the NGOs come in and they offer some support but the NGOs are outsiders and it takes a very long slow journey for these outsiders or new ideas to slowly start finding their way in. So all to say a set of things are done trying to reorganize the classroom to teaching at the right level to shift the classroom such that the teacher feels more empowered to teach differently\, she finds herself stuck because in fact it can’t be done through fear. It requires careful\, slow nurturing. To do that nurturing\, you created the mentor teachers\, but they are also from the same world. That too needs a careful set of inputs and slow nurturing. And we would see in the newspapers\, for instance\, that the chief minister has now sent these mentor teachers to Singapore or to Finland or to Cambridge. And then there would be a huge uproar. All this taxpayer’s money going to waste. Everyone is going on an easy little gig\, and et cetera\, et cetera. Where’s the accountability? But when you talk to them\, they may not have got anything\, but there sense of importance and power. I was sent somewhere\, I got to see something. And that kind of slowly starts changing their equation and their own status hierarchy within the structure of the school for them to start owning the idea that they are part and parcel of this process of trying to shift the classroom away from this lock-in of curriculum\, textbooks\, parts percentages and that’s a slow process\, could not have got any of that through an evaluation. It had to be done by actually sitting there and seeing the chaos and boy was it chaotic. So I’m often asked was this successful\, you know? But it is\, but changes of this nature is going to be messy and it has to be messy in order for outcomes to actually change. I’ll just stop to say the real shift I saw at the end of this whole exercise was in the staff room\, teachers were still complaining about all the same things. For an external observer\, this was all noise\, sound and fury signifying absolutely nothing. But if you paid a little bit of attention while they were complaining\, they were also talking about\, the kid in the last row is very far away from being able to pass the exam. Maybe I need to think about a slightly different way of teaching the child. That is a huge shift. COVID comes along the way\, two years school is closed. And suddenly schools reopen. Some state governments like Tamil Nadu did a lot. Delhi\, my children go to a private school\, they went back to private school after two years and suddenly they were supposed to behave as though nothing happened. The government schools tried to do something serious\, building up on all of this effort that had been introduced\, all these small missions that cumulatively came to something. And it really showed post-COVID. When there was nothing to be blamed\, except an act of God for the fact that no one was learning. And teachers knew that they had to think about this learning loss inside the classroom. So they then picked up all that they learned over those three years before the schools closed and began to apply it in the classroom. And then you really saw the conversation shift because they were literally talking about the last three kids who maybe need some special ed because they have been coming and despite all these camps they haven’t actually progressed because teachers were not kind of following progress. Of course eventually the exams came and that became the focus and it all went back. But there had been a mindset shift in a little bit of what the teachers were thinking about the classroom and the school. And that\, to me\, was a real change in the real state capacity. That’s what state capacity is. It isn’t about transferring money into a bank account. It is about engineering these careful shifts in the minds of all who are actual participants and deliverers of public services. \n\n\nSalimah Samji I hope you get a sense of the complexity\, right? We are often\, it’s too easy to think of things as success or not success\, and that\, I would say\, is really naive way to think about development. For anyone who’s done any real development\, it’s always messy. It is always messy\, and it is a process. But having an understanding of this can really help figure out\, you use this nice word in your book about finding these spaces. And I’m wondering… If my last question\, and then we’ll open up to questions from the audience. You identified levers of change\, right\, in all of these three years of work. Maybe you can share those\, and we’ll then open up to questions. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Sure\, in all this mess\, there were some important levers of change. And again\, these are very different to how the state capacity conversation usually happens\, at least in my interpretation\, in India for sure\, which is\, you know\, what technology can we infuse? How can we perfect the panoptical so we can monitor better? How we can we bypass these middle layers of the bureaucracy and just to deliver cash into bank accounts. Which is a great help. Some of my new work is around looking at how this correlates with voter choices. So if you’re a politician\, it’s a smart move. But in all this chaos\, there’s other really interesting things that are going on. And those are what I identify as the levers of change. So one is just consistent\, constant\, regular communication\, which sometimes we say get\, you know\, and Mia Kalpa\, this is just like political brand building that is annoying and\, you know\, trying to seek attribution for change that may not actually reflect on the ground. But that consistent communication is really crucial to sending messages through the system. What was really important about the way this communication was done in Delhi was that it actually happened not just through social media and radio and all of that\, but actually through consistently being present. Now it’s possible to do in a smaller site\, like Delhi schools are\, it’s more manageable than a large state. But the fact that there was always somebody in and out from the political party\, from the bureaucracy\, kind of in the schools\, talking to the school actors made a very big difference. And the mentor teachers played a really important role in that. So they essentially over time became ambassadors of some of the ideas that were being discussed and debated as part and parcel of what the reform process was to be about. So I think that that’s one\, communication. And if you look at some of the literature on things like relational contracting\, you see that even private sector firms\, this tacit shifts\, big reforms are not about tangible\, visible things. They’re about tacit shift in culture. They only come through consistent communication. And this is not about having a communication officer that can put out a big government ad in the newspapers every morning\, but it’s much more subtle\, deeper engagement. The mentor teachers also played\, I think\, the second visible thing for me\, which kind of is what I call the principal agents of change. So this idea of having these ambassadors of change\, there are complications here because they often get very closely aligned to the political party. And we’ve now had a change of government in Delhi and the mentor teachers of your are seen as\, folks that were part and parcel of the previous government. So they’re all being sidelined. So we have to think this through a little bit more about how these ideas can get also legitimized within the structure of administration as insulated a little bit from politics\, but they play a really important role and I think it’s an important one part of this tool for me has been an important lesson. Very often when we talk about state capacity in India\, We talk about it from the point of view of the challenges of blurring boundaries between politics and bureaucracy\, that the politicization of the bureaucracy is a problem\, it needs to be insulated\, but actually no change is apolitical. You will always have this blurring. The issue is how do you blur in a way that builds capacity rather than blur in a way that de-capacitates or overly politicized\, and that’s a very different set of thinking that we need to bring to the table. And the third lever actually took me back to where I began\, which was these missions. So where did I begin? I begin by listening to bureaucrats saying\, we know how to do the mission. There’s a burial ground of pilots. My issue is routinizing. But what Delhi actually\, where it had the most success was in when it kept infusing missions. So through the course of these three years\, teachers were really resistant. They felt already burdened. They felt even though the whole effort was to try and bring them in and enhance their dignity and stature. So one of the stories that the person who was one of the reformers\, Aatishi\, who then became the chief minister of Delhi used to repeatedly like to tell as a way of positioning\, we used to have these trainings for teachers\, the teachers used to complain that they would get\, you know broken chairs and\, you know\, bad samosas. And the money that they would get as reimbursements for coming to these trainings would take six months to be delivered. So they changed that. They got tent houses to give red carpets\, proper chairs\, nice quality samosa that weren’t stale\, bottles in little bit slurry\, just stature inducing things that\, you know\, but teachers kind of were looking at all of this knowing\, yeah\, this is what politics is. Like\, you know\, our daily lives are in the classroom and it’s very undignified and very different to this and it beats out any desire to actually teach. So they were really resistant to all of this change. And then\, you know\, the CM one day wakes up as CMs do and said\, oh\, I need a new thing and said we’re gonna start a reading week. And then everyone is scrambling saying\, what is that? And\, but it converted into a reading camp that was a two week\, three week camp where children were taken out of the class in the zero period instead of doing surya namaskar\, they were doing a kind of reading thing. And the teachers\, to begin with\, really hated it\, but slowly\, slowly\, slowly started seeing change. And then they built onto this layers and layers of missions. These missions were in the context of the school\, in the context of a classroom. And each with each one\, you saw progressive breaking down of kind of sites of resistance and opening up to thinking that\, oh\, maybe some something different is happening here. So this kind of the missions have to be consistent. All of this together\, of course\, requires political will. That political will has to have degrees of consistency. What was really interesting about Delhi is that the political party took its schools as a means to gain political legitimacy\, which is rare\, particularly in North India. And it kind of became part and parcel of what differentiated this party from other political parties. Whether voters voted because of what was done in schools is an open question and a hard one to answer. But this political legitimacy in short degrees of consistency. But I\, you know\, and I think that’s what made it interesting because we could bracket political will and then actually look at what’s happening inside\, you know beyond that. But all to say\, political will is important\, but it isn’t sufficient to make change. All these other things are understanding the base in order to create reforms and identifying what I call interstitial sites of change is where state capacity gets built. So I end by saying state capacity to me and that’s the biggest lesson is about the interstetial sites of the state where you identify levers that you can leverage to carefully and slowly motivate. Part of it is to build out the intrinsic motivation. But of course\, we are all humans and not everybody is fully intrinsically motivated. But the other part of it is slowly introducing tacit cultures of change within the context of the bureaucracy. I find it slightly embarrassing to go to Salimah and say\, you know\, I didn’t show up to school 25% of this academic year and therefore get legitimized for not showing up. I know that Salimah will take me a little bit more seriously if I say to her\, oh\, you know I went to work and I actually wrote a book and can we talk about it? So my account starts shifting and the way in which I seek legitimacy and status within my job starts getting a different identity. And that’s\, to me\, where state capacity will be built. So the more panopticons we build\, the more it is a sign of a state that has no capacity rather than a state\, that is enthused with some capacity. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAbout the Talk\n\n\n\nIn this talk\, Yamini Aiyar\, senior fellow at Brown University’s Watson Institute and former president of the Center for Policy Research in Delhi\, shares her path from a pivotal 2010 meeting in Bihar to a groundbreaking three-year ethnographic study of Delhi’s government schools. The story begins when Aiyar noticed a contradiction: RCT evidence showed that teachers in Bihar could improve student learning in controlled summer camps using “teaching at the right level” methods\, yet these same teachers failed to sustain any improvements when returning to regular classrooms. Instead of accepting the conventional explanations for teacher incompetence or lack of political will\, Aiyar recognized something more profound: the same people behaving differently in different contexts suggested a systemic problem within the bureaucracy itself. When Delhi’s new government made education reform a political priority in 2016\, Aiyar took the opportunity to conduct a study of 337 classroom observations across 8 schools\, 200 teacher surveys\, and an analysis of 2\,000 government circulars over three years. She sought to document what really happens inside the black box of India’s education bureaucracy. \n\n\n\nAiyar’s findings reveal that India’s frontline bureaucracy operated within a hierarchical\, order-driven culture where nothing moves without official circulars\, where teachers structure their entire day around responding to directives\, and where attempts to introduce flexibility paradoxically create paralysis. As one teacher explained: “If you’ve told us to drive with GPS and then suddenly shut it off\, how are we supposed to function?” Real change came not from top-down mandates or technology solutions\, but through what Aiyar calls interstitial sites\, or small spaces within the system leveraged through consistent communication\, mentor-teachers serving as ambassadors of change\, and repeated missions like reading camps that gradually shifted teacher mindsets.  The clearest evidence came post-COVID\, when teachers spontaneously began discussing individual students’ learning needs rather than just exam pass rates. This was a fundamental cognitive shift that took years of incremental work. Aiyar concludes that genuine state capacity isn’t built through surveillance and monitoring systems (which signal a lack of capacity)\, but through the patient cultivation of tacit cultural changes that make bureaucrats seek legitimacy through different behaviors\, transforming how they understand their roles and relationships within the system. \n\n\n\nSpeaker Bio\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nYamini Aiyar is a public policy scholar and is currently Visiting Senior Fellow\, Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia and Watson Institute\, Brown University\, USA. Previously\, she was President\, Centre for Policy Research\, New Delhi (2017-2024). Her research interests span the fields of public finance\, social policy\, state capacity\, federalism\, governance\, and the study of contemporary politics in India. Throughout her career\, Aiyar has worked in leadership roles to nurture institutional spaces that innovate using social science methods to produce empirically grounded\, policy-relevant research on the Indian state and contemporary policy challenges. She has published widely in academic publications and the popular press\, and writes regularly on current affairs and policy in mainstream Indian newspapers. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/lessons-in-state-capacity-from-delhis-schools/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251016T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251016T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T013610Z
CREATED:20250911T153842Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T013610Z
UID:28771-1760572800-1760659199@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Finding Purpose in Turbulent Times
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeaker\n\n\n\nShaun Tomson\, World champion surfer\, best-selling author\, and leadership expert \n\n\n\nHighlight Reel\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nShaun Tomson On the 24th of April\, 2006\, I had a terrible personal tragedy. I lost my beautiful 15 and a half year old son\, played a dangerous game at school\, bad choice. And since that time\, I’ve taken my life in a completely different direction. I was an entrepreneur\, I was a businessman\, and I went down a different path\, a path of purpose. And I now speak to hundreds of thousands of people across the world at some of the most famous learning institutions\, never spoken at Harvard before\, and I’m very excited to speak to you. I speak to the largest corporations in the world. I speak schools\, I speak prisons\, rehab clinics\, sports teams\, SEAL teams\, all sorts of different people and different groups about our purpose. And what I’ve realized over the last 20 years since I’ve been doing this\, our words have got great power. Yes\, the words of inspirational leaders like JFK have incredible power too. But the words of transformation are our own words. Our own words that can create personal change and through that personal change\, we can create change in the lives of others and in the societies of others. So\, words have got power to change our mind state. Mind state\, how we feel about life. So I wanna ask all of you a question. I want you to text me\, bust out your phones. I know you’re eating. But if you can bust out your phones and I want you to text me one word that describes how you feel about life. Let me put the QR code up again. Just one word that describes how you feel about life right now\, it’s anonymous. So just text a word about how you feel about life right now. And I’ll show you something interesting. So one word\, and hopefully\, magically\, it’s gonna appear on the screen here. Happy\, chaotic\, indifferent\, gratitude\, uncertain. Keep the words coming. We’ll give it about another 60 seconds. Confused\, overwhelmed. And you can see there’s a duality\, and there’s always a duality. Confused\, overwhelmed\, happy\, grateful. So I would say it’s most probably about 80% negative. So I started doing this in March 2020\, when the world shut down during COVID. My first client was the hottest company in the world at that time. It was called Gilead Sciences\, a biotech company that had the only treatment in the World for COVID called Remdesivir. And these are results from that company. These were all fully employed people. None of these employees had any risk of being fired. And these were their results. Exhausted\, disappointed\, anxious\, uncertain\, not dissimilar to the words that you have sent me. As COVID started to dissipate\, the malaise started to lift from around the world. This is another company exhausted\, excited\, confused\, eager. This was yesterday for two of Matt’s classes of maybe about 80\, 90 students\, anxious\, challenged\, duality\, optimistic\, opportunity. What I’d seen over the last five years since COVID started\, this was the malaise afflicting the world. The mindset\, stress\, anxiety\, depression\, disconnection\, I called it the sad mindset. So what I try to do with my simple method and my simple perspective\, I try to change the mindset from stress\, anxiety\, depression\, disconnection to what I call this code mindset. Commitment\, optimism\, desire\, engagement. Our words have got unbelievable power to change our mind state. When I walked in and saw those wonderful words of JFK\, what can you do? And I think about other simple messages that have changed this country. Some you might not agree with\, but certainly\, yes\, we can. Make America great again. I mean\, those have been fundamental to create societal change. Words have got incredible power. So words have got great power for both negativity and positivity\, duality. Words have got power for unkindness and kindness. Words have great power to engender despair. Words have power to motivate hope. So where does this power come from? As I see it\, and as I have observed with hundreds of thousands of people that I’ve worked with\, the power comes from purpose. Purpose\, our North Star\, our mojo\, our mission. What is purpose? That’s the strict academic description of what it is. Long-term commitment to accomplish aims meaningful to oneself and the broader world. Purpose is not just about self\, about success. Purpose about doing something\, getting something done and doing something for the broader community. I like to think there’s five elements to purpose. This is a little acronym. Purpose\, it’s aspirational. It’s our North Star. Purpose is inspirational. My purpose inspires me\, but it inspires my family\, my wife\, my son. And the people that I connect with. Purpose is moral\, fundamental bedrock of our existence\, part of our ethos\, part of our character. And purpose is authentic. There’s no bullshit about purpose. My purpose is a authentic to me in the same way that your purpose and mission and Northstar is authentic to you. And it’s timeless. It’s not like a smart goal\, specific\, measurable\, achievable\, relevant\, time-sensitive. Purpose is forever. So why is it important? Why is it important to have this fundamental mission? So these are interesting statistics. And I like to tell stories\, but I want to show you the statistics about the power of purpose. So this is a big longitudinal study. 73\,000 people from the University of Michigan having purpose in life makes you live longer. It actually makes you live twice as long. How about that for an inducement to live a life of mission and purpose? And then in the work context\, because all of you are either working\, you’re gonna be an entrepreneur\, you’re going to work for someone\, working with a sense of purpose leads to\, how about this\, greater engagement\, fundamental business problem right now\, motivation\, productivity\, and retention. And then this is from a big Ernst and Young study of over a million units\, business unit\, a million people\, 10\,000 business units. Purpose-led organizations perform 42% better than those that are simply in business. Why is a lack of purpose important? How about this for a telling statistic from Ernst & Young\, from Gallup. 79% of employees are not engaged at work. What does that mean? They’re not connected to their team members\, to their colleagues\, to their associates. They’re not connected to the mission of the business and they don’t dig the workplace. I mean\, the malaise of lack of a purpose. So during COVID\, I saw this issue\, man\, with all these people I was speaking to\, I saw there’s like stress\, anxiety\, depression\, disconnection. So I had lunch with a cool dude in Santa Barbara\, California\, where I live. He’s a philosopher\, famous author. I think he sold 18 million books. And we just met over lunch\, casual lunch. And he said to me\, hey Sean\, why don’t we write a book together? I told him about the malaise that was affecting the world. I said\, okay\, we’ll call it the Surfer and the Sage because he’s a philosopher\, poet. And the book was an exploration about how one can move from the darkness to the light\, how one could move from the negative to the positive. So every single chapter was about a duality\, anxious and calm\, but the negative first\, despair and hope\, doubt and faith. It was a great\, inspiring project for me to do\, is write another book\, it was my fifth book. But in the context of those troubled times to go out there and do a project to help\, to help people find light. There’s a wonderful legend here in Santa Barbara where I now live\, that we all live under the Rainbow Bridge. That Hutash\, the earth mother of the Chumash people that had been living in the area for 13 and a half thousand years\, the oldest humans in North America\, and they grew up on this island called Santa Cruz Island. Hutash planted a magic seed\, the people came from the magic seed. And in one of the first stories of sustainability or lack of sustainability. They ate through all their resources on the island\, and they started to starve. They prayed to the Earth Mother\, please send more food. She said\, now\, what I will do is I will build a magic bridge so you can cross to a new life on the mainland. It’s 24 miles across the channel. So the people crossed\, she said\, but whatever you do\, don’t look down. Of course\, when you give people a prescription\, they’ll do the opposite. A lot of the people looked down and they fell into the channel and they started to drown. She saw people drowning and she didn’t have the power to rescue them. But she cast a spell and she turned them into dolphins. So this whole channel is filled with dolphins and when I go surfing\, I ride with them. They’ll be surfing under my board or I’ll be waiting for a wave and they’ll come squeaking up next to me\, a mommy dolphin\, a little baby and I stick my head out of the water and so I keep communicating back with them\, so now I like to think that where the dolphin came down is my local beach in Santa Barbara called Hammond’s Reef and my late son Matthew and I used to love to surf this beach. And on this one particular day\, we went down to the beach to go surfing. There was no surfing. He said\, Dada\, let’s go and check out the Shumash Memorial. So\, on Shalawa Meadow\, which is dedicated to the Shumash people\, is a beautiful little memorial. You can see it’s got the dolphin figurines on it. And we ran up the beach to the memorial and you leave an offering. You leave a stone or you leave a shell. It has a beautiful inscription. The sacredness of the land lies in the mind of its people. This land. Is dedicated to the spirit and memory of the ancestors and their children\, ties us all together. So after we left the offering\, we left a shell\, he ran down the beach and he started to collect the stones that were on the beach\, and he arranged them in a large circle. And inside that circle\, we made another circle of stones. And inside the circle\, we made a third circle. And in the innermost circle\, we put down two large rocks\, and he ran off down the bridge\, got a stick\, and he said\, dada. We’re going to sit inside this sacred story circle\, and we’re gonna tell each other stories. There’s just one rule\, whoever has the stick\, tells the story. What does the other person do? Just listens\, perfect communication. So father and son sat inside the sacred story cycle. We passed that stick back and forth\, heart to heart\, eye to eye\, man\, just exchanging our love\, exchanging our spirit. And out of all the times I’ve spent on the beaches in the world\, that was the best time. And I spoke at a big Hawaiian school\, which has an endowment about the same size as Harvard called Kamehameha School\, dedicated to preserving and protecting Hawaiian heritage and culture. And the dean said to me\, when you spoke to your son\, you spoke in spirit language. And all the students put their heads down. And he said\, students\, give Shaun your mana\, your life force\, your spirit. And this wave of mana rolled across this chapel to me. It was an amazing moment. And I could feel the power of spirit and spirit language. So I got to my home and as I put my key in the door\, Matthew dug in his pocket and he pulled out a stone. I said\, what’s that Matthew? He said\, this is a sacred story stone from the sacred story circle. All the stories we told today are all inside that stone. How about that? And he put the stone right outside my door and it magically moves around the garden. And every day or some days when I go home and I listen\, I can’t feel and hear the stories\, but the power and the spirit I feel\, the spirit that’s inside that stone\, the mana that’s the stone\, the life force that we both put together in the stone. I’m hoping that all of you today have felt my spirit. You’ve felt my mana. And all of have got this tremendous power. And when you write your code\, it helps you focus\, distill\, and recode the power that you have into something even better. So I wanna ask you one more favor\, and that is bust out your phones\, and I want you to send one word that you’re gonna take home with you. Just one word\, I’ll go back to it. Just text me one word that you gonna take with you and hopefully the words will just\, did you guys get that? I’ll get the QR code. One word that you’re taking home with you. Purpose\, mana\, code\, power\, optimism\, intentionality. These are beautiful words\, agency\, purpose. These are great words. So I want to thank you all for your hour of valuable\, valuable time. It’s been a great honor to speak here at Harvard. Double Shaka\, thank you very much. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAbout the Talk\n\n\n\nIn a time marked by global uncertainty and rapid change\, legendary world surfing champion\, author\, and leadership expert Shaun Tomson introduced The CODE Method—a transformative framework designed to help individuals turn hope into action\, visualization into realization\, and desire into lasting commitment. Drawing on personal experience and deep insight\, Shaun guided participants through this powerful tool to cultivate positive\, purposeful attitudes that foster resilience and clarity in the face of turbulence. \n\n\n\nBuilt around 12 statements that individuals write and share beginning with “I will…”\, The CODE Method helps individuals and teams activate internal strength and re-engage through the power of purpose. Learn more about the CODE Method. \n\n\n\nSpeaker Bio\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nShaun Tomson is a world champion surfer\, best-selling author\, and leadership expert with over 20 years of keynote speaking experience. He developed The CODE Method\, a transformative framework that empowers individuals and teams to build resilience\, ignite engagement\, and lead with purpose. Shaun has inspired organizations like Google\, Disney\, and General Motors through his authentic storytelling and actionable strategies to change mindstate. As an entrepreneur\, he founded two global brands and authored three best-selling books\, including The Code: The Power of “I Will”. Shaun holds a Master of Science in Leadership and is dedicated to helping others achieve meaningful growth and sustainable success. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/finding-purpose-in-turbulent-times/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250303T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250303T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T013730Z
CREATED:20240905T174321Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T013730Z
UID:22655-1740960000-1741046399@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Inside the Political Mind: The Human Side of Politics
DESCRIPTION:Online \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nGreg Power OBE\, Founder & Board Chair of Global Partners Governance and author of Inside the Political Mind: The Human Side of Politics and How It Shapes Development \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome everyone\, we’re gonna get started. Welcome to the Building State Capability talk series today. My name is Salimah Samji and I will be your moderator. I’m the executive director of Building State Capability. We’re delighted today to have Greg Power with us. Greg is the founder and board chair of Global Partners Governance and the author of Inside the Political Mind: The Human Side of Politics and How It Shapes Development. I mean\, how pertinent is that topic given the world we live in today? So we are extra delighted to have Greg with us at this time. He has been a special advisor to the UK Minister Robin Cook and Peter Hain. He has been involved in constitutional and democratic changes since the mid 1990s. And since 2005\, his organization\, Global Partners Governance Practice\, has helped to strengthen political systems across Asia\, the Middle East\, North and sub -Saharan Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. He has worked in the weeds of politics in more than 60 countries\, helping politicians and officials find solutions to today’s problems while building the resilience of their institutions. Welcome\, Greg. We are really honored to have you with us today. I just wanna give all of you who are here a sense of how this presentation is gonna go. Greg is gonna start off by doing a presentation on his book and sharing some key insights. I will then as moderator ask him a few questions and then we will take questions from all of you. If you have questions while Greg is speaking or at any point\, please feel free to use the Q&A feature on Zoom and we will basically pick the questions from there and ask Greg. With that\, I’m gonna turn it over to Greg. Greg\, welcome again and I look forward to hearing your presentation. \n\n\nGreg Power Salimah\, thank you very much. And apologies to you all that I’m not actually with you. Salimah knows I’ve been trying to get to you physically for about nine months and have just failed for all sorts of reasons\, but this was the next best thing. So thank you for having me. What I’ll do is I’ll dive straight into the presentation. I will aim to talk for sort of 20 to 25 minutes. Salimah\, if I’m talking for too long\, please do interrupt and stop me because there is a risk that I could just keep talking unless I’m stopped. So. As Salimah mentioned\, this presentation is about the content of my book which came out last year called Inside the Political Mind and that book was pretty much an attempt to try and capture some of the stuff that we have been doing. As Salimah mentioned\, I started off my career in British politics\, worked in the British government and since 2005 been working internationally. We’ve done sort of mainly worked with parliaments and political parties but also with ministers and civil servants and worked with a whole variety of aid agencies and implementers right across the world. The book was an attempt to try and capture some of the insights from some of that work\, but also it’s partly a criticism of the way of a lot of international work has been done when it comes to politics. And I obviously exclude the Building State Capability Program from this because we think very much alike on these subjects\, but an awful lot of international support to politicians and to political institutions tends to focus much more on process than it does on people. And my experience of working in more than 60 countries has reinforced the fact or two facts. Firstly\, every single country in which we’ve worked is different. They all have their own specific peculiarities and differences. But the more you work with politicians\, the more you start to see some of the commonalities as well. And the key thing is that politicians are human beings. And when you’re working with them\, they behave like human beings quite a lot of the time. And that often gets in the way of sensible reform for reasons which I will explain. And I’ll start – I’ll try and capture some of this with an analogy about traffic. Now\, wherever you are in the world\, the the rules of the road\, in theory\, the highway code is you’d have it in the UK or the rules for driving are pretty similar\, wherever you are. And going to any country\, you broadly understand this. The stop signs look pretty similar wherever you are. They all conform to the same sort of basic principles. The road furniture will be the same. You’ll have a green man to tell you when to cross the road and when not to cross the road. The junctions you see\, you’ll have white lines down the middle of the road\, you’ll have those sorts of junctions\, you’ll have stop signs\, you’ll have traffic lights. However\, given all those similarities\, learning how to drive in another country is far less about these formalities than it is about human beings who are inside the cars\, because then you get to somewhere like Cairo. And I have a lot of my wife is from Cairo\, so I have a lot of affection for the place\, but it’s also\, if any of you have been stuck in traffic jams in Cairo\, it is an inordinately frustrating place to be stuck in a traffic jam. And when you first get there the traffic doesn’t seem to make any sense whatsoever. All the rules which I had thought were normal when I got to Cairo didn’t seem to apply at all. But the more you’re there the more you start to see the patterns emerge. You start to see the logic that has emerged from all of these drivers interacting with each other millions of times on a daily basis and norms start to evolve. You start to understand how you drive in this place. And as I say\, learning how to drive in a different city is far less about what the formal rules say than it is about the norms of driving that have evolved through all of those millions of interactions. And what that highlights is the difference between what the rules say and what the rules mean in practice. So as I say\, the road furniture will always look the same wherever you are\, but the norms will have developed over a period of time and then logic starts to emerge. The problem\, as that last bullet point highlights\, is that none of this improves the traffic and often it makes it worse. And I’ve encountered\, I mean\, I’m using Cairo as an example\, because I know it very well\, but I had similar experience in Delhi\, in Nairobi\, in Kuwait city where invariably I’ve been in a taxi and said to the taxi driver\, well\, the driving is very difficult here. And the response I always get is\, oh\, it’s perfectly safe\, provided by a pause\, and then provided you know how to drive here. And it’s that question\, provided you know how to drive here\, which is key to understand it. Just to use another example\, if any of you have been to another city\, the first point at which you try to cross a road at a pedestrian crossing for the first tim\, you often will not know whether the traffic is going to stop for you until you put your foot into the road. But everybody there does know it. It’s understanding the assumptions and the insights and the norms to which driving and traffic conforms in each of the different places. The problem\, as I say in that last bullet point\, is that this process of driving will make sense in the short term. What it doesn’t do though is improve the traffic and it often makes it worse. And the parallel here with politics is very applicable. This is that\, that photo is from Tanzania. We’re working with some politicians in Tanzania. This is just outside Dar es Salaam. I spent some time with the MP there going around his constituency. And it was him who said\, what else can I do? In the context of what he said was that: I know some people coming to me today. If I don’t give them any money\, they’re not going to eat. So what else do I do in that situation? He said\, I know it doesn’t solve the problem. I know these people are going to have to come back to me in a day\, a week\, a month’s time. They’ll go and tell their friends as well. And their friends will come to me. So I’m increasing demand without the ability to increase supply. But what else can I do? That’s the logic of politics\, that’s the logic of traffic. In the same way that drivers in dysfunctional traffic systems will find ways around the system\, so too\, do politicians. Where the state is weak\, politicians will be expected to fill the gaps. And they’ll often\, the only way they can do that is by going around the formal system because the formal system doesn’t work. They’ll have to find workarounds. They’ll have to\, you know\, most of the politicians that we’ve worked with around the world will spend a lot of their time\, as this Tanzanian MP did\, giving people money\, finding them jobs\, paying for the hospital bills\, paying for their kids’ tuition fees. They have to find ways of fixing the problems because they’re expected to do it\, but also because the state is failing to do it. What happens then is a logic-sensing. In the same way that the interactions between drivers start to set the norms so voters come to prize those traits in their politicians and elections are competitions between voters who are best able to get around the system and fix the problems that their constituents need fixing. What many elections end up being is quite literally MPs proving their worth to their politicians. They have to show that they have the means to help their citizens or can get access to those funds\, that money\, those resources\, have the ear of the ministry in order to fix those problems. And they’re competing on that basis for votes because that’s what voters want. But none of this addresses the underlying problems. And the catch -22 is that it’s expensive\, inefficient\, and largely ineffective. Most of the politicians that I’ve worked with doing the constituency work\, there’s a double-edged sword for this work in that they get almost\, most of their rewarding stuff that they do is in helping people locally\, because they’re often facing very\, very serious problems. And there’s a huge sense of personal reward. If you can give somebody money so that you make sure that they eat\, or if you can find them a house\, or if you can give them access to the benefits that they need or get their kids into a school\, that will give you a sense of fundamental reward as a human being. What it doesn’t do is solve the problem in the long run. And the book explains at some length\, how this constituency work is a useful thing to understand about what motivates politicians\, why they do what they do. And as I’ve come on to how you might address some of that\, the challenge and the distinction I make in the book\, I think there are three key points to make\, three key principles around which the book is built. The first is understanding the difference between what the rules say and what the rules mean. As I said\, a lot of international assistance in this space tends to focus on what the rules say\, but spends much less time on what the rules mean. Secondly\, there’s the importance of the human factor. Ultimately\, the way in which systems function is down to what motivates individual human beings. And you need to understand what’s motivating those human beings in order to understand why the system is working the way that it does. And thirdly\, what you end up with is systems or behavior\, which is entirely logical\, but not very rational. And what I mean by that is that in the short term\, as I said\, you know\, the lessons of the drivers\, if you’re stuck in a traffic jam in the middle of Cairo\, you will focus on what you need to do to get to your destination as quickly as possible today. If you asked any of those drivers in Cairo or Delhi or Nairobi\, would you like a better traffic system\, which works more effectively\, they would only have one answer\, which is of course\, yes. But that’s the rational answer. But they’re powerless to do that. In the same way as the politicians faced with a state that doesn’t function properly. You’re largely powerless to do much about that in the short-term. You have to fix problems today. You have to get to your destination today. And so you do what is logical. Even though by doing this\, you’re making many of the systems work\, the politicians that we’ve worked with will recognize that by going around the system\, politicians in these sorts of contexts get good at going around the system. But arguably\, they’re further undermining the ability of the state to actually strengthen its own structures and processes so that it can fix those problems in a more rational way. And that tension between what’s logical and what’s rational is what sits at the heart of the book. So the book then\, the last part of the book tends to go through four broad principles and focusing on a much more behavioral approach to political reform. The first\, and Matt Andrews work was very useful when I started thinking about all of this probably a decade or so ago\, and I very much enjoyed his book on the limits of institutional reform and development. And the book itself highlights a number of international interventions which tends to focus on form rather than function\, on process rather than people. And the example I use in the book\, having been to Afghanistan about a decade ago\, you could argue that by many standards\, the international interventions in Afghanistan were highly successful. In that\, they created almost exactly the constitutional architecture and the institutional furniture that the international community was trying to create. What they failed to do was take the people inside those buildings with them. So although the institutions of politics had changed in Afghanistan\, culture of politics hadn’t changed at all. People kept doing exactly what they had been doing\, just in slightly different surroundings and\, you know\, slightly more efficient\, in a slightly more efficient way. That’s the problem. I mean\, there are\, as I say in that last bullet point there\, there’s what is often good on paper is not so good in practice. Just because you’ve changed the structure of the institution doesn’t mean that people’s behavior is going to change. A lot of the patterns of political behavior in most of the countries in which we work are deeply embedded in you know\, the culture\, the norms\, the social expectations of what the local leaders should do. And these often predate the introduction of formal political institutions. And what you’ve got often is a very informal political culture trying to operate within the limits of formal institutional structures. And you get tensions at many levels there. The key point and that first part of the first principle of change is that from John Cotter is that change sticks when it becomes the way we do things around here\, but all change is ultimately behavioral change. The point of changing an institution\, changing a process\, trying to change the formal structures is to provoke a different form of behavior to improve the way that people are performing within those institutions. You get people better at their jobs to encourage different patterns of behavior\, new techniques\, new skills\, etc. That’s the first principle. The second then\, and the book borrows quite heavily from a set of well from three or four different disciplines from comparative politics as will be evident\, but also from behavioral economics and from change management in the business world. The behavioral economic stuff is really useful. And I’ve been talking to people in the behavioral insights team in London about some of this stuff. And what’s striking is that an awful lot of the way that behavioral science is used in the international sphere in particular is often about getting the public to do things differently. To get people to eat different things or wash their hands more regularly or hygiene\, whatever it might be. It’s very rarely applied to institutions and the process of institutional change. But there are huge insights from behavioral economics which are very useful here. And the key\, I mean\, I think the central thing to understanding how political institutions function\, and I mean\, every organization and the difficulty of change is the power of loss aversion. Now\, some of you will probably be familiar with some of the work that’s been done by Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler and others about loss aversion and the willingness of people to take risks. And all these behavioral experiments tend to show that people are only willing to take gamble or to take a risk if the benefits are roughly twice the value of what they might lose. So basically in order to take a bet\, which is going to cost you $5\, you have to win at least $10. So you’re potentially doubling what you’ve got. But the problem with a lot of behavioral economics stuff is that because it’s economics\, it tends to focus on money as the main currency. But in politics\, the stuff that’s at stake when you are\, when change is in the air\, is in many ways much more important than money. It’s about everything that defines you as a politician. It’s to do with power\, authority\, status\, and in many of the places in which we have worked the challenge\, we’ve had conversations with senior politicians who just did not want to contemplate the prospect of change because of the risks that it might bring with it. It wasn’t they weren’t even willing to engage with the pros and cons of the individual reforms. It was just a fact that as one there was a chief whip that I worked with in in the UK who who I had a conversation with about some of this stuff about you know the importance of reform and went with what I thought were really useful insightful arguments to persuade him and at the end of my long\, you know\, efforts to persuade him to support these reforms he just looked at me and said\, yeah\, look\, we know the systems aren’t perfect\, but we know how to operate it. And he said\, essentially\, what he was saying was that\, you know\, the merits of these changes you’re proposing\, you know\, absolutely\, I’m not going to argue with them\, but they come with a risk. And I’m not willing to take the risk because\, you know\, at the moment\, I know where my power is and I know how to use it. And I think the challenge of reform\, the challenge of\, and the power of loss aversion is hugely underestimated. As many of you will know\, you know\, change management from the business world\, there’s libraries full of books on change management\, most of which spend time explaining why change is so hard\, why people do not like to change. This seems to be magnified when it comes to policy\, because as I say\, what’s at stake is to do with power\, authority\, status\, everything which defines you as a politician or as a minister. What the book argues\, and I go through the process of change in a number of different parliaments around the world\, is that the successful reforms tend to be combining personal interests with a higher political principle. You know\, whenever change is in the air\, the first\, for everybody’s first thought is how is this going to affect me? That might not be the determining factor in whether you support the change or not\, but it’s always your first thought\, how am I gonna be affected by this? And change initiatives need to start by understanding what change feels like when you’re on the inside of an institution and you need to persuade people that the change is gonna benefit them personally\, but also that they will be supporting a bigger\, wider\, broader political principle. The third principle in the book then is how you use reciprocal exchange as part of that reform process. There’s an academic called Joel Barkan who did some really useful work on the development of African parliaments during the early 2000s. And his analysis of the Kenyan parliament was very interesting. What he\, what he did was that he\, he\, he argued that\, well\, the process of reforming the Kenyan Parliament was one which went from\, the Kenyan Parliament went from one of the weakest parliaments on the African continent to one of the strongest in the space of about 10 years\, which is a remarkably quick turnaround for that sort of change to happen. And it was largely down to a guy called Oloo Aringo who had been a minister but was then became a reforming MP working against the government in which he had been a minister. And his insight was that you needed to persuade\, you needed to appeal to both the the reforming side and the opportunistic side of politicians brains in order to get that change to happen. He recognized that for the parliament to strengthen itself it needed to have its own budget because it was entirely dependent on money coming from government to start with and for as long as it was dependent on that government money it couldn’t really control its own agenda or its work or employ its staff. However\, he also knew that there was a level of self-interest involved in this\, namely\, if the parliament could get hold of the budget and control the budget\, it could then determine how much MPs were paid. And he played on both of these things. As I said in the previous slide\, the argument was both to do with self -interest and political principle. There was a principle involved that parliament should have the ability to control its own budget. But secondly\, there was a certain self interest\, which is we can pay ourselves more\, we can have more researchers\, we can get better offices\, all those sorts of things. Now in Kenya\, as some of you will be aware\, at one point\, Kenyan MPs were amongst the best paid in the world as a result of this. So it’s not an unalloyed success\, but it did achieve what what Aringo was after\, in that the parliament did dramatically strengthen itself. And the book talks through a number of different examples from the political world about how politicians have used the process of reciprocity and negotiation of trade-offs in order to appeal to both of those sides of the of the political brain to both the the altruistic and the egotistic at the same time. The Cialdini book\, if any of you want to read it\, is a cracking book on how to persuade people\, his first principle being one of reciprocity. But it was summed up for me by that quote at the bottom. I was working with the Irish parliament in the early 2000s and the chief whip of that parliament when I asked him how he had successfully driven through a whole series of reforms quite quickly looked me squarely in the eye and somebody said to me you have to make sure that everybody gets something. You have to maximize the winners and minimize the losers if you’re going to succeed in getting change to happen. And then the fourth principle\, this is the last principle\, is one\, again\, which draws heavily from behavioral economics. The principle of thinking big and acting small. But I mean\, the first time I heard that phrase\, I was in Baghdad\, we’d been working with the government and the parliament in Iraq since about 2008. And when I was first there\, I asked one of them\, the people who’d already been there for a couple of years working with the prime minister’s office\, you know\, what advice would you give me\, you know\, about how to get meaningful change here? And he said that\, he said\, the thing you have to think big\, but act small. Progress is going to be slow. It’s going to be difficult. It’s going to be arduous. You need to be clear about the bigger objectives you’re trying to get to. But\, in order to get there\, you’re gonna have to take a huge number of very small steps in order to make this progress. And this was the Banerjee and Duflo work I’m sure some of you will be familiar with\, which really is built around this principle of trying to get small change in small spaces and then building it outwards. And that line really resonated with me\, that first line about how international assistance is often structured\, which is we shouldn’t do anything unless we can do everything. I’ve spent the last 20 years talking to different aid agencies about programs that they are trying to implement\, and they always end up being far too ambitious\, far too unrealistic about what they might achieve\, but they don’t get funded unless they promise to change the whole political scene in the space of three to five years. But everyone knows they’re not going to achieve that\, but they have to promise it to start with\, this sense that we shouldn’t do anything unless we can do everything. It’s much better to focus on the small stuff first. And it’s\, again\, I borrowed from some of the work of the key people at the center of the Building State Capability Program on some of those principles\, those challenges that you have in international assistance of over-ambition\, premature load-bearing and political resistance. They are always underestimated when it comes to international assistance\, trying to do stuff in the governance and political sphere in most of the places in which we work. As one Iraqi MP said to me\, when we first started doing that\, as I mentioned\, we were there. We started working there in 2008 and USAID at that time were running a project with the parliament\, which I think had a budget of about 35 million dollars a year\, I think. And the department was filled with implementers from different agencies scurrying around\, trying to get things done. And the Iraqi MP says to me\, we’ve got no control over this. It feels like we’re the ones that are being implemented. And\, you know\, there was a limited amount of lasting effect because of that sort of approach. The last thing I mention\, I will wrap this up in a minute. The last thing I’ll mention\, the Scott book is a cracking book\, Seeing Like a State. And\, I mean\, just generally\, I’m sure a lot of you are familiar with his work. But the idea of metis\, which he talks about in the book\, is a really useful one for understanding how politics develops\, how it works\, why it works when it does work and why it doesn’t when it doesn’t. This idea of metis is often translated\, a Greek word which is often translated as cunning. The way that he interprets it is metis is the sort of skill that you develop by engaging with a constantly moving terrain. So the example he uses\, for example\, is when\, if you’re trying to learn to sail a boat\, there is one thing to be learning\, you know\, the techniques of how you sail\, you know\, how you get the sail up\, how you use the rudder. The metis comes in reading the waves and the weather and the wind and anticipating what’s gonna happen. It’s like playing any sport. If you’re playing football or basketball or any sport\, you’re engaging with a constantly moving opponent. So it is one thing to learn how to dribble a basketball or kick a football\, but it’s something else to anticipate what the people you’re playing against are going to do and how you counter that. And that’s Metis. And Metis is essential to being an effective politician. And it’s\, it’s hugely underestimated those sorts of skills that you build up over time\, by engaging with your subject by engaging with it\, you know\, difficult topics by engaging with something which is constantly moving. The best politicians are the ones that\, that have that\, that metis. So\, to wrap up very quickly\, those four principles just to reiterate. the key to the reforms are people over process that you know it’s individuals over institutions understand what the institution looks like from the inside what does it look like through the eyes of the politician or the minister. Secondly if you’re going to try and get change it’s no good solely appealing to principle you need to recognize that personal interest will always have an effect on how people approach their own principles. Thirdly\, the importance of reform sorry reciprocity as a key element of reform. And then fourthly\, get the small things right. And if I was going to leave you with one final thought\, it’s that from Rory Sutherland\, who\, as it says\, there is Vice Chairman at Ogilvy\, the advertising agency\, who points out in that book\, which is\, again\, a very entertaining book\, you should never denigrate a behavior until you’ve worked out what purpose it really serves. And a huge amount of international assistance still doesn’t do that. It still is based on. walking into other countries and saying you’re doing this wrong why are you behaving like this this doesn’t make sense. You need to start by working out why it does make sense to the people who are doing it because there will always be a logic there and you just have to find it and I’ll finish there. Salimah\, back to you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you so much\, Greg. That’s been really great. We at Building State Capability often say policy is about people. We talk about how change is hard and we do talk about personal interests. I really love your whole point on humans are logical\, but not rational. Sometimes we like to explain\, especially the last point you made. I love that quote. Status quo prevails for a reason. It’s not\, you can call it unfair. You can call it whatever you want\, but it prevails for a reason and understanding why\, who is getting what out of the status quo really helps you start to peel that under that onion\, if you will\, of what is really going on. So I really appreciate this. You know\, we are living at a time and I had said that earlier in my intro\, of how great the timing is. I know we had wanted to have you in the fall and then that didn’t work out. But I almost feel like this is much better for these times\, the turbulent times and uncertain times we’re living in where the public sector is really under attack\, not necessarily just in the U.S. We see it in the ripple effects around the world. So how would you\, what would you say about how one uses the insights and the four principles that you’ve developed to be able to think through this new world order that is continuing to change. \n\n\nGreg Power Yes\, I mentioned that this has come up in previous talks\, which I’ve done as well\, and I still don’t have a great answer for it\, because it is so\, you know\, so seismic. And I think I’d say three things in terms of the themes in the book\, I guess there are three. The one is that the appeal of this sort of disruptive populism is again\, I think\, logical\, but not rational. And if I take the example of Brexit in the UK and what’s happened to British politics over the last decade. When we had the vote on whether to leave the European Union or not\, lots of people assumed that that vote was already won\, that it would be absolutely nonsensical for the UK to leave the European Union. What they’d missed was the fact that for the previous six years\, and actually since 2008 since the financial crisis. The government\, in trying to balance the books\, had implemented a policy of austerity\, cutting benefits and reducing public spending. Now this affected\, if you’re at the margins of society and weren’t doing well to start with\, you were most deeply affected by those cuts. By the time you get to 2016\, after eight years of this\, and you’re offered a vote\, lot of people were thinking\, well\, how much worse can my life get? Well\, let’s try something different. This is\, you know\, this is\, it’s clear that\, you know\, lots of people’s living standards have declined. And there are some\, I mean\, there’s some very interesting graphics\, which I’ve seen recently about productivity and real earnings in the UK over the last\, well since 2008\, which really highlight the problem. But off of that vote It might\, this might not be a rational\, any\, any rational argument would have said\, you know\, UK\, the UK has to say in the European Union\, it would be nuts to leave. But the logic\, the powerful logic of something which is very different at that point was\, was absolutely appealing to a lot of people. And that’s\, you know\, to a large extent\, the appeal of\, of Trump as well. And a lot of the other populist leaders that you’re seeing around the world is what we’ve lost sight of is that for a lot of people their living standards have stalled or declined over the last 15 years and faced with a choice of well do you want more of the same or do you want something really different which might carry a risk with it you’re thinking well the risk is not that great for me because my life’s not that great to start with so let’s take the risk. So that’s the first point the second point I’m sorry I’ll try and compress this because I was going to try and ask this in more short order. I think the what you’re seeing with the second Trump administration in particular is a deliberate disruption of the norms which have previously existed\, which\, you know\, both\, you know\, both Brexit and Trump 1 and now Trump 2 were\, the polarization which has emerged from that is a product of the fact that\, you know\, already the arguments were heated about on both sides of whether you supported Trump or against Trump\, supported Brexit or not. But\, the disruption of those norms has made those arguments even more incendiary in that both sides somehow feel the other side isn’t playing fair. Especially\, I mean\, especially true in Brexit\, where the people who wanted to remain thought that the referendum was only won by a tissue of lies. The people who wanted to leave thought that the Remainers wanted to ignore a democratic referendum. And you can see parallels again in the States with Trump about the good\, it’s not just a disagreement with the policies\, but it’s the way in which Trump is implementing those policies\, which is clearly illegal in many respects\, and ignoring\, you know\, the power of Congress and the law\, in order to get things done like the abolition of USAID and various other things. That’s what’s heating stuff up to a point where it becomes really incendiary. In the book\, at the beginning of the book\, there’s a short chapter about why parliaments fight. If anybody’s interested. there is a website called Parliamentary Fights\, where you can go and watch MPs knocking lumps out of each other. And I use that as an interest for the book to explain\, you know\, when the norms of normal interaction are being breached\, that’s when the fighting starts. That’s when tensions really get\, it goes from just an argument about policy to one\, which becomes much more personal and visceral. And then the third point\, which sort of links to the book is that the disruption of those\, you know\, the large part of the book is about how organizations depend on much more an acceptance of what the rules mean rather than what the rules say. In learning any job\, I mean\, you don’t go in and read the rule book in order to learn how to do your job. You learn by watching what other people are doing and absorbing some of the patterns and the accepted norms and the\, you know\, how you interact with each other. What the Trump government is doing just throwing all those up in the air which means that none of those institutions will work very effectively\, if at all\, for some time because new norms will have to come in to determine how they function. So we’re in it for a period of prolonged turbulence\, I think\, whilst they… I mean\, but this is clearly their strategy to deliberately disrupt how those institutions function partly because the real\, you know\, the sharpest effects of that disruption won’t be felt probably until the end of this electoral term\, possibly into the next election term\, because that’s the way that politics will start to really realize the damage I think in two\, three\, four\, five years time\, by which point\, you know\, they will have new people to blame for why things went wrong in the same way that in the UK\, the people who supported Brexit are saying\, well\, no\, it’s not our fault. It’s all to do with everything else that’s going on\, the reason that\, you know\, we didn’t get a proper Brexit. Anyway\, that’s\, yeah\, I’ll make those three points. \n\n\nSalimah Samji As you know\, Building State Capability is housed at the Kennedy School of Government. And we train public policy professionals. What advice do you have for them\, especially in this realm of politics? You hear a lot people say\, oh\, it’s politics. It’ll just work itself out\, as though it’s not even a variable to consider. And what you’re saying\, and a lot of our work tells you\, is you can’t not engage\, like you have to engage with politics if you’re looking to get anything done. So what’s your advice? What should students or alumni be thinking about? What skills should they think about sharpening to be able to be better policy professionals? \n\n\nGreg Power I’d go\, oh sorry\, I should explain. Tell me if I’m looking slightly ghoulish. It’s dusk\, it’s now got to about 6 p .m.\, so the sun has gone down. So this room has suddenly got dark\, I didn’t think to put lights on. If I need to put lights on\, please tell me. I could look like a character out of Scooby Doo\, if I’m not careful. The\, what I go back to is the\, I mean the feminist slogan of this sort of 60s and 70s\, that the person is political. I think the political is always personal as well. it’s if you reverse that\, it’s the fact that you’re right\, you have to engage with politics at every level if you’re going to get stuff done. And you have to understand that the political is always personal. That as I said in the talk that\, you know\, politicians are human beings and they behave like human beings with all the idiosyncrasies and odd things that human beings do. And I mean\, my own personal experience is perhaps instructive because I say\, you know\, I studied politics\, did a master’s degree in political economy\, I worked in the NGO sector in the think tank world for a few years. I ran a commission on how to reform the British constitution and parliament\, then went into government to work for a minister\, a couple of ministers in the early 2000s\, and went in thinking I had all the answers. I’d spent several years writing about this from the safety of the think tank world. And suddenly realizing quite sharply that the stuff which looks fairly obvious and straightforward and sensible from the outside takes on a whole new level of complexity when you’re on the inside of government and it’s far less to do with the intellectual cogency of your arguments than understanding the political interests at work and at a very simple level. You know\, the ministers that I worked for absolutely believed in the reforms\, which I was saying we should try and implement this. But what they wanted me to do was give them a briefing paper so they could go into the cabinet and explain to their fellow secretaries of state\, the fellow ministers\, why they should support that reform. And the argument often was why should we make the government’s life more difficult? We know how to function. You know\, we know how to run these things at the moment. It’s not perfect\, but it works. So why on earth should we change things? And it’s understand what would often happen is that politicians working on the reform of Parliament of Westminster in the House of Lords. What you often find is these old objections\, which would come out of nowhere until you realize it was to do with\, you know\, just how how they did their job. What happens with with parliaments in particular and with politicians is that the biggest determinant of whether a parliament in any country is going to get stronger is whether politicians have an interest in making that parliament stronger. And that will often relate to how they do their job because it’s like anybody coming in and interfering with your job description. Why should I do this? You’re making my life more difficult. The book explains a lot of this\, but I think The key insight is that I think that the sort of work that you do\, and you know\, I mean\, the Kennedy Center for Building State Capability is invaluable stuff. But the acid test is then going inside government\, looking at what this what everything that you’ve learned from the inside of government from through the eyes of a minister or a senior civil servant\, and understanding the things that they have to manage the I’m often asked to help NGOs and charities with their lobbying and the influencing of government. And what I say to them is the key rule of lobbying is what does the world look like through the eyes of the person you’re trying to influence? If you’re going in to see a minister and want to change their mind\, what does the world look like to them? What is it that matters to them? What motivates them? And what are they trying to manage today? Those three M’s are really important and you need to start every meeting with a minister or senior official thinking about those three things: what matters\, what motivates\, what are they managing? Then the fourth question is\, what have I got that is going to help them with all of those things? And that’s the\, you know\, my experience of working for ministers was\, you know\, ministerial days filled with meetings from eight in the morning till eight in the evening\, most of which involve people coming in and saying\, you’re doing it wrong\, you need to spend more money\, you’re not taking this seriously enough\, you need to do what we think is important. The rare meeting where somebody comes in and says\, look\, we think we’ve spotted a problem that you haven’t seen\, but we can help you fix it. You will take the handoff. You will invite them in for a second meeting. And I think that’s the key to\, and often for this process\, that transition from\, if you like\, the theoretical to the practical and back again to the theoretical is I think key part of what you do and the key part of\, you know\, working in public policy. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you\, Greg. I think you’ve got some real great ways of even thinking about this for students. I love the three M’s\, for example. Just thinking about what is their perspective. I think so many times at policy schools\, you are taught to be the expert\, not to think about what is the other person thinking about? What is putting yourself in other people’s shoes? So I think that was really helpful. Thank you. We’re going to take some questions that we have received. And I’m gonna read them for you. Our first question is from Maggie Jones. We know her really well. And so she asks\, the question is around change and contingency planning. And the question is\, there has been so much change in our organization\, she works for local government in the United States\, but our higher ups are lukewarm about contingency planning because\, in quotes\, we’re not there yet. How could we talk through the benefits of contingency planning? And how can it be a helpful tool in times of change and may provide comfort rather than assumption that it will cause chaos? I’m going to throw in the second question that we have so that you can answer those two questions. Our second question comes from Cesar Nunes. We know him well too. In the slide on reciprocity\, you mentioned the key principle\, make sure everybody gets something. How do you evaluate that? And how do you be accountable as a public policy allowing that everyone would get something different. So I’ll stop there. \n\n\nGreg Power And on that second question. I mean thank you for the question\, they’re both very pertinent. On the second question about that accountability and how you make sure everybody gets something\, the book is specifically about getting changed through the inside of political institutions\, but it applies\, I think\, to most sort of organizations. The thing about parliaments\, which is where we do a lot of our work\, is that they’re very difficult to change for three reasons. The first is that there’s never any one person in charge. I mean\, if you take the Congress\, for example\, you will have a speaker\, but the speaker only controls part of the institution. There’s also an administrative part of the institution and most of the power is always contested and this is true of most parliaments in that you will have\, there’s never one person in charge of the whole institution because that’s\, you know\, that’s the way\, that’s what democracy is for\, to make sure that nobody is in absolute control. So it means that in order to get any change\, you’ve got to negotiate. There’s a good book by a guy called Eric Schickler about the evolution of the Congress called Disjointed Pluralism\, looking at how the Congress has changed over the over the last century or so. And what he points out is that the change that tends to emerge is a product of negotiation. It’s ultimately nobody gets exactly what they want. So if you’re going to try and change an institution where nobody’s in charge\, but secondly\, I mentioned there were three points. So firstly\, there’s nobody in charge. Secondly\, every politician will have an opinion about how the institution needs to change or not. And thirdly\, and perhaps most significantly\, they’ve all got a vote on it as well. In order to get that sort of change through that sort of institution\, it often has to be put to the floor on a vote. So the process of getting change to happen is one of\, you know\, constant negotiation and trading stuff off. And most of the change which happens in that process of negotiation\, nobody gets exactly what they want. But you have to be willing to trade off some of what you in order to get most of what you want. But the key thing\, and the book sort of makes this point\, is that everybody has to feel ultimately that you’re gaining more than you’re losing. And what I argue in the book is that that sort of change\, rather than taking one reform at a time\, it’s far better to bundle several reforms together so that you have a chance of maximizing the number of winners and minimizing the number of losers. And that accountability\, that understanding that negotiation is an internal political process. Ultimately\, if some people feel that they are losing out\, it’s because of that negotiating process. But the key to success for all sorts of stuff that you do and we do is to try and make sure that the vast majority of people feel that they are net beneficiaries rather than losers from that process. So that’s the point I’m making. On the first point about contingency and change\, I’m not sure I entirely got exactly what the question was. But I think the key thing – It sounded like it was to do with people at the top not taking some of these issues seriously enough. And I think the problem\, as you go up organizations… Obama\, in his memoir\, one of the insightful things he said is that by the time you’re president\, all the\, you know\, you don’t get any easy decisions. You know\, anything that’s easy to decide is filtered out at a lower stage. It’s only the really thorny stuff which happens. And there’s a couple of quotes I use in the book for the start of different sections. One is from the famous Bismarck quote that politics is the art of the possible\, the attainable\, the next best. And that’s fine\, you know\, but the last\, the very end of the book\, the last short chapter\, starts with a quote from J .K. Galbraith\, the economist who worked as an advisor to Kennedy when he was president. And in one of the notes he sent to Kennedy\, he said Bismarck was wrong. Politics is not the art of the possible. It’s about choosing between the unpalatable and the disastrous. And that’s more to do with the reality of politics. By the time you get to that stage\, if you’re at a senior level\, it’s not often that it’s just about getting the\, you know\, trying to get the best outcome. It’s often that there are no good choices\, face you. You are choosing between the unpalatable and the disastrous\, and you just need to do the least worst thing rather than the best thing. And that’s the challenge you’re facing. So the I’m not sure I’m answering Maggie’s question particularly well\, but I mean\, I think in terms of those issues of\, you know\, trying to convince the higher -ups\, it’s understanding again\, well\, what are the other choices that they are facing here? What are the trade -offs they are having to make? And how do you make the case that this is going to be both a logical and a rational solution\, that it’s going to solve a short -term problem\, which is probably what they’re facing\, as well as a long -term problem\, which sounds like the contingency issue which she’s raising there. But I’m happy to have that question clarified and try and come back. \n\n\nSalimah Samji No\, I think she said you’re doing great. Thank you. That’s direct quote. Yeah\, just thinking about the less the least worst option. And again\, putting yourself in their shoes. Why are they fighting this? What is their interest? What are they possibly worried about? I think this your earlier point on loss aversion is something that we take very seriously as well. And it’s one of the reasons why we do say change is hard is it’s always loss aversion and just trying to figure out the risks. And as you go higher in the chain\, the risks are higher. And I love your President Obama’s quote on\, you only get the worst thing. So the risks just increase\, sometimes exponentially\, as you go above the chain. And that can help people understand. I have a final question from the chat. And this question is from Lacey Jeffries. And the question is\, is it possible to discuss change in reforms in an environment where zero -sum thinking… Sorry. It just jumped. Where zero -sum thinking dominates\, how do you help people with the zero -sum mindset shift it to make space for change that benefits everyone? I think that’s a great question to end with. \n\n\nGreg Power Yeah\, I mean\, that and that really\, I mean\, it’s a good quick\, if that’s the last question\, it’s a good question to finish on\, because that’s sort of at the heart of the book. And the first part of the book is it talks about how organizations function\, how norms evolve. And it uses our experience\, my experience of working in Iraq\, and Libya and Egypt\, where they were trying to create institutions where there were no norms\, where there were no\, you know\, accepted ways of working and trying to get\, you know\, leaving aside the political divides\, the fact that each of those countries had gone through a revolution of fighting. There was a huge political divide there\, but equally\, none of them\, also none of the politicians coming in had any agreement about how the institution should function\, what it was for\, what they were there to do. And Libya in many ways\, was the most extreme version of zero -sum politics I’ve ever encountered. There was no trust anywhere between any of the politicians. And if you’ve got no trust\, it’s impossible to negotiate. Now\, what I\, the point I make in the book is that you need\, I also refer to Robert Axelrod\, Robert Axelrod’s book\, the title of which is now completely escaping me. It’ll come back to me. Which is about reciprocity and behavior and how you move away from zero -sum thinking. But the key is\, you need to build enough trust for people to be willing to trade stuff off between them. You need the key\, the people who are gonna negotiate the process of change\, you know\, just get away from zero -sum thinking\, need to believe that the other people on the other side\, also\, you need to find the commonality. There’s an example I used from Somaliland\, which did go through a process of constitutional rupture and has largely been stable over the last 20 years. And they were able to negotiate this very fractured process in a way which was more successful than many other countries have gone through something similar. One of the key aspects\, key facets of that. was that many of the people who were negotiating with each other on different sides of the political divide had been to the same school together. So even though they fundamentally disagreed with each other\, they had a basis from which at least to negotiate. And it’s building that basis for negotiation\, that working out where the commonalities are to start with\, that’s the only way you can start to get away from that zero sum thinking\, where if you’re gaining\, then I must be losing. there needs to be some sense of reciprocal exchange of\, and the book talks a lot about reciprocal altruism\, which is another interesting concept which we don’t have time to go into\, but that’s the key. It’s building that basis for negotiation\, enough trust at least\, that you’re trusting the people on the other side to deliver on what they’re gonna say they’re gonna deliver and that you have some commonality of interest\, no matter how small it is to start with\, when you build outwards from there. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful. Thank you. I mean\, trust is really key and building that from commonality. It’s really great. The former governor of Massachusetts tells a great story of how he grew up in a household where his one parent was Republican and the other one was Democrat. And he really learned that that’s the only way is finding common ground. And he said\, you know\, we always can. It may take a day or two\, but you can always find common ground because we are all coming back to your real key point that we are all human\, and that is something that binds us all. We all die. \n\n\nGreg Power On that theme\, Salimah\, the book has now come back to me. It’s The Evolution of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod\, which is a cracking book. I’m sure you’re aware of it\, but I highly recommend it for describing exactly what you just described there. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Yeah\, it’s great. Well\, what a wonderful way to end this. This has been really informative and very helpful. I’m sure even those who are not here will be able to watch the recording and get a lot of at least some insights and how they may think about doing things differently. Thank you so much\, Greg. It’s been a delight. \n\n\nGreg Power My pleasure. Lovely to be with you. Hope to be with you physically at some point soon. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Definitely. We look forward to it. \n\n\nGreg Power Thanks very much. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAbout the Talk\n\n\n\nIn this talk\, Greg Power discusses his book Inside the Political Mind and his extensive experience working alongside and within political institutions from more than 60 countries. He criticizes international aid for political institutions that focus on infrastructure rather than people. Politicians\, he emphasizes\, are people whose behavior is shaped by incentives\, pressures\, and norms. Power uses the analogy of traffic and driving in different global cities to illustrate how informal norms develop that are deemed logical\, but not rational. That is\, they address immediate problems but potentially undermine long-term solutions. He then outlines four principles for effective political reform: Focusing on people over process\, combining personal interests with higher political principles\, leveraging reciprocal exchange\, and thinking big while acting small.    \n\n\n\nPower also broaches the challenges of the present political context\, explaining how populist movements tend to emerge when people’s economic situations have stagnated\, thereby rendering disruptive change to appear logical even though it’s not rational. He explains that successful reforms must take loss aversion into account\, as politicians are unwilling to risk their power\, status\, and authority. Pulling from behavioral economics and change management theory\, Power argues that understanding politics through a human lens is critical. In other words\, one must consider what motivates individuals\, what matters to them\, and what they are managing. He concludes that building trust and finding commonality are essential for moving beyond zero-sum thinking in our increasingly polarized world.   \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\nSpeaker Bio\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGreg Power OBE\, previously a special adviser to UK Ministers Robin Cook and Peter Hain\, has been involved in constitutional and democratic change since the mid-1990s. Since 2005\, his organisation\, Global Partners Governance Practice\, has helped to strengthen political systems across Asia\, the Middle East\, North and Sub-Saharan Africa\, and Central and Eastern Europe. \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/inside-the-political-mind-the-human-side-of-politics/
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SUMMARY:PDIA in Tunisia and Jordan
DESCRIPTION:Bahrain \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nLobna Jeribi\, Implementing Public Policy Alumni 2024 \n\n\n\nTim Kornprobst\, Implementing Public Policy Alumni 2024 \n\n\n\nPeter Harrington (Moderator)\, Associate\, Building State Capability \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nPeter Harrington So I’m going to introduce our speakers\, and then they’re both going to give a presentation of their sort of experience and the PDIA experiments that they’ve had. So I’m going to start with Lobna Jeribi. Lobna\, please\, I’m sure everyone knows who everyone is\, but this is Lobna for those of you who don’t know. So Lobna\, she is a public sector director at Wayview International\, which is a consultancy in international transformation projects\, building state capability\, data driven policy\, sustainable development. She works across Africa in the MENA region. Lobna has a fascinating career. She was minister of national projects. You heard her question earlier. She was minister of national projects and reforms in Tunisia and of higher education and scientific research. She also served as an MP. She was in the National Constituent Assembly from 2011 to 2014. She was also founder and president of a civil society organization called Solidar\, which is a think tank\, which has a really fantastic reputation and does very good work\, working on all kinds of policy issues and development processes. She has a PhD in information systems and artificial intelligence from 2001\, which I think is before artificial intelligence was a thing. So something’s happening here. I know she was a professor at Sorbonne. I mean\, too many amazing things. Change management practitioner\, PDIA trainer\, implementer. So Lobna\, thank you. I will introduce Tim and then I’ll hand over to you for your presentation\, but please welcome Lobna. So Tim\, Tim Kornprobst\, who’s going to speak about Jordan. So Tim studied political science at the University of Kiel. He has a passion for international relations and development\, you know\, development aid. He has a master’s in international relations\, peace and conflict studies from Frankfurt. And he joined the German Development Institute as a research and a postgraduate fellow and discovered movements like Doing Development Differently\, PDIA\, which I think has really captured your kind of imagination. And he works for GIZ\, the German Development Cooperation Organization\, and has been really working to try and integrate PDIA and sort of cultivate PDIA within that context. So since 2022\, he’s been a technical advisor on a solid waste management project in Amman in Jordan. And he’s a researcher at Darmstadt Technical University. So he’s actually writing a PhD on PDIA. It’s a lot of letters. And I’m really excited to see what comes out of that\, actually. So lots of ideas and thinking about reforms and decentralization. His interests are very broad\, peace building. And I think you want to basically make PDIA the way that GIZ\, you know\, a core part of how GIZ works. So please welcome Tim. Thank you both. So Tim\, have a seat. Lobna\, I’m going to hand over to you to present. I’m going to be a little bit strict. I’m not as strict as Salimah\, but I’m still going to be a little bit strict. So I’m going to give you 10 minutes to present. And then we’ll then we’ll hear from Tim and then we’ll have the discussion. I’ll make sure it’s really interactive and we ask lots of questions. So Lobna\, you can have this or you can have the lectern\, whichever you prefer. You prefer this? OK\, OK. Over to you. \n\n\nLobna Jeribi Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you\, Peter. Thank you\, Matt\, for the invitation. And I’m very grateful to present our project and to for our region. And I hope that this group and this meeting will be organized in a structure to have been sustainable network and to as organization or foundation for MENA and Africa. As we have common challenges. As I don’t have a lot of time\, so\, OK\, so this project is a part of the Tunisian Public Policy Consortium called TPPC or Al -Shabaka Tunisia\, Al -Siyaset Al -Omoumiya. It’s a consortium. The aim of it is to solve complex policies. It’s a part of the social. It’s a part of a laboratory called Social Innovation Laboratory working on three innovation access\, I would say. The first one is the capacity implementation for building for implementation. Of course\, with on building state capabilities\, but on many other fields than waste management\, we are working also on water management\, forest preservation\, slaughterhouse\, etcetera. The second innovation in the laboratory\, we are working on evidence based and data policies and how we accompany government in collecting data\, analyzing data in making evidence for design and evaluation. And this is with open government partnership. And the third innovation is on coherence is using holistic approach. And the pilot project is done with the United Nations on nexus water\, energy and food. And you can find all details in our different websites. OK\, so what is TPPC? So\, as I said\, it’s a complex public policy challenges addressing this complex policies with participatory governance and adaptive problem solving. The first we choose is the waste management as a pilot project because it’s a very we have during decades trying to solve this problem. And we didn’t succeed. So what we need here as a key success is sustainable solutions through stakeholders collaboration. We need to have building capacity among various stakeholders. So this is what we construct is stakeholders here\, not only in institution\, but we have built up consortium with unions\, with private sectors\, with NGOs. So all these stakeholders were a part of our team or PDIA team. And that was the main challenge for us. And also\, of course\, to create the iterative problem solving by showing successive step by step. And this was the main challenges. Well\, so here maybe I can get in the OK\, the fishbone\, our fishbone. I would say the main challenge for our fishbone was not the fishbone by itself\, but was to make all antagonist stakeholders being making consensus on\, for example\, the problem statement. Tunisia is submerged by waste. So that it seems simple\, but we spent and Peter was accompanying us. We spent like one month between all different stakeholders to make agree on this problem statement. And that was the same thing for the sub causes that we have made. The three A approach has led us to the first entry point was addressing inadequate financing mechanism for municipal waste management. So the first entry point is the financial. That’s where we have the authority\, the acceptability and the ability. And we made iteration adaptation on three regions that you have chosen\, Sidi Bou Said\, Siliana\, and Hammem Sousse. So for the Sidi Bou Said initiative\, Sidi Bou Said is this is the map of Tunisia\, Sidi Bou Said is in\, Tunis is the capital\, so in the north. So we started having sixty five out of one hundred seventy five establishment have an agreement\, agreement with municipality on noise management. The municipality of Sidi Bou Said have fifty two thousand dinar revenue and one having at the beginning one circuit of waste collection. Both waste and citizens and business owners. I will go to the results and then I will speak about the actions. The results is that here we have one hundred and seventy out of one hundred and seventy five establishment had agreements. So they were involved with the municipality and also in waste sorting. We have the annual revenue of the municipality raised on twenty hundred and sixty thousand dinar. So we have like more five multiplied by five the revenue and improve the collection efficiency by optimizing the collection circuit and enhancing scheduling. And this was the action was mainly I would say data driven\, data making evidence. So what we first make is the establishment. So we make a census for all establishment that we have at Sidi Bou Said the waste characterization. What do we have as waste? What do we have as establishment? What are the agreement that they have? What is the real cost for the municipality of this waste? Because we were not applying the principle of polluter pay or pollute. OK. They promote the waste sorting by adjusting fees and incentive. So what we have the action that we have made is the advocacy for the business owners saying that you have to make the agreement on based on the real costs. So there are more fees or you have to make the waste sorting. So of course this engaged the majority of business owner to go to the waste sorting. And we also separate. We have two circuits: citizens’ waste and business owners’ waste. So here. Ah\, OK. This is important is that the Ministry of Interior was really inspired by these results. And we issued a circular. The circular is saying for all municipality to apply the same action plan of Sidi Bou Said to all municipalities in Tunisia. Of course\, as having success in raising revenue and I would say engaging establishment in sorting the waste. And it’s also sustainable because the municipality having the means to continue. And this is the main issue is to have sustainable solutions. For Siliana\, it was the same entry point\, but it was different actions because this is adaptation. And this is we have also low revenue from agreements. But also the diagnosis is that they have the cost of the waste collection was too high comparing to private sector. So here what we have led as action and I will go further is that we make private and public private partnership making more. OK\, I have two minutes. My God. Adjusted so here we cost reduction saving for waste management. And we have also agreed the annual revenue. And for just for Hammem Sousse\, we have it’s very advanced Hammem Sousse is in cost region and it’s very rich I would say region. So they have they are a lot advanced. And what we were able is really to improve already what was done in selective sorting and increase the citizen engagement. This is interesting because we used an application platform and that did real time monitoring and really increase the citizen engagement in waste sorting. And that was very interesting. And actually what we are doing\, we expand. So we have we were asked by our partners to work on other issues like forest management in Tabarka in the north. We continue working waste management\, but now with a regional approach. So the fishbone is regional and the process is regional. And so water management in the south\, slaughterhouse\, etcetera. I would speak about two innovation. It’s not it’s kind of OK. One minute. Oh\, my God. Two innovation\, it’s kind of learned the lessons learned of applying PDIA. The first one is that as it’s an initiative from the laboratory\, which is an NGO and the consultancy\, it’s not within the institution. So we need more authorization. That’s why we build up what we call the consortium. The consortium is larger than the PDIA team. The consortium is composed by hundred members. And this is more large stakeholders. And from the consortium. So the consortium has mandated the PDIA team. So PDIA team\, we have here only eleven members and the PDIA team is accountable for the consortium. So each one or two month\, he come back to the consortium to present results. And this was a huge lever for building authorization\, because when we show result each month\, we have doors opened in each ministries and saying\, OK\, that’s interesting. We wanted to make the same thing. So that was very interesting in creating this consortium. I would say before the PDIA team and going through the larger consortium to build the authorization. Lastly\, the innovation\, the second innovation is that for solution building and solution design\, we implied a solution incubator. This is a new that we are doing it now. And the purpose is really to create like think out of the box process with the new ecosystem\, young entrepreneurs\, startups\, technological platform to really think about like through hackathons\, to really think about the solution\, to think about other solution\, other platforms. And this was an input for the PDIA team\, very an added value to continue the work. Thank you very much. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Merci\, Lobna. Thank you. Well done. OK\, over to you\, Tim. We’ll hear from Tim and then we’ll get into the discussion. So\, yeah\, over to you\, Tim. \n\n\nTim Kornprobst All right\, all right\, all right. So\, dear friends\, it’s my pleasure to be here today and to present to you the PDIA in Jordan case in roughly 10 minutes\, but actually Salimah promised me 12 just to let you know. OK\, so two PDIA cases I will present to you today. Now\, what you see here\, I’m here in the background and this is actually my role. I’m not actually the owner of the success story. It was done by Jordanian people\, by Jordanian public officials\, but they just give me the honor to present to you what they have been doing. So\, first\, my key message for the presentation\, PDIA is possible in Jordan and in the region\, and you can have real impact. Don’t let anyone tell you something differently. You can do it. It is hard\, but you can achieve it if you are pushing hard enough and don’t take no for an answer. So\, where did we use PDIA? Quite simple\, free construction site\, organizational development and greater Amman municipality from the capital. We used it for the informal sector integration in Irbid municipality\, which is the second largest municipality in Jordan\, and we used PDIA for the reduction of business barriers on a national level. Though I have to tell you here\, this was my facilitation role here. Here\, I gave more policy advice and the colleagues are doing it and working on the barriers of the private sector in recycling. And last but not least\, I’m writing my PhD and doing a long -term study on the impact of PDIA in Jordan. All right? Clear? So\, starting with greater Amman municipality\, what did we do? Well\, our focal team in waste management under the leadership of Dr. Omar Arabiyat said the biggest problem in GAM is they have very long processes\, very long decision -making\, which hinders any effective reforms in the organizations. So\, they brought together 12 departments and staff and managers under the authority of His Excellency the Mayor\, City Manager and Deputy City Manager\, which are the executive management of the municipality\, and start analyzing the problem\, which was long processes in decision-making and solid waste management hinder effective reforms and projects. So\, they analyzed in a workshop. Why was this the case? Because there’s centralization and decision-making\, there is data gaps. We talked a lot about data today. We need better trainings to equip our staff to get the job done\, and we have overlapping tasks in all departments. So\, just as an overview for you\, this was like the basic thing we were analyzing and tried to solve. Just as an impression here\, sitting with all the departments. That’s me\, by the way\, getting translation. What they’re discussing in here is PDIA in Arabic\, the fishbone that we do\, 2022 it was. So\, basically\, this was a two and a half\, three years journey. I’m trying to break down in like four minutes. So\, we started in 2022. We got the authorization not only from the management\, but we went to all departments relevant for waste management\, from tendering\, planning\, you name it\, too many\, and asked them\, do you want to join us working on this problem? The leadership said\, yes. Are you also interested in thinking this is a really relevant problem? They said\, yes. Go for it. We are in. So\, then we had in August our first PDIA workshop where we made the first fishbone and solution analysis. Then in December\, after some delays of decision making\, meter problem\, tackling our problem work\, actually\, we got the approval. And then we didn’t have the approval anymore because our authorizer changed\, new deputy city manager\, just saying\, Halas\, I want to rearrange everything. We lost half of our team. We needed to cancel everything. But through some communication strategies\, we managed still to continue our work. And then in May\, finally\, we started with our work and our iterations. This is the short story of long\, long years. So\, what were the results or what are the results so far? Because it’s still an ongoing story. So\, what we did\, we created a data map for waste management to close those data gap in decision making from more than 40\,000 containers in the whole greater Amman municipality of 4 .5 million people living there to make more informed decision making. And you know what? The people are really using it. They use it to make better routing\, to collect the waste more effectively. And this is really reducing costs in the municipality and some pilot areas by 30 percent. And in the overall city\, the whole operation expanded by 17 percent. Only the cost only increased by 3 percent. We’re still working on it even more effectively\, but you see some indications. We are saving hundreds of thousands of dollars every year by this initiative. Now\, looking at training and knowledge sharing\, which was one of the causes of Fishbone\, you can see we have new trainings fitting towards the tasks of departments. They’re really getting equipped for what they should do in the environmental sector to really manage complex problems and not only fixing like electricity lines or something like this. Then\, better coordination between the departments. You can really see in the interviews we did together and where we are evaluating the impact that the departments now who used not to talk with each other started to talk now. They are working together. They are clear about what the others are doing. And this makes the work already much easier. And this is the beautiful side product of PDIA\, that people start to know each other and know their tasks. And this already improved the processes and decision-making in Greater Amman Municipality. So\, you can see this\, for example\, in Tendering. Two -thirds have gone from the length. Now\, where are we now? In the process\, we are scaling up PDIA in Jordan now. In Greater Amman Municipality\, the management asked us now to involve the other managers to discuss with them what we can use from PDIA to make it as a part of the organization logic because they really see as a role model how to get things done in the organization. And we are using PDIA\, for example\, in a smaller scale to solve problems in our recycling pilots we have throughout the city alright. And maybe you can now go to the next slide\, please. Does it work again? You see some pictures here. This is in KACE\, in the King Abdullah Center for Excellence. And here you see Sura\, my dear colleague\, who is helping me so much from the governance team. We were sharing the knowledge of PDIA with the most important think-tank from governance questions in Jordan. And we really hope now to share this knowledge with the whole sector. And here’s just a picture of the whole team involved in this work from all different departments. Now\, looking at the time\, running through it. It’s like a marathon\, not like a sprint now. OK\, Informal Sector Partnership. And we brought together greater Amman municipality under the leadership of the mayor\, His Excellency\, together with associations for the informal recycling sector\, those people who are collecting recyclables to make a living in Jordan. More than 10\,000 people are doing this in Jordan alone. So we wanted to improve the situation and\, on the other hand\, improve the livelihood of those people to save costs for the municipality but also get more money in the pockets of the informal sector. So we brought them together for three days and analyzed the problem. And we found out they are not recognized as a profession. They are not respected. And they have problems to get the recyclables because police is harassing them all the time to go anywhere and charging them as beggars and giving them fees and even brought them into prison. So with the administration of Irbid and the informal sector\, we started to work on this problem. And after roughly one year only\, what can we see? 10\,000 JDs\, so I think $13\,000 roughly\, are saved every month. Hundreds of people have better income. They’re feeling more respected and their families are more safe. Because we did the following. Based on the cooperation\, we had an MOU. They were legalized. They get ID cards. They get uniforms. And now allowed to work everywhere in the municipality. So\, and this is like the summary of the impact. More than 300 got an ID card. They were legalized but not officially legalized. So this is a hybrid solution. So not giving them job titles but allowing them to do their work at the end. Simple solution for complex problems. They’re earning between $30 to $120 more per month\, which is 30\, 40% more of their income\, what they usually get. And we’re saving around 250 tons per month regarding the amount of waste. Because they’re recycling more. They can collect more. They can really improve their work now. And what for me is the most important thing here\, most of them in the survey confirmed they’re feeling more respected. They have better relation with the police\, with the residents and the businesses. And they’re feeling now like a valuable member of the community. And this is something I really think is the most important thing we achieved here. So the MOU\, the cooperation was extended. They want to distribute even more ID cards. And they want to integrate these workers and other solutions. For example\, the sorting station. So\, and they became a role model for the national waste management strategy. So\, Dr. Kofahi\, the mayor\, signing with the informal sector. Here the first people getting a license. This is the pilot what we did in the sorting station where they are supporting the municipality. Coming to the last slide. Perfect. Two minutes all I need. So\, lessons learned from research and practice. This was like quite a ride\, sir. Okay\, again\, PDIA for me worked on very different problems in the waste management. It really made tangible approaches on administrative tasks\, but also really on working on social policy problems\, all right? So it worked on very different things here and proof waste management in Jordan. The challenges we see here\, it was\, how did you say it on page 57 of the toolkit? Doing PDIA is hard. I would add here doing PDIA is very hard. So\, because it is so time consuming. You have to meet so often. And you have people who are delaying you in the decision making. You have people leaving the task force because they are not really convinced that this will make a change. And you have a donor organization very rigid requirements\, which makes it hard with your indicators and your budget to really try out something new. And the question is\, after we’re leaving\, will it be sustainable? Inshallah. Only God knows. Okay\, but keys to success here for donors and other reforms is a flexible project frame\, I see. So it is really about that you give the flexibility about the measures you implement\, right? To make already the frame good for reforms or projects what you are doing. Not to all the details to have it. You have to have an agile mindset. You have to train the people on PDIA or at least the thinking behind PDIA to understand why you are doing this\, to take them with you. And you really need to focus on outcomes and problem driven indicators. We have this also in our project a lot\, actually\, that we say this is like the focus of our initiative that everybody is on the same page where the road should go. And so\, last but not least\, again\, my key message. PDIA is possible in the MENA region. And it can have huge impact. Do more of it. Thank you. \n\n\nPeter Harrington So\, thank you so much. Really fascinating. Oh\, okay\, we might not have this anymore. Well\, you need to refer to it. You can talk through. Thank you both very much for fantastic pair of presentations. I know there was a lot to say. There is a mic for you here. There is a lot to say in a short space of time. I tried to\, I gave you both a couple of extra minutes. But we have a good amount of time for discussion now. I was really struck by how much there was some really interesting parallels between your cases. But there was also really interesting differences. Actually\, where I want to start. So I’m going to\, you know\, let’s have a little bit of a discussion. I’m going to take advantage of the moderator privilege to start with a couple of questions that I find interesting. And then we’ll bring the whole group in and hear questions. You know\, have some have some some some group discussion. Where I’d like to start is is an area which can be quite challenging with PDIA and which we sometimes don’t talk about very much\, which is how do you get started? How do you how do you begin this process? So a little bit almost before you. What happened before your presentation began? How did you initiate this? How did you engage with the stakeholders and authorizers and convince them to try PDIA\, convince the participants who you wanted to be in the teams? How did you kind of sell this idea in your area? Because I think for everybody here who might like to try and use PDIA in their context\, that bit it’s almost before the page one of the toolkit before you do problem construction. How do you begin this\, create this\, get everybody in this process to get everyone in the room? So maybe Lobna you can talk a little bit about how you got started. Tim\, we can hear from you. Just how did you go about that? How did you kind of sell this? How did you convince people\, including the authorizers? \n\n\nLobna Jeribi I will start even before is that in 2019\, I led a mission with United Nation on what are the risks that is facing our country in next five years. And we studied all the risks\, security\, migration\, democratic\, everything. And after months of discussion\, structuring\, etcetera\, the conclusion was the first risk that is facing our country for development\, and this is all United Nation has used this to prioritize their action\, was the capacity of the state to make reforms. This was the first risk. So it’s the root causes of the risks. In fact\, so why you are not facing we have a problem of security because we cannot reform our country to have better security\, etcetera. So this is why the idea of the capacity building that we need to accompany our state to being more capable in implementing. And that’s why we want to so we went we were searching and we went to the PDIA and we went to the Building State Capability and we made the training. So and that’s why we are not specialized in waste management. We are specialized in transversal in organization change management\, how make things better and efficient. So we choose your waste management and say\, OK\, this is where we can find the results for this. So after having the training on the PDIA\, and of course\, our for us\, this important to make it through the consortium\, because the implementation cannot be done without having a huge multi -stakeholders around the table. So it’s first of all\, it’s multi -institution. We have how say silos\, governments. So the environment ministry never discussed with the interior ministry. Interior ministry are in charge of municipalities and environment ministry are in charge of wastes. So and they have antagonist interests. So first of all\, we need these two institutions to speak together and to have common issues. And we didn’t get this at the beginning. So we started without\, for example\, the interior ministry. We started only with environment ministry and other multi-stakeholders. And this is also the consortium. What our data has shown is that after having the results\, the interior ministry saying\, OK\, I will be part of the program and we will let people representative of interior ministry being in the PDIA team. So it was step by step and showing successes that. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Yeah. So this point about results\, results are powerful communication tools is very important. I think what’s interesting about what you’re saying is some stakeholders agreed to participate from the beginning early on. Others were unwilling. But once you got some results\, it was very helpful to persuade the unwilling stakeholders. It’s like the interior ministry to\, you know\, to join. So there’s some there’s some persuasion at the beginning\, but also results are very persuasive to bring more in. \n\n\nLobna Jeribi Excuse me. And even at the final\, we have also the presidency of government even represented because they were a lever to coordinate the communication between environment ministry and interior ministry and other agency. So they were also in the PDIA team at the end of the first mandate of the first government\, because the government has changed and we have to build everything from scratch. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Politics is very complicated. Tim\, I think this was I think you are the the the kind of instigator of this idea to try PDIA in Amman in Jordan. How did you where did you start? Who did you speak to? And how did you convince them to try this unusual thing PDIA? It’s quite different. It requires a different way of working. It’s a bit confusing sometimes for the people that you’re speaking to. How did you convince your organization\, but also authorizers particularly I’m interested in how you convinced authorizers to try this. \n\n\nTim Kornprobst Okay. Well\, guys\, now I can speak a little bit slower after this sprint through a presentation and like not 10\,000 years\, but three years of intensive work. So how it started 2020. I went to my former manager who was my boss in an internship in Liberia. And I talked with him because he was asking me when you learn something new in your recent workplace the IDOS Institute of Sustainability and Development think tank for the German government on development politics. When you learn something new\, tell me I want to know it. And I told him I heard about PDIA. PDIA is awesome. It’s very oriented. It’s agile. It really gets things done. And he said like\, wow\, this sounds amazing. I’ve been working private sector and so this is how I think things should be done. Might you help us design this project. The new one we are planning and so waste management with PDIA. And I said\, okay\, I will do it. And then I helped them to design it. There were also some resistance at the beginning of the designing team if PDIA is really appropriate and so on. But I tried to convince them and my authorizer at this time\, my manager helped me with this. So at the end\, we got it done. And then he asked me\, now you are the one who brought me to this idea. Now you are the one responsible and make this work. And you better do it good. So I joined GIZ in 2021 after being a researcher at the think tank. And then I got things started\, which were also not easy because my director\, he was not my director. The highest of my cluster\, my department was really into this PDIA thing. But my direct manager wasn’t at all. That’s what she told me from the beginning\, actually\, quite harshly. But what I was doing\, actually\, after I convinced my director\, I tried to convince her and my team really by teaching them about the PDIA method. By showing them where it has been applied\, where it was successful\, why we use it. We tried it also out for some smaller challenges. And then I went to the partners\, actually. And we tell them\, now\, this is PDIA. This is how it has been applied. What do you think about it? And Dr. Omar Arabiyat\, who is a great guy\, very intelligent\, very dedicated\, public servant\, mission driven\, everything. Great guy said\, yeah\, we have this long process. OK\, yeah. What about that we go to your management and just talk with them about it? And then we brought together the directors of greater Amman municipality and talked with them. OK\, this is the problem. What do you think about it? And they said\, yeah\, OK. But we have also money issues. Why you don’t give us more money\, as GIZ. And the budget is bad. And said\, OK\, but guys\, we have also other challenges than the financial thing here. We have really the problem that this is what Omar was telling\, that we want to implement more quickly. And then the deputy city manager\, similar as Uli at the time to me\, said\, OK\, do it. And this is your responsibility to get things done now. They delegated us with the work. But then\, as I shortly mentioned in the presentation\, this was not enough. Because at the vertical level and the hierarchy to have the leadership\, the sponsorship is good. But to really get things done\, as we learned\, we need also on the vertical level\, the authorization. So we went to every department and hall of Greater Amman municipality\, which had more than 20\,000 employees\, by the way. It’s a huge monster of an organization. We went to all departments relevant and talked with them. This is the idea we have. Would you like to join? Not all were convinced. Some said\, no\, I’m not interested in this. But 80\, 90 percent said\, we are into that. And then we came together. But then after we got started\, we again had the drawback or like really a cut when the authorizers were changing or one of them and really questions the whole thing. And we really cut down the size of the task force. Because we were planning to work with 30 people and having like basically four iteration teams at the same time to work on things on parallel\, actually. So at the end\, we were only like 14. Then we were just 12. But nonetheless\, we were meeting with him. We were again explaining to him the idea and say\, well\, it’s important. And we keep again the authorizers all the time updated. We’re giving them reports. We are meeting them every two or three months to give them like really a short presentation about the progress. And we try to involve them and ask them also for their feedback. What can we do differently? What kind of solution did you forget about? So this is basically what we’re doing. And I would like to stress what Lobna was saying. With more success\, the legitimacy is growing. You know\, the stairway to heaven Matt is talking about. Suddenly\, everybody wants to be part of the PDIA team. And people from other departments asking\, can we join\, for example\, from the planning departments? They’re all not part of our task force from all the sectors in GAM. They all want to be part of the success story now. People in GIZ want to be part of the success story also now. We are planning big things. And thanks that Sura is joining me as really as a senior advisor who knows the sector so much. And she gives me so much advice\, helping this thing to continue and to improve constantly. So with this support\, I mean\, you get people on board\, you can do it. And in the first year\, it was horrible. First call I had with Matt was basically said\, I’m near to a burnout. I don’t know how I can do this anymore with my manager and so on. But after a while\, after the second year\, it got better and better. And now I’m feeling really we are doing something great here and get things done. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Fantastic. Hear hear. It’s really fascinating to hear both of your answers. I think there’s some really interesting parallels. So one of the things that strikes me is\, you know\, the work\, the time needed before you even have the day one workshop\, the time that you both invested before that\, just to get to that workshop on day one\, you know\, it was more than a year for you. So there’s a real amount of time and work that’s needed to kind of lay the groundwork and get the buy -in from the different actors. Lobna\, in your case in Tunisia\, you created this interesting model with this consortium of stakeholders\, a little bit more like a formal structure to get that buy -in and maintain that. And then I think what’s really interesting that you’ve both spoken about is how important\, just getting the buy -in at the beginning\, you won’t get everybody. I mean\, you said you went to\, you know\, dozens of different\, the number of different conversations to build just enough buy -in to start\, but then maintaining that and how important the results are in kind of maintaining that buy -in and growing it. Yes\, please. And then I have a follow -up question and then we’ll come\, and then I’m going to bring everyone else in. \n\n\nLobna Jeribi The point here\, I would say\, for convincing is really the trust of person. At the beginning\, no one knows what is PDIA\, no one knows what… It’s when I went to the different ministries and trying to speak about the project and also to discuss with unions\, etc. Really\, the first beginning is they trust the person. So\, okay\, I will go with you\, but I don’t know what you are speaking about. Okay\, so\, but I trust you. And this is\, of course\, it’s  smaller actors\, a number of actors and stakeholders\, but it’s the beginning. We need to begin from something to start. And that was\, of course\, and then the showcase built up other authorizations. But I would say to answer exactly to the question this is. And\, of course\, the design of the framework\, the consortium\, the stakeholders- when we get our first consortium of multi -actors\, we know already the PDIA team. But we were\, how do you say\, it’s like it’s very important that the consortiums think that the PDIA team is chosen by the consortium to have their add -on. They have to be committed. So\, of course\, but because we need the PDIA team\, more representative\, and we have chosen the persons. We spent a lot of time to choose the person that the PDIA team\, that would be consensus. It’s very important. More the institutional belonging of the members of the PDIA team is also the quality\, the human quality\, the soft skills of this person. And we made a lot of time in choosing these persons. But\, of course\, we try to make the process. It’s like our democracies\, but this is it’s yeah\,  we try. We make people believe that they are deciding. But this is another subject. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Ok\, thank you Lobna. So I think you have really interesting takeaways here. You know\, the the you know\, that initial buy in is so important. The amount of conversations you have to have\, the groundwork\, laying the foundation. But then once you’re moving\, how important it is to generate work and results to maintain the authorization. Because it has to be.. you build it\, but it has to be maintained. And how much the work\, the reporting that you spoke about making sure that authorizers are seeing the results and the progress that’s being done. So so important. I want to before we open out to everybody\, I want to.. we’ve been talking about creating the right conditions around a PDIA team\, which is very important. Authorization\, the support\, the stakeholders. But I want to move inside. I want to move from the atmosphere\, the environment around the team to inside a PDIA team. And what are the important things that\, you know\, that we can learn about what’s happening inside a team? What are they going through? What challenges are they facing? And how did you see inside this team? How did they overcome those challenges? Maybe the\, you know\, thinking about the mindset shift. You both spoke about mindset shift that happens to the people-in the individuals. How is the culture growing within the team? How is the..what are the things that you saw which are really important for them to maintain motivation and momentum and just just\, you know\, to be able to make progress? What did you what did you learn to be the really important things? And what could you do to try and create that? Maybe let’s start with you\, Tim. \n\n\nTim Kornprobst Excellent question. Difficult question also. I would say the most important thing is\, of course\, to just first of all talk with people what PDIA is about\, as I talked about in my presentation. To make them understand the mindset and also some of the methods. And often you will be surprised because many people who did agile management course before in the municipality already know\, oh\, yeah\, this is like here\, not waterfall. And OK\, really nice. OK\, it’s like an IT and you see there are some parallels and they’re getting excited because they always wanted to try out those ideas. This helps when you retake the time to explain why we’re working on a problem and why we want to work in the way we want to work. OK\, this is the most important thing. Now\, in the team\, you will always have people\, even if you’re processing\, even if you have progress\, they are at the point not interested. They’re not saying anything. After maybe some month\, they will no longer attend the meetings or even say\, maybe just let you hear about other people. “Ah\, I don’t really care.” “I don’t believe what Tim is doing is sustainable at all.” “And or what the team is doing. This is something you have to accept here – you will not get the buying of everyone at the task force level\, so to say. Now\, I would say is very important that you and your role trying to give a good..at least in Jordan\, a good stage for the people to present and show that they’re doing something differently and something important\, actually. So what I really tried all the time\, as soon as we had like after some months\, very promising first results\, not only in front of the internal leadership\, but also shared with GIZ\, having like presentation formats for them\, getting in contact also with our colleagues from the governance (seems to us\, by the way\, from the governance cluster). So working together\, sharing this with them and see how they can also present their results to other people. Because what is the problem in the public organization? I think in the MENA region and also other countries\, public officials often don’t feel recognized for what they are doing. They’re working on sometimes very harsh conditions. They’re trying their best to get the mission forward\, but they aren’t seen for their work. And when you give them not only financial incentives\, I don’t believe that is the most important thing. The most important thing for people is that they’re getting recognized\, getting respected for their work. And you know\, people like Manar\, Mohamed\, who are like a little bit elite of the iterative teams\, they have been working for 20 years in the municipality. They are doing excellent jobs\, and they are so dedicated. They’re very knowledgeable. And I can tell you\, after we start publishing and also thinking about writing a paper of Harvard\, which hopefully will be published as a teaching case soon- they were super excited. And this gave really a push also for them beyond the results and presenting it\, but really seeing like\, wow\, our work is recognized\, people see what we’re doing. And this really pushes us. And now I’m at a point- this is amazing actually- when I’m sitting in the conversations with them. First\, I was talking too much and asking questions. And then\, what are you doing? Now\, most of the time\, I’m just sitting back and let them do their work. And sometimes I ask maybe three\, four questions in the room. “Yeah\, OK\, how exactly do you want to do that?””Uh -huh\, OK. And when you want to do that?” “Uh-huh\, OK. Go for it. Have fun.” And this is\, for me\, a first indicator that there is getting more and more ownership and room that they’re taking over and taking this thing away from me. And I’m very happy about that. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Very interesting. So a little bit\, same with the authorizers. The progress and the results was very motivating for the team. Actually\, just doing the work and making that progress and then the recognition for the work was a big motivator for them. And I agree with you. I think a lot of civil servants\, you know\, people talk about incentives\, but really it’s about that purpose and being able to achieve something. Lobna\, what about the team in Tunisia? What challenges did they face? How did you get the team to go from something completely new to being able to perform and being effective as a team? What challenges did they face and how did you overcome them? \n\n\nLobna Jeribi Yes\, very similar to the experience that the team has shared and very interesting. Also\, first we have trained facilitators. So we have the PDIA team. And first\, and you were with us\, Peter\, and the facilitators were the one that were behind and trying to get the team in structured and not wasting a lot of time\, et cetera. The first challenge was also\, of course\, the fact that they have antagonists. So\, for example\,  the private sector and the workers. When we were speaking about Siliana on how to improve the costs of waste management\, because when the municipality do it by itself\, it costs like five times the private sector. So\, of course\, the municipality needs to privatize the waste management inside the municipality because it’s too costly. And of course\, it was a problem for the workers because this is for the worker union. So what the antagonist point of view\, what we made\, we made kind of negotiation. So this kind of social dialogue. But what is interesting is that the solution and the consensus of inside is that there is a part what was privatized and other part- it’s within the municipality so that you will maintain the workers. But we are more effective in terms of costs. So that was very interesting. So the dialogue between both actors of representative of union private sector and the workers make the solution acceptable by all actors. So the solution is balanced\, the solution is efficient. And the all the months of discussion was not really lost\, even though\, of course\, we spent weeks\, as Tim was saying\, we also have the weekly meeting and the discussion. And it was very long. And you’re saying\, OK\, it’s what is the issue? But finally\, we needed this discussion because then the implementation was very efficient and very interesting. And that was the same thing\, for example\, between Ministry of Environment\, Ministry of Interior and Environment never work together for waste management. And it’s a transversal issue. That was a huge challenge for us to make this representative around the same table. But what was interesting is finally the way we use the final issue\, because it’s not dividing. The financial having more finance for municipality was the issue where they are not against each other. So we choose also the subject through the discussion and hard discussion and very long discussion\, as you remember\, to find out. So it’s not lost. The discussion is interesting. The lesson learned. We feel we need to have discussion between the whole stakeholders. Take the time to structure the solution\, to design the solution\, to design the entry point\, because it will be very efficient then when we implement. \n\n\nPeter Harrington OK\, thank you Lobna. So I think thinking about the team\, the dialogue that they engage with and the consensus that you could build was very important to give the team that clarity\, that the way to be effective. I’d love to take questions. We have some\, you know\, a good amount of time for discussion with everybody. So please put your hand up if you have a question about the experience that Tim or Lobna had in their environment. I see a question at the back from our Saudi colleague. \n\n\nAbdulaziz Alohali OK\, so it’s a question. Can hear me clearly. First of all\, thanks for the fireplace. I think maybe it wasn’t… \n\n\nPeter Harrington Yeah\, it’s a little bit colder. \n\n\nAbdulaziz Alohali Yeah. The question here is\, you know\, I would say you worked extensively in implementing the PDIA and\, you know\, on a mass level\, you did\, you know\, with the training\, the research\, you did it with multiple agencies. So my question to you after that time\, if there was a chance and just kind of to relate to all of us\, maybe knowing PDIA\, but not this exact problem that you’re working on to create the PDIA 2.0 and kind of like maybe apply PDIA on PDIA itself and improve it and then take it to the next level. And then\, you know\, have Matt here and the team. Would there be anything that I would say you kind of tried to push that did not work? Maybe for your context\, it works in another context\, and it would kind of create and evolve\, grow PDIA even even further. So that’s maybe the question. \n\n\nPeter Harrington And your name and for the benefit of people online\, your name and where you’re from. \n\n\nAbdulaziz Alohali Abdulaziz Alohali from the Zakat\, Tax and Customs Authority in Saudi Arabia. \n\n\nPeter Harrington So yeah\, how do we PDIA- how do we apply PDIA to PDIA? How do we experiment? How do we\, you know\, tailoring PDIA\, the way we do things in different places? Lobna\, you experimented with some new structures. Tim\, how did you tailor the kind of PDIA model- which is very flexible- how did you tailor it in your context? And what didn’t work? I think was also an interesting question. How did you identify what didn’t work and learn from that? Let’s go with Tim first and then we’ll come to Lobna. \n\n\nTim Kornprobst This is a great question. And actually\, if you ask me\, we need a PDIA MENA toolkit. We need something which is not only in Arabic\, but also maybe taking to account also a little bit different discussion cultures and really reformulating the question that they make a little bit more sense because what I experienced when using the PDIA toolkit at this time in English\, by the way\, we make a free translation because one of our colleagues was also a translator in his previous career. We translated them roughly to somehow be able to work because some people did not understand what is written there. And it’s very complicated English. Nonetheless\, I love PDIA so much. So don’t get me wrong. So\, but I think\, yes\, we should work on this and we should only what Sura had always in their mind and also other here in the room and Lobna and me\, we also discussed this some months ago. We need to have like a new toolkit and maybe like really training guideline with more details\, telling people what kind of exercise are possible to get the steps of problem analysis\, construction\, deconstruction and change space analysis possible. And regarding what didn’t work so well. And our Jordanian context is most of all went very well. But what I would say is that change space analysis is always a little bit tricky. And also in the toolkit\, it’s very roughly only explained\, actually. And I have the feeling sometimes you make an analysis and then everything is like\, actually\, from  what they’re saying\, very\, very good. But when you look at the toolkit\, for example\, they have like mid mid authority\, mid acceptance\, but huge ability. The two could basically\, for example\, say\, OK\, there’s no change space. I disagree with this and from my experience that is change space when there is this\, for example\, and also you should give the alternative of this analysis because it’s very timely actually to do same change space analysis helps\, of course. But sometimes people don’t have the time for this. Maybe you should go for this alternative. What they did was this ranking of very impactful to less impactful and easy to solve and less easy to solve and start a discussion at least around this\, which is not as elaborated as a change space analysis\, but gives you at least a feeling and also gives you a feeling- what is the really important causes you should start working with the binding constraints when we think about Ricardo Hausmann and leading economic growth\, the things that really matters. Also\, what I felt in Jordan\, what is hard is the agility and adaptation of solutions sometimes because earlier we saw it a little bit more. But in GAM team\, they did it partly. But often it was more like first year was just\, OK\, we have now our plan. We want to implement those solutions. It was.. I always try to encourage them to think about how to adapt it. But they were like no no\, we are  just happy to work as a team and do those things. And sometimes you have to really focus better now to be agile and always changing or just having a team working on a common thing and then see if it works out. So this was a little bit challenging. We get more agile in the second year\, basically after a while. But at the beginning\, this was hard\, actually\, in the bureaucratic environment of Jordan. \n\n\nPeter Harrington So the learning and adaptation is a habit that has to be cultivated. Lobna\, briefly\, you spoke about some innovation that you brought in this wider stakeholder consortium. You talked about bringing in sort of hackathons and other methods to kind of come up with solutions. Just talk a little bit about why you introduce these innovations\, the extra elements around the PDIA. Are there any things that didn’t work that you learned from? \n\n\nLobna Jeribi The PDIA team composition was difficult to maintain a PDIA team as changement of government. We have each year a new government. We have political instability. And this is\, I think\, also a common issue in our countries- MENA Africa region. So it’s very interesting to have kind of effective common\, not guideline\, but I would say sharing experiences and innovation. So that’s why the consortium is very interesting\, because the consortium is the stable entity. So the consortium is wider\, is representing institution and is including civil society\, including public servants\, which are not politics. And of course\, then when there is the PDIA team\, when the government change\, we need to have new representative. But our stable entity is the consortium. So go back to the consortium and then nominate another representative of which is closer to the ministry\, to the decision makers to be in the PDIA team. So it’s very interesting. The consortium is regarding the change context\, regarding the author. This one is the level of authorization. And the second\, the hackathon also. In our country\, we have even we have the deep state\, the weakness of administration. We have a huge potential in the youngs\, in technology\, in the startup ecosystem. We have.. they are making amazing work through the international\, with international private sector. And we are not using them as.. are not acknowledging in this potential. So I think it’s very.. that was very interesting also to make this solution incubators\, and the new community within to give a new insight for this public servants\, even though there are discussion\, it’s always\, it’s a new air\, a new and very\, and having practical solutions. So yeah\, this is our two major\, I would say\, PDIA process innovation that we have implemented. And I think it’s very\, maybe relevant for our regions because we need this new levers to address the weaknesses for other\, in other issues. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Great. We have time for a couple more questions. So please put your hand up. But what I was interesting\, what you were saying is when you have some kind of political unpredictability\, this stakeholder forum that you created with civil society\, with the bureaucracy\, it created some continuity. They insulated you a little bit from the\, from the political changes that were happening. I’d like to see if there’s..\, I’d like to take a couple more questions. You’re pointing at someone\, Mannat\, but I don’t know who you’re pointing at. Yes\, the gentleman here\, please go ahead. \n\n\nBoris Owonoa Hello. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Please introduce yourself. \n\n\nBoris Owonoa I am Boris Owona. I am Dr. Boris Owona. I am Civil Administrator from the Prime Minister Office in Cameroon\,  IPP 2020. Thank you for your insight and about second thing in creating the condition for implementing PDIA. I just wanted to know if when implementing PDIA to your local context\, I want to know if you have found some kind of positive deviance\, something that you have learned from yourself\, because PDIA is the journey of discovery. And sometimes we have to confront local solution with those best practices. So I want to know if when implementing PDIA\, you have found some positive deviance that you can share with us. Thank you. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Fantastic question. So yeah\, you know\, did you discover pockets of positive deviance where you were? I think everybody is familiar with this concept\, positive deviance\, but also what did you learn personally? I like that part of the question as well. I’d love to hear that. Lobna\, briefly so we have time for one more question. \n\n\nLobna Jeribi What I learned personally is success\, I would say build success. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Success breeds success. \n\n\nLobna Jeribi Yes\, this is very important. Even very small. Don’t be shy that working on very little small locality with the kind of things\, because it will open the doors. So positive deviance we have- we use positive deviance. We have some regions\, for example\, that are making their circular economy\, but it’s a very little region. And these are youngs and entrepreneurs that are in the municipality. We found that the actors within the decision maker in the municipality are represented by this ecosystem that we want to use in the PDIA. So we adapted and we learned and we structured this in the process. And of course\, teaming. I really learned a lot in the training. In fact\, I made the training two years after implementing. So it was very interesting also because maybe it’s more meaningful sometime because we experienced the challenges\, the problems\, and then when the training was very interesting because it makes. So of course\, the triple A is very meaningful also for us- its structures. When we are within the administration or we work with administration\, sometimes common sense. And after the training\, it structures things. So what is triple A? We measure the authority\, we measure acceptance\, we know that if you have the ability\, so that’s very interesting and more efficient for our work. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Very interesting. And almost what I find interesting is what you were saying is on the positive deviance point\, almost through the PDIA\, you were trying to create positive deviance. You spoke about Sidi Bou Said\, you made Sidi Bou Said a functioning example. And then other municipalities were inspired by this. The Ministry of Interior said\, this is a good model. Let’s replicate it in other places. So you almost created some positive deviance in one municipality\, which influenced others. Tim\, what are your thoughts about on the question? And then we’ll take one more. \n\n\nTim Kornprobst Well\, what I learned for myself while doing PDIA is don’t make things too complicated. Things are already complicated\, complex enough. And if you’re not careful enough- thinking PDIA too much into complicating this toolkit\, you are preparing\, preparing\, preparing\, having very long workshops and bombarding people with questions. And at the end\, they say\, Oh God\, what is this? So I had to learn also by watching\, by the way\, Matt also\, how he’s doing this in Harvard classes\, how simple you can make PDIA. Yeah\, just tell me\, okay\, what is the problem? Okay\, break it down on here on the board. And then we have like a first starting point\, try to make it simple. And also\, what I learned during my PDIA journey is talk less\, listen more\, ask more questions. This really helps give room really for the people. And regarding positive deviance. First\, how we started was we discovered actually a positive deviance in PDIA in Jordan\, because I think 2018 a team of dedicated ladies from the Ministry of Labor\, for example\, MaryEllen was under them. She did an excellent marvelous job in using PDIA to improve expert laws and to create more tax income. Yeah\, nobody talks about this. And they even don’t talk about that much because I think there are also some things that don’t want to shine too much right now in their ministry\, because in Jordan\, there are also some challenges when you are too good. This could also be the end of your career actually. Yeah\, this is some context. I think also in the MENA region also not that\, maybe everywhere. Maybe also in Germany sometimes. Yeah. This was very inspiring because we talk with them in the beginning in the first year\, and they retaught us PDIA is possible\, and you can do it like this and this. And this is what I would like to recommend you. Go to the blog page\, look for people who did the class and talk with them. Maybe some will say\, I didn’t do any PDIA afterwards\, and some will tell you\, well\, I did really a reform based on this. And those network really helps you use this network for us as an advice and positive deviance to combine both. The last thing is\, well\, the cool thing is now Greater Amman Municipality and Irbid became positive deviance cases by doing PDIA. Because I told you shortly with King Abdullah Center for Excellence\, this governance thing\, they’re really close to royal court\, has a lot of influence in assessing and giving advice to the public sector. They are now use PDIA for their own organizational potential and challenges and heard from GAM experience in the presented\, as you can see. And they really say we need more problem solving. And I could name much more. Sura can also tell a little bit about this. But really people see the success and see this is something very extraordinary. So you add one or two years\, maybe you also get to this when you use more PDIA. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Fantastic. We’ll take one final question because after that\, it’s lunchtime. So the last question to our colleague from Cote d ‘Ivoire. And then brief answers and then we’ll wrap up. \n\n\nJoseph Diabate Okay\, thank you so much. Joseph Diabate \, IPP 2023. How do you get the strong commitment of the main stakeholders? And I want to know what was the key success factors in your case? Thank you. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Great. That’s a difficult one to answer briefly\, but try and be very\, very distilled and condensed. What were the key success factors in the process? Lobna? \n\n\nLobna Jeribi Small successes- build small solution and knowledge on it. This I would say key factors. Perseverance\, is it? Yeah. Yeah. It’s really to make the weekly\, to continue years by years. It’s really to not be tired. Keep going. Keep going. Yeah. This is also very important. Agile\, we really need to be to adapt. This is the philosophy of the PDIA is to understand the context\, to understand the team and to try to\, even though\, for example\, and now I will go back also to the question of Abdulaziz\, if there is the process PDIA\, there is methodology\, but sometimes you should find other way to find the same. So it’s always the design thinking\, there is agile processes. The aim is that we make little successes and it’s shared by the multi -stakeholders and everyone owns it and to build on it. This is\, I would say\, the most important. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Thanks\, Lobna. Very succinct. Last words to you\, Tim. Critical success factors. Yeah. \n\n\nTim Kornprobst So I presented some of them on my last slide already\, just to summarize it. You have to give yourself time in the preparation\, what we also did one year or so\, some months at least\, talk with your authorizers\, bring the idea into their heads\, and based on this\, try to create a structure which serves your purpose. Get projects or special initiatives\, innovation hub\, whatever\, where you have resources and the space to try out things. Maybe you can also make it in a small PDIA that you start in your team. Yeah\, we try now to use the Fishbone diagram to solve some solutions\, but if you’re really ambitious and want to make a PDIA initiative\, try to create a structure which serves you. This is what I tried to do from the beginning\, actually. This is important\, and then you should really have in this project a clear focus where you don’t have any strong structures telling you what kind of deliverables you have to give\, but just giving you outcome or problem -driven indicators. We say we want to solve the eight main barriers of the private sector. You really want to see an increase of recycling rates or see really that the processes are getting shorter\, obviously. When you have those frameworks and support of your leadership and work in this kind of field with some PDIA knowledge that you all have here in the room\, then you have good enabling factors to succeed with your reform. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Fantastic. Wonderful reflections from both of you. So much to take away and to learn and lessons that I think are relevant everywhere. So\, I just want to ask everybody to join me in thanking our two presenters\, Lobna and Tim. Fantastic. Thank you both. And I think it’s lunchtime now. Mannat\, I don’t know what time you want us to reconvene? \n\n\nLobna Jeribi Just would like to really say that we need really an organization. We need that this event is not one shot. We hope that we continue sharing. We create really an entity able to make a network\, able to share experience\, to have expertise around regions\, to knowledge in all these experiences and to make more synergy between us through foundation\, NGO\, whatever. We started discussion with Tim and our group and we hope that we can continue this discussion in our WhatsApp alumni to build this project and to make it really efficient for our different countries. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Fantastic. Thanks\, Lobna. \n\n\nTim Kornprobst Hundred percent. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Hear hear. Over to you\, Mannat. \n\n\nMannat Singh Thank you so much. If you can make your way up to the 10th floor\, lunch is served and we’ll be back at 2:25p.m. for Matt’s session. Please be on time because the session is on time management. Thank you. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nIn this video\, Lobna Jeribi and Tim Kornprobst discuss their experience using the PDIA approach to address solid waste management problems in Tunisia and Jordan respectively. While they both tackle similar issues\, their approaches differ\, demonstrating the adaptability of PDIA.  \n\n\n\nThrough examples of Waste Management Consortium and Social Innovation Incubators\, Lobna highlights the importance of innovation in public policy. Tim focuses on securing authorization\, forging partnerships and iterating\, showcasing that PDIA works. In conversation with Peter Harrington\, the two IPP alumni discuss the importance of not only creating the right conditions around PDIA (authorization\, support\, stakeholders) but also the inner workings of PDIA teams including building team capability and trust.  \n\n\n\nThis session was part of the IPP alumni seminar held in Bahrain from January 31st-February 2nd\, 2025. \n\n\n\n\nTUNISIA CASE Slides\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJORDAN CASE Slides\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/pdia-in-tunisia-and-jordan/
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UID:22657-1730073600-1730159999@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Motivation and Purpose in the Public Sector
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nDan Honig\, BSC Associate\, Associate Professor at Georgetown McCourt School of Public Policy & University College London \n\n\n\nElizabeth Linos (Moderator)\, Emma Bloomberg Associate Professor of Public Policy and Management \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome\, everyone. Those of you here in the room and those of you joining us virtually through Zoom\, my name is Salimah Samji\, and I am the executive director for Building State Capability. We’re delighted to be able to co-host this event with the People Lab and Elizabeth Linos is here\, our faculty director for the People Lab. At BSC\, we believe in resolving public problems with purpose. We train public sector teams around the world to work iteratively to solve their own nominated problems. This involves teaching teams how to build psychological safety\, felt accountability\, trust\, to be curious\, to ask questions\, and also actively listen to the answers and how to take action. Taking small steps\, turning moments into momentum. So it’s a great joy today that we have Dan Honig with us today to talk to us about motivation and purpose in the public sector\, because it really is extremely important in getting what we want done. Dan is BSC associate. He is also an associate professor at Georgetown McCourt School of Public Policy and the University College London. Dan will begin with a short presentation and then and then Elizabeth Linos will have a conversation with him. And then we’ll open it up for Q&A. For Q&A\, we have a mic that will be here\, so you can just come and line up to ask your questions. We just ask that you end your question with a question mark and that’s how we will roll with that. Welcome\, Dan\, let’s give him a round of applause. \n\n\nDan Honig Thank you. Thank you so much all for being here. It is just an honor to be back here. You know\, I got my Ph.D. here\, which shows that\, you know\, some Ph.D. graduates here don’t amount to much\, but\, you know\, it’s still a warm and welcoming place to have you back. So and thank you\, in particular to the People Lab and Elizabeth Linos and to the Building State Capability program and Salimah Samji for for putting this together. So let me talk for just\, I don’t know\, 15 minutes or so about about this book. And I guess what I what I think we might need to think more about if we want to make the world of public management better. So basic framework of the book\, right? So stylized ways we can approach trying to manage but not quite blocking. I’ll go here. So\, you know\, in blue at the top of the screen is a kind of stylized empowerment managerial route\, right? And in red at the bottom is a compliance route. So most management practice\, I think we see in the world today has a kind of logic of compliance\, right? So that is to say we’ve got someone who’s not going to do the right thing. We’re going to force them to do the right thing by using monitoring and incentives and penalties to point them\, to force them in the right direction so they act in consonance with the mission. And so we get better performance. But what if\, in fact\, folks kind of want to do good stuff\, right? What if they are interested already in fulfilling the mission of the organization? We might want to take a different approach\, right? And so we might want what I call supportive management practices\, practices that allow autonomy\, cultivate competence and create connection to peers and purpose. So that’s not to suggest that this is binary\, right? So\, you know\, like most things in the world\, management\, most management is going to be a mix. So this is kind of if you think of it as a ratio of empowerment to compliance\, we can imagine worlds in which an organization functions best not at the extremes\, right? But that the size of the shape of this graph depends on the nature of what you’re trying to do. If you’re trying to do stuff where it’s really easy to monitor and measure what’s going on\, you know\, collecting rubbish\, collecting the trash\, right? Then probably the peak performance comes more on the compliance side of the house\, right? If instead we’re trying to do something where we can’t see all the things we want to get done\, well then probably peak performance is more on the empowerment side of the House. And let’s think about kind of the differences between those tasks. So lots of evidence in the book. I’m just going to touch on a few things in the next few minutes just to flag. This is not a book only about my own work\, but that draws in all the existing research that I think speaks in any way to the topic theory\, including that of a number of people in the room. So five things I think I learned doing this work that I hope might be useful. The first management changes I’m sorry\, motivation changes in response to management\, right. It’s not that there are good folks and bad folks. You know\, as Dolly Parton memorably said\, somebody who comes up often\, I’m sure at the Kennedy School\, you know\, she memorably said\, some of us are saints and some of us are sinners. And for all the rest of us\, it sure does depend. Right. And one of the things I think it depends on is\, in fact\, management. People respond. People change in response to management. So one kind of illustration of this\, a profile from the book from a woman named Judy Parfitt. So Judy was the head of human resources for the South Africa Revenue Service just after the end of the apartheid era. Right. So faced with\, as she put it\, a national front aligned. You know\, employees with a workforce that was not was associated with kind of the old regime and indeed was quite low performing. You might think she needed to get rid of everyone to turn the organization around. But that’s not what happened at all. Instead\, what happened was the workforce came to buy in to the idea of a new South Africa to believe in and identify with this purpose and what was required to do that? The experience of feeling a gentle\, a feeling that their actions made a difference and had a meaningful\, positive contribution to the work the agency was doing. So this echoes what I find in my own work in Thailand. These are in fact four different buildings\, four different district offices\, extremely hierarchical\, looks exactly the same from the outside. But when you go inside these buildings\, you find managers who are managing differently. And the more these managers are managing for empowerment\, the more they are able to deliver on welfare to citizens\, the more satisfied they are as employees\, the more they want to stay in the job and stay in the place and feel driven driven to serve the public. This makes South Africa and Thailand just like everywhere else\, right? So looking at I put together the world’s largest data set of sort of civil service surveys. Right. So we’re talking about over 4 million observations\, over 2000 agency observations\, five countries\, dozen plus years. And we find indeed that the higher the level of a supportive management project\, a supportive management practice within an agency\, the higher is the level of motivation in that same agency. And as management changes\, so does motivation. Right? So here is what I just showed you as a line. And it is just simply the case that as managers\, as managerial practices rise\, as support\, managerial practices rise. So\, too does the motivation of the same agency versus what it felt like last year. Right. Management\, of course\, though\, is not just about today’s personnel. It’s also about tomorrow’s. Because management attracts or repels the already mission motivated. And here I’ll turn to my hometown of Detroit. Depicted in this picture is the English translation of Detroit’s motto\, which is We hope for better things. It shall rise from the ashes. And it is\, you know\, was written after a historic physical fire. But I think anyone who knows much of the Detroit story knows that is a place where we have had hope for better things for a long time. But from a relatively low base. And one of those is the care given to Detroit’s most vulnerable children. So working with people with Wayne State University’s School of Social Work faculty\, that’s the City University of Detroit. Essentially\, we look at people who joined the Child Protective Services workforce\, and we find that the people who care the most\, people who go in saying\, you know what\, I want to help these children thrive\, they leave the fastest. The more you care\, the faster you go. Right. Why is that happening? Well\, it’s happening because they enter this job and they find out that this is not a job where they can\, in fact\, feel a genetic about helping kids. This is a job where there are mountains of paperwork and every incentive is to take children out of the home as quickly as possible\, because the only real risk from an accountability standpoint is the risk of leaving a child in an hour too long and something bad happening to that child\, which is absolutely tragic. I’m not saying it is not it’s not the only thing that is tragic. It is also tragic to pit children who may not need it away from their families and into an underresourced foster care system. And\, you know\, if we end this again\, kind of like the story I told you before\, makes Detroit just like everywhere else. Right? So\, again\, going back to that data\, this is kind of a stylized depiction of what we see in the data. The more you care\, the more mission motivated you are\, the more responsive you are to management practice. Right? So if I go in because I really care about the job and I find that I can’t actually get the job done\, I like those child Protective Services officers in Detroit leave the fastest. But if I go in and I really care about the job and I find that this job is one where I really can have some impact\, well then I’m even more likely to stay then than it is somebody else. Right? So we need to manage not just for today’s personnel but for tomorrow. Three whenever we have a kind of clear well identified as those of you who are students here will know\, like\, you know\, kind of we have a rigorous comparison of two different way of going about reforming a system. And we have something that looks like a compliance oriented reform\, something that looks like an empowerment oriented reform. Over and over again\, the empowerment reform seems to work better\, so much so that there are like quite convoluted explanations in some of these papers as to how that how that might have happened. And this is\, I should say it’s something we need a lot more work on. But let me focus on just one of them. Right. So this last case\, so in Pakistan\, looking at procurement in in Punjab\, some some leading economists look at giving people more autonomy for communities with more autonomy. Right. So that’s an empowerment-oriented reform. And in the other arm\, they look at paying for performance\, right? So you save the government money\, you’re going to make some of that money back into your own pocket. Right. And I’ll be honest\, when I first heard about the study\, I was like\, well\, you know\, I think the pay for performance is going to work better because\, you know\, just giving people autonomy is not empowering them. You need to take an active managerial process to empower. And also like 10% of salary is a lot of a lot of salary. And these are really simple\, honorable things. Paper pens write things that should be really tractable to clients. But even here it’s the autonomy treatment that ends up having the remarkable and sustainable results that ends up saving more money. And why is that? You know\, it’s kind of problematic for my theory. Actually\, empowerment is working better than I think it should be working right based on what I told you before is because even for those jobs where a lot of compliance is optimal. It seems to me we often find ourselves having even more than that optimal point. So shift back towards more empowerment is helping because we’re on that far right side of the image I showed you before\, and thus we’re coming back up the curve as we move in an empowering direction. And you know\, I guess one of the central messages for me that I hope folks take away from the book is that compliance oriented accountability can and often does undermine performance. And it’s not it’s not\, you know\, neutral. It’s not just the transaction cost of having to file the reports. It’s actually making things worse. The things that we’re pretending are making things better. Let me take one U.S. example. So Hurricane Sandy\, you know\, struck the east coast of America about a decade ago\, dozen years ago. And the US Department of Housing and Urban Development was given an appropriation to do so. Housing reconstruction in the earthquake zone. Right. The Office of the Inspector General was given an identical sum. Right. So first we might ask ourselves\, do we really wanna spend half the money checking on the use of the other half or actually\, more than half the money? Because in fact\, even the HUD part of the money\, some of it’s going to be used for administration and compliance and things like that. Right. So is that an efficient use of funds? One question we could ask ourselves\, even if we ignore that question\, what happens as a result? Well\, if I know that the auditor general is going to have the inspector general is going to have people who can check every detail\, every i dotted\, every t crossed\, I’m going to need to require that of citizens so I can show it to the inspector general. Right. And if I’m going to show it to citizens\, I have to go to these people who’ve just lost their homes and say\, Prove to me that you own the home and how much your stuff is worth. And you say\, well\, you know\, mate\, I would love to do that. But\, you know\, I just lost my home. All my stuff was in the house. You know\, I don’t have the proof that I would have had a week ago because of the thing that’s bringing you here. Right. And I’m frustrated. Even if I then can pull up my phone\, Dropbox\, or go to the safe deposit box and prove it to you. Right. But I’m even more frustrated when I can’t prove it to you. Who do you think Can’t prove it. Is it people who are richer or poorer in the community who are less likely to be able to reach that to access this documentation? Right. So and that’s exactly what happens. So this is the then serving senior advisor for disaster recovery at HUD. And he\, you know\, is saying like\, look\, the poor the family is\, the less likely they have this stuff. This is an equity problem. It is also taking a lot of our time on reporting\, which means we have less time to spend on actually delivering the citizens. We ask why are people frustrated even when they get benefits? You know the state is giving out so much. Why aren’t people happy about it? Why are we not seeing a dividend? Well\, to me\, this is part of the answer. And\, you know\, it is wonderful that their mission driven bureaucrats like Trey are willing to stick through and fight the system. But imagine if we had a system they didn’t have to fight. Imagine how much better system could be. This status quo is all over the world. This is my friend Erin McDonnell in a wonderful book. I highly recommend saying like\, look\, the idea that we need to pull power up to the top is what we see everywhere. Yeah. And it is wrong. We know it’s wrong. Right. And work joint with Elizabeth Lee notes\, in fact\, and others. We survey people around the world and we find that the same pattern kind of everywhere\, right? People feel that they are engaging in much more compliant. The majority of people feel that they are being managed in a way that is compliance oriented. Right. So you are seeing a graph of kind of the distribution of people. Right. And as you will note\, many more people are on the compliance side\, despite the fact that most of the things government does are things for which that level of compliance is likely inefficient and inappropriate if what we want is the best possible performance. Luckily\, another way is possible and we can get to that way. Often even without reducing our current compliance monitoring system. So it may sound confusing. I’ve been making this sound like a 1 to 1 trade off for a little while\, and at some to some extent they are right. So you’re at a point like D on this graph\, you’re only going to be able to get more empowerment if you get less compliance. Right? So but most agencies in my experience and actually I would love to hear the wisdom in the room on this\, are not just mismanaged\, they’re under managed. Right? There’s room to go in the sense that we could do more things before we hit that threshold\, before we hit that tradeoff. Most agencies are a place like A or B on this graph. Right? And that means we can get to the frontier any which way we want\, which doesn’t mean it’s easy. It doesn’t mean it can happen. And there are just so many ways we can do it right. So. Last bit of the book collects those strategies. I’m not going to go through them in detail here. But just to say\, you know\, some of them are as simple as getting people together and saying\, well\, what are we here for? And you know\, why? What drew us to the job? What is going to bring us together? Of course\, we can also think about changing the formal rules and think about how accountability is leading us astray. And we should probably do that\, too\, if and where we can. But not being able to\, you know\, sort of revolution revolutionize the system is no excuse for not getting started. There are so many ways to get started. For managers to think about individuals\, for them to think about teams\, for senior leaders\, to empower agencies as a whole different ways of recruiting\, thinking about motivation in that recruitment process. ET cetera\, etc.. There are many\, many\, many roads up the mountain. Yes\, my friend Dolly helped me make this. There’s so many roads up the mountain\, you know\, to the summit of sort of empowered people who feel their jobs be meaningful. And in fact\, that is also what is very frequently going to be better for the public performance we all seek. You know\, this gentleman let me close with where the book opens\, which is with this gentleman named Joseph Roberts. I took this picture myself. I took this picture while we were being evacuated from Senegal at the very beginning of the pandemic. Right. So a group of me and my fellow citizens sitting on a plane feeling scared about where we were going to go. Senegal had closed its borders. Right. So we had to take a US State Department flight out. And a remarkable thing happened. Just a group of people on a plane started applauding a bureaucrat for doing his job right. I was incredibly thankful that he was here that day\, that he was there that day. So were my fellow citizens. And when I went back after getting many bureaucratic permissions from the US Department of State\, when I went back and spoke to him some months later\, he told me what you see here\, which is fighting for lives\, accomplishing anything. I didn’t feel like I was trusted. I probably wouldn’t be along for this job. No wonder what he means. Of course\, no one mission motivated. No one who really cares about the job would. And he’s right. And it turns out that makes him just like everyone else. If we want a better public service. The easiest thing to do is to stop getting in our own way. There are so\, so\, so many people who want to help serve the public. We should let them. Thank you. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos There’s a standing ovation of governments everywhere. Hi\, everyone. I’m Elizabeth Linos. I’m an associate professor here at the Kennedy School. And Dan is a good friend of mine who I look up to for not just this book\, your previous book\, too\, and all of your research. So thank you for being here. \n\n\nDan Honig Such a pleasure to be here. And the feeling is very mutual. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Great. So what I want to start us off where you left off with that quote from Joseph. Do you want to tell us a little bit more about what made you feel the need to write this book at this time? \n\n\nDan Honig Yeah. So\, I mean\, lots of places it started. So but maybe one of them is. So I found myself in Dhaka 6 or 7 years ago at a kind of gathering of ministers and senior bureaucrats organized by IGC\, which some of you will know\, Right. And\, you know\, one of the speakers asked for a word cloud\, right? So what’s the first thing you think of when you think of public service? Right. And this word cloud. Was full of sort of\, you know\, authoritarian\, you know\, unapproachable\, you know\, uncaring. Right. And I was like\, this should be the most positively selected group for thinking\, well\, of this community\, I could imagine. And you all have also bought into the narrative that as soon as I start thinking about the individual\, you know\, all of a sudden I lose the human right? It’s like\, you know\, I was at an event with Tony Blair last week and he. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos As one does. \n\n\nDan Honig No. Well\, it wasn’t just me and him\, other other a lot of lovely people in the audience. And he was he was saying\, you know\, I’ve heard him say before offhandedly\, like\, you know\, I worked I just had the most incredible experience. I was lucky to have the best bureaucrats in the world working with me. And I’ve heard plenty of other leaders say similar things. But\, I mean\, they can’t be right. They can’t all be getting\, you know\, the best possible draws. It just turns out that if you take people who say\, Hey\, I want to give my life to making things better\, I want that to be my professional identity and to give them a chance to make things better. They get really excited and lots of good stuff happens and we are just leaving value on the table all over the place. And I wanted. And when I went looking for a place to kind of start citing and\, you know\, give people that message\, I found\, you know\, there are bits and pieces\, but I guess I felt that\, you know\, there was a missing link in putting it together a little bit\, sort of skimming. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Yeah\, absolutely. And I think it is. It is a book that allows you to kind of see the big picture and give kind of the data and the evidence on individual cases\, which is why I think it’s it’s good at helping individualize and humanize the people who do this work\, but also tells a bigger story than what we’ve seen elsewhere. You know\, one thing that you already reference\, which I think is interesting\, is that this is scholarship that is really important to the public management community\, but it’s also really important to people who are in government right now. Can you tell us a little bit about\, you know\, as you talk to leaders both in the UK and the US\, but also globally about this work\, what’s the part that feels harder to convince them of or where is that? What are the misconceptions that are coming up for them or pushback that you’re getting about what this would mean if they actually took the learnings from this book and implemented them in their own agencies? \n\n\nDan Honig It’s really interesting. That’s a great question. You know\, it occurs to me you spend a lot of time talking to leaders about extremely similar things. And I guess I’d be curious what your thoughts are like both about this book\, but also from your own experiences. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Yeah. Yeah. \n\n\nDan Honig I mean\, there’s always a risk\, you know\, and\, you know\, get in conversation. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Well\, let me let me say this. So one is I want to be handing out your book to two various government agencies that we work with at the People Lab. One thing I think that I’ve learned from from your research. Which I think is a pervasive misconception. And it’s partly because of the way academia is structured\, is that there’s like. Countries\, entire countries or entire governments where the narrative about public servants is like\, how do we reduce corruption? And then other narratives\, which is like where we support kind of public service motivation. And I think your research is really clear\, and you said it a couple of times. I do want to highlight what Dan was saying\, that this is the same everywhere\, or at least the differences across countries are smaller than the differences than people imagined. And I think kind of in the in the Western context where we do see people talking about public service motivation\, a new divide has emerged\, emerged and no\, no\, I have to finish the sentence. In one video\, it emerged in executive education classes I’ve taught where people will say\, like kids these days\, right? So even in environments where we have a narrative around public service and government\, the divide is now\, well\, we the oldies cared about service. But the younger generation isn’t motivated by these things similar to like we in the US care about motivation\, but in the global South we really should be focusing on reducing corruption. So those are kind of misconceptions that I think keep coming up where it feels scary to manage for empowerment in the way that you do. But I don’t know if that’s that’s kind of what you’re saying in your work. \n\n\nDan Honig Yeah. I mean\, so I’ve said a number of times\, maybe not on video\, so this might be the first online video that that\, you know\, poor countries get corruption. Only rich countries get culture. Right. You know\, only one of these actors gets gets to have a conversation about what really drives people. Right. But that’s I mean\, to another place this book came from\, you know\, my work with the government of Liberia most substantially\, but also in South Sudan and Somalia and a number of other places led me to think this is the same story. You know\, does that mean the people are different\, the contexts are different? I’m not saying there are no differences between countries\, but\, you know\, these dynamics are the same everywhere. And\, you know\, I would say the first misconception is that kind of globally for the individual manager\, though\, I think it’s more this kind of like belief of disempowerment. Right? So like\, you know\, I you know\, if you’re talking to me\, you a little bit bought it maybe lots of people aren’t. But you know\, if you taking the time to approach me\, write me an email and like\, you know\, we set up a\, you know\, day and I read the book. I’m really excited. Let’s talk about it. Let’s talk about it. You people tend to think that they have no agency to make this better. And that is true of the kind of individual street level bureaucrat in that language. But it is also true of the minister\, right? The minister is like\, you know\, I got to report to somebody and\, you know\, a couple of years and I have these other priorities. It’s like\, okay\, well let’s think about\, I mean\, we all face constraints\, but we also have agency and let’s think about what is in the gift of your agency and the work you can do and the momentum you can build. And\, you know\, one of the things that I think organizations like The People Lab or at Georgetown\, I work with the Better Government lab or the Building State Capability team here\, right. Is a way of kind of creating more space for those good things to happen. And I think we have underutilized the Academy’s ability to change the incentive of people inside government or the the prices almost the political economy decision of adoption. And I think there are a lot of people who are\, I don’t know\, empowerment\, curious. And and the question is\, how can we convert that to actual meaningful changes and how can we create proof points to show that\, you know\, another way\, another world is possible? \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Yeah\, I think one of the things that is so striking with with your research is exactly that point\, right? So if we go from these like\, conceptual ideas that like empowerment is good and compliance might be we might be over indexing on on compliance. For me\, it was very striking to see that variation\, right? So like when you change management practices\, you see this very strong correlation with with levels of motivation and thinking of empowerment as a recruitment and retention tool\, I think opens up a whole world of of avenues for government that we haven’t seen. I’m going to ask you in a little bit to come up for questions\, but before we do that\, what would you say to people and this is a hard question\, I think that say like. \n\n\nDan Honig Good because the other ones were really easy. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos What would you say to people who say\, yeah\, okay\, great. Like all this empowerment mumbo jumbo is wonderful\, but you can’t eat autonomy. You can’t pay your rent with authentic purpose. What would happen if we switched government to worrying so much about this type of management that it moved away from kind of the structural ways that we need to improve what it means to be a government worker so that we can recruit and retain people who don’t have the privilege of caring about mission and purpose. And I’m I’m just making like whatever this is that people complain about when they complain about empowerment. \n\n\nDan Honig Yeah\, I wouldn’t say that. I would say that that person is treating as substitutes things that are compliments. Right? So that is to say we currently do that. What you just said a lot\, right? We do not give people the wages that would be concomitant with the skills. Right. So\, in fact\, and this is also a global phenomenon\, there’s some great data from a mutual friend of ours and his team at the World Bank’s bureaucracy lab. Right. Which shows that actually the public sector wage premium for low skilled jobs is positive. Right. In most countries\, if you are a janitor\, you make more in the public sector than the private sector. But if you have high skills\, right\, if you’re in leadership management\, you have the kind of those kinds of things. You’re the sort of Kennedy School folks\, right? Certainly of the system. But even\, you know\, even folks who are coming in with bachelor’s degrees and above. The public sector wage premium runs the other way. You make less money on average in the public sector. It’s not true in every country\, but it’s true in almost every country in which they’ve left. Right. So we currently do exactly what you said and they’re still motivated people\, right? My\, if we raised the level of pay\, we would recruit more motivated people\, right? Because indeed\, most people the idea that motivation\, that’s another kind of misconception I think we have in the world. Not at all from you. I mean\, your work demonstrates amply that\, but that\, like\, people either care about purpose or money\, right? I guess. I think I care about purpose. Maybe I’m wrong\, but if Georgetown came along and said\, Look\, Dan\, you’re so into purpose\, we’re just going to cut your salary by 95% and like\, you’re going to be fired because there’s values and then you’ll give more back and will distribute will be public. You and I would say\, yeah\, I think I might find something else to do. I’ll be honest with you. You know\, I think we should pay people well\, we should change structures\, but we should not imagine that work is just a search for money. It is also a search for meaning. But that doesn’t mean it’s only a search for meaning. And incorporating both those things is what’s going to get us to a better public service. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos That’s a great answer to the question\, you have a bunch of governments that are listening to you right now. Some of them I don’t know how much you can say on record. What’s one thing that you hope people will do tomorrow coming out of reading this book and being inspired by your work? \n\n\nDan Honig I hope they’ll make a plan right? So I hope they will think about the concrete steps they can make\, they can do to make things better. I hope they will reach out for help\, you know\, to to me\, to you write to Salimah and Matt and the Building State Capability team\, you know\, to all the folks who are going to be excited to help them do better. And I hope that once things are actually tried\, once we actually pilot things that we rigorously focus on figuring out what’s worked and what hasn’t and build a global knowledge base to help show that another way. It’s not just that\, another way. It’s possible that it is already happening and we can build on it. And I think that there are\, as you say\, there are people at various levels of government in a wide range of countries who are excited about this idea. You know\, I hope\, you know\, I hope that this book is one small brick in a foundation of\, you know\, a larger social change in how we think about how this works. And that improves folks lives. And anyone who wants to think in serious and concrete ways about how to put that infrastructure in place\, you know where to find me. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Well\, let’s open it up to questions. As you heard from Salimah\, if you can line up behind these microphones. Let me say two things as people start lining up. One is\, Dan is an excellent example of what it means to do a Ph.D. in public policy here. But I do want to recognize\, especially for the students in the room\, which is someone who can contribute directly to academic scholarship\, but also is contributing directly to real government practice in a way that’s very\, very relevant. So thank you for modeling what that can look like for academia as a whole. \n\n\nDan Honig What’s your PhD? Again. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos My PhD is also in public policy. \n\n\nDan Honig Oh I see\, it’s wonderful. Yeah\, that’s great. So an example that I have learned from. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Great. Let’s take questions. \n\n\nStudent 1 Thank you so much. I really appreciate this forum that builds the capability put together. So I appreciate your work and all that you’re doing. I’m a social worker\, a licensed social worker in New York City. Shanequa Moore\, MC/MPA student. And it’s interesting because I left government to do mission driven work. I didn’t feel like it accommodated what I wanted to bring\, the change that I wanted to bring. And so I ended up leaving state government\, being a state rep in New York for about eight years to operate my nonprofit full time\, which does a lot of mission driven work. But on the other side\, I’m also now working with managers and leaders within government\, sort of training them how to do mission driven work. And we I hear a lot of these managers talking about feeling burnt out and not feeling like there’s a place to do this kind of work in a government that doesn’t necessarily accommodate it. So closing with a question\, Salimah said\, How do what is your advice to people like myself that may be training managers and leaders within government? How do we sort of take this framework and start to empower them within it in a government that may not necessarily be ready to adopt this? \n\n\nDan Honig Yeah. So\, thank you. So thank you for your for your service. I mean\, in the way that we talk about in other lines of work\, but should talk about this line of work. You know\, if you were in touch with a bunch of managers in the system who are feeling burned out. So the first thing I would say and this draws actually a bit on Elizabeth Linos’s is working and the People Lab’s work\, you know\, connect them\, connect them to each other and start to figure out what are the kind of common things that they’re facing. Right. You know\, a system is more responsive as a collective. The managers in the system have power that as individuals\, they don’t. And your ability to stand between those managers and the system and say\, hey\, look\, here’s what we are anonymously hearing\, right. Is a way of making legible the problem. First step to any solution is recognizing you have a problem. Right? So\, you know\, it’s the first step of Alcoholics Anonymous for a reason\, right? You know\, recognize the disease\, recognize the issue. And\, you know\, I think that those connections will be a form of support for those managers. But also you have the ability and the real power and opportunity to help the system\, see what it’s doing wrong and find ways to make it. Thank you. \n\n\nStudent 2  Thank you\, then\, for your interesting presentation. My name is Arif from Indonesia. I’m a visiting scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. And yeah\, I have a question about the empowerment reform that you have talked about before. Could you elaborate more on this concept and how\, when this concept puts into the weak states institution\, like\, for instance\, in my country\, in Indonesia\, so. \n\n\nDan Honig Where in Indonesia? \n\n\nStudent 2 Indonesia? \n\n\nDan Honig What part? \n\n\nStudent 2 In Java. Yeah. \n\n\nDan Honig What city? \n\n\nStudent 2 Bandung. So\, you know\, that. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Dan knows Indonesia. \n\n\nStudent 2 Okay. Great. In other words\, what might the what are the challenges that government may face to shift from the empowerment based reform from the compliance based reform to empowerment based reform? Thank you very much. \n\n\nDan Honig Thank you. So you asked a question as if it was Indonesia or perhaps developing country specific. But I think actually the central challenges are common\, which doesn’t mean they’re identical. Which is\, you know\, when I give up control\, I\, I now am empowering\, you know\, a number of people. And if it if there is some number of people I empower more than\, say the 30 people I trust the most in the world maybe the 300 I trust the most in the world\, somebody is going to do something wrong. Right. You know\, if somebody is going to do something wrong\, hopefully that’s well intentioned. Right. But in fact\, if we empower enough people\, someone’s going to do something wrong that’s not well intentioned. And so\, you know\, one thing I suspect you as well\, Elizabeth\, I’m very frequently asked to speak these days about\, you know\, how can government learn from failure? Right. And I have lots of thoughts about that question. But before I answer it\, I always say first\, we need government to be able to learn from success. And currently we have a system where\, you know\, if we empowered 100 school principals in Bandung\, right. And 96 of them used that empowerment to make things better. And two of them acted within the rules but had no net effect. And two of them stole\, you know\, ₹10\,000. Right. We would find that we would call that a failure because that would show up on the front page of the paper. Right. And we would say and\, you know\, on average\, the minister in charge\, the deputy minister in charge would say\, you’re right. We should never have let this happen. We’re going to make sure it’s never going to happen again. And the only way to make sure it never happens again is to remove the empowerment that allowed this to happen. Right. That allowed the success to happen. So\, you know\, I would say that that risk is not is totally known to the people at the top of the system and they see it ahead of time. Right. I’m not I’m not providing them new information. You know what? I. And and that kind of shadow of accountability risk means that I don’t want to take the bet. Right. We should be extremely\, you know\, in the background here\, I hear a kind of like in weaker systems\, people will act with fewer controls first. I don’t think there’s a lot of evidence for that. You know\, I think people without control\, some of them act wrongly in all systems. Right. But most of them act well. And so we want to be careful. We want to think about how what we do when and what the sports are and how we check on how things are going on when we find those two principles. Right. We should treat them\, you know\, as the criminals they are. I’m not saying we should tolerate waste\, fraud and abuse. Not at all. Right. But that is different than saying that the only acceptable level of waste\, fraud and abuse is zero. We know that driving cars leads to accidents. We even know that sometimes people drink and drive cars. The existence of drunk driving does not lead us to not allow people to drive cars. But the basic equivalent of that is how we treat the public sector. And as a result\, no one goes anywhere. Thank you. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos I think one thing that you said in your Hurricane Sandy example that really resonated with me is something that we saw during Covid as well\, right? Which is at some point we allowed for less documentation in the interests of speed. But it was this like very brief moment in U.S. government kind of values alignment. That said\, we need to get people help on the social safety net or other programs. We’re not going to ask for the same level of documentation because we don’t have time for that. And then as soon as there was a fraud case\, a lot of states flipped back. So there’s a question about how do we maintain that sense of measuring success as opposed to just worrying about failure? I don’t have an answer\, but other people will have questions. But I think it is an important thing that we’re seeing this this idea of the shadow of accountability is going to is going to stick with me. \n\n\nDan Honig  And it seems to me. Well\, just a second. But it seems to me there’s something in kind of rebuilding social contracts there to\, you know\, in the relationship between government and citizens. We’ve taught citizens to expect that what government does is\, you know\, deliver and hold accountable in a kind of\, you know\, command and control way. You know\, I would be curious if in your work you find\, you know\, in your work with governance\, what do you see is like seeds for hope in them. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos I think there’s there’s a lot of people who are starting to think about. The question of trust that kind of underlies that and what it means for a government to tell its residents that you’re part of the solution. We’re going to co-create or co-produce the services that you want. And depending on where you are on the political spectrum\, that’s going to take different forms. But in some places where we work\, we see\, you know\, what does it mean to actually scale up participatory governance in other places? We hear from leaders that say we’re going to put the power back in the hands of residents to decide how they want their government to act\, but also that comes with responsibility. And and underlying that\, it is these these underlying questions of trust and mistrust not only in the government\, but also in each other. Right. So like in places where you think people who benefit from government programs are inherently not trustworthy\, you might create a whole different system than if you inherently believe the people who benefit from… \n\n\nStudent 3 Yeah. Yes. I’m actually really glad you took that turn\, because my question’s in a similar vein. And great book. Big fan would recommend purchase. \n\n\nDan Honig Wise man\, I can tell. Listen to this guy. \n\n\nStudent 3 I think one of the paradoxes for me is that while there is a general sentiment among bureaucrats that the compliance approach is stifling and really difficult\, to a certain extent\, the compliance approach is the result of the democratic process and voters preferences say to crack down on waste\, fraud and abuse or to avoid corruption. And so to a certain extent\, we as the public managing the bureaucracy expect compliance\, even though we wouldn’t love working under our compliance system. So I’m wondering if you can both speak to why you think there is that mismatch. And B\, how can public managers also manage the expectations of the public when they’re transforming systems and perhaps communicate what this model can do better? Yeah\, that is the great question. That is like a book length question that I will not I will not do justice. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos The next two minutes Dan? \n\n\nDan Honig Yeah\, I mean to four minutes right now. Like 100 points. Yeah. I think let me start in a place that I think might be a little controversial in this room\, which is where do voters preferences come from? Right. So since you mentioned that specifically. Right. So if you go back to like the political science literature\, there’s consensus that voters preferences come in large part from what they are taught are the things over which they should have preferences. And\, you know\, when parties change without any specific regard to any specific party and any country\, when when party’s leadership changes\, we see a remarkable change in the views of the people who support that party. Right. That seems to be driven by the leaders\, not by leaders responding to the citizens. Right. We have a narrative about about elites responding to preferences. And of course\, they do. I’m not saying there’s no responsive preferences\, but I think we should not take as given that because this is what voters expect. This is what voters need to expect. And there are plenty of countries which it does not work this way. Right. I think we need to change the expectations of citizens over what leads to the outcomes they want. Right. And as soon as we change that mental model\, we will find that there is support for a lot of the things that we do not. We cannot leave citizens out of them. It’s not like it isn’t a separate group. And we just need to talk to at the end. And you know\, my work actually. So my next set of projects is around. I’m fortunate enough to have a large grant from the European Union to look at things like what I’m calling relational state capacity. The idea here is like the capacity of a state is not just\, you know\, how many hospital beds you have\, how many doctors you have\, and whether you get a CDC. So the relationships that trust\, you know\, between citizens and the state. And that trust is born of the interactions you’ve got you’ve had before. And those interactions\, they are somewhat about the outcomes. Right? If I can’t serve you\, that’s not going to be good for relational state capacity. That’s about the respect I am able to show and about how much you feel you’re talking to a human being. And that is\, I mean\, you know\, social work right. And you know\, those I think we need to rebuild from the micro to get there. And this is part of why at the city level\, at the local level\, we see so much more opportunity this growth because there are enough people that I can reach them all\, that I can change their world. And I think we just need to take the truths we already know and serve\, raise them and make them more state or federal\, more\, you know\, national imagery. \n\n\nStudent 4 Thank you\, Professor. My name is John. I’m a former mission driven bureaucrat. \n\n\nDan Honig Reformed. You gave up. You gave up the mission part or you gave up the bureaucrat part. \n\n\nStudent 4 I used to be with the State Department in the management track\, and I left for the reasons that you wrote in your book without knowing it at the time. Then I joined higher education and functionally doing very similar work. But I was really surprised when I started. I’m like\, Wow. Like nobody’s checking what I’m doing for this. Like\, I could use my purchase card to do this. Like\, it was very surprising to me. \n\n\nDan Honig  John now drives a Ferrari. \n\n\nStudent 4 But it helped me to realize that it wasn’t the mission part so much\, but as the compliance part. And so I’m now with having built better agency within myself through my studies and my work here\, I feel ready to go back into government. The question I had was I’m choosing organization\, sorry\, structural organizations such as Peace Corps or the Department of Commerce as an alternative\, because I find that them\, relatively speaking\, to be relatively less compliance oriented as well as more mission specific. So I’m looking for that alignment. So my question to you is\, at what point do you make the judgment call where instead of trying to empower your team within where the organization structurally. Maybe just overly compliant. And is it better to kind of adapt to that and make it keep going or allow that to fail and align yourself with one that is more empowering? And how do you make that sort of decision? \n\n\nDan Honig Yeah. So you could mean… Thank you\, John. And thank you for the candor and clarity. That was a great\, great account. And so we can make failures two ways. So\, one\, we can imagine the agency failing and saying\, this agency isn’t doing any good\, we need to do something else\, right? I would suggest that history shows us very few acknowledged agency failures in that regard. Right. That you can fail or be failing\, but persist. And in part\, that’s because I can set a measure and I can meet those quantifiable measures and I can do that. The compliance actually helps me do that. So now what are you talking about? I’m failing. I you know\, I made the most widgets of any quarter on record\, you know\, And so I must be doing well. And so. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos Fewest failed widgets… \n\n\nDan Honig Fewest failed widgets. Exactly. Exactly. No widgets were returned in our process that does not allow returns. And so I and so I would suggest that I would think of that failure or that like\, you know. One thing you really illustrated here is that a labor market has two players in it. It has somebody hiring\, so it’s somebody applying\, entering\, exiting\, reentering. And so and I agree entirely with with Elizabeth\, it’s very hard for me not just to call you Linos. It’s very it’s very hard. It’s I agree entirely with Elizabeth that the that the kind of the kids today aren’t motivated is ridiculous\, right? Absolutely. But I do think that there is a kind of a need for generational updating regarding how people think about careers. I think there’s a real difference there. And you know what you’re just describing\, which is entry\, exit and very hopefully reentry is going to become much more the norm. Right. People aren’t going to stay for 25 years in one job. Right. And that means that all the things we’re talking about\, about making it attractive\, about building the world you want right in your agency are all the more important. So\, you know\, I would say that different mission driven bureaucrats are going to have different approaches to what they most prioritize. Clarity of mission doesn’t need to be at the organization level\, doesn’t need to be at the team level. Right. You know\, I say to everyone who asks me\, like\, the best indicator is a boss who you admire\, right? A boss who you say this person believes the things I believe\, and I want to work for her. You know\, I want to work for them. I want to contribute to this. And I can see where that leads. And sometimes that’s going to be at the organization level and sometimes it isn’t. You know\, Commerce versus Peace Corps versus something else. You know\, the mission that is attractive to you in the place that gives you the ability to contribute to that mission is what I would hold on to and what those. Yes. And how exactly would you sort that I think is going to be very individually specific\, but also the way you’re thinking about it\, which is you are the asset. Not just because you have the Ferrari to give people rides in\, but for other reasons too. You know\, I think that is the key. Like you\, you have value. You’re not just looking for a job. You’re looking for a place where you can make meaning and contribute to a kind of collective effort to do that. And the place that’s excited about that perspective is the place where I would predict you most likely to thrive. Thank you for the question. Thank you for your service. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos And there’s one thing I think that we’ve now heard from two speakers\, which we’re seeing in this kind of generational divide. People are interpreting the fact that young people don’t want to work in government is they don’t care enough about mission. But actually\, I think the real interpretation is what we’re hearing here\, which is if you care about making a difference in the world and you want to make a difference\, do you see government as a place to do that as opposed to other things? And we’re seeing\, at least in our surveys\, that everybody wants to make a difference. Everybody wants service. They just don’t necessarily see government as the place to do that. People who do. End up having other challenges with burnout later on\, but actually might very much align with your research. But that’s a different form of mission driven bureaucrats than how we usually talk about it. Yeah. \n\n\nStudent 5 Thank you Dan\, Elizabeth\, and BSC for the session.  I’m doing my SYPA on state capability in India along those lines. And I work for the Indian Administrative Service in India\, I’m a bureaucrat. I don’t know a mission driven one\, but yes. So my question is\, has two parts. First\, like we know like autonomy helps. We know like enough work already on it. And like this apart from like the current work\, in past 20 years there has… Bureaucrats know from secretary to it down to director and at every level. They know that autonomy is good\, but why? Like this system is in such equilibrium where it doesn’t like provide this autonomy to stakeholders and small agents. And further\, that agent is also principal to some other agent. And second part is like if we talk about people\, are we like seeing it as a proxy? Like when I worked in the government\, sometimes what happens is we see the finances like the ability to tax capabilitie is so less\, that funds are meager compared to the problem we have. And is that affecting the morale of the bureaucrat also? And then that we are seeing this as an indicator\, as the indicator might be something is and that might be a binding constraint and be focusing on the wrong problem. So two points. \n\n\nDan Honig Figuring out where the binding constraint is can be different in different systems. Absolutely. I would say that\, you know\, in broad strokes\, my the general reason I think we see too much compliance is because they feel like the only tools available to those at the top. Right. And we were talking about trust between citizens and bureaucrats before. There’s also trust inside the system. You know how many you know\, how many IAS have I sat with\, you know\, talking about the folks lower in the system who might not you know\, they might not have the same level of trust regarding their behavior. Right. And that’s true. That ramifies up and down and sideways and every which way. Right. Well\, one of the great things about being at the IAS is that you start as a D.C.\, right. As a district collector and you get to actually meet the folks on the ground. Right. But by the time you’re 20 years in\, you know\, and you’re\, you know\, sitting in an office in a state capitol\, you know\, I can hear\, you know\, what’s happening. You’re passionate about how the system is broken. You know\, all of a sudden you’ve lost that connection. People on the ground. And I think I think that’s part of the answer to that. So I’m very excited to hear that you’re working on this. And I think there’s lots to be done in India specifically thinking about how systems work. \n\n\nStudent 6 Thank you\, Dan. I’m  presently doing my PAE second-year. Again a bureaucrat from India kind of experience. Not the same service. Different service. Revenue service. But my question is based on something that I’ve experienced. You talk about the equilibrium between compliance and enforcement. And because every agency\, every institution and every organization is built different. A speed to reach that clear even the possibility to reach that equilibrium be across organizations. In your experience\, what would you think are the preconditions and the factors that allow for faster discovery  of this equilibrium and even make it possible? And I’m pretty sure you might have alluded that to your book or your previous books. But I’m asking you\, this is because of a single reason. Someone asked me the same question. It’ll be in line with what you’re seeing\, because I’ve seen it unfold as head of anti-smuggling team at Mumbai. Wherever there’s this follow up question\, it’s what you were asserting. It works in all scenarios. \n\n\nDan Honig I love it. I. I’m tempted. So anti-smuggling move by the American Civil Service and the Pendleton Act in some ways grow out of concerns that the New York Customs House and there’s a lot about the history of civil service reform that I could imagine could be relevant here rather than go in that kind of abstruse academic direction. I’ll try to answer the question\, which is what makes it easier to figure out\, figure out that we should manage in a different way. Is recognition that we have a problem. So when I talk to Pinnacle\, Pinnacle bureaucrats and ministers\, usually I say\, let’s start with what you already think isn’t working. Right. So\, you know\, what’s the worst that could happen? The thing that’s not working will continue not to work. You know\, so let’s let’s let’s start there and think about think about it. I think information about I think equilibrium\, understanding we’re in a bad equilibrium also happens faster when we have systems in place to gather information from the people doing the work right\, rather than only the kind of like data and reporting systems. Right. So that is\, you know\, sort of the\, you know\, the first the first discussion about about social workers in New York State. Right? So\, you know\, if we can get more of that information\, we’re going to see it faster. I also think it is easier to find these equilibria in services where you can see performance. You can see a two sided performance problem. Right. So revenue is interesting. Revenue services are really interesting in part because there is the risk of under collection. There’s also kind of a risk of over collection\, right? So\, you know\, that is to say\, you know\, we want appropriate collection\, but what is that? And how we set up a system to see that. And if our compliance management systems are driving us to kind of break the relationship with citizens because of what we’re incentivizing. Right. We maybe need to set up systems that think about that. And\, you know\, Tamil Nadu has done some work specifically. I know about this. So. Yes. And so\, yeah\, great question. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos There’s some interesting research in the US context with tax collection about how compliance driven systems have have. And I don’t think they talk about in these terms\, but have have created the incentives to over inspect low income households on tax evasion\, much more so than what would be the actual\, more appropriate performance metric\, which would be related to like the potential savings or potential revenue that would come from affecting higher income individuals. So it has these. \n\n\nDan Honig That’s because higher income individuals require more skill to examine. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos It’s easier. Exactly. It’s easier to inspect and audit for the bureaucrats. I think as part of the argument before you you give your final question. Let me just apologize. I have to go to an event that is for people who are thinking about how to do recruitment and retention of public sector workers in state and local government\, where we’re going to talk about how we don’t have any good research on this. \n\n\nDan Honig I was invited to the same event. Send them my best. \n\n\nElizabeth Linos So I will talk about your book like this. So I need to run to that. So I’m going to invite Salimah to help finish off the Q&A and then and then close us off. \n\n\nDan Honig Thank you. \n\n\nBSC Team And I’m just going to voice the questions from Zoom. So we have two questions. One is around what would you say to a federal agency that is heavy on the compliance factor for recipients of programs and those that administer them\, administer them? What would you tell them in an effort to encourage motivation? I know you’ve covered some of this. And then the second question was around how could an outcomes-based framework meld with the approach you suggest? \n\n\nDan Honig Yeah. So so the first question\, what do you tell a place steeped in compliance? You know\, first\, if you’re telling a place where there’s no one interested in listening\, you know\, I would say let’s talk elsewhere\, right? You know\, so that is to say\, you know\, systems don’t change because pointy headed academic sitting on high chairs\, you know\, tell them\, you know\, which I appreciate\, I’m not the tallest human. And so I’m glad glad to have the lift here. I told them they were doing it wrong. Right. Like you have to actually have reformers or people who care inside the system. So. But where do you start? If you have them? You start wherever you find yourself. You know\, you start by looking at where you are and saying what what are the steps that can build momentum in this direction\, that can show progress without risking my job from day one? You know\, maybe maybe I want to do that eventually\, But like\, let’s try to work inside the system first because that’s where I am. I’m in that system and maybe I’ll exit and have even more impact. But\, you know\, let me let me try the inside strategy first and to outcomes. That’s a great place. Assuming that’s where we’re ending. Yeah\, that’s a wonderful place to end\, which is\, you know\, I\, I was tempted when Linos\, when Elizabeth asked me earlier for the misconceptions to go on like a slight rant about the many things I think people\, people miss about this argument sometimes from time to time. And one of them is absolutely the idea that either we care about empowerment or we care about outcomes\, right? I think we should care about empowerment because we care about outcomes that. So if the best way to get outcomes is not to monitor every step of the process and focus entirely on compliance\, we should not do that right? We should do the thing that leads to the best outcomes. And so let’s figure out the outcomes we want and let’s figure out where the process is actually undermining our ability to achieve those outcomes and let’s act accordingly. And so\, you know\, in some ways academically\, this work is sometimes set up as against new public management\, which was a\, you know\, a philosophy of sort of\, you know\, rigorous measurement and compliance in some ways. But the original dream of new public management was that we were going to focus on the outcomes and we were going to let up on everything before then\, on all the process controls\, right? What happened in practice is that we added lots of measurement of outcomes and also lots more measurement of the process and we layer that on top of the existing compliance system and turned out that didn’t make things better\, right? But the original idea\, let’s focus rigorously on the outcomes and figure out how we get there. I’ve not only do I have no complaints\, you know\, I think there’s a lot to be said for it. And I think that managing for empowerment should be in service of actually improving people’s lives. That’s the point. That’s why we should do it. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. Great. Thank you very much. I’d like to thank let’s give. Thanks\, Dan. And I really hope that those who are empowerment curious can realize I love that word\, can realize that they do have agency and that your book has ideas of how they can try. Even if it’s in small steps. I also want to just echo how beautiful it was to just watch you and Linos. I’m going to call her Linos in conversation. You know\, these are two HKS PhD alums who are doing incredible work\, and I hope it’s been an inspiration for the students here for what you could do. You can go out there and make real great things happen. So welcome back home and thanks again\, Dan. Let’s give them another round of applause. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nIn this talk\, Dan Honig discusses the relationship between empowerment and compliance-based management in the public sector. He outlines research showing how excessive focus on compliance and control tends to undermine performance and motivation among public servants\, demonstrating through examples drawn from different countries that when public sector workers are given autonomy and feel connected with their mission\, they perform better and are more likely to remain committed to their roles. Honig rejects some common misconceptions about how to manage public servants\, arguing that the desire to serve the public good remains universal across countries and the generational gap. \n\n\n\nThrough examples like Hurricane Sandy relief efforts and child protective services in Detroit\, Honig illustrates how compliance-oriented accountability systems\, while intended to prevent abuse\, often create contradictory incentives that make it hard for mission-driven bureaucrats to serve effectively. He highlights that empowerment and compliance aren’t mutually exclusive\, and that government agencies are putting too much emphasis on compliance. In conversation with Elizabeth Linos\, the two HKS alumni explore how these ideas connect to larger questions of trust between government and individuals\, generational changes in public service career paths\, and the challenge of measuring success rather than simply attempting to prevent failures. \n\n\n\nThis event was co-hosted with The People Lab. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/motivation-and-purpose-in-the-public-sector/
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SUMMARY:Good Intentions\, Great Laws\, Terrible Outcomes
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nLant Pritchett\, Research Director\, Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP) \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThis event was not recorded. \n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nIn this talk\, Lant addressed the question “how did we go from the end of history in 1989 to where we are today?” Students had the opportunity to ask their burning questions. \n\n\n\nSpeaker Bio\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLant Pritchett is LaMP’s co-founder and research director. Lant is a world-renowned development economist who has spent the last 30 years applying economic principles to complex problems of systems change. Lant worked with the World Bank from 1988 to 2007\, living in Indonesia 1998-2000 and India 2004-2007. He taught at the Harvard Kennedy School from 2000 to 2018\, where he was the Faculty Chair of the MPA/ID Degree program. He has published over a hundred books\, journal articles\, working papers and has over 38\,000 citations on development topics from education to economic growth to labor mobility.  \n\n\n\nLant has a track record of translating visionary ideas in practical realities at national and global scale. Lant’s early work in 2006 calling attention to a growing learning crisis in the developing world and the need for an emphasis on achieving early foundational learning. His suggested replacement for learning targets was reflected almost exactly in the 2015 Social Development Goals and more recently in the World Bank’s goal to eliminate learning poverty. Lant’s work\, together with David Dollar\, assessing the impact of foreign assistance on achieving development goals called for “selectivity\, not conditionality” as a way to channel foreign assistance led both to substantial changes in World Bank practices and the founding of a brand-new development agency\, the Millennium Challenge Corporation\, explicitly adopting the principle.  \n\n\n\nHe graduated from Brigham Young University in 1983 with a B.S. in Economics and in 1988 from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a PhD in Economics.  \n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/good-intentions-great-laws-terrible-outcomes/
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SUMMARY:The Mirror Cracked? On Democracy\, Welfare Politics\, and India’s General Election
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nYamini Aiyar\, Senior Visiting Fellow at Brown University and previous President and Chief Executive of Centre for Policy Research in India \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome\, everyone. We’re going to get ready to get started. Welcome to the Building State Capability Talk series. Today with us\, we have Yamini Aiyar\, and she’s going to be talking. The title of her session is The Mirror Cracked? On Democracy\, Welfare Politics\, and India’s General Election. Yamini is currently a senior visiting fellow at the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia and Watson Institute at at Brown University. She was the president and chief executive of the Center for Policy Research\, or CPR\, a leading multi-disciplinary think tank in New Delhi from 2017 to 2024. Yamini’s work sits at the intersection of research and policy practice. During her tenure\, she spearheaded the establishment of two important new research initiatives within CPR on state capacity and politics. Prior to becoming president\, she set up the Accountability initiative at CPR\, known for its work on governance\, social accountability and expenditure tracking on social policy. Yamini’s research interests span the fields of contemporary politics\, state capacity\, social policy\, federalism and India’s political economy. Let’s welcome Yamini Aiyar. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Thank you. Thank you so much\, Salimah\, for inviting me to be here. It’s an absolute privilege to to be on to be here with all of you. CPR has a very close relationship with the Kennedy School because so many of our younger fellows have found their way here and gone on to do bigger and better things with their lives. And for me too\, this is a very special place because although I didn’t have a chance to study here\, I went to the other Cambridge\, the real one. I did a lot of my actual academic training\, came through the Kennedy School in different ways. There was a mini Kennedy School in New Delhi. When I joined the World Bank a very long time ago\, the first person I met who became my friend\, partner in crime\, mentor\, colleague\, everything for the years we spent together\, Salimah at the World Bank and Lant came and taught us how to be provocative\, creative\, energetic\, and also always remember that even if you miss a deadline\, which\, by the way\, you will make sure that you tell your boss you remember the deadline and you’re going to miss it. It always helps in ensuring that everyone thinks you’re super professional and you still have missed the deadline. So I learned many things\, including survival skills in the professional world thanks to that experience. And so it’s for me\, being here is almost like coming back to where it all started for me. When Salimah asked me to speak here and we were discussing topics\, I thought to talk about the Indian elections\, which was somewhat unusual for a home that is talking about state capability in a sense. This is not pure political science in that sense. But I wanted to talk about the elections on this platform because in fact\, the questions of state capability and the way India’s politics has evolved\, especially in the last decade or so\, are very\, very closely intertwined. And I’m going to spend the bulk of my presentation really talking about the politics of all of this. And I say this because one of the reasons why the president\, our current prime minister\, Narendra Modi\, acquired kind of national legitimacy ten\, ten\, 12 years ago\, had a lot to do with a broad disenchantment within the Indian population. But amongst Indian voters and one that found its expression in elite voices about Indian politics abroad\, disenchantment with state capacity in terms of its ability to deliver just about anything. Prime Minister Modi or candidate Modi rose to national importance against the backdrop of large scale corruption scandals that had rocked the country back in 2012\, 2013\, and projected himself as the leader with strong-man capability to govern capably. Maximum governance\, minimum government was a slogan that attracted several to his capacity for governance in a country that was in desperate need of good governance. And it was one of the most critical arms along\, of course\, with the ideological project that gave him large scale credibility and legitimacy and was very much part and parcel of the narrative that unfolded over the decade. In that context\, a very important part of what he brought to the table for state capability was this marrying together of a strong leadership\, quote unquote\, and technology to build out a pipeline for welfare service delivery. And in more ways than one\, one of the most visible contributions that he has made over these ten years under his leadership of the Indian state’s transformation over this last decade has been around using technology to deliver welfare benefits at the grassroots level\, projected as ways of cutting through the layers of an incompetent\, ineffective\, apathetic state that delivers on on the back of patronage rather than delivery to all. And it has been part and parcel of the aura and the allure of the Prime Minister himself. But his political body has been positioning himself as the leader who has been able to clean up the pipelines and deliver effectively. This is state capability at its best. India projects itself across the globe. In fact\, the prime minister is in New York today. Yesterday\, he spoke to various people of the Indian diaspora talking about India’s digital public infrastructure as one of its greatest exports\, the deployment to the wall\, the deployment of that DPI into state capability. Big\, big part of the story. But I do think it’s very important\, especially for policy students like you\, to also understand that with every attempt at using new tools of state capability\, there is also politics. And that politics needs to be engaged with and understood because it does create large amounts of complexities both to the discourse on state capability\, what it is\, what it is\, and how it can be used\, and also what it means for  the larger project of democracy\, of social inclusion\, of equity. And these are questions that we often don’t ask in policy classrooms because we are looking very much at thinking through what the technological fixes are. So so that’s why I thought I wanted to talk to you a little bit about the Democratic context in which the Indian elections unfolded\, what that meant and how the discourse on democracy unfolded in India in these last over the last few months. But then I want to spend the bulk of my time focusing much more on welfare politics. And a lot of what I’m going to talk to you about is based on a survey that I that that I was a part of that we conducted in May during the elections. The other lead researcher\, along with me is my colleague Neelanjan Sircar\, who is a political scientist based out of Ambedkar University in Delhi\, who is also a colleague of mine at the Center for Policy Research. And I\, a group of other researchers\, came together to undertake this survey. And so I wanted to also share findings from that and get your feedback as we move forward with this work. So let me begin just by giving you this broad overview. I will rush through this\, but we can talk about it in the Q&A because I wanted to spend a little bit more time on the welfare stuff. I don’t think it would be news to anybody in this room to say that India went into the general elections in its that started in April and went through seven phases till June 4th when the results were announced under the shadow of what I certainly felt significantly was the emergence of creeping authoritarianism in our polity. And we can argue about why I say this\, but let me just lay my cards out straight upfront. In in March this year\, just on the eve of the elections\, the BJP\, sort of its big slogan was\, this time we will cross 400\, 400 seats in the lower House\, which essentially meant that there was a push towards total dominance of the BJP Abki Baar 400 Paar. Back into 2019\, the election slogan was if Modi is there anything is possible. Modi Hai Toh Mumkin Hai. This time the slogan was Modi toh Aaenge\, Modi will come. It was almost seen as accepted that the the outcome of the election is known before the election was going to take place. And there were some very important reasons behind that. This was partly on account of the very well recognized popularity of Prime Minister Modi himself\, which was showing up in all the polls. But also a lot had been done by the BJP and by Prime Minister Modi himself to give the appearance of total domination some legitimate and a lot not so legitimate\, stifling opposition voices. On the eve of the election\, the Congress body\, the largest opposition party\, announcing that its accounts had been frozen on the eve of the election. One of the most visible leaders of the opposition alliance\, Arvind Kejriwal\, being put into jail\, stifling every kind of civil society voice\, dissenting voices in every way. In every form. 95% of the of cases against the coercive officers of the state\, the enforcement directorate\, the CBI\, the tax authorities\, all targeted specifically at opposition politicians\, 17\,000 FCRA\, the Foreign Contribution Regulatory Act\, licenses of NGOs were being were rejected. My own institution had spent the better part of two years dealing with all of this. There was a very closed media completely. All that you could see when you put on the television was was a narrative of the government. All that you could see when you open the newspapers were the narrative of the government. All that you could see when you were driving around Delhi\, the city I live were only pictures of Modi’s guarantee. It was the government and it was this one singular leader that you saw everywhere. It felt like all that needed to be done for total hegemonic control had been done. In January\, the Prime Minister sort of became the only visible face of the consecration of the Ram Temple\, one of the key ideological sort of pivots of the Hindutva movement and all over parts of parts of the country\, North and south\, people were being enjoined to participate in this consecration ceremony. And it. And pull that together into the slogan of This time we’ll cross 400. It was almost as though the promise of the ideological project is about to be achieved\, which is why we need total dominance and the election happened. The campaign happened suddenly. You moved away from the dominance of national media\, the dominance of put political party leader voices to be forced to interact with ordinary voters. And at that point\, a lot of things started changing. I’m just going to highlight three. One really important one was that we began to see a fairly large diversification in sources of information and media. Now\, it will be argued\, as is often does\, that social media has a very limited reach\, etc. but it plays a very important role in building narrative. And I just have two quotes here from ordinary voters that we spoke to in in Uttar Pradesh that give you a sense of the extent to which people were looking for alternative sources of information and narrative building to get an understanding of what actually was going on. Dhruv Rathi is a well-known social media influencer who suddenly came up in a big way. Everybody in this room\, all of the Indians\, probably have seen his short videos talking to us about authoritarianism\, talking to us about majoritarianism\, talking to us about corruption. The point was just that the numbers were going crazy. I mean\, people were looking for this kind of thing. And we find in our surveys some very interesting things. 58% of respondents argue that mainstream media only represents the views of Prime Minister Modi and the BJP. I put that in red because I think it’s important to know that the voter was beginning to recognize that  the extent to which the authoritarian project was actually becoming clear. Does this change how you choose to vote? I have no idea. I will say that in the in our survey\, more or less voter choices mapped onto the final outcomes of the election. But that was not the purpose of this. It was to understand people’s perceptions. But I just want to show you where it is that red lines do get crossed from voters perceptions. Lots of discussion about electoral voting machines. A big part of the technology story of why India is invested capacity is improving including of debate in India about whether EVMs are fair or not fair. I personally have absolutely refused to engage in this conversation because I can’t imagine a world in which we have to question the act of voting itself. It’s the most fundamental act of what it means to be a citizen in a democracy. But we did ask this question because it was high on the topics of chatter during the elections. And what is interesting in both ways\, 62% say that the electoral voting machine process was fair\, but a fairly large 22% say it wasn’t fair. And there’s a strong correlation with those who said it was fair. With support for the BJP\, again\, just an indication of the extent to which red lines were being crossed. We know from our data\, from data from the national Election survey of CSDS that real economy questions\, no matter how much we were being enjoined into believing that India was going to develop into this grand future going forward by 2047\, Viksit Bharat\, the developed India was one of the big taglines of the BJP. We were told that India is on a technological superhighway. India is going to take over the world with its digital public infrastructure\, third largest economy. But the reality of most people’s lives was very much caught in the challenges of unemployment. And with that also a sense of price rise\, partly because of increased food inflation. And all of these came together into a sense of  There are democratic red lines that are being crossed. There is a real lived experience that isn’t mapping on to what we are being told. And what is really unusual about this election is that the opposition was able to pick up on this for a change\, which it hadn’t in the last ten years\, and use it very effectively early in the election campaign. A few. And this is where the complex dynamics of Indian society starts coming into play. Political scientists have often argued historically that Indian society has so many different poles and pressures of identity\, of stratification\, caste\, religion\, etc.\, that politics at the national level will always be centrist. And one of the big puzzles of these last ten years is that we move from centrist politics to very close to Hindu hard\, hardline politics. And the explanations for that are still evolving. I don’t think we still know in a satisfactory way. But one element of that\, particularly in large states like Uttar Pradesh\, was the effect was the ability of the BJP to effectively and welfare played a big role in it to a degree create a cross-caste Coalition\, particularly amongst the lower castes and the upper costs towards Hindutva. What really happened suddenly in the course of this election\, there’s a dominance story\, 400 seats for total dominance led in the early part of the campaign. A few of BJP politicians suggested that  total dominance was needed in order to amend the Constitution. And this ran parallel to the reemergence of caste as a very important element in the discourse of the election\, and a sense that when they say total domination\, they also mean total domination to remove reservations from the Constitution. Now\, there are many complicated reasons why the election outcome look the way it did. It was as much a national election as it was many\, many state elections. Caste is a complex issue. I’m not getting into the details of that. We can talk about it in the in the Q&A. But what is really important is that particularly in the in Uttar Pradesh\, cost and constitution and democracy all kind of came together to build a narrative around the Indian constitution. And so I have a picture here of all the opposition leaders\, when they went into parliament after the elections\, holding up that little red book\, that little red book became a really important part and parcel of the electoral narrative. But what’s really important is in this election\, this the combination of the story of the red lines of democracy\, the reemergence of I don’t know if reemergence or the caste emerging once again as a critical element in electoral politics after ten years\, particularly in states like Uttar Pradesh\, brought alive the Constitution and the arena of mass politics\, which was very unusual. And it wasn’t just that political party leaders of the opposition\, the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh.  Rahul Gandhi\, the Congress Party at the national level\, were using the Constitution to try and mobilize voters. Actually\, you could hear the voters talk about and in very\, very fundamental terms and there’s many reasons for it\, I don’t have time to go into its details. Again\, we can talk about it\, but the relationship between the constitution maker\, as the author of the Constitution\, what this means for Dalit voters in Uttar Pradesh played a very important role. You can see from the quote I have here of a young voter in Agra in Uttar Pradesh\, Ambedkar means everything to us. We don’t think it’s easy to change the Constitution\, but we do believe the BJP wants to. Whether the BJP wanted to or not as irrelevant thing. So elections are about narratives. The narrative was really strong\, a very clear sense of the relationship between constitution\, fundamental rights\, reservation. Constitution matters because it protects us\, says another voter. It gives us reservation. It must be protected. It is our fundamental right. This relationship between constitution\, rights\, democracy\, reservations was a very important part of the narrative of the election in Uttar Pradesh in particular\, but it also spread\, in my view\, to many other parts of the country as well\, and played a really important role in bringing to bear the relationships between democracy and fundamental rights and the elections. And of course\, I must also note that there are faultlines. This was also a very divisive election on the back of religious lines. None other than our prime minister himself went on in rallies using words and language that frankly\, is not appropriate for the leader of a secular country. And when you talk to people\, Muslim communities and Hindu communities\, this was definitely on people’s minds. But the debate on constitution\, on fundamental rights and equality never really spoke to the question of constitutional fundamental rights and secularism or equality between religions. So you would hear about the Constitution in Dalit Hindu\, but you wouldn’t necessarily hear about them talking about questions of religious divide. Hindu-Muslim relations and Muslims would always speak about…. Hindus would speak about… Two very different things equality between religions and equality between caste. And so I think that remains. It is regularly being argued that perhaps this is the aim of Hindu majoritarianism. I don’t think so. I think it has seeped much deeper into parts and parcel of Indian society and we need a much more robust debate about that. So that’s a that’s a sort of broad metanarrative in which these elections unfolded. And I do think that democracy\, constitution and fundamental rights played an important role in how the dialog on elections and electoral outcomes should play out for the ordinary voter. And this was a very important piece of the story. So I said in March it felt that creeping authoritarianism was about to give way to total authoritarianism. In my reading\, I think the Indian voter really saved and protected Indian democracy. It is argued that the fact that it was 240 and not 307 or 370 or 400\, which was all which are the numbers that are floating around is on account of democracy\, not backsliding. I would argue it’s on account of the fact that voters recognize that democracy was backsliding and needed to be protected. And there’s something intuitive about that sense of democratic instinct in Indian society that that that saved us\, at least for the moment. Let me now come to the question of welfare. As I mentioned\, right up front\, and I’m going to try and go through this as fast as possible. The use of technology was a very important use of technology\, and direct cash transfers or in-kind transfers has been the hallmark of the welfare politics of the last decade. And this is not something unique to Prime Minister Modi\, although he added the gusto with which it was pursued. It was in the making for quite some time with the building of the technology architecture built out on this disenchantment with the capability of the state to really invest in public systems it’s too corrupt it’s too apathetic. It does not work\, and we find ways to bypass through these layers. And technology offered a very tantalizing alternative. What Prime Minister Modi’s government did at a national scale\, which over time state governments also picked up\, was in building out this pipeline building of welfare architecture that was suited to this pipeline. So the biggest push on welfare was not investments in public systems and public and married goods\, health and education as two very important examples. Sanitation\, yes. But again\, with sanitation\, it was about. It was about private goods via cash and direct benefit transfers. So it’s basically using public money for private good. So even in sanitation\, the hallmark was  subsidies to build toilets rather than investing in big sewage systems or fecal sites\, management\, etc.. So the whole welfare\, the big flagship programs\, the biggest public health scheme that was launched in 2018\, was an insurance program director to the DVT Architecture. A card was handed out to beneficiary families for a for insurance. So every single big scheme linked itself into the direct benefit transfer system. And it was done in true\, true BJP style with its political communications designed in such a way that you knew this was the leader’s benefit being given directly into it to the individual. One of the hallmarks\, for example\, of you see that picture that the first big DVT scheme was a gas cylinders to women. The Prime Minister is right there. There’s a lot of publicity\, massive publicity that was given\, and it is seen as Modi’s benefit that is being given to the individual beneficiary. During Covid\, the public distribution system for free rice and free food\, essentially free rations was the biggest scheme that India launched to to deal with the fallout economic fallout of Covid. Quite literally on bags of rice was Modi’s picture. So the photograph is really important as a device of political communication. But there’s another very important element here that a lot of these schemes were designed to identify categories of beneficiaries legible to the state\, largely women who have emerged as a critical constituency. So caste suddenly disappears in some ways from this discourse. It’s women and economic levels of economic capability. Of course\, the two intersect\, but it’s not openly said. And other categories employ employment\, unemployment\, age\, young women\, women with children\, women over 45. So so new categories of beneficiaries\, were identified. And technology is sort of used as a basis on which I attribute economic attributes of individuals and households are pulled together into data systems. We do not have the capability to actually make any sense of those data systems. That’s where the new consultants are beginning to play a very important role. Again\, a very important part of how we think about technology and state capability. As new technologies come in and you don’t skill the stage itself\, it opens up space for all these consultants to come in to do the functions of the state. The state has beautiful databases\, but between line departments\, no one has any idea how to actually read those databases. And while it gives employment to the policy types\, it really raises very important questions about the capability and capacity of the state. And for politicians\, this is a great thing because you can build a direct link to the voter. And I’ll show you in a second why this matters. The Act of Welfare Benefits serves as a repeated reminder of who’s giving you the benefit. It is coming from the party leader. It has itself kind of it contributes to a politics that is deeply centralized into the individual leadership that almost bears out a deification of the leader. Neelanjan\, my coauthor on this work has a very nice framing of how to think about some aspects of this. It’s a politics that is based on Modi uses this word vishwas\, which translates roughly as trust. It’s a politics based on trust of the leader\, and you trust the leader because the leader is delivering these benefits quite literally directly into your bank account or directly into your ration\, into your home food on your plate in the toilet that you see and remove because it removes the needs of intermediaries. Don’t need the local panchayat for delivery. You don’t need the local block office for delivery. You don’t need the local district office for delivery. They may be chains in the game\, but it is monies that go into your account. It is a benefit that reaches you directly at the point at which you\, the POS\, the point of service where you actually go and pick it up. So it creates a very different kind of relationship. You may still see the local government official and the local administrator as critical to your link with the state\, but it isn’t local government official who is responsible directly to give you these benefits. And so from an electoral point of view\, what does it do? It creates a politics of direct attribution. So when we ask voters who is most responsible for delivering benefits to you\, 51% say it’s the prime minister\, 19% say it’s the chief minister. And there’s a lot of state variation which I’ll come to in a second because it’s really interesting and you see very strong correlation of support with voting choices for the BJP\, where you see people mentioned the Prime minister. So 51% of those who said is the Prime Minister who is responsible for delivering benefits. This is really important because when you didn’t have direct benefit transfers in India’s federal structure\, government of India may use a mechanism of financing schemes that it calls its own\, which can go back to the voters for. But the implementation requires close coordination with the state government. So if you compare this data with 2014\, the national Election survey data\, you will see people often mentioning the State Government\, the Chief Minister for things like the National Employment Guarantee Program\, which is a Government of India scheme\, because the states played a very important role in the process of delivery. Now the states are actors of the leadership on the top in the process of delivery\, but the direct connection is so closely made with the voter that you can see very clear political attribution. It completely changes the nature of the federal dynamic when it comes to delivering schemes. And so in that sense\, it also changes a side of contestation of welfare. Who do you expect to deliver for what and what is the role of the national\, state and local governments shifts very substantially in this kind of thing. Some interesting detail which I’m still trying to make sense of\, but I presented you anyway on how all of this has changed narratives of corruption. Let me be very clear. We do not have a census in India. We have a household consumption expenditure survey that was only just done. The last census was done in 2011. The household consumption expenditure survey was just done. Only a fact sheet is out. We have a periodic table for survey data which is telling us how serious the employment question is. In India we do not have much independent evaluation like we used to in the past. So it’s your claims or mine. Your observations are\, well\, mine and I have a little bit of survey data to tell you what people are perceiving. I can’t say anything about what else is going on on the ground. And this is a serious problem for a country that was once known for its statistics. Where we are today is something very scary. Anyhow. We asked people what they thought. What do you believe? That corruption has come down? 43% said yes\, that’s not a small number and there is a strong correlation with voter choice. 61% of those 43 said it was BJP voters. And we did also ask why they thought it was coming down. And the two most common answers was strong monitoring by the prime minister and technology. So some combination of that state capability narrative\, strong leadership technology has a way of bypassing to reduce corruption and reach the voter reach the beneficiary is an extremely important part and parcel of how welfare programs are being perceived and understood. But it doesn’t mean that anything has gone away. We asked voters\, do you have to pay a commission for direct benefit transfers? That is corruption. Effectively\, 49% said no\, but a very large 32% said yes. This is 16 states\, 36\,000 households. So it’s not a small sample. The contractor. Does he still take a cut? 43% said yes. So it’s not that corruption has gone away in any substantive in a significant way. But certainly the perceptions of corruption\, the nature of corruption has changed and shifted. And I think in some positive ways\, which is why overall you see a somewhat more positive response. What about the role of the intermediaries? 44% said that they do see more presence of MPs and MLAs in. Or in comparison to the previous five years in the delivery of welfare schemes. But when pushed in terms of what their role is\, it largely seems to be about reminding us that Modi is giving you these schemes or the Chief Minister is giving you these. So\, so the nature of their role has shifted\, although they still play an important visible presence in the whole thing. You had a clarification question or a deeper question\, because we can take the deeper questions later. \n\n\nAudience Member 1 No\, just a clarification question on the last point\, did you ask something about Panchi. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar We did\, we did\, we did. And those numbers are 43%\, if I’m not wrong\, said that they see more presence of the Panchi. But for data collection. So all the data that goes into the MIS system is collected by the Panchi and the Panchi officers in Andhra Pradesh. I’ll come to that in a moment. We saw something very interesting. Now\, when it comes to electoral gaming\, while the BJP has been a better at it than anybody else\, it’s not to say that other state\, that other regional political parties and indeed BJP’s own state governments haven’t recognized the very\, very electorally powerful relationship between welfare\, politics and electoral gains in this context of direct benefit transfers and in. And so you have particularly in the last five years\, there has been this emergence of what I call competitive welfarism. Regional parties have figured out that this is one important way in which they can also play the same game that the BJP is playing at a national level in the region\, in regional politics. And so direct benefit transfers\, particularly to women at state government levels\, are also playing a very\, very important role. One of the questions I get asked a lot after the 2024 result is so\, you know\, you say that there was a direct attribution. It played an important role in shaping the legitimacy of Modi\, but it didn’t work this time\, clearly\, because in places like Uttar Pradesh\, they didn’t do so well. So where do you stand on that? My answer to that is competitive federalism. Chief ministers are smart enough. All political parties in India today\, in my reading\, tend to operate in exactly … are prone rather to exactly the same political party leadership centralized form of inner-party lack of democracy. That is how they operate this centralized power into the Chief Minister’s office\, the centralized power into the Prime Minister’s office. And they look at ways in which they can electorally play the same game. Direct benefit transfers are a good way to do that. Revenue you could see data across states will tell you that 9% of revenue and expenditure now across multiple large big states is being deployed for direct benefit transfers. So you get lots of an idea across states\, which is interesting to see how this plays out in voter data to a degree. Andhra Pradesh\, the state of Andhra Pradesh\, you can see up here the picture below that is he lost the election. Jagan Reddy\, who started a massive direct benefit transfer scheme. Some of my colleagues from CPR who are here at the Kennedy School work with us on some of the work we did on these projects. And the picture above is of the BJP\, Madhya Pradesh government\, that launched a scheme called Ladli Behna. It was meant for women direct cash transfer of ₹12\,000. Andhra Pradesh\, you see the red line. There was a lot more direct attribution to the chief Minister than the blue line\, which is the Prime minister. BJP doesn’t have a strong presence in the state\, but Andhra Pradesh also gets a pretty high yellow line of others. It’s a two party complex\, competitive state\, the TDP\, which won the election. And a lot of and one of the ways in which the direct benefit transfer schemes were implemented in Andhra Pradesh had the creation of a bureau of a contracted bureaucratic arm at the village level\, kind of bypassing the the local elected local government structure. So voters that were not keen on the party often use said government officials are responsible for delivering those. Government officials were essentially a way to say we recognize that schemes are being given\, but we don’t want to attribute directly to YSR. And most of those who said others ended up in terms of their voter choices were gave voter preference to the TDP. \n\n\nAudience Member 2 Can you speak to Kerala? \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Kerala is really important because Kerala has very strong local governments. So you’ll see a very high others then because we had broken it up. The bulk of the other in Kerala goes to local governments. Kerala does not have as robust. There is also the same centralizing element of party politics in Kerala\, but it’s its broad welfare schemes are. So they’ve been around for so long\, they’re so entrenched. And the local governments play such an important role that DBTs are an add on\, but not core to the structure of welfare\, of the nature of the welfare architecture as it exists today. And I just point out to others\, Madhya Pradesh\, which has this largely been the scheme with for women\, which was that now they had a state election in December 2023. In the run up to the national elections\, the BJP won phenomenally. One of the reasons was the scheme was very popular. It had just been launched in the run up to the elections. What happens when you have a BJP\, state government and the Prime minister from the BJP on the top of the national government attribution goes to the Prime Minister. So you can see and the same thing happens in Uttar Pradesh as well. Political attribution goes straight to the Prime Minister. West Bengal is another place which has a strong regional party\, opposition party chief minister. Again\, she was very popular for her direct benefit transfer cash schemes to women\, direct attribution to the BJP. And I have a whole bunch of slides which I’ll show you later in the Q&A\, because I know I’ve talked too much\, but you see a very close correlation between where you’re attributing and how you’re voting or how you say you are voting. And I think that those are very important relationships to understand between welfare\, politics and all of this. So let me close by just saying this. I think one of the challenges to me\, I’m a big believer in a robust welfare state\, but I do believe that the discourse on state capability suddenly as it has unfolded in India\, has taken us to a place where we valorize the possibilities of strong leadership and technology in ways that are legitimizing uses of technology such that we no longer invest in public systems. This is politically super powerful. After a while\, if you can beat the national Party that is dominant at its own game. I mean\, this is only one part of many reasons why people vote\, but it’s an important part\, particularly in state elections. Why would you not try it out? It has become the dominant way in which we are building our welfare architecture. It also feeds into the dynamic of our democracy in that we are building a very\, very centralized political parties where the presence of the party leader\, the individual party leader\, dominates over everything else. One of the important elements of this is that it converts the idea of the citizen as a rights bearing agent as a beneficiary\, because it obliges the state to look for you\, look at you as a beneficiary to whom the party leader is delivering these benefits. It’s solved an important role. I\, in my view\, in cutting through some of the the the the the the the the societal cleavages around caste by creating this beneficiary category. The Hindi word for it is … the recipient\, the beneficiary. And it allows political parties to say we are giving welfare benefits to all your caste\, Your religion doesn’t matter. Show me how there’s discrimination. And party workers mobilize on the back of these of this beneficiary category of the Lab Harti\, which works sometimes as it has for the BJP in the past and other times. Other parts of the mobilize of mobilization around identity and caste that comes up and creates new cleavages. But it’s an important tool that party politicians have started have have been using more or less effectively. It raises very important questions about local democracy. Where do contestations on welfare go? You when your MP\, your MLA\, your panchayat is an agent of the centralized leadership who is delivering benefits to you and therefore it raises questions about who receives benefits\, how inclusive those benefits are. But above all\, what is your welfare architecture? Is it about handing over cash and in-kind private goods to individual to beneficiaries? Or is it about building a broader imagination of a capability oriented society in which solidarity and equity are foundations? And I think these are important questions that we should ask when we debate state capability. I’m sorry. I think I spoke longer than I should have. \n\n\nSalimah Samji We’re going to move on to Q&A and we’ll take a set of three questions. But before we do that\, I just want to Yamini a question. This is just really fantastic. Yamini\, you talked a lot about politics and the importance of of politics in\, you know\, this is a school of government. A lot of people in this room are going to go back maybe and work in government. In a situation like India where there is this narrative\, what are how does one engage in this space? One\, And what are some skills that students here can think about\, you know\, muscles that they can strengthen before they go out and play this game? \n\n\nYamini Aiyar That’s such a difficult question\, to which I don’t have a good enough answer. I think\, look\, I speak to the challenges I\, I the questions I ask myself often\, and they were particularly alive to me in the last couple of years\, which was\, I think engaging in the policy space requires you to work very closely and in and in collaboration and to be relevant to governments that you work with. And what are how do you balance out collaboration and relevance with critical thinking\, which is a really hard question\, especially in a context where politics is moving in directions of very\, very centralized\, semi authoritarian forms of governance which are legitimized in the framework of state capability. And it’s not there are no for how you play the role of being the critic\, but also at the same time continue to being relevant and contributing to the actual delivery of systems. There is no good way of doing this\, but the one thing that I think we’ve tried to do not very successfully in CPR was when you work with government and you at least ask yourself and therefore your government counterpart\, what are the skills and capabilities that you can build within the system so that those stay in the long term? And part of that process of building those skills and capabilities requires degrees of reflection. So\, for example\, when we work with data systems or when we work with data systems\, it’s very normal for bureaucrats and us to talk about eligible beneficiaries who need to be verified. We need to remove the duplication\, duplicate benefit beneficiaries\, we need to remove the non eligible ones. Everyone is reduced to a number. If you stop for a minute and say it’s a number in your data system\, but it’s an individual. It’s a household\, it’s a citizens. How do we think about the words that the vocabulary that we are using? Can we ask if there’s a different language that we can deploy when we are using engineering terms to refer to people in households? How do we think about you know\, I’m not making any argument against technology per se. I use it as much as all of us do\, and I recognize its benefits. But how do you use technology as an aid rather than an end? And if direct benefit cash transfers is the preferred mode of service delivery and we effectively think about public dialog\, deliberation and engagement even around that. So I got my deed back in the days of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was being thought was passed and implemented with Salimah in early days of of that we we were observers\, participants\, students of the social audit process. There’s a lot of good bad ugly complicated aspects about it. But one of the elements that it had which I think have gone away\, which we can bring back\, is that through the act of the of the the village dialog\, you brought this debate into the public sphere. Technology is an it’s an individual act. I have received the money into my bank account\, or I have not. If I have not received it\, I will go to X to lodge my complaint. If that X officer does not take my complaint because I belong to a certain caste or I belong to a certain religion\, or I or I am of a particular gender\, where is my site of redress? If all public spaces of contestation and deliberation and dialog go away? So can we bring some of this back in to our everyday democratic experiences\, however complicated and painful it is\, to go and lodge a complaint at the block office or the district office\, which is how it used to be. In days before you dealt with a server\, there was a physicality about you as a citizen going to a state office. You may be mistreated. You may have to stand in lines for hours and hours\, but it is the obligation of the officer of the State to deal with you under all circumstances. And even if he or she doesn’t want to. I mean\, endless numbers of times when we go to block offices and district offices\, you see citizens milling around and the block and the offices are refusing to talk to any of them\, using us as the excuse. We want to talk to the Day Madam instead of talking to the doing a real job. We’re just talking to citizens. But ultimately we go and you have to face them as you go out to sit in your car. So I think that there’s a there’s a huge importance to the physicality of governance\, which is actually at the heart of building state capability that we shouldn’t let go and we need to be alive to it. So every time you walk into a government office in just remembering and trying to bring that piece of it back in to how programs are designed\, how information is shared. Why did we need transparency on  village panchayats\, which was the heart of the right to information? It was because that act empowers people into a dialog within the village\, and I think bringing that back in is really important. I mean\, I for one\, am I am just amazed that one of the positive things about moving Hill my children are going to a public school in Providence is how much communication there is between the schoolteacher and the principal and us parents. In the private school in Delhi\, where my children go to the school doesn’t talk to us. But this is I mean\, this is like community engagement in ways that we all imagine that would be possible. And I know that there are many flaws to all of this and many challenges there. But bringing that back into the debate is really important. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you very much. Strengthening systems and looking policy is about people recognizing that human side. Thank you. We’re going to take three questions. Please make sure you end with the question mark and then Yamini will respond to your questions. Yes\, please. \n\n\nAudience Member 3 Thank you for the wonderful presentation. And I was just looking at the spread of the states that you presented here. I was wondering if Orissa was at any point part of the mix because the fact that DBT was important and women and also the fact that the same prime minister ruled for 25 years and now there’s a flip. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Yeah\, yeah\, yeah. So there you go. That’s why I do this. I still need to make better sense of it. I we’ve just been slicing through the data\, but. But it is quite interesting\, as you can see\, that you do get there’s direct correlation between voters who identified the Prime minister as the primary person responsible for delivering benefits and voter choices for voting for the BJP and similarly for the BJP with the Chief Minister. So\, so\, so\, so to the extent that when there is competition\, you do see these deviations in voters minds and those who say benefits come from the Prime Minister also tend to vote for the BJP. Those who say benefits come from the Chief minister also tend to vote for the  for the regional party. That line is very clear\, but obviously there are lots of other factors contributing to voter choices\, which is why the but the BJP just had a thin edge\, at least in the state assembly. So also\, for those of you who don’t know how the state government with a chief minister who had been around for 25 years\, Naveen Patnaik\, who also had a simultaneous elections for national and state at the same time\, and the BJD lost the election to it. Akin But it was a very big thing for them to lose after 25 years. He was the longest standing chief minister in India and the BJP won. And they also won a larger number of seats for the in the national elections compared to the BJD and compared to previous years\, the previous election. So it was a big upturn. One of the reasons why the BJP is still a single party majority in the national parliament is because it did much better in Orissa than had previously done before. \n\n\nSalimah Sanji Thank you. There was a hand here and then I will go there. \n\n\nAudience Member 4 Yes\, I have one clarifying question. We see that based on your survey the attribution of Uttar Pradesh\, for instance\, is still pretty high\, which is surprising to me\, honestly\, because I feel … pretty strong. And so there’s attribution there to the Prime Minister. But yet we saw a very surprising result in the largest states with a high number of constituents. I think it affected their power narrative. So if you have any thoughts on that one and you alluded to this a little bit in your presentation that you were like\, so there is this sort of mechanism where technology and state capacity is there\, but you have to go to consultants for that. The actual ministries and departments don’t really have the kind of prowess we want them to the on that one. So can you speak to that a little bit? Maybe the remaining? I know. I mean\, as a student and development economist\, we see so many. So\, for instance\, my team was setting up a like a RCT sort of arrangement with the government of Odisha\, for instance\, and we are trying to create that entire data policy life cycle situation there where we build in monitoring and evaluation and things like that. So if you have any thoughts on that\, on how we can do that better and maybe how we can play a role in that\, I guess. \n\n\nAudience Member 5  Seeing this data and the election. Does it look like what is the how one nation\, one election will play out. But what does it data tell us? What will happen if we have one nation\, one election? \n\n\nAudience Member 6 Thank you so much for coming and sharing this. A reflection question I’ve been sitting on since the election results is that what are elites getting wrong about the socioeconomic political development of India? \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Thanks. Fantastic questions. Uttar Pradesh. I think one of the biggest factors that contributed to the attribution. So in the double engine states\, which is the term that the BJP users\, where BJP is in power in states and at the center\, you do see an overwhelming dominance of the Prime Minister’s imagery in the minds of voters\, even in Uttar Pradesh and Assam\, which are two places where state chief ministers are relatively stronger players within the party. And this has been this is going to be one of the BJP’s biggest problems\, which is that it has effectively all of these last ten years done what many used to accuse Congress of doing in its heydays\, which is undermining state leadership to the point that everything gets centralized in the national party leadership\, which which which is argued to be one of the reasons why the Congress kind of one of many reasons why the Congress atrophied as it did\, But in U.P. in particular a while\, Chief Minister Yogi has a very\, very\, very strong presence\, visible presence on welfare. The biggest game changer was the public to my reading. And I was I spent some time in Uttar Pradesh during the state elections\, just on the aftermath of Covid in 2022 which the BJP won was the presence of the on welfare was the presence of the public distribution system. This played a huge role in how it was relatively better delivered. It was delivered literally. I mean\, women would tell me\,party workers have called us to say two bags of rice have come\, please come and pick it up\, dal come down\, has come\, etc.. So the inter-fusing of the party cadres on the ground\, the the fact that this was seen as Modi’s ration scheme in a big way and it’s the central role it played in deeply distressed economically distressed households as a consequence of Covid was very\, very important in the 22 election. And I think you just still see the hangover of that in how people see welfare and why it comes to attribution goes largely to the Prime Minister on this one. And in fact\, the PDS is fantastic because it tells us what you can achieve when you actually genuinely do build a public system. Because the evolution of the PDS Salimah will remember in the early 2000s when she was in India\, there was this constant argument about getting rid of the PDS system and moving directly to cash. This is undermining our nutritional capability. It is causing all the Punjab\, Haryana problems with farmers. It is people. People don’t want it. People don’t need it. It’s too corrupt. It’s completely messy. And lots of effort was made by state governments\, actually not in the elite discourse\, which is one of the reasons why the elites got it wrong. Elites were debating cash. But state governments recognize that this is still the central backbone in a very\, very economically complicated\, complex society of Social Security. So they started investing in basic systems and the technology and PDS was built into that in a somewhat more ground up way\, building on the experience of Chhattisgarh\, Orissa. Eventually Bihar also made huge success and then the National Food Security Act. So when it came to Covid and there were two things that were done right back in 2020\, enhancement of budget for … and using the public distribution system to distribute free grains and rice. And they expanded the total number of beneficiaries. There’s still lots of problems of PDS\, as we saw\, including the presence of the contractor and the intermediary. But it worked better than the past. And in our survey data\, we see like we asked a question about of all the schemes that you receive\, which is the one that benefits you the most and 69.7%\, I think at national level\, I haven’t yet looked at it. I disaggregated by state said that PDS is the most critical scheme that they need and it actually it’s for all its flaws of the past\, it works. So now we’re not talking about cash anymore. We still have the Punjab Haryana problem\, but that’s a whole different issue. So\, so I think that’s one of the reasons why you see this attribution. Of course\, the election dynamic in is much more than welfare. And in Uttar Pradesh\, as I mentioned\, the\, you know\, both the story of the BSP\, the question of reservation\, the complex dynamics of the BJP and unemployment and became a big issue was a big issue even in 22. But it came to a head. Now all of these different features played a role in ensuring that the BJP was really humble and no better way to describe it than the loss of the BJP’s candidate seat in. In the home of the Ram Temple in Ayodha. So it was and I do think that I mean\, what I gather from the ground\, it’s not like this is a rejection of him. It is that it was just not enough. And\, you know\, while everyone had been mesmerized in some ways by the charisma of Modi\, some it kind of was breaking and people were like\, yes\, it’s no one said that I’m temple consecration was bad. Is that okay? But that was to be expected. Now what what about our employment? You know\, those were the things that people were talking about. And frankly\, even very obviously\, BJP party workers  saying that if you put on the media\, all you see is Modi. It it had it had got too much. I think on the question of the role of consultants\, which is a longer and different conversation\, I hope we can have it\, because I think it’s really\, really crucial. But I do find that the biggest and most overwhelming challenge that the Indian State and our discourse on state capacity concerns is the emergence of the consultant as I mean\, it’s not just India\, it’s happening across the world. But you go to state governments and you think that\, you know\, elites are talking about public private privatization. On privatization\, you are a leftist. If you don’t want private privatization of public health systems\, you’re a rightist. If you say\, let’s do some PPD\, God only knows what’s happening on the dock\, what state governments are just like this\, stop investing in the state they’re calling in BCG\, E&Y and why all of you will get really good jobs in all of these places. God bless you. You will earn very well. Please use that money well and sensibly. But you’re not building state capacity. Let’s be very clear. You are contributing to solving a particular problem\, but leaving in its wake a huge vacuum of of what actually needs to be built\, because ultimately you will go away. But the implementation\, thus says still rests with the frontline worker. Well and actually in the if you look carefully at what India has achieved\, especially in the last 10 to 15 years\, we’ve got overrun with  DPI and technology and jam and all these nice things. But we where we have invested in public systems\, they are looking really well and these need to be documented health and wellness centers and public health. They are actually one of the most important and impressive achievements. And if you want to be political about it\, I would say if somebody asked me what is the best thing that Modi’s welfare has done\, it is the setting up of these health and wellness centers. They have they have an imagination of comprehensive primary health. They are building the conduit between patients and the tertiary system where they exist\, where they’ve been invested in. They are working well\, went up in Delhi\, did a lot to try and fix government schools. Good\, bad\, ugly. A serious attempt was made and some movement on a very hard question of pedagogy and learning outcomes was some. Some movement was made there in a short span\, which is not an easy thing. The Asha worker\, the reason why we were able to do Covid 19 vaccine is relatively better than for a completely broken health system\, the Covid. Well\, because the Asha work was so great\, where we have invested in public systems\, it actually does some it actually does work. And I think we keep forgetting that in this disenchantment with the larger story of of the state and the enchantment with the possibilities of technology. And then we also forget that actually there’s a very complex interface between states and citizens\, and that’s what we need to be investing in. And here dynamics\, of course\, gender\, everything plays out and it’s at that level where our investments we need to be made\, where the discourse on state capability needs to move back. So I’d be very happy if we stop talking about consultants and MIS systems for a few years. Then we’d be able to move the needle further. One Nation. One election is an appalling idea. It’s completely anti federal. It is anti-democratic. It makes absolutely no sense. It speaks to why are we obsessed. We valorize efficiency to a point where we undermine democracy. What is the argument that is being given that legitimizes one single election? It is that our elections take too long. Nobody asked for a seven phase in the middle of June election. Certainly\, not voters and those who had to go and sit in those hot rallies because all the politicians had coolers and fancy helicopters in which they showed up. It was because of our Prime minister and the BJP and the election commission collectively thought this might be a good way. I don’t know. Some complicated calculation was made. I will stop short of saying something silly. But\, you know\, if you can guess\, if we if efficiency is what you need. Have elections over two days\, don’t have elections over two months and have counting. We we have the capability to do it\, especially if we have EVM machines. So I don’t buy the efficiency argument. How can you be a democracy if you say elections are a problem\, they’re too expensive because of the nature of our political economy\, not because we have simultaneous elections and because we have multiple elections. Reduce the time\, reduce and make them more efficient that way. Deal with the big black box of election financing\, which no country in the world\, certainly not one has been able to achieve. But you can try if you want. And don’t tell me that simultaneous election is going to solve the problem. What it will do is.  \n\n\nAudience Member 5 My question is what does the data tell us? \n\n\nYamini Aiyar So I have looked at the Orissa data from 2019\, where you actually saw strict ticket voting. And so a lot of people argue that without being careful about it or nuanced about it\, that a simultaneous election will essentially mean voters will vote for the same body. It’s not so simple. Voters are much more astute. They’re able to pick. And as you can see\, they make very clear distinctions on credit attribution and who and how they choose to vote. What does happen\, though\, in these very centralized body structures is when you have competition between political parties in the same election\, your money\, your mobilization capability and the issues on which you vote for become much more fuzed. And that’s where the national large national parties will have an added advantage that that that’s my sense on this. But but as an idea\, I think it’s absolutely flawed. And I think more electoral competition is a good way in such a large and complex democracy of keeping governments accountable in their different ways. Elites are getting it wrong for many\, many reasons\, including that they don’t actually interact with a large part of the country\, and that includes the BJP elites and the trolls. They spend too much time on Twitter and too little time actually dialoging and engaging. But I do think I mean\, there’s many aspects to this\, But\, but\, but I’ll go back to where I started\, which is the disenchantment with the Indian state and the enchantment with the possibilities of what 1991 offered us. What did it do? It basically\, you know\, the the kind of quip  that the Indian state grows at night when the state sleeps. It had a lot it had a lot of resonance in\, shifting our imagination about what the state can and cannot do\, what we look for from our political parties\, what we look from our politics. I think one interesting way of understanding this is in the discourse that we’re having right now about the question of cost and consensus and and where that plays. It’s it’s you know\, it’s kind of it’s sort of seen as the messy realities of politics in which\, you know\, identities compete with each other\, in which democracy has been the only site where voices can find ways of prizing open and accessing state power. That messy reality is always seen as something that undermines our efficiency. And I think that is what lurches us in not just the elite discourse in directions that that they do. We are much more towards centralization of power and seek a certain kind of delivery and an assumption that then the the\, the good\, the good spirit of the market will be able to do everything. And without looking at our own professions. I think and I’ll end here. One really lesson that India needs to learn over these last ten years and ask itself why this happened. Why have our collective professions so easily fallen prey to demands of state power? Why did media fall prey so easily? Why did academia fall prey so easily? Why did civil society fall prey so easily? Why did our courts fall prey so easily? What is it about our professions that follow\, that seek state power and fall prey to state power? I can I can actually see it much more clearly in that in state capital relations\, it’s it’s much clearer to me. But what about everything else? Why did journalism end like this the way that it did? Why did academia end up the way that it has? These are really important questions that we need to ask. You know\, no democracy is robust if it’s association life isn’t. And if our professions fall so quickly\, what happens going forward is a big question. \n\n\nSalimah Sanji Great with that. We are at time\, so we’ll still be in the room if you have questions\, but we’re going to end the session. I’d like to thank Yamini Aiyar.  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nIn this talk\, Yamini discusses the intersections between welfare politics\, state capability\, and democratic institutions in India’s 2024 elections. She examines how direct benefit transfers and technology-driven welfare schemes have shaped political attribution and voter behavior and highlights the emergence of competitive welfare politics among regional parties and the impact this has had on federal dynamics. \n\n\n\nYamini raises additional concerns about how this welfare system may be changing the nature of citizenship and centralizing power in the hands of a small number of political elites. She emphasizes the importance of maintaining public spaces for contestation in governance and pushes for a nuanced understanding of state capacity that extends beyond technological interventions. Aiyar concludes by reflecting on why professions and institutions in India have struggled to maintain independence from the state and calls for strengthening democratic institutions \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\nSpeaker Bio\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nYamini Aiyar is currently Senior Visiting Fellow\, Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia and Watson Institute\, Brown University. She was the President and Chief Executive of the Centre for Policy Research\, a leading multidisciplinary think tank in New Delhi from 2017-2024. Yamini’s work sits at the intersection of research and policy practice. During her tenure she spearheaded the establishment of two important new research initiatives within CPR on State capacity and Politics. Prior to becoming President she set up the Accountability Initiative at CPR known for its work on governance\, social accountability and expenditure tracking in social Policy. Yamini’s research interests span the fields of contemporary politics\, state capacity\, social policy\, federalism and India’s political economy. Yamini sits on a number of boards and advisory committees of research centers and non-profits. Her policy commitments include Member\, United Nations Committee of the Experts on Public Administration; Council Member\, United Nations University\, Member\, Chief Minister’s Rajasthan Economic Transformation Advisory Council (2022-2023). Yamini has published widely both in academic and current affairs journals and newspapers including the Economist\, Foreign Affairs\, Indian Express\, The HIndu. She has a regular column in the Hindustan Times and Deccan Herald\, two leading mainstream newspapers in India. Her forthcoming book\, “Lessons in State Capacity from Delhi Schools” will be published in October 2024 by Oxford University Press. \n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/the-mirror-cracked-on-democracy-welfare-politics-and-indias-general-election/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240916T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240916T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T014031Z
CREATED:20240905T172637Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014031Z
UID:22653-1726444800-1726531199@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Why Trust (not Money\, Data\, Evidence\, Argument\, Credentials) is the Currency of Change
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nRakesh Rajani\, President of JustSystems \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome to our Building State Capability Talk series. Today we have Rakesh Rajani with us here. And he is the President of JustSystems\, which seeks to strengthen and support infrastructure to make public systems effective\, inclusive and dignity affirming in the Global South. He brings 25 years of experience in starting and running civil society organizations and nine years in philanthropy. He was the first vice president of programs at Co-Impact and led its conceptualization of systems change\, and the Director of Civic Engagement and Government at the Ford Foundation in New York. Previously\, Professor Rajani founded and served as the head of Twaweza East Africa\, an organization that advances citizen agency and open government\, and established Uwezo\, Africa’s largest program to assess basic literacy and numeracy. He has also co-founded and led HakiElimu\, Tanzania’s largest citizen engagement and education advocacy organization\, as well as Kuleana Center for Children’s Rights\, which is now defunct. Rakesh is a founding member and past co-chair of the Open Government Partnership\, and has been a long time fellow of the Center for Global Development. He has also served on several nonprofit boards including the Hewlett Foundation\, Illuminate\, IBP\, and IPA. He presently lives in Cambridge\, Massachusetts and Dar es Salaam\, Tanzania. We’re really delighted to have you\, Rakesh. Welcome. \n\n\nRakesh Rajani Thank you Salimah and thank you all for coming. It’s a real treat to have you here. I’ll share some thoughts and then I’m really looking forward to the conversation. You know\, I’m sure you’ve heard that people say you learn more from failure than success. And I was trying to figure out why? I think it’s probably because if you plan to do something and it succeeds\, it just kind of confirms what you know. But if you plan to do something and it fails\, then your knowledge has to be stretched because what you knew didn’t work. So what I’m going to try to do is to start off by sharing two stories of failure\, or perhaps success which in fact brought failure\, and then try to share some of the findings from the research that we’ve been doing together with Carolina who is there and part of JustSystems\, and and see if we can put them together. And then let’s have a conversation. So one of the first things I did at the university back home in Tanzania is to work as an activist to try to reduce the debt load that countries like Tanzania have. At that point\, we were paying 42% of all of our revenue in servicing debt\, not even paying back. And one of the things we showed is that you are spending three times as much on debt servicing as we were spending on education in a country that desperately needed to invest in education. Thanks to that\, we contributed to something called HIPC. As you’re probably familiar with the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative\, that was a deal where if a country made a plan or how they were going to use that debt savings\, that debt would be forgiven and that money would be then channeled to good things. In fact\, the first time I engaged on it with President Mkapa who was the President of Tanzania then was right here at the Kennedy School. There’s a guy called Jeff Sachs you may have heard of who was supporting him on making Tanzania’s plan. So it was funny that Tanzania’s plan of what to do was being made at Harvard rather than Dar es Salaam. But I got a chance to spend three days\, working. I was meeting with people on the side\, but it was still heady days. Thanks to that\, when I went back home\, we worked on the education component. It was called the Primary Education Development Plan\, and then a secondary education plan\, and had huge influence. And we were able to get school fees abolished because we showed that the amount of money coming in for school fees was tiny\, something like 8 to $12 billion a year\, but it was keeping out at least 2 million kids. So it was a thing where you charge something and brought you very little but its negative impact was to leave lots of kids out. We abolished school fees. We focused on making sure money got to schools through something called the capitation grant\, because we knew that you needed funding at the school level if you wanted quality. We strengthened school governance. So\, you know\, the governance is really important\, by setting up school committees that are more democratically elected\, we even made sure students were represented. One boy\, one girl was on a school committee. And we also knew that this huge program would need good communication. So we persuaded the planning to have a good kind of communication program so that everybody\, citizens\, government leaders would all be aware of what this program is\, its key features. And. How they could be part. So by any subtle objective measures\, you could say that was a huge amount of policy and programmatic influence. Now\, of course\, in implementation problems started happening. And the first was the communication stuff\, where there was a $2 million budget for it out of 600 million. It was relatively small\, but the people who were designing it in the Ministry of Education basically wanted to get a whole bunch of t shirts and boring posters\, and we tried to persuade them that that’s not a good idea\, and they didn’t listen probably because there was also maybe a little kickback in the t shirt procurement\, because each t shirt cost $6. When we did some quick check and we realized you could probably get them for less than two. But because we didn’t persuade them then that the kind of big meeting\, multisectoral meeting where you have lots of government people\, some civil society and the donors who are funding this. We essentially exposed that this was a crappy idea and maybe the money was being not well spent\, and that’s coupled. So we saw that as a success. Stop money being wasted across a not so smart communications program. The money that was meant by policy to get to the schools through capitation grant. It’s a nice idea. Anecdotally\, we could see that the money wasn’t getting there. So we managed to commission a study called the Public Expenditure Tracking Study. That was one of the first big tent studies in education\, certainly in Tanzania. And it showed what we felt was true\, which was that the money was not kind of boggled up at the central levels and the best at the the district level but it was not. This kind of wonky technical report. We made sure it had wings. We made sure we publicized it\, made in popular. We did a simple version of it for media\, but not only did the kind of few policy bureaucrats and donors know it\, the whole country kind of knew it\, and we used unlike those boring posters\, we used TV adverts and ways of using  humor to kind of point out the hypocrisy here. We also showed that the school governance was working\, cherry picking\, if you will\, the best examples of accountability in the school where parents\, sometimes even students\, were showing how their principles that\, you know\, the head teachers as well as the district level officials. Why do we have all kinds of procurement rounds\, cement\, you know\, for classroom building or desks at inflated rates. And we ridiculed them. And it was this  was a super; there was a lot of humor. People joked about it and it kind of was rooting for the little guy right there. The ordinary parents\, the students. And we were making sure that those pompous government officials couldn’t get away with it. And we did this other series where we showed up\, the kind of hypocrisy of how everybody\, all of us who are making these decisions\, we send our kids to private school\, which are very different than these public schools. And so come on\, we kind of pointed out that we were quite happy for other people’s children to have these crappy conditions because we could opt out and have better conditions. And that had a huge impact  to this day. This is more than 20 years later. You go and people still remember this happened. I\, I personally at the organizations I was part of got huge credit where we were seen as\, you know\, speaking truth to power\, showing what the problems were with government\, puncturing a kind of pompous balloon\, puncturing the kind of\, lies\, if you will\, or the rosy stories that the government was telling. Obviously\, the government didn’t like this. First\, they just try to ignore us and sideline us from the policymaking process. So where we had been very influential at the beginning to shape what the policy would be now\, we were kind of put to the side then after ignoring us\, but because we kept going\, they started attacking us\, criticizing us\, telling us that\, you know\, our data had no basis. We were making things up\, we had no credibility. But we persisted. We can we showed that\, in fact\, the data we were using was largely government data. And we\, you know\, our evidence was second to none. And we kept quietly pointing that out quietly as a\, not with a shrill voice\, but very effectively. And that was always in the public domain\, so that the whole idea was that people know what’s going on. They will make sure that they  put pressure on government to do the right thing. It’s got so bad as far as the government is concerned. There was a time when that same President Mkapa\, who I worked with here at the Kennedy School for a few days\, went on national television in and publicly attacked the organization\, and publicly attacked me in some very undiplomatic language and the headlines in the newspapers the next day were final nail in HakiElimu’s coffin\, which was the organization I was leading. The cartoons with my head through a noose\, and things of that sort. I got lots of praise as to how courageous I was\, how brave\, principled. And \, and the country knew there was a survey document that showed that 79%\, nationally representative survey\, including rural areas\, remote rural areas\, showing that 79% of Tanzanians view what HakiElimu was what it stood for. So by multiple measures. This was a huge success. We had stood up to a big government. We had pointed out what was not working. Stood our ground and kept saying what was needed. We focused on many different things. And by the way\, the donors loved us. Lots of money kept coming. We had more money than you know. We had more offers of money than we could accept. Now let’s look at this story just from a slightly different window. Remember\, we started this work because we wanted kids to be in school\, showing up to school and learning. So what happened to those outcomes during this time of our success? Schools. They want kids enrolled. Names on a list while actually showing up to school attendance. No. We had put that in the system that attendance should be measured\, not just enrollment. But that system was not working. And where the children actually learning\, we did some other survey work based on what’s called ASER in India and  Uwezo in East Africa that showed kids are not learning. And even though that data was out there\, things didn’t change. Did the money from the capitation grant reache the schools. No it didn’t. The problems persisted. What about the effect it had on government whose practice of pressure was meant to improve our very effective use of data and evidence\, and public communication had the impact of humiliating the government. Whether you are a district level official or whether you are the president of the country and everybody complained – were humiliated people were laughing at them because we pointed out that their rhetoric was empty and not so powerful. But what did it make them feel like\, capability? What did that humiliation do? It made them big on the defensive\, they they strengthened the muscle of how to defend themselves\, whether it was done credibly or not is a different issue. But their energy went into being defensive\, and being able to show what they were doing was great\, or try to undermine what we had told. The energy was now not focused on kids being at school. Everyone was focused on defending their record. Remember\, this is also coming up to elections. So concerns about much more than education\, the concerns around how are they going to win the next term. The reformers inside government that we had worked with to do some of these positive changes now had much less space to operate because this became: We are under siege. There are these people out there attacking us. So whose side are you on? Are you with those outsiders? Are you with us? And there was a kind of allegiance that they had to swear they could do very little\, because if they tried to do the sorts of things we were talking about\, they would be seen as traitors\, and perhaps in the long term\, and most insidiously\, what our success did was kind of reinforce the idea that you heard in the Western media\, often racist media\, and what some of the more neocolonial minded funders in our country were also having\, which is that\, you know\, when it comes down to it\, this African government is corrupt\, bureaucratic\, ineffective\, not to be trusted. You need to keep them on a short leash. Look\, after all\, we can see all the ways in which they operate. These lessons that I’m sharing with you. Now\, this second perspective is not something that I focused on 25 years ago. This is with the benefit of hindsight. So the story I tell you is one of great success. Many mentions. Great record. When you look at it in terms of what are the outcomes. What is the difference between what is the capability of the government to be able to drive that meaningful change? In fact\, what we do is probably undermine. Let me tell you one more story of failure\, and then I’ll get to some of the lessons from our research. This other story also starts in the US. I thought I’d share lessons\, but since I’m speaking\, we do that through a set of lucky accidents. That includes your new dean. Jeremy Weinstein was at the white House when Obama became president\, and he wanted a kind of signature global development initiative. George Bush had PEPFAR\, and he wanted to do this. We came up. Some of us were involved in that process\, and we came up with the idea of something called the Open Government Partnership\, which I think is actually a terrific platform. It doesn’t get the attention I think it deserves but it achieves a lot. So basically\, Obama asked his people to come up with ideas\, and this is the idea that was chosen by Obama. It was launched by him\, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly early on in his term. And it was this small gathering of heads of state. And\, you know\, those are heady days. Remember the early days of Obama? Everybody was so excited\, particularly in Global South. And I was lucky enough to be able to sit at the same table close to him. There were only like seven speeches\, Obama\, six other heads of state\, and me. And\, you know\, just like this\, I’ve reached my pinnacle. Everything else after that is going to go down. And\, my president\, Kikwete\, who by the way\, is speaking here at 6 p.m. today. At that time\, he was also very excited\, was kind of surprised that I was getting this far. But he was very excited. I remember when the thing ended\, President Obama was like\, kind of came over to be. And he quickly inserted himself\, and he claimed me as one of his own\, like\, you know\, you know he’s from Tanzania. Do you know what twaweza means? It mean\, means we\, you know\, we can make it happen a little bit like the Obama slogan. And then when we went back\, I got President Kikwete got us to join the Open Government Partnership. He invited me inside cabinet. So I spoke at two cabinet meetings to explain what the OGP is\, how it works\, how we made a plan. I ended up kind of essentially being the main architect of that plan\, because the way OGP works is you make a plan\, you make commitments to co-create that plan\, and then you work on it and report on progress. And it’s also independent. So I got to rub shoulders with President Obama. I get to address cabinet in Tanzania. We get to make a plan that has some really amazing features. The plan focused on two major things. Transparency. How can government be transparent about what it does and what real situations? How much money is going where? And all of those sorts of things. And the second part involved public participation. How can citizens actually be involved in everyday governance because governments work. Again. I was very proud of that work. Very proud of what we did. And it was in the plan. In practice\, though\, even though\, you know\, the president behind me and\, you know\, he launched it\, but there was also ribbon cutting and lots of good stuff. It didn’t quite go so well. Now\, because of time\, I’ll cut through a lot of other parts. But the short kind of conclusion is that transparency had the effect of\, again\, making the government look bad. We went straight to transparency without working on strengthening the capability of government systems to because we focus on the right things\, not like were these kids were enrolled? But were they actually learning? The kids were not learning. So as soon as you made the data transparent\, you’ve made government look bad. So many people in government understood this wonderful effort as essentially a way of making\, exposing their weaknesses when they didn’t have the resources and the capability to do that and the kind of wherewithal to change. The other thing was around public participation. We went from a kind of super authoritarian government post-independence and pre-independence which was just used to being very top down to insert an innovation that was all about bottom-up and citizen engagement without ever building the mindsets. And so in practice\, people in charge felt this was a challenge to their authority. We talk about kind of a patriarchal world\, ageist world\, where people who are older are kind of used to just having the same question. And now we are having students question because that’s what we do. So I share these stories\, as a way of what I have learned\, is that you may think you are doing great work\, but in fact you can end up having the opposite. A lot of these lessons were recently confirmed when we did a piece of work over 6 to 8 months that involved reviewing 53 initiatives on state capability and systems change and kind of\, having 130 long\, unhurried conversations with people in government and outside government around: What does it actually take to get government to work better for people? So if we can go to those slides\, Kathryn. The are only three slides that go over several points. I’ll just walk you through them. So you write up hundreds of pages of work. Most civil society organizations\, philanthropies and consultancies. You know\, whether you are a McKinsey or one of the more boutique firms\, don’t really understand what makes government tick. They understand the official roles. They understand the laws. What does the actual political economy of democracy and political psychology look like? And both civil society organizations and government. They demonstrate very little curiosity to understand. We are very comfortable in our silence. Those were not\, you know\, and I’m an activist out there. We we like to lampoon government. But similarly\, people in government also\, all those people just make a lot of noise. They shout. They’re donor funded. So we\, we\, we kind of\, wallow in our stereotypes of each other. The second part is\, and again\, a lot of this\, you guys are in the Kennedy School. You know this. Politics is the biggest determinant of systems change. It’s kind of both small p and capital P politics advice. But many of us are trained when we think about global development to keep away from politics. We don’t\, you know\, India elections. No no no\, you can’t touch that. And what that means is when we shirk it\, we don’t understand how accountability would work in practice. Next one. Inclusion. Everybody says it’s important\, especially gender equality or women in leadership. We all have the data. We know how patriarchal our systems are. But when you scratch the surface\, there’s some attention to numbers\, but very little work on the kind of underlying drivers of discrimination they’re not getting addressed\, as well as the deeper manifestations of how does agency\, how do girls and women feel agency when they are in school or when they are running for office? There is often great work. There are many feminist organizations doing some incredibly good work\, but it really has work at scale. So it’s almost like exceptions to the rule that kind of show that the rule can be changed. Fourth one is a kind of very simple point\, but and this is the work when we did\, for example\, the work of Carolina did on on looking at the many efforts\, there’s a lot of attention on activities and inputs and even outputs\, but very\, very little focus on actual outcomes of these\, the kind of activities are fetishized rather than how is that leading to difference? So lots of leadership programs where you it’s very hard. You know\, we talk to people who run leadership programs for 20 plus years. Okay. As a result of that\, can you tell us how people’s lives have changed. So they struggle to answer that question. And in this we also saw that there was very little prioritization. We have a kind of epidemic of good stuff happening that actually doesn’t add up. Where\, you know\, I think lots of good stuff is probably the enemy of two good things. Next. And this\, I think about. I’m curious what you think about this. Capacity is very much thought of as individuals\, like so many fellowship programs\, like\, let’s give them the skills and the connections rather than trying to understand how does a system either create or erode capacity? How does capability get created? How do the incentives and the motivations of a system get ordinary people and make them really capable and give them agency as opposed… And so what happens is you get often very talented\, skilled\, capable people who go into a system that kind of strips them of that capability. And then all we do is we find those people and give them more skills\, but they could go back to the system. The system erodes\, disincentivizes them. And this idea of how do you get the bureaucracy? I use that word deliberately. How do you get a bureaucracy to be able to think\, motivated to think and function with confidence is a question that gets very difficult. Next. This is a really important point. Lant Pritchett and others make it is that if you think of a lot of the problems that government have been solving for a while\, how do you get teachers deployed? How do you get people paid? How do you get classrooms built\, you know\, and so on. Those are really important problems\, right? They need to be fixed and replaced but the nature of the problems. The really big problems we face now are around climate change or around\, you know\, you can get the teacher trained\, but what will make her wake up every day and do a good job? How do you solve that problem and scale. That takes deep work\, but we don’t know how to do the deep work. What we knew how to do is shallow work and that’s what gets rewarded and recognized. The last gap we found is this is all the kind of philanthropic funders side is that\, lots of funding. What it does is it creates hundreds\, thousands of projects. Labs. Ideas\, experiments. All kinds of stuff. Well-meaning\, often good ideas. But the sum effect of that is essentially just creating more noise and distraction from the causes and if anything\, because it kind of distracts\, because it kind of takes kind of scattered fragments your thinking and fragments the institutional structure\, it may actually undermine the systems change that you see. And that kind of also further cynicism\, because you come up with all these ideas and then they don’t get traction. So it kind of reinforces that\, you know\, these people are not interested. There’s no capability. Nothing is going to change. So it’s actually an effect that is quite serious. Now I want to just focus on five things in the next slide that when we spoke to leaders both in government and civil society\, they said these are particularly missing. And this will kind of echo some of what you’ve seen. So first one is getting the technical part right of course matters. If you want to teach kids\, you need to know how to use the right kind of question. But the major constraints are political and institutional\, not technical. So people get trained to come up with technical solutions\, when in fact the problem is not technical anymore\, it’s political\, etc.. Next one is that good design of course matters. So everybody who is smart knows how to do\, you know\, focuses on strategy and policymaking. That’s probably what you guys all get trained to do\, right? But while that matters\, the crux of the issue is effective implementation. It’s implementation where the rubber hits the road\, where lives actually change. And implementation isn’t simply a kind of mindless following of the good policy. Implementation needs huge amount of thinking in real time in practice\, as you need to adapt and pivot all the time. Those muscles are not well trained. We don’t know how to do that. All the smart people just kind of fetishize strategy policymaking and stay on that side where 90% of the work is missing. Third: delivery\, of course\, matters\, right? You want to have the blah blah actually make a difference in people’s lives. So they should be a focus on delivery. But it’s not only deliver… It turns out\, and Lily Tsai at MIT and others have made this point. How people experience public systems really matters. So you go to your health clinic. They don’t have medicines because the government has run out of money. It’ll make a huge difference whether that patient is told. Get the hell out of here. Or just like\, why are you bothering us? There’s no medicine\, get lost. Or whether they are treated in a respectful manner where they explain\, look\, we don’t have medicine. But look\, let’s think together what we can do. Experience of that people have with government matters not only to be treated well. Nobody likes to be treated like shit. But it matters also in terms of how much trust and energy are you going to put into fixing the government system? Fourth. Oh\, okay. Leaders struggle with isolation. You would think that leaders are surrounded by people all the time. Like\, last thing you know\, they feel is: What do you mean\, isolation? They’re with people all the time. But as I’m sure you’ve heard\, it’s very lonely. Especially if you are a reformer. Especially if you try to do something that’s different. What they crave more than money and policy ideas. Or\, you know\, smart papers that you published. They just want trust. They want a community of people who understand that they can talk with\, be open\, be vulnerable\, and engage and be challenged and trust in that and the civil society side\, in the government side\, but particularly on the government side. And then again\, the funding is linked to the distraction point. Money tends to focus on\, like if you think of like a lot of West Coast philanthropy in particular it’s like\, how can I get the biggest bang for this money? So they kind of thinking\, you know\, I have $10 million to spend $100 million or whatever. What can I do with that amount of money? And that thinking means you focus so much on what 10 million can do that you’re not paying attention to the 5 billion that the government has already spent. And how that can be put to better use. How your 10 million perhaps can focus not on the Best Buy\, but what it can do to help the 5 billion be put to better use. Because even if you can take if you can influence 5% of that five billion\, it’s going to be much more than what you’re going to be able to do. So this is a real problem where I think a lot of well-meaning philanthropy actually does harm by causing lots of noise outside with their money rather than. And it’s also just not very smart. All right. Last slide. And then we get into the discussion how you when we said what should be done. We did have a kind of one for one like okay\, this problem\, fix it like this. Instead what people said is that what you need is a kind of way of thinking that’s different. So don’t play whac-a-mole and fix each problem\, right. We need to kind of think of how we think about this. So the first phase of this is the DSC event. So you’ll probably like this is focused on state capability\, culture and practice to get things done well instead of pushing your solution. We talked to a IAS administrative service officer in India who said\, you know\, this is my day. I wake up in the morning early and there are files\, and there’s a line of really smart NGOs\, researchers\, RCT people and\, you know\, management specialists lining up trying to sell me their idea. Each idea is good. I still haven’t responded to the 50 ideas that came yesterday. My life is full of salesmen trying to sell me the shiniest gadget What I need. Nobody is interested in where. What am I dealing with right now? And I have to view it. Stuff. Sometimes stupid stuff like my chief minister is where he wants to go in this meeting. Or there’s a scandal about to break in the newspapers that I need to respond to. It’s about a small thing\, but it’s a scandal. If I don’t address it\, I’ll be fired. And the salesman selling me the shiny things don’t. So don’t start with your policy idea\, please. When you leave the Kennedy School\, don’t start selling policy ideas. Focus on the focus on state. What matters is a methodology\, right? Not a particular idea is like essentially a set of questions\, a way of thinking and approach rooted in values and purpose. But those really matter. It’s not just strategy grounding in values on inclusion\, for example\, purpose\, the work that rides on education again rather than your policy position. Next. Real systems change takes deep work but our environment rewards shallow work. And one of the. When we asked leaders what made them successful despite all these challenges. Invariably many of them said the ability to just stop. Remember\, these are incredibly busy people who have long to do lists and what they’re telling us. The most important thing that have the ability to stop and step back\, quiet and kind of cut out the noise and focus on the one of the goals. This can sound like a kind of\, slightly new-agey private practice. And yet what we heard is that this was what they attributed their public success to is the ability to do this. It’s. If we and our friends were able to make this change happen\, we probably would have done it right. Yeah\, we are friends. We speak the same language. We hang out\, we get together. Most of the big challenges that we have\, we are not going to be able to solve with like minded people\, like the phrase like minded has become one of my least favorite terms. Essentially says we’re going to just stay in our naval gazing club. And that’s important\, especially as our world become more polarized\, like like this country that many others. So we need to be able to\, to be able to speak across difference and create winning coalitions\, not because we like each other\, we even agree on a lot of things\, but because we realize we need each other to achieve something that we identify as important and  develop not only the kind of shared purpose\, but also the relationships to get three more points. I hope we can discuss this a lot. We need to reimagine accountability from adversarial. The kind of thing that I peddled it for many years. You know\, pointing out the failures of government\, to not saying\, let’s get rid of the captain. The purpose of government is people. But how can you reimagine accountability as relational with Dan Honig\, for example\, talks about in his mission-driven bureaucrats book which I highly encourage you to read\, as shared responsibility between people and people in government for change. Sixth. Well\, this is kind of an interesting point around\, you know\, what does it take to make change happen? And we realize that it may not be a Kennedy School degree or your master’s or money\, or something else. It’s maybe something about sensibilities that we have. You have a slight … what kinds of sensibilities you need a kind of grounding in purpose? Values\, a purpose\, an open mind\, any fundamentalism\, whether you’re a religious fundamentalist or a human rights fundamentalist. I think any fundamentalist does not help you do this work\, because that means you are so sure you have an answer\, perhaps like I was when I told you those initial stories that do not open to questions and finally generate money. You need the right kind of funding. A lot of the money\, whether it’s the World Bank or a foundation\, so it’s so undermining of systems change and it’s so not focused on how existing much larger resources\, both people and money can be better spent and to take time to do that. And in fact\, it just kind of just creates a lot of footnotes on the side. And the mainstream story doesn’t change. I want to end by just one reflection. When India became independent. There was a great deal of energy in the 60s\, for example\, in Tanzania\, and many other African countries\, because we felt we could now run our country instead of colonial powers. So there was a sense that government is ours. We’re gonna to run. I’m not going to be a bunch of white people from London running it. We’re going to run our countries. What has happened now is you don’t have that sense. You have a sense that government is there. People are here. There’s this kind of othering of government\, and there is whether it’s on the left or the right. I think it’s across the ideological spectrum. There’s this kind of distrust and a suspicion of government and a sense that government is going to do bad unless you kind of watch out for it or you cut it down to size. So when if you are on the right\, you say\, let’s strip government of money\, lower taxes\, smaller government. If you’re on the left\, it’s like\, oh\, you can’t trust government there. You know\, put all kinds of constraints on it. But the sum effect is this othering of government\, has\, I think\, a deeply insidious effect of taking the very institution people need to be able to do good things and other it and make it suspicious and have suspicion of it and make it small. And I think what we did to really question in ways that I certainly wasn’t in the first 20 or 30 years of my professional life\, it’s really questioned what conceptions we have of government\, what effect it has in terms of how we imagine policy practice. Thank you very much. I hope that was useful. Over to you. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nIn this talk\, Rakesh Rajani shares candid reflections on the complexities of driving systemic change in government and development. Drawing on 25 years of experience in civil society and philanthropy\, Rajani recounts personal stories of success and unexpected failure in Tanzania and beyond. He counters common assumptions about transparency\, accountability\, and state capability\, arguing that well-intended efforts can often undermine the systems they aim to improve. \n\n\n\nRajani discusses key findings from research on state capability initiatives\, highlighting the importance of understanding political contexts\, focusing on implementation over policy design\, and reimagining accountability as a collaborative rather than adversarial process. He emphasizes the need for deep work and the ability to build working coalitions across differences. This thought-provoking talk provides valuable insights for policymakers\, activists\, and development professionals hoping to effect meaningful change in complex political systems. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\nSpeaker Bio\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nRakesh Rajani is the President of JustSystems\, which seeks to strengthen a support infrastructure to make public systems effective\, inclusive and dignity affirming in the Global South. He brings 25 years of experience in starting and running CSOs and 9 years in philanthropy. He was the first VP of Programs at Co-Impact and led its conceptualization of systems change\, and Director of Civic Engagement and Government at the Ford Foundation in New York. Previously\, Rakesh founded and served as the Head of Twaweza East Africa\, an organization that advances citizen agency and open government\, and established Uwezo\, Africa’s largest program to assess basic literacy and numeracy. He has also co-founded and led HakiElimu\, Tanzania’s largest citizen engagement and education advocacy organization\, as well as the Kuleana Center for Children’s Rights (now defunct). Rakesh is a founding member and past co-chair of the Open Government Partnership and has been a long time fellow at the Center for Global Development. He has also served on several non-profit boards\, including the Hewlett Foundation\, Luminate\, IBP and IPA. He presently lives in Cambridge\, Mass and Dar es Salaam\, Tanzania with his independently minded children and wife\, and is reportedly a capable househusband\, dhobi and cleaner. \n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/why-trust-not-money-data-evidence-argument-credentials-is-the-currency-of-change-upcoming/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231019T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231019T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T014232Z
CREATED:20231030T134623Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014232Z
UID:19801-1697673600-1697759999@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Reflecting on a Decade of Building State Capability around the World
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\, Faculty Director\, Building State Capability & Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC)  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Okay. We’re going to get started. Welcome\, everyone\, to our reflecting on a decade of building state capability around the world event. And we’re really excited. Marshall\, front row. For you\, front row. Thank you so much for joining us. What an honor. Welcome to all of you who are joining us on Zoom. It’s a delight. We have a lot of friends who are joining us today from around the world. And welcome to all of you. So I’m going to tell you a little bit about how our event is going to work today. We’re going to start with a presentation to kind of map our decade of what we’ve actually done in the ten years we were actually 11 years old\, but in the ten years that we’ve been around. And then we’re going to introduce some voices. We have a video presentation. Three speakers who are joining us from Zoom from around the world. Also\, we’re going to share some of their reflections and then we’ll open up for a Q&A. So that’s how the session is going to run. I’m going to start with our presentation and walk you through our journey. \n\n\nThe first thing I’m sure you’re asking is who are you? So here we are\, the Building State Capability team. Anisha is on Zoom\, Kathryn is standing back there. Danny is standing over there. I am Salimah Samji\, the Director of Building State Capability\, and Matt Andrews is our Faculty Director and he will be joining us shortly. So we actually empower organizations to find compriate solutions to their problems. And we use this approach that we’ve developed called PDIA or Problem Driven\, Iterative Adaptation. And what it does is it empowers action\, it facilitates the emergence of local solutions\, local solutions to local problems. That’s one of our things that we talk about. And more importantly\, creates new capabilities to solve public problems. What do we do? You ask? Well\, we always work with problems\, public problems\, and we work with teams. Those are our two big things that we work with. And the third is an authorizer. If we’re going to be able to change anything\, we need somebody who is authorized to allow you to try different things. We have actually trained and engaged over 3\,500 development practitioners in 148 countries\, and this was a count that we did in March. So that number is actually up. \n\n\nIf we were to look at where we are today. And that gives you a sense\, the map\, the the light blue are the countries that we’ve had projects and the dark blue are practitioners that we’ve trained around the globe. But now we’re going to start a story of what did we look like when we started. So our founding grant\, this is year zero\, when we launched the program\, it was September 27th. Chuck was in the room. Chuck is there. He’s the Director of Communications. He was there. You see Chuck is right there in 2012. And we were launching the program because the first grants – right\, you need money to start a program – and our first grant was given to us by the University\, United Nations University WIDER\, which is World Institute for Development Economics Research. And they were our grant\, our founding grants\, and they gave us a grant to write some papers. And as part of that\, they have a WIDER annual lecture. And we let Pritchett\, who is an author of the book\, also\, he was doing the annual lecture on September 27th in Helsinki. And the title of his session was The Folk and the Formula. And we were livestreaming. That’s Perkins room here. So if you just walk down\, that was Perkins room and we were streaming it. And the reason you have the shot is\, do you know how HKS makes these videos of a Day in the Life at us? We captured that event. Turns out they actually did that on September 27th\, 2012. And so they have live footage from Perkins of them launching this event\, as well as all other things that happened on that day. So I just wanted to share kind of where we started. It’s hard to think about livestreaming in 2012\, but apparently we were able to do that. Chuck is like our hero. He makes things happen. \n\n\nSo this grant actually gave us money to write eight papers which were then published under the RE COM program\, which is the research and Communication on Foreign Aid project. And our work fit within governance and fragility as their focus area. And you can see the first PDIA paper\, which was called Escaping Capability Traps\, was published. It’s published in many places\, but it was also published by WIDER in 2012. In 2013\, we held a conference called Untying Development. So we had we were at this point of thinking that things in development aren’t working. We need to do things in a different way. How can we have a convening with people who are trying to think about this and start to have this conversation? What can we learn from others who are also thinking we need change? Implementation is much more important than just coming up with a good plan. The real devil is in the detail and how you’re going to implement. And so you can see photos from here. We had Frank Fukuyama\, who is at Stanford University\, who is here at this conference\, Matt Andrews\, a younger version of Matt Andrews sitting there. Marilee Grindle\, for those of you who don’t know her\, she was quite the star and had the title that Matt has today. So it’s kind of nice to look at that photo and see that she was the Edward the S Mason professor\, and Matt now holds that title. She retired and then that’s your hands and you’re going to hear from Peter. He was actually a student at HKS at that time\, and he was a participant in this conference. And he was talking about his work. He had worked at the Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative\, and he was sharing some of the types of activities that they had done in that conference. \n\n\nAnd then in 2013\, our first year\, we launched our first blog\, and that’s the first blog that Matt ever posted on our blog in 2013. Today\, Hirschmann we love. And for those students who are here or anyone who’s listening on Zoom\, if you don’t know Albert Hershman and you are interested in economics\, you should really read his work Development Projects Observed. If you read it today\, it reads like it was written yesterday\, and yet it was written in the seventies of the eighties. We now have 650 blogs and they’re searchable. You can actually find blogs by region\, by sectors. So we had this idea of there’s this thing that we should do development differently and let’s try this thing called PDIA. But it’s one thing to have an idea about let’s do something and another to figure out how are we going to do this\, right? Everybody bought into the critique. But the question has always been\, so what are you going to do about it? And so in Mozambique\, Matt actually was working from 2012 to 2014 and then ended up writing this paper again for WIDER on how can we tell a story of the Mozambique reform through a PDIA lens? And a lot of learning of how things work. You know\, you see in this slide in 2013\, the Minister of Justice asks for help. And that’s when we have an authorizer with an itch. They really want to solve this problem. We can try doing some things differently and let’s see what that’s going to look like. And that essentially was like the first real experimentation of what does PDIA in practice look like? \n\n\nAnd then. I love this one. “Books are Dead.” So Lant Pritchett\, for those of you who know him or don’t know him comes in once and he’s like\, I just spoke to my friend who’s an editor\, and he said\, books are dead. And we’re like\, okay\, remember the book outline? They’re writing a book\, right? They’re thinking about and Building State Capability exists. The book is there. But he’s like\, books are dead. Nobody reads books anymore. Let’s make videos. And we’re like\, All right\, let’s make videos. So the whole idea was writing a book takes a long time. It’s a two year minimum. Those of you have done it the minimum two year timeline of doing that. And we already had things we wanted to share. And we thought\, how can we share this with the world before we actually have the book come out? And so what we did is we recorded 35 short videos\, each of them 3 to 5 minutes\, which really had the key elements of the PDIA concept. And you can see these are real screenshots of our videos. They again look different at different stages. In one of our executive programs in an assignment\, a student actually mapped all photos of Matt over time and all the videos and it was pretty hysterical. We have 236 videos and over 100\,000 views. Our videos still get watched that we shot in 2014. In 2014. We also started to work in Albania. So Ricardo Hausmann and the Growth Lab were already working in Albania. And one of the things that they were finding is that it’s one thing to help a country develop a growth strategy\, and it’s another thing entirely to help them think about how do you implement that strategy? And so he invited Matt to Albania to come and see how can we work together and how can we really help them help the government think about implementing a growth strategy. So three years later\, we had actually trained 131 government officials in ten ministries and agencies working across 20 teams. And what we did see is the real emergence of capabilities. So building upon what we had learned in Mozambique about how to do PDIA\, Albania was really another testing ground. And Peter\, I’m hoping when you speak\, you can speak a little to that. Peter’s in this picture\, right there. Peter and Matt were very engaged in Albania. Tim joined us at some point. Tim McNaught in this. So it was really an opportunity for us to try and test how do you do PDIA in practice on the real in the real world. In 2014. You know how we did the conference in 2013. So we had another conference in 2014. And this is where I’m not sure if you’ve heard of the DDD Manifesto or the Doing Development Differently Manifesto that was born here in Cambridge and ODI\, the Overseas Development Institute and Building State Capability\, hosted a two day workshop to really get people together and think about how can we do development differently\, How can we think about a community of practice? And that’s actually a picture from a board. We were at 1 Brattle where we held this conference. \n\n\nSo that is really what was born out of this process in 2014. In 2015\, you know\, we’re now starting to do PDIA. There’s a lot of demand. We’re a very small team. How do we reach people where they are? And that’s when we had the idea of do an online course like this is 2015\, way back\, and we think we have videos. So what do you need for an online course? We have videos already. We’ve done those. We’re writing a book. We have chapters and material to give them that kind of makes up a course. So why don’t we start to experiment with an A free and free? Because we felt if we really want to give these skills to the people who need it the most\, they cannot afford to be able to pay even executive education or whatever. So let’s offer it for free. And we were allowed to\, Suzanne Cooper was very\, very we’re very grateful to her for allowing us to do this. And between 2015 and 2019\, we actually offered 11 courses and we went our learning was really tremendous because the wisdom was nobody can take a course more than six weeks. And we’re like\, we have a 12 week course. And so they’re like\, Cut it into two. And we said\, okay\, we’ll cut it into two because that’s what you say we should do. And so we did A part A\, part B and Lant\, I remember\, said to me\, if 50 people register for this class\, this will be a success. 800 people registered. 600 actually signed in for the signed onto the the course website. 300-something did the first assignment 296 finished six weeks and we ran this ending the week before Christmas. \n\n\nEvery week we were like\, people aren’t going to do their assignments and we were wrong. But then taking those people who had momentum and putting them in the second class was very difficult. And we learned our first lesson that don’t listen to what people tell you sometimes and just try because they might be wrong. So we lost people who were very excited and they didn’t ever take the second part just because there was time in between. And we didn’t run a 12 week. So we went from one person\, two parts to two different courses to adjusting times. You know\, remember six was the magic number. We were offering 16 week courses with 90% completion rates. We count completion rates from doing your first assignment\, right. If you do your first assignment\, you kind of have a sense of what this course is about from the first assignment to the last assignment\, whether it was six weeks\, 15 weeks\, we landed on 15 weeks. It was really that high a completion rate. \n\n\nAnd then in 2016\, again\, the Growth Lab was working in Sri Lanka. We’d already had this work that we were doing in Albania\, and it all was it was almost an automatic reaction of you’ve done this in Albania\, why don’t you come to Sri Lanka with us? And so learning again\, how to work with the Growth Lab we were able to really take this is how we should structure Sri Lanka because of what we’ve learned in Albania and how we’re going to work with the growth lab here. And we were only there for nine months. And I’m I’m hoping Anisha will speak to this. Anisha\, we found a Nisha in Sri Lanka and she worked with some of these government teams and we also had so in Sri Lanka. So while in Albania we were working on implementing a growth strategy\, in Sri Lanka\, we were actually working on the problem of attracting foreign direct investment into the country. Now one key player in this is the economic attachés who are in the embassies around the world. So in addition to like building capacity and capability of the teams\, the government teams in the country to think about how we can do that. We also did a training of the economic attachés or diplomats around the world to be able to sell their story of why people should come to Sri Lanka. \n\n\nAnd then we had another DDD conference doing development differently. In this time. It was ODI hosted it in London\, and this was more to share for all people to share. Okay\, so we signed this manifesto. We came up with it. What have we done in the two years since then? And that’s a picture of Peter and me. Peter was talking about the work in Albania\, and I was talking about our online course and what we had actually learned through this process. It was at this event that Matt Andrews and Neil Cole from the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative\, CABRI\, that’s located in South Africa. Their main function is they have African member countries and they do training of public financial management. And what they wanted to do is try to use PDIA in Africa. And so we announced that in London of what we would do together. In 2017\, learning again from what we had done in Mozambique\, what we had done in Albania\, what we had done in Sri Lanka and our online course\, we developed a program for Cadbury on building PFM capabilities and we coached them on how you would actually do a PDIA training. If anyone knows anything about us\, none of our trainings are one week\, we don’t do that. We always do extended because there’s a spacing effect to learning. You have to try\, you have to learn a lot of things. \n\n\nAnd so this program\, it started online and then everybody met in-country. They went back to their countries to do the real work and then come back at the end to have a closing workshop where everyone could really share with each other what they’ve learned. We were there for two years. Our first year. It was really like developing the course and testing it\, seeing what it would\, what it would look like and train people. The second year we said\, All right\, we’ve done this in English\, let’s try it. And Africa has multiple languages\, not just English. Can we do this for two country\, two languages at the same time? And so our experiment for the second year was running a simultaneous English and French training program. And the Central African Republic and Cote d’Ivoire were the two country teams that participated in the second year. CABRI continues to do this. We were only there for two years and they are funded. They continue to get funding by the Gates Foundation to do this. And I encourage you to check out their website to see all the cool things that they’ve done with this training. In 2018\, Gates Foundation also commissioned an evaluation\, an independent evaluation of the PDIA process in the PFM sector. That evaluation was public\, but recently there is a World Development Perspectives Report that was published in July this year that does talk about this work. So it was not only done design\, but it was also evaluated\, and it’s been written about in a journal. In 2017\, Remember\, books are dead. So we did publish the book. \n\n\nBut as you can see\, we’d done a lot before the book even came out. We were teaching online courses on PDIA before the book came out. And I think the real big innovation here was\, you know\, download the book. It was in London at the DDD conference that we ran into. Duncan Green\, who had just published his book with Oxford University Press. And he said\, Oh\, I bought it. You know\, I have open access rights to the book. And we were like\, What? You mean we can actually get this book to be downloadable by Oxford University Press? And he’s like\, yeah\, you can do that. And we were just in time because the book hadn’t gone into publishing yet. And so we actually signed a deal with Oxford University Press to allow us to offer this book Open Access. What that meant is\, because it’s Oxford University Press\, the date that it gets published in the UK is different than the date that it gets published in the US. But because it was already published in the UK\, the downloadable version was available at the date it was available in the UK. So we had the downloadable PDF before we had the physical books for the the BBC book. In 2018\, so again\, we’re learning all of these great things and we’re thinking\, what are we doing about our students here at HKS? How about we bring what we are actually learning on the ground to our students? \n\n\nAnd in 2018\, we basically started to teach MLD 103\, which is PDIA in action. This is a field lab class where one thing that we learned and I think it was our online course that really taught us that the only way to learn PDIA is by doing it. This is not a conceptual thing. You cannot understand it. You have to do it and then you understand it. And that’s why we have longer programs. So we said\, Why don’t we create a seven week course where we can teach students a version of PDIA\, but they have to learn it by doing so. Let’s give them real people that they can work with and real problems and teach them how PDIA works. And so we’ve actually iterated on this. This is 2020 when we were are all on Zoom. This was just before we literally went into lockdown two days after this photo was taken. That was March. Andrea took that class with us. So in this class\, what we’ve actually seen is the challenge that we had is finding an authorizer that actually understands PDIA or understands what we do. And by that year we’d figured it out and it was basically pick people we’ve trained in executive education. So all the authorizers that any student works with are people we have trained in an executive program ourselves. And that allows us to be able to have that sort of learning happen to everyone. \n\n\nIn 2018\, we launched the PDIA Toolkit. Again\, books are dead. This is kind of the current theme of this whole story. The book is out\, but people can’t read the whole book. So can we come up with an easier way to teach people how to do PDIA? That is a little more interesting and easy to read\, and that’s Tim McNaught. You’ll see him in a video. We launched it at the Harvard Worldwide Week\, the PDIA Toolkit. It’s now available in six languages\, German being the latest one. And that was interesting. We did a program with the Bloomberg Harvard Center for Cities\, and there was a team from Mannheim that was actually being trained and they were so excited about this that they came to us and said\, Can we translate this in German for you? And we said\, Yeah\, by all means. And so thanks to the city of Mannheim\, we now have a German version of the PDIA toolkit. Honduras. So in 2018\, we were in Honduras and we tried to share some photos to be able to give you a sense of the kind of fun that we have in some of our programs. So we worked with seven government teams and with the Delivery Facilitation unit. And at this point\, Danny joined us\, who also happens to be from Honduras and worked on this project. In 2019\, again\, learning from all of the things that we’re learning\, we thought\, how do we bring this idea to executive education? We’ve now bought it\, we’ve brought it to degree programs\, but how can we teach this in executive education? And we designed our first program. It’s five years already\, and the model of the program is they start one month online. They spend a week here. It’s usually in June and at the Kennedy School. Then they go back to their countries. Six months\, they form a team. They start to work on this. We check in with them very regularly and then they join at the end. They join the community of practice. And we now have close to 300 people in our community of practice. And that’s a picture from one of the classes\, again\, to just show you the fun that happens in that it’s not all boring. In 2020 when the pandemic hit\, we had just finished teaching a class. Matt had this great idea of this is a time when leadership really matters and how can we really help people in real time? If you look at the dates\, that’s March 15. So while people started to quiet down\, we went into crazy mode where we launched this 18 part blog series. \n\n\nWe also held virtual sessions to get people together\, to have conversations. How do we think about this? How do we implement things? The world is very different. What can we learn? What about burnout? The types of issues that we really thought about were really diverse\, but all related to how you can lead through crisis. In 2021\, we offered a program\, a virtual training program in Brazil. We don’t speak Portuguese. The entire program was run in Portuguese. Thank you to Zoom\, where we had translators on Zoom so they would see Matt and I’s faces\, but they would hear the Portuguese translation and when they would speak\, we would hear the English translation 12 weeks. And we actually did this training for 60 public servants in two states and Brazil. And you can see people will still have etc.. And that’s kind of you have a good sense of what this virtual thing looked like. Sometimes they were in the room together\, sometimes they were on their computer screens. And something about the Brazil one. This opportunity actually came to us through a participant who had taken the online course. So she had taken the online course in 2016 and was really excited about it and then found a job at this NGO that was doing work on education and then came to us and said\, Can you do this for me? And it was it was actually very exciting. Tim McNaught who you’ll also hear on video helped us with this. He does speak Portuguese\, so we did have someone and he ended up writing a paper on the case of Sobral through a PDIA lens as well. \n\n\nIn 2022\, we did the Fcdo actually wanted to test out this idea of what would a PDIA education systems look like. And we ran a 12 week program for 56 education practitioners and nine country teams. Papua New Guinea again came to us because the team in Papua New Guinea had actually the executive director of this NGO called The Voice had taken our online course in 2018 and then came to us and said we’ve got this new funding from the Australian Government to run a local leadership and collective action program. Can we use PDIA as a base for this? So we are in our second year. This photo was taken in August this year. That’s the second cohort and this is from the first cohort that we trained\, the 31 of them that participated in this program and it’s currently running through to December. \n\n\nIn 2023\, we redid our website and if those of you want to learn anything more about what we have talked about\, everything plus more is available on our website\, including videos of those events that I’ve talked about. It’s all on our website. And for that one\, I wanted to give a huge shout out to Kathryn\, who’s just sitting there. She I can’t tell you how many pages she’s built for this website and if it was not for her care and concern and detail orientation\, this website would not exist. So thank you\, Kathryn. Sneak peek to 2024. We’re going to be talking a lot more about students here who are taking an M.D. One or two might find this familiar policy making as mountain climbing is going to be the place that we’re going to be headed in 2024. \n\n\nAnd then finally\, I just wanted to do a thank you. You know\, we this is a lot of work and we cannot do it alone. And we have a lot of people\, students included\, who’ve really been helpful down here. There’s Andrea Hayes in the front row and Chuck and Katelyn. And Sarah who helped us with finance a long time ago. We have a lot of you know\, to get things done is not easy and we need a lot of people. So thank you very much to all of these people. I’m going to end with you know\, I started with who we are and what we do. And people like to use this analogy. If you teach someone to fish\, you feed them for a day or whatever. We’re slightly different. So what we do at Building State Capability is teach them how to teach themselves to fish so that tomorrow if they need to farm\, they can teach themselves to farm. That’s what we do. We don’t teach them how to fish because that restricts what they can do. That’s the difference between capability and capacity. Thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji We’re now going to show you a short video and it has Lant\, Michael and Tim. \n\n\nLant Pritchett So I have an interesting story. I feel I was moving into PDIA\, moving out of PDIA\, and then coming full circle back to PDIA. Before I started working on the state capability book and approach that led to PDA. I was working on basic education. How much do kids actually learn when they go to primary and secondary schools in the developing world? And the more I dug into it\, the more awful it was. It was just an example of which people were trapped in incredibly dysfunctional institutions and had been trapped in those institutions in ways that people just didn’t see a way out of. And I wrote a book that was about how to create education systems that would produce more learning. Then this led to a broader attention of state capability. And I realized many organizations providing services were similarly trapped and compliance driven\, bureaucratic\, top down\, nonperformance driven situations\, which led together with Matt and Michael to the PDIA approach of breaking out of those cycles of compliance driven us increasingly focused on performance\, being able to search for positive deviation and reinforce that. Then\, after working on helping to create the Building State Capability\, I went back to an eight year research project on education. And after eight years of research\, what we turned out is the most important thing about improving basic education in the developing world is creating a PDIA like environment in schools\, creating an environment in schools in which teachers have clear performance criteria of what they’re trying to achieve\, are equipped to achieve those\, and then then\, given the opportunity to use their professional skills to pursue for better performance with feedback loops for them and others about what leads to better performance. Trying to create that system inside the large scale public education systems around the world is the challenge going forward\, and I feel that challenge merges precisely a concern about education with a path forward\, about generic state capability\, which applies well to education. So I feel I have come both a fertile circle\, but I spend more of a spiral in which I have learned more about education from focusing on state capability and more about state capability by focusing on education. \n\n\nMichael Woolcock For me\, I think the big gain from media has been really helping us to respond more effectively to what governments want and do. One of the maxims that one of our colleagues\, Lant Pritchett\, has at least instilled in my brain was that we can’t want it more than they do. And so but when they do really want change\, when governments are really focused on trying to change the mindset and the skill set of the public employees\, then we need to be able to respond to that in ways that don’t just presume that we know what the answer to that particular problem is. The work that we’ve been doing with with the Building State Capability program has been really centered on trying to build out an approach that looks\, feels and tastes and touches like those who are working with it. It’s not that they’re just copying and replicating something else from somewhere else. It’s them being able to own a change process in ways that make sense to them with a vocabulary and examples that are all from their particular world. And that’s what we’ve that’s what when this works well\, that’s what it looks like. It’s not just they perfect what we’ve taught them. They own what we’ve taught them and they can do it and teach it and replicate it among their own colleagues. And that’s the really fun part of it for us from our point of view as well. It’s not that we are just cloning ourselves. We are creating people who are willing and able to own this fully and then teach us about how and how to work with this elsewhere\, because we haven’t solved this. We are in the business of learning systematically and helping systems to learn systematically. And when we do that at scale and when we are able to give incredible examples of other countries and places where teams of people have come to embody a process of change that works for them and that solves the problems that they are wrestling with every day\, then I think we’ve done our job and I hope that’s the legacy of the PDIA work and I hope that’s how it continues into the future. Thank you. \n\n\nTim McNaught Hi\, everyone. Tim here. Congrats to everyone at BSC. on ten years of incredible work. First and foremost\, I’m just a big fan of you all. You know\, like I first started learning about PDIA in grad school\, in Matt’s class\, and it was just something that really connected with me from the beginning. And after graduating\, I took the first PDIA online course\, and then when BSC opened their first position for a fellow\, I just jumped at the opportunity. So I joined BSC seven years ago\, flying straight from Timor-Leste to Sri Lanka for a project that we were starting there. I have a super blurry photo of Matt\, Peter and me in the back of a tuk tuk that brings back a lot of good memories. When I think of BSC\, I think of all of the incredible people I had the opportunity to work with. Matt\, Salimah\, Peter\, Anisha\, Geeta\, Edit\, Marla\, Dany and everyone at the Growth Lab\, and of course all of the inspiring civil servants that we had the pleasure to work with as well. I just love how BSC’s work was always about empowering civil servants. So instead of coming in with solutions\, it was always asking what do you think the problem is and what are your ideas for making change? And what do you need to start taking that first step? And then the most rewarding part of the work was seeing civil servants like Ganga and Awa and Eleo and so many others taking some of these PDIA tools and making them their own and just running with them. So even though I no longer work at BSC\, I still feel like I’m part of the family and we’ve continued collaborating together. I had the opportunity to write a paper about education reform in Sobral\, Brazil\, looking at it through the lens of PDIA\, and I still often watch the videos of Matt and Michael on YouTube\, which are still an incredible resource. What I really admire about Salimah and Matt is that they practice what they preach. So they know that the best way to learn is by taking action and they are never afraid of trying something new as they know that they will learn and adapt and figure it out along the way. So I just want to say thank you. I wish I could be there all with you today. And congrats again on an amazing decade of work and hope to see you soon. \n\n\nPeter Harrington Well\, Salimah asked me to join and I’m really honored to be joining. I can’t see the room or others online\, but I’m really happy to be here and kind of delighted to be celebrating this with everyone. Salimah gave us 3 minutes to speak\, so one thing that you learn at BSC is if Salimah says 3 minutes\, you’ve got to stick to 3 minutes. I was asked just to say a few things about my sort of journey and\, and participation with BSC over the years. A bit about my journey\, I joined in 2014. I mean Salimah it’s\, it’s funny to see photos of myself\, it’s a much younger me as well in some of those photos as a\, as a graduate student at HKS\, um\, I had read the CGT papers published by Matt and Lant and Michael and Salimah before I came to HKS while I was working in the President’s office in Liberia. And I remember reading these papers and they were sort of light bulb moments and the ideas were incredibly salient and refreshing. And so I sought out Matt when I got to each case and I participated in the untying development conference\, as Selina said\, um\, and when I graduated\, Matt asked me to work on the Albania project just as it was starting. And over the next five years I worked on that project\, I worked in Sri Lanka and on other projects and then have continued to write and contribute with Matt and the team ever since. And it’s been\, it’s been an incredible story. And in the process I’ve worked on a lot of PDIA projects\, a huge amount of PDIA projects. So\, you know\, supervising the Albanian Sri Lanka teams in those early years\, as Salimah said\, we were sort of iterating the practice of PDIA as we went along. You know\, how do you actually do this in the real world? \n\n\nLots of the tools in the PDIA toolkit were kind of developed in their raw form during those years\, those projects. There was so much sort of PDIAing of PDIA itself\, which is a bit meta\, but yeah\, there was a huge amount of just working out what works and testing and learning and changing and developing. You know\, the learning was\, was the huge part of it\, um\, looking for different ways of structuring support through teams\, through these courses that Salimah mentioned and all these various models. And in terms of what I’ve learned\, I mean it’s more than I can possibly summarize here and in a few short minutes. I think apart from\, well\, apart from learning where to find the best bootleg Albanian raki and also the best food in Colombo\, I say I’ve learned a lot about why things happen and why they don’t happen. The real reasons when it comes to implementation\, that’s a big lesson or big set of lessons. And also that there are really good people around the world\, all over the world\, in the public sector\, outside the public sector\, who are doing really good work against incredible odds. And that’s that’s kind of\, you know\, core for me. I remember sort of just the last few thoughts. \n\n\nI remember Matt and I were sitting once having a beer. It might have been in Colombo after a sort of a long day of meetings. And I remember he kind of asked me\, why are you here? Well\, you know\, why are you doing this work? Why aren’t you at McKinsey like lots of your HKS colleagues? And the question kind of stumped me at the time because I had never thought about it. But the best answer I could come up with at the time was that this work is authentic. PDIA is authentic. It’s authentic because it puts people at the center. It’s authentic because it deals with the world as it really is\, and it’s authentic because it works for results which are real\, not just not just for show. And after 15 odd years working international development\, I can tell you that’s incredibly rare. That authenticity is incredibly rare and incredibly special. I find different people relate to PDIA differently. Lots of people\, you know\, think of it as a set of tools. It’s a cliche\, but for me it’s always more of a way of working and a way of thinking than any specific tools. You know\, I work mainly at a firm called Arab doing infrastructure in the Global South that I use PDIA every day. It’s not necessarily fish bones or\, you know\, using Triple A tools\, but it’s the principles\, the core idea\, the philosophy that turns a lot of development dogma on its head and puts the right people in the driving seat. That’s what means a lot to me. \n\n\nI think apart from all this\, all these principles\, what means the most to me is not the projects or the results. It is the people that we work with and the PDIA community. I always felt hugely honored to work alongside officials in the difficult struggle to\, you know\, change the country or do something meaningful. And that motivation\, when you find people that really care about it\, it’s not incentives\, it’s not anything else. It’s not career advancement. They just really want to do something\, that’s really special. And that’s meant a huge amount to me. And of course\, it’s also meant a huge amount to be part of that BSC family. It’s honestly been the most meaningful work and the best team I’ve been part of. And yeah\, I love these people\, so I’m very grateful to be here and I’ll stop before before I run too over the 3 minutes Celina gave me. Back to you\, Salimah. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you\, Peter. Anisha. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Hi\, everyone. Can you hear me? \n\n\nSalimah Samji Yes\, we can. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Okay\, perfect. As Peter said\, it is such a joy to be here with you all\, Just kind of reflecting on a decade of amazing work. Just a little bit about myself. I started off with the PDIA team in 2016. As Salimah mentioned I was in Sri Lanka and so I got to work with the team on the Sri Lanka project and then I moved into helping out with the PDIA Online Course Alumni Network. So the community of practice that we created in 2019 and then on to the IPP Community of Practice. And in the past few years I’ve worked as a teaching assistant for some of our exec ed courses. So I’ve gotten to work with a variety of practitioners around the world at different levels\, and I think it has just been amazing to see how PDIA can be applied to every aspect of your life professionally and even personally in all regions at all levels. And so I just had like three quick reflections from my own journey kind of learnings that have stuck with me over the years. The first one being and it cool because Peter mentioned this too\, just the sheer talent\, knowledge capability that is out there amongst the practitioners that we work with. I just\, that was the motivation for me to keep showing up to work was the people and the heart that they have for the work that do\, for the communities that they serve. Against all odds\, you know\, it’s not easy facing community members who are suspicious of your work. It’s not easy reassuring authorizers to trust you and the process. It is a huge challenge sometimes to just get your teammates on the same page. \n\n\nBut despite all of that\, you know\, our teams would show up and they would keep working and they would persevere. And for me\, that was my motivation to\, you know\, keep showing up for them as well. The second thing that has stuck with me is kind of how the PDIA creates this space to fail\, or as we like to call it\, kind of have key learning moments. And I think that has been so liberating and empowering for teams coming in. Because we find that teams come in feeling like they need to have a plan\, feeling like they need to have the solutions all figured out. And we kind of say like\, Hey\, wait. Like\, it’s okay. We can try something. We can take the risks. We can even make mistakes and learn from them. Like\, you know\, this is all learning. And even for myself in my own personal life\, like\, I’ve found that to be kind of a relief sometimes\, but also empowering to be like\, okay\, I can try something out. I can try like\, a new thing out\, and the world is not going to come to a halt and crash. In fact\, it might work out for the best. And so that has really stuck with me. And then finally\, you know\, these are moments of reflection. It is so inbuilt into the PDIA process. And I think that that is a big part of the impact and success that this approach has. You know\, we always talk to teams about having check-ins like\, what did you do\, what did you learn\, What did you struggle with? What’s coming next? And just seeing kind of the power of such a seemingly simple thing\, just taking the time to stop\, lift your head up from your work and just check in with your team\, with your self has been very impactful\, I think. \n\n\nAnd so even today’s event\, you know\, it’s right in the PDIA spirit of just having that reflective nature. How far have we come and what’s what do we have to look forward to? And so that’s all from me. I just want to say thank you to everyone for your time\, for your hard work. You are an inspiration to us all. And just keep going. Thanks\, everyone. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you\, Anisha. \n\n\nAwa Touray So my name is Awa Touray. I’m from the Gambia and I’m a Public Policy Practitioner. So my journey or my first first touchpoint with BSC started in 2017. I was nominated whilst in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in the Gambia to participate in CABRI’s Building PFM Capabilities Program. And that’s where I met Matt\, and he introduced us to the PDIA approach. And then I was a junior member of the Budget Directorate. Right? But it was a touch point that has changed the way my entire career trajectory has changed\, the way I see development. It has changed the way I approach service to the public in the sense that I was a junior budget officer who felt empowered to shift away from my routine work. I felt empowered to be able to tackle issues\, challenges that I saw on a day to day basis in the way that we were managing public finances within the ministry\, but that I had previously felt disempowered to be able to take on. I remember our initial response to to the PDIA approach was\, Wow\, you’re doing work that we would normally contract consultants to do. And that was essentially the selling point for him that we were tapping into our abilities are very technical abilities. We were collaborating across government within the Ministry of Finance\, but most important people in ministries. So that was my first touchpoint with PDIA. Within that same year I joined CABRI\, and the selling point for me in joining CABRI was that I saw the ability to now deploy this this approach beyond the Gambia. So joining CABRI joining the Building PFM Capabilities program and being a coach to country teams. So I went on to coach several teams as part of whilst I worked at CABRI\, including The Gambia\, Rwanda\, South Africa and to on various problems in PFM. And I reiterate any point that that this is hard work and you see the sheer dedication of these public servants. \n\n\nIn Rwanda. I had a team that was meeting on weekends because of the sheer workload that they had during the week\, but they were dedicated to make sure that they made moves with regards to their problem. After CABRI\, I became an international consultant and was invited by a state building contract\, an EU funded project in Sierra Leone\, largely because of my PDIA expertise. So they wanted to deploy PDIA to develop a public financial management reform strategy for the government of Sierra Leone for a period of 4 to 5 years. And I see this as a huge step because it signals that there is a willingness\, there is a move by key development partners. You mentioned Gates as a key funder to cap the EU in doing in providing support to countries in a different way in making sure that local agency is different\, too. So it was really the PDA framework that we use to leverage to decide what it is that was going to be within a strategy\, whereas previously it would be led by the consultant. The consultant would decide the issues that would be tackled. But we established a process where we engaged various stakeholders across from cross-functional teams in the very PDIA way we identified problems and the root causes. We used the Triple A framework to sequence the reform interventions\, and we made sure that the implementation strategy had tight feedback loops so that key stakeholders were able to reflect on how they were implementing these strategies and had the room to adapt as they were as they were implementing it. \n\n\nAnd then finally today\, I’m still doing PDIA\, but in a different sector. So I am the Deputy Chief of Party for a US aid-funded project in Liberia\, supporting education system strengthening. And here again\, PDIA is really the anchor for this project where we are supporting or we’re trying to develop a more capable Ministry of Education by establishing PDIA teams at the central level\, but also in subnational government. And in terms of the learning that I take away from all these experiences\, I feel like PDIA is about empowering local actors. And veritable change only really happens when local actors want it and when they drive it. But this process is not automatic\, right? PDIA is hard work. It’s time consuming. It’s not a linear process\, and it’s often easier to tick boxes\, right? You publish more documents and your OBS score goes up\, so you’re able to signal to key development partners that you’re doing the hard work. It might trigger some budget support. So you’re constantly faced with this battle of reverting back to an easier way or the traditional way of doing things. Let’s just conform to form and do things that will signal some that we’re doing some work while not having a very meaningful change take place. So it really is about key actors having some intrinsic motivation to address the issue and making sure there’s some urgency that people believe in or want to address the problem is a key part of the process. \n\n\nAnd a second learning point was for me was about leadership. Previously\, I saw leadership being often identified by a single individual. It’s about a position. It’s about an authority figure. But doing this work showed me that it’s really about having a vision for change and mobilizing other actors to make that change happen. And so for me\, this has been extremely rewarding work. It’s hard work\, but I find it so much fun. The learning has been monumental. I cannot even believe I’m beginning to tell you how it’s changed my life and the way I approach things in life. So thank you to BSC thank you to Matt and the team\, and it’s an absolute pleasure to be talking to you all today. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you\, Awa. Do you also want to share a little bit about not just your career\, but your life partner? \n\n\nAwa Touray So I also met my husband through PDIA. So he was an assistant minister in 2017 and was part of the CABRI program and a team member of the Liberian PDIA team. So we met through BSC. We’re married currently and have a boy and a girl\, twins. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Congratulations. \n\n\nAwa Touray So thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you\, Awa. And I’m now going to pass it on to Danny and then to Matt. Danny. \n\n\nDanny Barjum Thank you Salimah\, and good morning or good afternoon\, everybody\, and welcome to everybody on Zoom. It’s it’s very difficult to follow up on our three speakers because it’s really hard to add to anything that they said\, but it’s even harder to precede Matt Andrews so I’ll keep it short. I think. I think the thing that I really liked about PDIA. Well\, I’ll start with me just quickly. I’m a research fellow at Building State Capability\, and I’ve been there for now almost four years. And before that I worked in the government in my home country\, in Honduras\, which is incredibly difficult country in terms of politics\, in terms of crime\, in terms of a lot of issues\, which I’m sure resonates with a lot of you here or on Zoom. And I think one of the key learnings and what I like about PDIA is that it feels very natural. It’s a very natural way of engaging with people. It’s a very natural way of thinking through problem solving. I come from an engineering background\, so we’re taught a lot of how you actually solve problems and find the right solution. The difference is that there isn’t the right solution necessarily in development compared to\, say\, in engineering or a technical field. And so PDIA is a really awesome way to kind of respond to problems and to respond to people who tell you no. And I feel like it’s empowering in that sense that\, you know\, you’re often come to someone and you tell them we should do this. This is a really smart idea. This is a really smart thing that we should do. And then\, you know\, this is maybe the best solution for this. And we often are like\, what do we do in this situation? What do we how do we confront this? We sometimes shy away. What happens in practice\, I see\, is people just kind of end up settling for their position and say they’re kind of stuck. And and we provide like a framework to kind of figure out\, okay\, this “no” can empower me to think about my problem differently\, to think about what I should go about. What is it that I need? What authorization do I need\, what abilities\, what capabilities? And so it’s a really great way to confront those challenges. And I think the second learning what I enjoy about is Peter kind of referenced this as well\, and everybody referenced this is how we put people first. \n\n\nAnd the power of that isn’t necessarily that you get success is that you get success with the people you work with. And and these people really tend to engage because it’s something different that they haven’t seen. And and they buy into this not because they like the frameworks and their tools\, but because they see the value in our work. We’ve had\, I’ve had so many people come to us and after we give a session or engage with them\, tell us Danny or Matt or whatever\, whoever’s doing this\, they’ll say\, look\, thank you\, because this just gives me brings back motivation and joy to the work that I do. And it’s something different from the norm that is in governments or in public sector or in positions that work in development. And so it’s it’s just a really fun way to engage. It’s a really human way to engage. It’s a really personal way to engage. And surprisingly\, or maybe unsurprisingly\, it is one of the best ways to discover solutions to your problems. Oftentimes we come and we see in development not necessarily that people come in with ideas and solutions and try to convince someone by saying you should do A\, B\, and C\, but then\, you know\, how many times does that actually work? At least in my experience\, it’s I don’t think it’s ever actually worked. So the approach is more humanistic more about asking\, more about figuring out how do you connect to the people that are doing this work that really know the concepts really well and discovering solutions together. And I’ll keep it there and I’ll keep it short. Thank you. \n\n\nMatt Andrews I really don’t have much to say that has been said\, but I think I think I’ll say two things. The first thing is when I think back to when we started this stuff and in in Mozambique in 2008\, and I’ve been writing a lot of criticizing development. And I think Danny Roderick said to me\, It’s time for you to come up with another idea. And then I remember going to Mozambique and finding myself in a meeting in the Ministry of Health where it was swelteringly hot and complaining that it was so hot. And then the people complaining that the World Bank wouldn’t let them buy air conditioners and sitting there and thinking\, do the World Bank really believe that it’s possible to work in a place where you actually can’t concentrate? It’s so hot and just getting so frustrated at everything about development. And in that meeting them saying\, well\, what can we do differently? And I literally sat there and thought like. I don’t know. Let’s try to do a fishbone. And I remember like\, experimenting with fishbone and it was like they sat and they loved the fishbone. And it was like\, oh\, they like the fishbone diagram. So we can now use the fishbone diagram. And so we just kind of made stuff up as we went along\, in a sense\, and tested a lot of the a lot of playing with all the people in this room. \n\n\nAnd so this wasn’t something that came from one place and it didn’t come from some like high level of design. This came through iterating and finding people who wanted to do things differently and they’re all over the place\, everywhere\, right? And actually it’s like finding those people\, people will say to me\, like\, so what then happened was then\, of course\, you know\, within three months we had the World Bank saying\, okay\, tell us how to do PDIA\, tell us exactly what the process is\, blah\, blah\, blah. What is your proof? What is your evidence? And you know\, it’s like ten years later we have more questions than we had even then. But then\, you know\, we had no answers. And I think it was confronting this world where nobody has any patience and nobody really\, really wants to do things properly. And I really mean that. And I don’t think it’s that people don’t want to do a proper job. But the organizational settings to be in create the incentives for us to do stuff before those things have been thought out. And what’s been great is that we spent ten or 11 years working with people who have actually said\, no\, no\, no\, we want to do proper things. So\, you know\, the key message from everyone is just there’s a lot of people out there like this. It’s not that they’re hiding. It’s just that they have to have to be shown that there’s another way. I was saying some people will say\, well\, how successful is this? It can’t be successful all the time. And I’m like\, no\, it’s not all the successful time. Depends what you call success though. But I’m like in probably 60% of the time\, I would say confidently\, teams make much more progress than they would have thought. at the beginning. Probably in 80% of the time\, they have a lot more fun than they do normally. Even if they don’t make progress and maybe like 20% of the time\, like we have issues that we have to work through and it’s a problem. But 60% is a lot\, right? And then they’ll say to me\, well\, I don’t believe it. \n\n\nAnd I say\, well\, you know\, you should believe it and say\, well\, what’s the key? And I say\, the key is that there are so many people out there who have been put into boxes in their job. And as soon as you give them something that allows them to be creative\, to work with other people\, to to be respected\, they actually put their hand up and they say\, I’m there. It’s not about PDIA being great\, not about any of that. It’s literally creating a space for human beings to be human beings. And then people say to me\, Well\, how do you do this in budgets and how do you bring money to this? And I’m like\, the number one thing that we’ve observed is that development and policy is more about people than money. And right now\, when you don’t have enough money to throw out all of the things that need to be done\, we need to pivot. We need to pivot away from we need 100 million for this and we need 50 million for this and we need this for this. We need to remember that people are the key. And if we can develop policy mechanisms and tools that that inspire people\, that bring people together and that kind of empower them\, that’s the key. And and we don’t do it enough. \n\n\nBut people are the key and they are all over the place. So for me\, probably the most amazing thing has been ten years of working with people who don’t mind ambiguity. Salimah Samji\, all of these people that you’re meeting who don’t mind ambiguity or the number of the number of times\, you know\, Peter came and worked with me in Albania and it was like we in Albania and what are we doing? We’re working on these teams\, working on the growth issues and working on like electricity. How do we do this? I have no idea\, Peter. I don’t know. Peter was like\, This is cool. It’s let’s do this. And Danny was like this is cool. And all the Growth Lab guys that we’ve worked with\, including Ricardo\, he just was like\, this is cool. I don’t mind that you don’t have all the answers let’s just go and make it up. And I think creating that space for that is something that we’ve benefited from and we’re still doing it\, but we’re still trying to do new things and trying to mobilize people. The people who are executive programs\, they bring that spirit too. They bring that spirit of saying\, we’re going to take risks and we’re going to we’re going to support each other. \n\n\nI was saying to Salimah\, the new thing right now is not the mountain climbing that is going to be fun. The new thing that’s on my mind right now is just\, in the last few years\, a lot of the work has been kind of how do we think about managing time? How do we think about managing self? And how do we think about the fact that\, you know\, a lot of people who we work with are\, like\, damaged? They hurt. Doing public service in the modern world. It’s very hard. And a lot of those people\, every day\, they’re going through a skirmish and honoring those people and bringing them together to talk about that. That’s the new thing. And so\, you know\, I don’t know where we’ll be in another ten years time. I’m not sure that we have all of the academic articles that everyone else has. I’m not sure that we have all of\, you know\, the coin of the realm of the coin. Yeah. We don’t really do well in that. But I do think that these people are making a difference where they are. And I think these people are empowered. And for me\, the fact that this work has brought me in contact with all of these people across the world\, in this room and everywhere else\, is\, what a great way to spend 10 years. So thank you\, everybody. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nOver the past decade\, Building State Capability (BSC) has engaged with over 3\,500 practitioners in 148 countries. In this session\, the BSC team discusses the evolution of PDIA and its pedagogical methods\, as well as shares reflections on their journey of building capability and igniting change. It also features voices of global practitioners who have used BSC’s tools and approaches. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/reflecting-on-a-decade-of-building-state-capability-around-the-world/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230315T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230315T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T014307Z
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LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014307Z
UID:15069-1678838400-1678924799@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Implementation Doesn't Happen by Edict
DESCRIPTION:Online \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nAgustin Filippo\, Lead Economist at Inter-American Development Bank\, Mexico\, IPP 2022  \n\n\n\nAgustin is a Lead Economist at the Inter-American Development Bank. Since 2019\, he lives and works in Mexico with responsibilities in economic risk analysis\, applied research in real and monetary economics\, and policy dialogue. He worked with other LAC countries prior to this assignment\, and lived in Argentina\, Brazil\, France\, Uruguay\, and the USA. He studied in Paris and in Buenos Aires\, and holds a doctorate from the University of Buenos Aires. He completed the IPP program in 2022. \n\n\n\nJorida Zeneli\, Former Associate Director in Financial Management\, NSW Treasury\, Australia\, IPP 2019  \n\n\n\nJori has 15 years’ experience working for international and domestic organisations on the design and delivery of public services. Originally from Albania and based in Australia her experience spans across different portfolios in Federal and State agencies specialising in investment\, social determinants of health\, governance\, risk management\, fraud and corruption and monitoring and evaluation. She is the cofounder and CEO of the BeWell Hub – a start up company that supports employee wellbeing. She completed the IPP program in 2019.  \n\n\n\nShanequa Moore\, CEO & Founder of IRAISE\, United States\, IPP 2022 \n\n\n\nShanequa is a thought leader\, speaker\, and Non-Profit Expert who has committed her career to transform the lives of vulnerable children and families through reshaping and restructuring governmental systems in education and child welfare. As CEO and Founder of the New York City-based community organization I’RAISE Girls & Boys International Corporation\, her work has impacted more than 30\,000 vulnerable children in NYC and beyond. In an effort to address the New York States school mental health crisis\, in 2014\, Ms. Moore designed a school mental health program\, which has become a model during the COVID-19 pandemic in reshaping mental health services in New York City schools. She completed the IPP program in 2022.  \n\n\n\nAmber Thatcher (Moderator)\, Senior Director\, Program Delivery\, Harvard Kennedy School Executive Education \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC)  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nAmber Thacher Thank you for joining today’s session: Implementation Doesn’t Happen by Edict\, conversation with program alumni. We’re going to start off by introducing everybody who is joining us today. I want to thank everybody\, all of our panelists especially\, for joining us from around the world as well. This webinar is presented by Harvard Kennedy School Executive Education and the Building State Capability Program at the Harvard Center for International Development. All right\, to start us off\, I’m going to introduce myself. I’m Amber Thacher. I’m the Senior Director in Executive Education. I have worked in executive education for nine years and was the program director. Of implementing public policy when we launched this program in 2019. I worked very closely with Matt and Salimah and both of our teams to get this incredible program off the ground and have been thrilled to watch it flourish and see the community it’s built over the years. Salimah Samji is the Director of Harvard’s Building State Capability Program at the Center for International Development. Salimah works very closely with Matt Andrews\, who is the faculty chair of both the Building State Capability Program and the Implementing Public Policy Executive Education Program. Their research at BSC is centered around strategies and tactics to build the capability of public organizations to implement policies and programs. Salimah will talk later in the session about the impetus for the executive education. Next up\, I’d like to introduce our alumni panelists. Agustin Filippo is a lead economist at the Inter-American Development Bank. Since 2019\, he lives and works in Mexico with responsibilities in economic risk analysis\, applied research in real and monetary economics\, and policy dialogue. He worked with other LAC countries prior to this assignment and lived in Argentina\, Brazil\, France\, Uruguay\, and the USA. He studied in Paris and in Buenos Aires and holds a doctorate from the University of Buenos Aires. He completed the IPP program in 2022. Jori Zeneli has 15 years experience working for international and domestic organizations on the design and delivery of public services. Originally from Albania and based in Australia\, her experience spans across different portfolios in federal and state agencies\, specializing in investment\, social determinants of health. Governance\, risk management\, fraud and corruption\, and monitoring and evaluation. She is the co-founder and CEO of the BeWell Hub\, a startup company that supports employee wellbeing. She completed the IPP program in the inaugural year of 2019. Shanequa Moore is a thought leader\, speaker\, and nonprofit expert. Who has committed her career to transform the lives of vulnerable children and families through reshaping and restructuring governmental systems and education and child welfare. As CEO and founder of the New York City-based community organization\, I’RAISE Girls & Boys International\, her work has impacted more than 30\,000 vulnerable children in New York city and beyond. In an effort to address the New York State School mental health crisis in 2014\, Ms. Moore designed the School Mental Health Program\, which has become a model during the COVID-19 pandemic in reshaping mental health services in New York City schools. She completed the IPP program in 2022. Again\, I’d like to really thank our panelists for being here with us today. As I mentioned\, they are from around the globe. And as you heard in their bios have very diverse experiences and have very diverse experiences in attending the Implementing Public Policy program. So we really appreciate you all being with us and sharing your experience with our attendees today. So I want to start off by just hearing from you all about your experience in the program\, implementing public policy as you’ll hear later. In our session was designed for a very specific reason and is really applicable to people in various sectors and various areas of importance for implementing public policy or just implementation challenges that people are facing around the world. So I want to hear from you all about why you chose this program. And a couple highlights from your experience. So I’m gonna start by turning it over to Agustin if you could share your thoughts with us. \n\n\nAgustin Filippo Thank you\, Amber. Hello\, everyone. So I work in international development\, and I participate in policy design and implementation in different roles. And I came to this course for the reveal\, right\, how to implement public policy or how to do it better than what we are currently doing\, right? There was a sense that… We can do better\, policy makers can do better. So I came for the ideas and on this course. And I have to say I found quite a few. So if I have to choose\, then a couple highlights about the course and share with the people here\, I would say\, okay\, first\, there are plenty of technical\, very concrete and practical tips and strategies as to how to go about designing and implementing public policy in ways that is probably not the ways\, are not the ways that international organizations or even governments are using. I mean\, it’s designing in a slightly different way. So that’s a very important part of\, and I think an important highlight of this program\, Right\, you get out of it with concrete guidelines as to how to go about designing and implementing public policy. But that’s not it. And it’s not all of it\, actually. And equally important\, I would say\, to my surprise\, are all the\, is all the knowledge\, the information\, and again\, the practical experience shared with us in the course about how to understand and navigate people and organizations\, right? Depending on where you are in your own organization\, you may deal with technical issues or you may be more involved in leadership roles. So here you have a blend of both\, but I was positively surprised by the information and experience I got from how to navigate people in an organization. So those will be my two highlights. \n\n\nAmber Thacher Would help if I unmuted myself. Jori\, thank you\, Agustin\, for sharing. Jori what are your thoughts on this? \n\n\nJorida Zeneli Hi\, everyone. I welcome and thank you\, Amber and Salimah and everyone else for joining this. I would love the opportunity to support potential candidates into this amazing program. And before I start\, I’d like to acknowledge the Cammeraygal people of the Guringai tribe of the Eora Nation. They are the traditional owners and the custodians of the land I’m joining you from today. And I’d to pay my respects to their elders\, past\, present\, and emerging. May we continue to love and respect the lands as they have. So what are the highlights of this program? There is a long list\, but I’ll try to focus on just a couple. Just for a bit of context\, when I joined the program\, I was associate director in the financial management policy team at New South Wales Treasury here in New South Wales in Australia. And I had just released a very important policy. I had done a lot of work to streamline investment requirements and basically needed some knowledge on how to support effective implementation. And in general\, what I had noticed\, not just necessarily within these organizations\, but in the duration of my entire period in government is that we work in this black box\, we design these policies\, and then we’re like consulting them\, and then\, we go back to the black box. And then\, we design some more\, and we’re\, like\, go to the world\, and be effective and impactful\, and then wonder where did things go wrong. So in general\, what I had noticed is that\, uh\, implementation is indeed the poor brother of strategy and policy design. And I was like\, there’s got to be a different way. And I really cared about this work that I had done\, and I really wanted to do a good job implementing it effectively. So I was looking for a course that offers this and I literally stumbled across the course. And I have to say… It was the best coincidence that could ever happen to me because what I was hoping to get is learning and gain all this knowledge\, et cetera\, which I did\, and it was amazing. But what I also got is perhaps something that is valuable to a much larger extent\, which is an amazing community of practice. Meeting the lecturers\, the people in the program\, Salimah\, Matt\, Amber\, Anisha\, Rob\, you name them\, and all the peers in this program\, a fantastic people\, high caliber of expertise. And they’ve been an important factor that has helped me in my work. And beyond that\, the learning of course was about different methods on how to implement public policy\, more the standard methods\, which are the plan and control. And of course\, the gem was this idea of facilitated emergence\, this problem-driven iterative adaptation. Which is particularly important for complex problem solving. So when you work with a high degree of uncertainty\, which in general\, most complex problems or wicked problems\, as policy wonks call them\, deal with. So yeah\, I think these two were perhaps the biggest highlight. And I’ve implemented. Most of the methods which are incredibly hands-on throughout my work beyond that. \n\n\nAmber Thacher Thank you\, Jori. Shanequa\, do you want to share your thoughts? \n\n\nShanequa Moore Absolutely\, and thank you so much and welcome everyone. Thank you all for being here. So echoing some of the sentiments of my colleagues here\, when I started or when I originally applied for the IPP program\, I was looking to really move the needle forward in my industry and to paint some context. I run and operate a CBO\, a community-based organization that’s based in New York City. And we work directly with elected officials to shape policy on a myriad of levels. And one of the major policies that I have been working on is how do we work with the city of New York and the state of New york to implement a model to support kids’ mental health? And there was so much uncertainty when I started the IPP program\, just not knowing where to start and how to begin. But I think there was a lot of substance that I got from the program. I think one of the major things was a paradigm shift. When I first started the program\, I thought I sort of knew what to expect. I came with a strategic plan that I thought was going to work and I was told to essentially throw it away. And that for me was one of my defining moments that I was getting ready to essentially adopt a whole new paradigm. And I think that’s what IPP was for me. It was a paradigm shift in how policy is done and how to work with people and how work on teams. The second for me was really the experts that were in the room\, which were my colleagues\, being able to learn from people around the world\, other policy professionals that were in various industries\, it really added to a meaningful and impactful experience. We have a cohort that is very connected and very bonded. We share stories throughout the days\, the weeks about what’s going on. Not just in our professional world but our personal world and I think that is really important and something that was a highlight and is a highlight for me. So I would say those two things resulting in a paradigm shift in the way that I do policy and also having a new family that really are policymakers around the world. \n\n\nAmber Thacher Thank you. I’m glad you touched on that too. I think Salimah and I would both echo everything all of you have said\, but I think that community that is built through this program that lives on beyond the end of the program is extra special and she and I stay in touch with it. And I think we get energized as well and supported as well in our work from all of you. So thank you so much for addressing that. I want to next talk about the format of the program. So I’m going to share my screen again\, just to give a little visual. It is something that is very\, well\, it’s unique to Harvard Kennedy School Executive Education. And we launched this program in 2019\, and thought our online presence was something that we were venturing into a little\, did we know\, a year later. We would all be online doing a lot of different things. But we are back to the blended format\, which I think everybody appreciates and is excited for. So I just want to talk a little bit about how this program actually functions and then I’ll turn it over to the alumni to get their take on their experience doing something in this format and how they integrated it into their lives\, both personally and professionally. So the way the implementing public policy program is set up is a blended program that runs from May until December\, which is a lot of time and seems like a lot of time\, but it’s broken it up into different phases. So the first month is online. People can expect to do two to three online\, what we call asynchronous modules\, where you’re doing some reading\, you’re watching some videos\, you’re listening to some podcasts\, a lot of different modalities thrown in there. There’s a couple of assignments during that time. And then\, there’s a few live sessions that happen where you come together with the faculty and with the rest of the program participants both in a peer learning group setting and a full class setting\, but that’s all done virtually. The focus of this one month online period is really on implementation challenge. So everybody comes to this program with an implementation challenge\, which Salimah and the alumni will talk about later on. But that one month period is really focused on honing in on what that challenge is. Then in June\, you come to campus for a week in Cambridge\, Massachusetts at the Harvard Kennedy School campus\, which is always a good time. You get to meet the people that you’ve seen online for the past month and have class sessions together. It’s a very intensive week\, but really built around having you focus on the learning\, the tools\, the frameworks. You have class sessions\, three to four class sessions a day with various faculty who teach in our program and are focused on different aspects of policy implementation\, or leadership\, or teamwork. All the different things that Salimah will talk about that are covered in the program. I would say that the week on campus is very stimulating\, engaging. People often comment that they’re excited to be a student again\, to be back in a classroom setting\, but it is an intensive week for sure. Once you leave campus\, the program doesn’t stop. There’s five more months to go\, and that is all done online as well. So that\, again\, is what we call the action learning phase. That is when you are really applying what you’ve learned in the classroom to your work and to your implementation challenge. It’s similar to the first month where there are asynchronous modules on a monthly basis. Again\, reading\, podcast videos\, and then live sessions each month that you come together with the class and your peer learning group. As we talked about\, the program really ends in December\, but the experience doesn’t. After completing the program\, all participants are now members of the implementing public policy community of practice. And as Shanequa and others have described\, that is really a robust network of policy professionals who have all gone through the program and are there to continue learning to continue supporting one another. It’s run by a group of moderators that are program alumni. Shanequa was actually one of our moderators right now. I think Jori has been a moderator in the past. So it’s really driven by the alumni\, which makes it even more special and keeps everybody connected. So I want to turn it over to the alums just to get your perspective on this model and how you found the experience. Dovetailing both online asynchronous in-person work and how you incorporated and managed seven months of program commitment into your both professional and personal lives. So I’m going to go backwards this time if that’s okay. And we can start with Shanequa. Shanequa\, do you want to share your thoughts? \n\n\nShanequa Moore Yeah\, I was I was like thinking back to what it was like when when I first started I think online we’ve when just looking at let me look at the screen one more oh you put this slide down that first month when you’re online I think is just sort of getting you very introductory getting you sort of acclimated to the material into the curriculum and to essentially what the rest of the program is going to be. I love the first month because it was sort of a light touch a light dive. But when you get on campus\, I think that’s where the intensity starts to build up. And for me\, and I think for a lot of my classmates and my colleagues\, that was the part that was most meaningful because we got a lot of in-person interaction. The activities were very intentional. Even the pace of the material was very strategic. There was a lot information and a lot of times we felt a little overwhelmed in full transparency. But it was intentional. It was strategic. And so I really enjoyed the activities that involved around peers\, that evolved around our challenge. I think that week was something that gave us essentially a toolbox. And we got a lot of tools that week that we essentially were able to take and now start to utilize in our work. Following the on campus part\, That’s when the real work started. And so I think for many people\, we were like\, well\, where do we start? But what I love about IPP is that it really gave us a step-by-step process. And it was very different for everyone based on whatever policy challenge you’re working on. You’ll really get something that’s really customized and meaningful to your policy challenge. And so\, I was able to take the tools inside of my toolbox. And essentially start using it. And sometimes it’s confusing because you’re like\, well\, I have all these tools\, so which one do I pull out? What I love about the program is you get to learn which tools do I use for which problem I’m facing within this implementation\, right? So you’re prepared for a myriad of challenges that may arise off campus when you’re now back into the real world. You’re prepared to pull out different tools and you essentially begin to learn what those tools will be. And so I found it very\, very useful to take the material and really implement it in my work. I thought it was going to be difficult and there were some challenges\, but I think what helped me was that it was interwoven into my place of work. Well\, my staff didn’t really have an option. They had to take the material\, but I was able to take their material\, bring it back to my team and we really digested. We really began to work. Strategically with what we had based on what I received from the IPP course. And what I also loved is that not only did I take the material to my place of work\, but I took it to other places of work within the city of New York. We brought the material\, to the mayor\, to different commissioners\, to different organizations. And they were able to take this material and also adopt it. And so it allowed people that never came together in government to come to the table and begin to talk to each other. And I really\, really did see a lot of transformation within my work\, I wanna say within maybe 60 days. So the material\, it works\, the tools\, they really do work\, but you have to be committed to the work. You have to committed to process. And if you are\, if you have that commitment\, I think you really will see some level of transformation in your work. It also allowed me to start seeing the needle moving forward. When I first started IPP\, I was in a place where I felt like I was hitting a roadblock. But when I took that material\, brought it back to my place of work\, I began to see change and I began to see that needle moving forward for me. And so I’m really grateful. I think the material\, the pace\, the curriculum\, everything blended extremely well and what also helped was having that community of practice. So when you’re when you feel stuck in your work and sometimes you feel like maybe you’re the only one that understands this\, you can go back to your community of practices. You can ask questions to your colleagues. You could learn from them and I think that’s really helpful and implementing your policy challenge. So that was my experience. \n\n\nAmber Thacher Thank you\, Shanequa. Jori\, do you want to share your experience\, especially given your time difference on the channel? \n\n\nJorida Zeneli Um\, I\, um\, thanks so much\, Shanequa. And without wanting to\, um repeat some of the aspects\, I actually chose this program because it was over seven months. So for me\, um this was the only way. And because it blended\, cause I have two young kids and\, um\, it’s not possible for me to leave Australia for a longer period of time. Um\, however\, I think for something to really stick for it to become a habit and so on without wanting to like bed mouth other amazing programs at Harvard. But I feel for me it does need to extend over a period of time and seven months sounded to me perfect. So you have this period of like intensive learning and faculty interactions at the beginning and then you have the week in Harvard where you get to know your peers and this full immersion week where… Literally\, I think no one that I know\, including myself\, didn’t experience fear of missing out. I think I hardly ever slept in that week. And thankfully\, it was not longer because it wouldn’t have been sustainable. But because all these conversations and all these… lectures\, and all these interactions were so interesting. Everyone is working on such interesting stuff. So you are literally learning also what else is going on in the world. What’s in every corner of the world\, literally\, and both in the public and in the private sector\, because we in our cohort\, we also had people from the private and non-for-profit sector. So that is gold and and then In that week we were assigned to different groups of people. That was really such an interesting way to build up something that’s then going to sustain you for the future. Because even\, so we started working in these groups\, in these smaller groups on case studies. And so applying literally what we had learned the day before. And then slowly towards the end\, we’re like\, okay\, so now we all have our individual challenges and this is gonna be my group and this group is gonna support me implement\, you know\, these challenges when I go back home. And so after that\, that sort of relationship was intense. It was moderated by Anisha\, brilliantly done so. And it was weekly\, basically\, touch points with these people\, delving from whatever corner of the world\, which was great. And What else did I want to say for me didn’t feel like it was\, you know\, overburdening me because you could choose a challenge from your own work from your own area of work. So for me\, it was like\, Okay\, great. I’m doing work. I am thinking deeper about this work. I’m actually elevating this work\, I’m pitching this work to authorizers. So basically\, it’s your work. And The good thing about the work or the challenge that I had chosen is that it didn’t have any urgency\, so it allowed me to stretch it over a period of time and really integrate all the learnings. I had a lot of time to iterate and experiment\, which made this work really\, really fun. And yeah\, I think this is me. Yeah\, with regards to the group\, I also wanted to say that… Every time I wanted to pull the plug out of something\, they were like\, that’s not you. Don’t do it. And on the other hand\, every time I was experiencing some win or gaining momentum\, they were\, like\, yes\, you’re biggest cheerleaders. And when do you have that? Like\, um. And the entire method is like\, you literally don’t experience much defeat or failure. Like we hate that in the public sector. We are so risk averse\, uh\, you know\, because you have all these entry points into this complex problem that you are trying to solve\, you’re like\, Oh\, okay. I’m going to park this because it doesn’t look like this entry point is working and I’m gonna. To tackle this problem from a different angle. Let me try this for a period of time and then go back to that. So yeah\, it made work so much more fun. \n\n\nAmber Thacher That’s great. Thanks for making work fun is always a good thing. Agustin\, do you want to share your thoughts? \n\n\nAgustin Filippo Yeah\, so for me\, after completing the course\, the program\, in my opinion\, you cannot do this program any other way\, right? If you believe you can learn this stuff and learn how to put this in practice with a one-week course\, I think you’re fooling yourself\, right. So for me it’s a necessity. That’s my first point. My second point is when I was facing the program\, should I take the challenge or not? And I talked to colleagues\, some of them didn’t wanna take the course because of the seven month commitment. And I did it\, right? However\, I think the way you look at this from before enrolling and before completing the program is like\, okay\, this is going to be like going back to school and it’s going back to school for seven months. So I’ll be reading for seven months and next year\, I’ll doing something with the human capital I’ve accumulated in this seven month course. But it’s completely different than what I’ve just described\, right? It’s not that you’re gonna be reading for seven month and then the year after you’re going to be doing stuff\, right. It’s a very practical day to day. Your work is your course load and your readings are going to help in your afternoon video conference. It’s not something you read and forget\, and five years later\, some will say\, oh\, you should have used this. No\, no\, it’s what you read in the morning\, you’re going to be using in the afternoon. So it’s very\, very practical. Shanequa and Jorda already touched on what you do in the first month\, the online\, the on campus and afterwards. But I wanna go back to everything that happens after campus\, right? So it five months in which what you have is the most talented people you could ever think of\, right there to help you with your struggles\, right. So you’re doing progress in your work. In your work\, like you’re paid for your work whatever you are\, right\, and things not normally don’t go as expected\, right. So on a weekly\, monthly basis you get back to faculty and peers and you share your problems and they give you the most useful advice you would ever have\, Right. So it’s completely the opposite of what people may think of when they start. It’s not something that’s subtract from your work. So you have to budget the time to do this. It adds to your work\, so you can do more if you are in the course than if you’re doing your regular stuff\, right? And lastly\, for those of you who work in an organization\, like I do\, like you probably have year-long plans\, goals and development goals\, personal development goals. And you have to write up and be assessed on how useful you were to your organization in the 12 months prior. You have a bunch of stuff to show of how you’ve done things differently by being enrolled in this course. So again\, this doesn’t subtract from your day-to-day activities. It actually provides and adds up to whatever you are\, and improve the quality of your work\, and it shows\, and you’d be rewarded for that. That’s my message about the seven-month time commitment. \n\n\nAmber Thacher Thank you Agustin. All right\, so I want to turn it over to Salimah now to talk more about why we designed this program\, what the need was\, and what is covered in the program. So Salimah over to you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you\, Amber. Welcome\, everyone. I’m just really delighted that you’ve decided to join and learn more about our Implementing Public Policy program. So as you’ve already heard\, we started in 2019 in the last four years\, we have 294 alumni from 71 countries who’ve completed the seven month program and they’re all part of our community of practice and we’re really delighted that we have with us today\, a current moderator\, Shanequa\, and an older moderator\, Jori\, who are here\, who can speak both about being moderators of our community and also being participants in our program. And from our first and last year\, we ran 2020 and 2021 virtual because Harvard was remote. But 2019 and 2022\, we ran this blended version where you start online and then you come to Harvard and then we continue online. Now\, why did we create this program? And it was very\, very different and still remains a very different type of program even within the Kennedy School\, a very unique program. And a lot of it comes from our experience working in development. And what we saw very often is that people come up with great plans\, but they don’t get implemented. They don’t solve problems. And sometimes the plan itself is too simplistic for a complex problem. And in the world of complex problems\, you need a different approach that actually allows a lot more learning where there’s a lot of unknowns. You really have to spend time to reflect\, to learn more about the unknowns and then to adapt and to iterate. So different approaches are required for the different types of problems. But what we find often is that there is the same plan and control type of approach that gets used for any kind of problem. When the management method should be something slightly different. And so what we decided to do is create a new program where we can train people to learn these new approaches to working on complex problems. But I really am happy to hear what Agustin said that you can’t do it any other way. And it’s true\, you can learn\, we already have this experience. And in fact\, the program that I am the director of is called Building State Capability. And the reason why we use the word capability is because the word capacity means one work training\, which oftentimes doesn’t lead to much change. You can be wowed. You can’t be excited. But the problem with the one week course is you are the one who’s transformed. And then you go back to your system\, your organization that did not get your training and did not change. And then it’s you fighting against this huge mountain. And it’s really\, really hard to be able to do that. And so… From our own experience\, it’s about building the capability. And the way we want to do that is empower you to learn while you go back. And so creating this long program where the first part\, including the part that you come to Harvard\, is learning the tools. And then when you go home\, I also liked how Shanequa said that’s when the real work happens. That’s right. The real work happened when you go back home and you start to implement this. You start to build a team. That’s gonna help you\, you start to build coalitions\, you start really better understand\, have you really understood the problem correctly? Who do you need to be on your team? So we teach a lot\, as you see on this slide\, the problem-driven iterative adaptation is the approach that we teach. And this really has a lot to do with how do you work with the problem? How do you identify a problem? How do you deconstruct it to find out what the root causes are? Because oftentimes what we see time and time again is we are more hardwired to sell solutions than to solve problems. And in order to solve a problem\, you need to understand a problem. There’s this huge bias to jump to solutions. Oh\, we know how to do this. When the reality is\, do we really know what the problem is? And if we spent some more time understanding what the problem is\, we could probably find. Solutions or ideas that we can test that will solve the problem that you’re trying to work on. And in this process\, we also talk a lot about how you manage your authorizing environment. In the Q&A chat\, there’s also a question about private public\, there is people around\, how do you manage them? And you are in a system and there’s plenty of authorizers\, whether it’s your boss or you work in a government and it’s other ministries or other departments. How do you work with them? How do build authorization? And how do you maintain and sustain authorization? These are really important to be able to help implement policies. And then in the world of complex problem solving\, you can’t work alone. One person cannot change things. You need a team\, but it’s not obvious how you work in a team. So part of the program is really teaching you how to work in team. How you could create these teams and how you can build coalitions. And we also teach how you exercise your own leadership. Regardless of where you are\, you can exercise your leadership. How do you think about your own leaders? How do think about managing up? How can you think of managing down? How do think about trust? How do you think about time management? How do you think about delegation? These are all of the different tools and strategies that we do include in IPP and something that’s been really recurrent through the past few years has been our module that we tried for the first time in 2019 on self care. And it has become a really important module where participants really value this idea of what about me in the policy making and how do I take care about myself. So that kind of is\, in a nutshell\, why we decided to have this program\, why we structured it. It came from practice. You know\, we are an 11-year-old organization. We have been doing this around the world with teams. We wanted to bring these great ideas and the way we work internationally to Harvard to be able to open it up to even more people around the word because we are a small team. We can’t go everywhere\, but we can have an open enrollment program that allows many people to come in and really build a community of like-minded people who can start to help each other in implementing public policies together. So with that\, Amber\, we can stop sharing. I’d like to pose a question to our alums on sharing what implementation challenge you brought to this program. So this program really is one where\, in order to teach you something\, PDIA or problem-driven iterative adaptation. Is a way you can only learn by doing. I can stand and lecture till you’re\, I’m blue in the face and nothing’s gonna change for you. You have to work on a problem yourself and work through it for it to become a habit. And so everyone in the program comes in with an implementation challenge that they will work on and will continue to work on and use the tools in practice on that. So I’m wondering if the three of you can share\, I know you already shared a little bit\, but both what challenge you brought to the program and what sorts of impacts working through this challenge had\, both for you personally\, for the challenge\, and your organization. And\, Jori\, why don’t you kick us off? \n\n\nJorida Zeneli Thanks a lot. This was so good. I felt like I refreshed a lot through your… Thanks\, Salimah. So the challenge I had chosen was on how to embed resilience. Um\, principles in investment policies and with resilience\, I mean resilience to natural disasters. This was my task. This was the program that somebody put on my desk that I had to basically deliver this\, this piece and the policy we had just been delivered in the format of a pilot and\, um\, I knew that this is not going to go anywhere. Um\, that you know\, so I used this problem which was given to me on which I had authorization to anchor this other piece of work which was like\, okay\, so what’s the real problem I’m working on? Because this is a solution to something\, but this solution to something might be a new problem in its own right. So basically going back to the drawing board. There was no sense of urgency. So I could really take time to think deeply and implement the methods. And natural disasters\, unfortunately\, we’ve had a lot of them since the catastrophic bushfires in 2019. So literally\, that gave the burning platform for them this work to be really… Front and back of the mind of many authorizers. When I started it\, it was not the case. And so that basically shifted the conversation so much. And then I had all this work ready on time to go when the time was right. And that I think made a huge difference. Yes\, I think so. In general\, I think the methodologies helped me understand how this problem at a much deeper level and also at a more broader level because I came back with this massive fishbone diagram about all the root causes\, about where are viable entry points\, and then I could test all of this in the sector. And it so happened that my authorizers\, a lot\, were outside of the organization\, because I had authorization to deliver on this work from my own organization. What was not working was this scattergun approach to this piece of work. And and to the fact that there were many\, many entities in charge and that we didn’t have necessarily a centralized function that held all the knowledge\, all the know-how. So one thing is to tell them\, invest in this space. But how should they do it if they don’t have the data\, if they have the knowledge? If the knowledge is sitting somewhere else or constantly changing? And those are the clear barriers that became so apparent through this work. The work didn’t just change the organization I was working in and necessarily the teams and the people that I was. Having coalitions with it\, it literally changed the landscape of the sector because after the bushfires\, a new agency was created\, and that doesn’t happen very often in the public sector. Like we change the landscape or the public sector\, we then had a centralized function\, a new agency to do this work. And in the meanwhile\, the agency has now reshaped. It’s now part of the ministry\, et cetera. But the fact is that the premise of that work\, of the need to have a centralized function to deliver on this important work hasn’t changed. And also the course changed me a lot to some extent because I had sort of lost a little bit the spark on why this\, that I’m doing this day-to-day work in the public sector when I see no impact sort of thing. And I’m sure a lot of us have been there and just interacting with you guys\, it was so inspiring\, it reminded me. Why did I want to do this work in the first place\, you know\, what was my purpose\, what was my mission\, and it was such a good reminder because it reinvigorated my entire approach to work and to my own discovery as well\, because a lot of these methods we don’t just take to\, you for people like us who love this work\, and probably I’m talking too and they’re working. Um we we we don’t finish work and never think about work ever again you know we bring it home we talk about it with our families and so on so this this method literally changed my life because i was then implementing some of it at home iterating at home you know which was great and um you know eventually i then realized that it’s uh this is it for me within the public sector I… Didn’t want to be given a problem anymore. I wanted to choose my own problem\, and I wanted imagine something bigger for me. And I was ready for it. And basically\, I’m now the proud founder of a startup company. And you’ll be surprised how many times I’ve gone back to my notes and used the methods that we learned to build my business\, especially in the planning phase. So I think you can go back to the Harvard Business School\, charge them a lot more and teach them these things. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great\, thank you\, Jori. Shanequa? \n\n\nShanequa Moore Oh\, I’ll try to be short because Jori\, you said it all\, right? My challenge was mental health in schools. And my agency received a large grant to scale mental health and schools in New York City. And so we were tasked with the challenge to create a model for kids in New York City that worked\, where there is no model. And so\, we worked a lot with stakeholders. We connected with people throughout New York City. We really hit a lot of roadblocks and challenges with the mayor of New York city\, because I think the way that the mayor was doing\, or at least addressing mental health in schools\, was in a way that left out a key group of people\, which are social workers. And I didn’t know that coming into the IPP program. But when I started to implement and iterate and experiment\, we started to find out answers. And one of the key things that we found out is that the mayor of New York City was blocking social workers out of this challenge. And so we’re still working with the mayor to try to get them to bring us to the table\, but we have made a lot of progress in the policy. So we were able to\, through the work that I’ve been doing with New York city\, we were finally able to get the mayor to adopt at least a model and to now say that he’s gonna invest and making sure that every school in New York City has a social worker and has a model. They don’t have the model yet\, but this is where we’re gonna come into play and really work and sit at the table with the mayor of New York City to address what that model looks like. So I’m grateful that using experimentation and iteration has worked for me and my challenge. I’d also say\, Salimah\, you said a whole bunch of things that I was like trying to take notes. But I think the other thing we did was we impacted a lot of systems on multiple touch points. And that was really great because prior to IPP\, again\, we were stuck. We were not\, there was not a lot progress happening. But once we were able to get into the rooms\, talk to the right people\, connect the dots through stakeholder analysis\, we were able to identify the right that we needed to speak to. Who are our authorizers? We were able to understand our authority\, our level of competencies\, and to really begin to really navigate through the politics and policy\, which was huge for me. And so I was able to navigate and still learning to navigate the politics within public policy\, which is really essential when you’re trying to understand your authorizing environment and when you want to see policy success. And then the last thing I would say is the leadership part. That has been so huge for me. As Yuri said\, really echoing her sentiments\, this work has changed me as a leader. And I am grateful because it’s changed me not just as a person and as a CEO\, but it’s changed me as a mother to my daughter. It’s changed in all parts of my\, my world\, and I appreciate that. It’s changed my staff. You can see the change and the transformation actually happen when you utilize the materials that are given to you. And like you\, Yuri\, I am now teaching PDIA\, and probably didn’t mention this yet\, but NYU now wants to learn this as an elective course. I’ll be teaching it to social workers in New York City at NYU. And I’m also going to be utilizing this work out in the state of Georgia where I’m currently running for office\, for city council and building a new city so I will be using PDIA to build a new city out here and so I’m grateful for the material. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you so much. I didn’t know that\, Shanequa\, congratulations. Very exciting. Agustin? \n\n\nAgustin Filippo Well\, impressive. And coming last\, there’s not a lot left to share\, to say\, I think Jorida and Shanequa mentioned the big transformation you can experiment by going through this program. I worked on economic development challenges in some states in Southern Mexico. That was my challenge. And I came to the program perhaps already knowing what the challenges were\, or at least I thought\, at the technical level\, right? I’ve written strategies as to how to diagnose those challenges\, what to do about them and all that. And of course\, before I did it\, many others\, smarter people have done so\, right. It’s everyone and everywhere probably in the world\, not this is this doesn’t stop in Mexico. Everything has been overdiagnosticized. So vices are known. The problem is how to make things happen\, how to change\, and change is hard. And perhaps what I want to highlight about my experience is that this program encouraged me to move closer to the people I was trying to help\, to connect with them in a different way and understand their context better. They all know they are in this big play where they have a role to play\, they have their script and they move from one conference to the next\, from one office to the next saying and doing what they’re expected to do and to say\, right? And that hardly brings any change at all. And showing like\, look\, you need to change things. Are you happy with how things are going? And let me help you. Let’s work together on how to refocus your priorities and how to come about with a plan as to make things happen and to change things one step at a time. So\, I mean\, that’s the technical part of what you learn in the program\, But the. Unexpected consequence of that was you actually move a lot closer to your clients in your own organization and outside of your organization\, right? And you learn from them and you learn and they learn from you. And you can see them finding something on all of this\, right. They get inspired and as a benefit\, you get inspired as well. So that’s\, I think that’s behind what Jorida and Shanequa said in terms of the joy they get after applying these techniques into their own work\, because it’s actually that. I mean\, we were all motivated professionals\, but I mean I think we all discovered that there’s more joy to have from our day-to-day work once we get this close connection to the people we work with and the people who are trying to help. Those are my last two cents. \n\n\nJorida Zeneli I agree totally. And do you know what brings that connection? I was reflecting about it because you were right that what\, what became really apparent is that the bonding between colleagues was so much stronger. I think this method always invites to\, uh\, authenticity. It keeps you very honest. And because you keep learning\, it also keeps you very humble and you’re like\, okay\, so what’s next? And this\, this is what\, makes the bonding\, I think\, really\, really good. Sorry\, I interrupted. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Not at all\, not at all. I see that we are getting to\, there was a question in the Q&A about what skills you’ve learned\, but I think in the last round you actually did answer a lot of these\, and I think\, Amber\, we can just answer some of the other questions about what do we look for in participants\, etc. I can start on that one. Generally\, you can be in the private sector\, you can be in the public sector\, in fact\, in our first cohort\, Jori\, we had Mitch who worked at Bank of America in London\, and he was a participant in the program and he found the tools extremely useful. So I don’t think there is a private versus public NGO government. I don’t think there’s those kinds of questions that you can ask\, but what you do need is a problem to work on because that is a minimum criteria. If you don’t have a real problem that you could do something about. Then because the program is long and requires you to work on a problem\, if you don’t have a real problem that you can work on that you have authority to do something on\, then the program becomes very difficult. And that’s\, you know\, when we read applications\, it’s the first thing that we do. And that doesn’t mean that we can’t find you a problem that you had in your organization. We actually have had people who’ve worked on problems in their own organization. We had one participant at the World Bank. And this was during the pandemic. And the challenge was being able to work in the country given that they weren’t able to travel. And so they said\, oh\, but I really want to work on this. And we said\, yes\, but you can’t take action. So this is not a good problem. You will be frustrated. You will not learn. Let’s look for something that you have control over. And she happened to be on the diversity and inclusion team within the organization. And she worked on that internally at the World Bank. And It was the success that she had from that. She thought\, oh\, but I’ve been doing this for 10 years. And we said\, but it’s something that you can do something about\, please just trust us. Why don’t you work on that? And she ended up making huge strides on that work in the organizations. Cause to learn the approach\, you have to use it on a real problem. This is not theoretical. This is\, not let’s all work on somebody else’s problem. This is you work your problem. \n\n\nAmber Thacher Yes\, thank you\, Salimah. I think that is the honing in on\, you have to have a problem to be working on is the key to being successful in this program and being admissible to this program. We have\, as Salimah said\, people from all different sectors. We have people from all different experience levels as well. First year of the program we had a very very young person in the program but he was in a position to make change and to to do work and had a problem so we admitted him to the program and he was fantastic so it’s it’s not about level of experience it’s really about is your work going to benefit from what we are teaching in the program. I just put a slide up that has some detailed information about the program. Everybody who has registered and also attended this webinar will receive all of the slides and we’ll send a follow-up informative email with more program details. I’d encourage anybody that has further questions to reach out to the program director\, Jesse Delano. Unfortunately\, she’s traveling abroad right now and running another program\, so you can join us\, but you will meet her. And I really\, really\, just want to again thank profusely Agustin\, Shanequa\, and Jori for joining us. I think this program is so unique that it is best described by you guys and the experiences that you had and I’ll speak for Salimah but we’re just like so overjoyed that you all have gotten so much from this experience but also you’ve brought so much to the program itself and to the community of practice\, so. Again\, thank you all. Jori\, thank you for joining at 3am in Australia. And I wish you all the best of luck in your work ahead of you. It sounds like you are all doing great things out in the world. So thanks again. Thank you\, everybody. And we look forward to hearing from you. Have a good day. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nAre you tasked with implementing policy\, but frustrated when you and your team can’t get it across the finish line? Are you a policymaker wondering why the policy you’ve developed to address a pressing issue for your community or organization fails to come to fruition? You are not alone. The Implementing Public Policy (IPP) executive program is uniquely designed to help you approach policy implementation in a new way by testing tools and frameworks you learn on your implementation challenge\, in your own context\, in real time. This session features the IPP program team and program alumni who share how this program can help you and your organization achieve better policy outcomes. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\n\nPhotos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/implementation-doesnt-happen-by-edict/
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UID:13580-1675641600-1675727999@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:They Eat Our Sweat: Transport Labor\, Corruption\, and Survival in Urban Nigeria
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa\, author of “They Eat Our Sweat: Transport Labor\, Corruption\, and Everyday Survival in Urban Nigeria”  \n\n\n\nDaniel E. Agbiboa is Assistant Professor of African and African American Studies at Harvard University. He earned a PhD in International Development from the University of Oxford\, and an MPhil in Development Studies from the University of Cambridge. His research focuses on how state and nonstate forms of order and authority interpenetrate and shape each other\, and the relationship between mobility\, power\, and politics in urban Africa. He is the author of They Eat Our Sweat: Transport Labor\, Corruption\, and Everyday Survival in Urban Nigeria (Oxford University Press\, 2022: Finalist\, Global Development Studies Best Book Award) and Mobility\, Mobilization\, and Counter/Insurgency: The Routes of Terror in an African Context (University of Michigan Press\, 2022: Winner\, ISA Peace Best Book by a Global South Scholar); co-author of People\, Predicaments and Potentials in Africa (Langaa RPCIG\, 2021); and editor of Transport\, Transgression and Politics in African Cities: The Rhythm of Chaos (Routledge\, 2019). He is a recipient of the Harry Frank Guggenheim Distinguished Scholar Award and a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study\, Princeton. \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome to the Building State Capability Seminar series. This is our first one for this calendar year\, and we’re really excited to have Daniel Agbiboa here with us. He is the assistant professor of African and American Studies at Harvard University. He earned a Ph.D. in international development from the University of Oxford and an MPhil in development studies from the University of Cambridge. His research focuses on how state and non-state forms of order and authority enter\, penetrates and shape each other and the relationship between mobility\, power and politics in urban Africa. He is the author of this wonderful book called They Eat Our Sweat\, Transport\, Labor\, Corruption and Everyday Survival in Urban Nigeria. We are really excited to have Daniel here. Welcome\, Daniel.   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Thank you. Thank you to all of you.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji And welcome to all of our audience who is here on Zoom. We’re excited to have you. The order of this session is we are going to do this\, the conversation style. And after that we will take Q&A. So if you have questions\, you can post them in the chat. For the audience here\, we will take live questions at the end and then Daniel will answer your questions. Great. Thank you very much. There’s also some information about Building State Capability. For those of you who are on Zoom\, we’ll be sharing that with you. For those of you in the room\, there is stuff on the pillars\, etc. to learn more about who we are and what we do. Okay. Without further ado\, Daniel\, what inspired you to write this book?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Great question. Great place to start. First\, let me thank you all for coming to this during this launch period. And I’m excited to obviously talk about the book that has been a while in the making. The starting point\, what inspired me to write this book is in many ways very personal. I grew up in Lagos\, Nigeria\, which is Nigeria’s commercial capital\, but also Africa’s largest metropolis. And my parents were civil servants who from about the mid 1990s dabbled into the informal transport sector\, the informal transport sector\, the popular transport sector\, the sector that is not unique to Nigeria but is actually quite dominant in the global South. You know\, they call it dallas\, dallas in Dar es Salaam\, trotros in Ghana\, matatus in Nairobi\, espirit de corps in DRC or the spirit of the dead because of their propensity for accidents. So they are quite familiar to anyone who has navigated the African city. So they dabbled into it as a form of supplementing their income. This was the period on the back of the Structural adjustment program in Nigeria\, which was implemented in 1986 on the back of the oil bust when Nigeria went and experienced an oil boom and then due to some external shocks had oil bust and needed rescue package which came in the form of the IMF World Bank reform package\, which was really about removing bureaucrats from business in order to strengthen Nigeria’s economy. But unfortunately it did not work for a host of reasons\, and the removal of the state from social provisioning plunged many households into severe poverty\, and many had to adopt multiple modes of survival to sort of get by and make do\, something that is not at all\, again unique to Nigeria at that period. Many people work multiple jobs today to complement their wages in order to get by. My parents\, being civil servants\, decided to pool resources together and buy a minibus taxi\, which they believed would do two things: Would take us to school\, bring us back\, and in between sort of make money. So that was the whole idea to blur this sort of public private responsibility. But it ended up to be a huge disappointment for them\, something that they have not forgotten and certainly not forgiven the drivers who were implicated in it. From their point of view\, it was a case of dishonesty. Even though this driver that they employed to run this business came through trusted networks like the Nigerian pastor. But these\, in their view\, the driver was dishonest\, formed all sort of collusion with other extortionist on the road including mechanics\, street level bureaucrats like police officers. Motorpark touts who to work for the National Union of Road Transport Workers or in some sort of network to extort money from them. So every day was so I recall I recall fondly the joy of having someone drive you to school. In Nigeria\, owning a car is a status thing\, no matter how old or rickety the vehicle is\, it was always something to be proud of. So we grew up with that sort of pride of owning a minibus taxi\, but at the same time it was not lost on me that there were constant arguments and fighting back and forth between my parents and the driver and the conductor. It was always over money issues. It was one money today\, one money tomorrow. The car was broken\, the car was working. Sometimes my parents had to leave work to sort of monitor this guy and see what he was doing. But anyway\, they went into debt because of essentially this business\, which is supposed to supplement them. But I always felt many years later when the opportunity came to do a Ph.D. at Oxford\, that I was always going to do something around corruption because it was so ingrained in everyday life. It was something that I observed cumulatively. So I wanted to understand the system because at the same time\, the anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria and much of Africa was really designed to put the bad guys behind bars. And I always felt that it did not really plug into the kind of corruption that I experienced on a daily basis\, the social dynamics of corruption\, the corruption that was there\, and not there\, sort of a spectral phenomenon. So that was always something I was interested in. But then\, it was too broad and I needed to ground it. And for me\, the first sort of place to start was the place of transport\, because it was something that I experienced. And I always wanted to see the story\, not from my parents point of view\, which was a dishonest sector or a sector that was not trustworthy\, but also from the point of view of the anonymous\, even nameless driver who was stigmatized as a con doctor. And I never really got to hear their own point of view. So this was very important for me because informal transport workers across Africa\, South South Asia\, they have an identity of being what a sociologist Goffman calls data workers. They are seen as violent\, in fact\, they are the occupation that you don’t want your child to grow up to become. So I wanted to understand beyond this stereotype\, beyond this sort of facade. What is the sort of plight of these workers? What is their own story? It was important to plug into the feelings of my parent because it allowed me to understand sort of the precarity of ownership. Sometimes precariousness is always sort of seen as the preserve of workers alone. But I was able to understand that you can own something and also be in a very precarious position. So that was important. But I wanted to understand the mutuality of precarity\, that it wasn’t just one against the other\, that there was this sort of speculation that happened. And so I wanted to understand from the driver’s point of view and more broadly\, from the point of view of informal transport workers. So this was the inspiration to go back and try to understand what was going on at the time.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. So you get to Lagos\, you’ve got a plan\, you’ve got a methodology\, you’re going to interview a lot of people. And then that’s not what you did.   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Yes\, I tore up the paper\, the whole formal ethics\, approval. Everything was done to go and study corruption in the informal transport sector. Being a social scientist\, it was about interviews\, semi-structured interviews\, in-depth interviews. It was about talking with the stakeholders that were involved. It was all very straightforward. And hence it was approved. But I go on the ground\, and two weeks\, a few days into my fieldwork\, I have this sort of chance encounter with a former schoolmate and he happened to be a minibus taxi driver\, danfo as they are called\, hurry up. And we get talking and I tell him about my research and he tells me you won’t get much with the kind of approach that you want to take. If you want to understand really the mutuality of corruption\, what happens from within\, then you have to be a driver or at least be a conductor. So driver just seemed too daunting for me\, so I left it for him and I said okay\, I would work as a conductor. My supervisor\, luckily the late Abdul Rauf Mustapha\, as radical as it gets\, was open and walked with me through the ethics process to ensure that I was able to to carry out this kind of research\, this kind of learning by doing research. So this is what happened. I became a conductor running one of the most difficult routes\, so between Alimosho local governments\, which is the largest local government area in Lagos and Oshodi\, which is the central hub in Lagos. Everywhere you want to go to\, if you get to Oshodi\, you will be able to find a connection to that point. So it was as easy as it gets. And I navigated several checkpoints\, dangerous checkpoints\, but also checkpoints of conviviality and sociality. So it was this mixture of danger\, but also a sort of affect friendliness\, a sort of performance of violence that I navigated on a daily basis. So there was a real embodied knowledge\, things I had to learn by just doing. And it was then that I began to experience what it felt like to be an informal transport worker. This sort of distrust. You were the\, you embodied as a conductor all that was wrong with the with the city. You were sort of the punching bag of the passengers who were frustrated with the dysfunctionality of the context and would often displace their aggression towards you. You were\, in a sense\, never really seen as a person. You were part of what is called the non incorporated\, those who are not part of the realm of humanity. You existed outside of humanity\, so to speak. So I had that embodied experience of what it means\, and I think it it really informed the kind of research that I wrote in a way that is filled with empathy\, that really understands positionality. And I’ll say more a little bit later on about the need to reflect on one’s own positionality within the sector. But I was an outsider within. So even though I was part of the sector\, I was not permanently part of the sector. There was always an escape route for me. You know\, and there was the whole aspect of my family being scandalized that I would even be part of this sector. And I remember when I even broached the idea\, my mum wanted to follow me to the motor parks. I said you’ve done your own share back in the 1990s\, let me do this one. But\, but this was how it happened. It was a chance encounter. I went on\, went to the field with a very clear idea of what I wanted to do\, and it was blown in my face with this\, with this encounter. And that’s what the city does to you. It’s a space that is both strange and familiar. It’s unpredictable\, and you have to be open to the unpredictability because that in itself is a resource.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji And how long did you do this for?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa So this was for a year. I did the transport\, the conductor work for two months. It was impossible for me to continue beyond that. Just the wear and tear that it has on your body\, the insults\, the the psychological impact it has on you just meant that I could not continue. Which made me realize that for many who are sort of trapped in the system\, there’s nowhere to go to. You have to navigate the system you have to face the system squarely. And so sometimes we look at these people as the tough guys of the city\, the rugged guys of the city\, but the toll that it takes on them\, the work\, it’s synonymous to what you may call a slow violence or a slow kind of death. It just a systematic exhaustion to the body of having to navigate this many\, this violent and unpredictable system. I think more than the actual violence\, it was the fact that fear was a way of life in this space\, the fact that there was always the possibility of violence\, not so much the enactment of the violence itself\, was something that was just exhausting. So this was what happened. I just could not endure or sustain the energy with which I came.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Two months is a long time. I’m not sure many in this room would actually have lasted two months. Can you give some color\, you know\, you’ve talked about navigating this. It’s a really difficult job. What does a day in the life of a conductor look like? For those of you who’ve never had that experience\, like\, what does that look like?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Yeah\, that’s a great question. A day in the life of a conductor. I think to understand that question\, we have to begin by saying that one of my favorite minibus slogans\, and you know\, again\, if you know the informal transport sector\, you know there are sort of mobile bodies of meaning. On their bodies are always all these graffiti and different slogans that is the way in which they as marginal actors are able to enact their voice in a city that often looks beyond them\, in a city that renders them anonymous and surplus. One of my favorite slogan is “Life is war”. And underneath that slogan is “24 hours on the road”. Another a slogan says “Ghetto boy”. “No time to check time”. So all of this sort of this is a space that is conceived as is. So when you wake up in the morning and you go to work\, you’re going to battle. You’re going to battle with forces\, not just physical forces\, but also forces that are beyond\, that are more than the eyes can meet. So this is how they conceive of their work. And so you don’t go into battle unprepared. So therefore\, to prepare themselves for battle\, you do various things. First\, it’s early too\, it’s making hay not while the sun shines but before the sun shines. You have to wake up early because you have to avoid all the extortionist on the road. So. So waking up around 4\, 3 sometimes in the morning. And there are a range of things that you would do as a conductor in conjunction with the driver. You would pray. And some would make sacrifices\, talking sacrifices to their deities\, which is often at intersections which are seen as that potent place where most of the corruption and violence happens to sort of protect them through this sort of treacherous business. Some would hit the drinking\, the beer palace\, as they are called\, to sort of immune themselves to the various insults and risks that abide in this sector. So those are those are sort of the range of things that you do as a conductor to prepare yourself. But it was always this sense that this is a space of war and you had to be prepared for it. And so that’s how you went through life.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji It’s interesting that you call it “Prepare for war”. What does that mean? Can you unpack\, like\, what does war on the street look like? What are things that could happen to you?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Yes. Let me let me let me let me turn it around and say earlier when I said\, or rather\, when when when the language of corruption is used in Africa and more broadly\, the global south\, it’s always the language of militarization. People come into power and say they want to wage war on corruption. We say the war on corruption\, and it’s almost like the war on terrorism. What I experienced was a cold kind of war. It was a war that was a mixture of the spectacular\, which is that you could be literally shot dead for refusing to pay bribes to a police officer. But it was also spectral. It was not there most of the time when you go to these places\, people are cracking jokes\, people are eating together. So you feel\, well\, where is the violence? But it’s always there. It’s in the possibility that things can suddenly change in your face. So there was that war. So in two months\, for example\, I witnessed the death of about four conductors. Now\, these are violent deaths that were just literally these guys were just pulled down from from from minibus taxis in motion. Why? Because they refused to pay bribes to motorpark touts who work for the National Union of Road Transport Workers\, which is the most politicized and violent union in Nigeria. And some of those deaths occurred in full view of the traffic police officer who simply looked the other way because they’re sort of in on the game. These transport workers work with them collect money from them. In fact\, literally one of the money they collect is owo olopa\, which is money for the police. So in a sense\, this is a certain mutuality in this regard in such a way then\, that I wouldn’t say the transport operators are entirely passive without agents\, but there is a sense in which you give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar so you can go on your way. So that’s the kind of what we’re talking about. But you’re also dealing with an infrastructure that swallows people in form of the road\, the potholes\, the accidents\, just the traffic congestion that means that you are just slowly dying in traffic and the pollution that is in that space as well. So so that is also a form of death as well that you have to\, a form of war\, that you have to endure and you have to pray to avert. And this is not unique to the transport drivers. It’s also to transport\, the passengers as well. And\, you know\, there’s always a play on the slogans on the body of these minibus taxis\, for example. This taxi\, this taxi slogans\, they speak\, they have this double meaning where they tell you what is going to happen\, but at the same time they reassure you. So it’s this danger and comfort. For example\, they could say experience is the best teacher. So you are looking at this minibus taxi that is just like on its last leg\, and it says “experience is the best teacher”. It says “all that glitters is not gold”. It’s telling you don’t just go with these young guys driving the flashy ones and playing blaring these 2Pac music. Trust that\, as one slogan puts it\, “it still moves”. So this thing is old\, but it will get you where you want to be. Some would say “come in to carry you home”\, which is almost a subtle way of telling you that this is a fly in a coffin. And you could be. And one other slogan says “six feet”\, which is just essentially reminding people of the fact of the proximity of life to death and both the biopolitics and the necropolitics of making die and letting die. That is part of this space called the transport sector. So the slogans themselves\, if you read them carefully\, you can understand the kind of space that you are in. But it’s also a case that these slogans were a form of competition where people could gain a competitive advantage. Nigeria was ranked\, I think\, in 2000\, says one of the most religious space in the world. And people really\, so many of the slogans were religiously embedded. So people really trust when they say “the blood of Jesus” or when they say “fear not” or “anointed”. People feel a certain comfort in going with these these drivers because they feel there’s a sort of a divine intervention that is in this space. So this is sort of the broader picture that you can read from the city itself rather than from outside the city.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you so much. Now\, you started because you wanted to learn more about corruption\, right? What did you learn about corruption?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Excellent question. What is corruption?   \n\n\nSalimah Samji That’s right. Exactly. Let’s start with what is corruption?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa What is corruption? That’s the question that sort of throngs the gateway of my senses when I went to the field. You know\, Nigeria has at least 500 languages. And one of the first things I realized was that there was no direct translation for the meaning of corruption in any of these languages. Joseph Nye\, who is the former director of the Harvard Kennedy School\, famously defined corruption as the use of public office for private gain. You know\, when I went to the field\, it was hard for me to see what the public was and what the private was. In fact\, in many ways\, not using public office for private gain was to be perceived as corrupt because there was a commonality around food and eating that blurred the boundaries between the public and the private. So in a sense\, then\, one of the first things that I encountered was that there was no direct translation for the word corruption. Corruption. In fact\, the closest I got was the [unknown]\, which means oppression. So corruption\, people instead would use idioms of eating and not eating well enough or eating too much to to describe corruption\, which tells me that there was an intimacy at the heart of corruption. And eating together\, there’s an intimacy around that as well in these spaces. So there was a mutuality and intimacy\, an aspect that characterized corruption that made it not there\, but here. And so that was the first lesson that I learned. The second thing was that many of you have probably experienced one email or another telling you that they are the lawyer to the late Nigerian president and telling you that they have a lot of money in the bank. They just need your bank account to be able to sort of get hold of this money and distribute and pay your school fees and give you some stipends. So there’s a lot of these sort of and images of the Nigerian prince is very\, you know\, widespread. So there’s a culture of corruption that is often dominant in popular media. But one thing I discovered from being a conductor and talking and being in that social space of the motoparks and the bus terminal was that it was as much a culture of corruption as it was against corruption. People would often condemn corruption. People would always agonize over the corruption that they experience on a daily basis. And so there was a paradox there in which people at the same time gave in to corruption and reproduced that corruption. So I wanted to understand why do people sort of denounce the very practice that they reproduce in their daily lives? And\, you know\, probing that you realize that there was the corruption was people worked\, as one minibus taxi driver puts it\, when you fail to engage with corruption\, you die\, you cease to exist\, you become anonymous. So people were compelled to reproduce this corruption that did damage to them. It almost reminds me of the political theorist Lauren Berlant’s work on what she calls cruel optimism in which people get attached to the very thing that hurts them and reproduce that very thing\, maintain relationships that ultimately is not good for them. So I think this was a certain cruel optimism around corruption in Nigeria\, in which one could be mistaken to say that Nigeria’s fantastically corrupt\, as the former British prime minister noted. But what is missing is the fact that they feel trapped into a system that they have to engage with\, they have to negotiate with through various tactics and strategies in order to survive. So that was another key understanding of corruption\, that corruption was was was something that was closely related to survival\, the struggle for survival and people. And so when we talk about a culture of corruption\, there’s nothing inherently flawed about people\, feckless about people that made them sort of embrace corruption. In fact\, I have struggled to find a country that is as critical of corruption as Nigeria is. And the elections are coming yet again. And Nigerians are very concerned about corruption. And we know on the back of what happened with George Floyd in the fall of 2020\, Nigerian youth went in social protest through what is called the EndSARS movement against police brutality and extortion\, rejecting corruption yet again. But these were not the misbehaving youth that the president made them out to be. These were patriotic youth\, they were holding their national flags that were dancing to the national anthem in what Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor calls the Festival of the Oppressed. And yet they were shot dead in cold blood. So so again\, this was something that was very it was important for me to set the record straight that this was not a culture of corruption\, but it was a cultural against corruption and that we need to move beyond this\, this sense that certain countries are fantastically corrupt. Or that they are inherently feckless or inherently give in to corruption\, which sometimes is how narrative is put out there.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Yeah\, I really like this blur that you have. It’s not black and white\, right? You started off by saying the corrupt guys go to jail. There’s only those corrupt guys? It’s like it’s a whole culture. It’s a whole system. There is different levels. There is no us versus them.   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Yeah\, no us versus them. You know\, you have to think about corruption in terms of you have to push and blame. It’s not a case of Nigeria’s problems simply being the problem of leaders. Right. The ordinary citizen is implicated in the very\, you know\, discourse and practice of corruption in such a way then\, that this us versus them thing will not get us anywhere. In fact\, most anti-corruption campaigns has always been designed around a state logic of trying to catch these guys who loot billions\, billions of dollars. What the point that is missing is the social dynamics of corruption\, the fact that the everyday and the political are intimately related. The fact that the the street logic and the state logic are closely intertwined. And so this was something that was very a key point in this book to try to show the mutuality of corruption\, the ways in which these logics are overlapping so that the division between the public and the private\, the state and the society\, the elites under subaltern politics\, needs to move beyond those sort of bifurcated lens to begin to look at how things interact. And only then can we even get close to dealing with corruption. Which\, by the way\, I don’t believe that the language of war tells us that corruption can be eliminated. Do not believe. I think it’s nonsense. I don’t think it can be eliminated. I think corruption is something that people have to learn to live with rather than try to completely win the war over it. Actually during field work\, many transport operators went on strike not because they were not against the corrupt system\, but because there was no form of regulation. They wanted to know that\, okay\, there’s a defined place where we pay the price. There is a certain amount of money that we pay. There are actors that we know that are paid. So there was in regulation within the system. And so what happened then was that there was a felt marker that these motorpark touts in conjunction with the police officers\, would have where if you pay\, then they would put a mark there. And then there was a form of regulation. Sometimes they were ticketed for what was going on. So there was a certain regulation in this sector that made it functional.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Understanding what the lay of the land looks like as opposed to\, like you mentioned in your book\, new checkpoints coming up. So you have no idea just how much you’re going to have to pay in bribes because it could change from day to day. How are you supposed to then survive? We can all accept that\, fine\, I have to beat bribes\, but let’s at least figure out how much that has to be. And we can all work together so that it’s a win win for everybody.   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa And you touch on an uncertainty there that governs life in most cities anyway. Where people have to live in a state of almost changing gears\, driving just in a state of preparedness. And this was also important from the passenger’s point of view because as a conductor and a driver\, there was no set rules. Even though we ran from Alimosho  to Oshodi\, we always knew that based on information we get from the drivers coming in the opposite direction\, that you know what\, there’s so many checkpoints and because the checkpoints as well are not static\, they are shifting checkpoints\, there are so many checkpoints\, and even the sort of the alternate routes are sort of blocked by bribe demanding officers\, you could easily just decide that\, you know what\, it’s not worth my while\, I’m going to run a different route\, which means that a passenger gets into the bus not really knowing if they will arrive at point B. So as soon as we feel that it doesn’t\, it’s not worthwhile we could just offload the passengers\, give them what we think\, if they’ve paid $20 for the trip\, we think we’ve taken them $10 it\, give them $10\, and said\, good. We’re just going to give you $20 and marry two passengers together and we are off on our way. We’re making a U-turn and we’re going somewhere else. And so people have to find alternative routes. So there was that fit in\, that uncertainty there\, that sort of filtered through from the drivers to the passengers themselves. So it was a logic. It was the logic that governed this space.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Now we’re at the Kennedy School. These are students who are studying about how to be good policymakers. What’s your advice to students like these on how should they address these kinds of things? What did they learn from your research?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Great question. So the first thing I would say is that is from my own experience\, right. You have an approach right here\, designed here from the library\, from the warmth of your room\, safety of this place about how you’re going to approach these subjects. Right. But there is a certain\, you have to respect the uncertainty of the space you’re going into and be flexible enough to change\, to be open to learning from the locals and to recognize that there is a certain agency\, a certain capacity for action. So the space you’re going to is not tabula rasa\, it’s not a blank space that you’re coming in to impose a certain theory or a certain approach. But rather think about it with the same logic of that particular space\, the logic of mutuality\, of conviviality\, of complementarity. So in that sense\, then you have something that you want to come and do. You have something you want to bring to this context? But this context also has a lot to bring to you. And how are you flexible enough to see the agency of that particular space\, to understand\, to be humble enough to know? I think that flexibility is very important. As my professor used to say\, don’t be wooden. Don’t be reluctant to change. I think in that way we do write pieces you really want to write in a way that is also very respectful of the space that you’re going into. So there is certainly that flexibility that I would say is very\, very important. I think another thing that I benefited a lot from was the language of the space\, knowing to speak the language\, not just the formal language but also the informal language\, unofficial language. The code of the street. And knowing even if you study and care for minds and study in the state\, that state is not immune or disconnected from the everyday. In a way\, some people in our social science research would like to say we do elite interviews\, we do interviews with the people who know. They are not disconnected. And that’s one of the points that I drive home with this. You have to engage with both because they are constantly in interaction. Nigeria is preparing for elections now and most of the money we use to fund the election will come on the back of motorpark touts and on the back of informal transport workers\, because the level of extortion on the road is escalated hugely in order to sort of\, you know\, find the money that is needed for these political parties to sort of have their way at the elections. So there’s a certain connection\, certain speculation and mutuality that if you don’t take anything away from this talk\, please take this: That there is a conviviality\, mutuality of corruption that one has to understand\, and then that the public and the private is not always as clear as you might believe in the policy world. And that policy\, the best policies are policies that allow the local to inform what you have. Not doing away with what you bring into the context. but being open to compliment that\, to expand and compliment.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you. I really like how you talk about flexibility\, adaptability and humility. Humility is just so important in this. We are not the expert with the answers\, but we’re going to come and we’re going to learn with that. We’re going to open up for questions. We’ll take questions in the room. If you have a question\, if you could raise your hand. Katelyn has a microphone that we’ll be passing around. For those of you on Zoom\, if you can put your questions in the chat\, Daniel here will be asking the questions on your behalf. When you ask your question\, please\, we’ll take three questions at a at a time\, please tell us your name\, the program\, and then you can ask your question. Thank you.   \n\n\nAttendee 1 Thank you very much\, Daniel. My name is Valeria. I’m an Italian researcher. I come from African studies\, and then I shifted into development activism. I’m here at CID as a research fellow\, and your research really reminds me the research of a dear friend of mine\, an Italian researcher who did a PhD in Oxford\, Matteo Rizzo\, who did research on the Dala Dala system in Tanzania. So and more or less the same methodology also engaged themselves directly\, became a conductor. And so my question to you is\, could you please comment with the comparative respective the systems that you are experiencing in Nigeria and the system in Tanzania or the matatu system\, which I experienced\, I lived for years in Nairobi. So I mean\, I use the matatu everyday. So what is the difference between these three contexts and systems of informal transportation? Thank you very much.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you.   \n\n\nAttendee 2 How are you doing? Yeah so it’s great hearing your insights because I grew up in a family of\, you know\, transporters. My dad was a transporter. And\, you know\, his slogan was gotten from [inaudible] you know so I definitely understand where you’re coming from. And I\, myself\, you know\, I’ve been into the transport sector where I’ve served as a driver and as a conductor. And\, you know\, I’ve also had the privilege of\, you know\, working directly with the driver\, you know\, for a couple of weeks because I was working and understanding the dynamics that happened. You know\, I could give you lots of interesting stories\, but\, you know\, if I’m just to go straight to one question\, it’s going to be like if you are to set just one policy\, you know\, around the whole transport sector\, what will you do?   \n\n\nAttendee 3 Hi\, Daniel\, thank you for your work. My name is Miguel. I’m from the Philippines. I am in the MPAID or International Development Program. I find your story of throwing off the official research plan very intriguing. I am just wondering how broadly transport advocates or activists in general and young researchers will be able to engage with policymakers or\, you know\, hierarchical state institutions\, especially when trying to explain the context that we are navigating in these spaces\, especially like with the emphasis on legibility\, quantitative data\, versus the approach of being able to understand these contexts\, being able to understand how the liminality of these spaces can’t just\, you can’t just have one linear cause of corruption however you define it.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. We’ll come back for another round.   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa Wonderful\, Valeria. Excellent question. Matteo Rizzo. Very familiar with this work\, of the work on the dala dala system in Tanzania\, which is also fascinating as a policy space. And I’ll come to that with the second question. But what’s the difference? Let me say the first difference is that\, so\, Matteo Rizzo is an Italian working in Tanzania\, and I’m not sure if he was a conductor. But if he was\, I’m sure our experiences were substantially different for the very reason that he would stand out. As in\, what is this a word for the white man? Whereas I would become anonymous within that sense\, which meant that. We had differential experience with how the stigma and the violence occurred. So I think that’s just\, and which which\, there’s a space for both\, right? In anthropology\, you have the etic and the emic\, the outside and inside a perspective. So we come in complementing each other in terms of the way in which we approach. But that’s sort of would be a difference in the sense that I blended in in a way enough to feel that my life was constantly being threatened and I didn’t really stand out. But\, you know\, there’s a lot one can talk about the geography of informal transports. You know\, people who are in Nairobi\, Kenya\, in Dar es Salaam\, in Kinshasa\, they can share a general understanding of corruption as being of informal transport workers\, as being just there to work as these workers who are stigmatized. So there’s across the board that aspect. In terms of difference\, there’s sense in which Lagosians always like to feel that they are exceptional. Nigerians always like to feel like this is one of the toughest places\, if not the toughest place in that sense\, in addition to the sense that they are also the giant\, they see themselves as the giant of Africa\, albeit a crippled giant. So they set that difference in terms of the broader sort of scope\, in terms of comparing Tanzania with Nigeria\, then Nigeria actually has this inflated sense of being the country. But at the same time\, they would defend fiercely their country\, especially when they are having a soccer match. But at the same time\, they are also very critical of themselves\, highly critical of themselves\, maybe in a way that you will not find in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. But I think there’s more that connects our research than separates us. For example\, Matteo Rizzo would find similar kinds of slogans like life is war in Tanzania\, as I would have found in Lagos. The Bus Rapid Transit system\, which was introduced by the World Bank to sort of clean up these undesirable spaces\, was also introduced in Tanzania. The difference being that in Tanzania they learned to work with them. Initially implemented without much participation from the the informal sector\, but over time has been\, indeed it will be regarded as one of the slight success stories in the sense of which you were able to work with informal transport workers to create sort of complementary lanes in the city in the way in which I don’t think Lagos has been successful at doing. So I think those would be the slight difference. But in all honesty there is a certain language of informal transport that cuts across\, I would say not even Africa. I think if you speak to people from Afghanistan\, you speak with people from Iraq\, from India\, they will tell you that this is also a similar kind of reality in such a way that we can speak about a global perception of informal transport workers\, sometimes also called paratransit workers. In fact\, people are moving away from paratransit and informal to popular transport\, sort of move away from this sort of illegal space within which they are planted. So that’s sort of my my perception of the work. And to come to the second question\, which is really interesting you talk about “Enemies label in vain” which tells you that there’s a battle that they are going into and there’s this sense in which there are a lot of enemies of progress on the road\, both physical and metaphysical enemies and so words themselves the Yoruba believe have power. So people speak. Those words are not just for display\, for reading the African city\, but they are also sort of an amulet\, something that protects them\, something that speaks power to their lives. So. So in that sense\, then you can already tell that this is a space that is filled with a lot of bad spirits\, bad energies as well as good energies\, and they have to compliment you. But going back to the area of policy\, I would say policy\, one policy that I would propose a policy that works with not against the flows of the city. So in that sense\, then let me give you a concrete example. Implementing the Bus Rapid Transit system initially in Lagos\, Lagos branded itself as a world class city\, as Africa’s Big Apple. And so they felt that this informal transport had no place in Africa. Had no place settling in a city that aspires to become a center of excellence. This was the same thing in Tanzania. This was the same thing in Nairobi\, in Addis Ababa\, in South Africa. There was a sense in which this is not something that we want to be associated with. A lot of the governors from Lagos\, Nairobi and the rest\, they come to MIT\, in the walls of Harvard trying to impose order on the chaos of their city. They are trying to make it planable and readable. But this is a fundamental policy flaw because in South Africa\, for example\, this fear of informal transport was sort of the first place where black capitalism emerged. The was fear of black agency\, the Kombes\, as they are called in South Africa\, was this fear in which black people could first become economically empowered and assert their agency within this dominant apartheid hegemonic system. So in that sense\, then I think when you do away with\, when you come in\, they are trying to replace and you are not flexible enough to learn from the local\, what you do is that you reproduce an image of Africa that comes to study it from what it is not rather than what it is. Via negative. And so from that\, via negative sort of approach\, Africa would always be something that emerges in the popular imaginary as a problem to be fixed. But we have to think beyond that as this as a space of fantasy\, of desire\, of imagination\, as scholars have reminded us. Right. And so when we come at it from that angle\, then a bus rapid transit project can look at the ways in which you could integrate these transport workers to routes that you are most efficient at running\, and then use the bus rapid transit to run the other routes. You wouldn’t come in and completely do away with these forms of transport and create it dedicatedly\, which is what happened in many of these African cities and say this is the Bus Rapid Transit lane. So then there was protests\, there was stoning of these bus rapid transit systems in Lagos when I was doing field work because they said they want a city that looks green\, that is beautiful\, technologically advanced\, that is modern\, but there is no room for multiple forms of modernity. There is no room for us\, the poor in this city. So this is what has happened and this is a kind of policy that fails to be flexible\, to see things in mutuality\, see things in mutuality rather than in separation. And those kind of policies will effectively fail. They always fail. The bus rapid transit now look like the informal transport workers because they have been run ragged. So essentially then it’s working with the flow of the city rather than against it and seeing this not as what it’s not\, but what it is. And building from there. I think that’s what I would say. And then the other question about how\, as young scholars\, how do you weave these spaces of illegibility into this legible space that we know? A classic example is the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index\, which goes on ranking countries and obviously African countries most of the time will find themselves at the bottom of the ranking. But this is based on perceptions that are always removed from the everyday. And so in that sense\, then you wonder if something so ingrained in society can be reduced to a single number and used to rank\, which is just ridiculous. So in that sense\, then you can ask them how far they have. You can look at the countries that have been ranked in the bottom since it started ranking and see if there has been any change. If there has not been any change\, just like they are no change between development\, developing and developed country. How many Africans since we started having development\, developing and developed\, how many African countries have made away from developing to developed? No\, because these systems are seen as a child that will never grow up. We are stunted. So they are\, woven into them is a rigidity. And so they need to be flexible\, not because I say\, because it’s not working for them and they are not respecting the changeability\, the variability that is part of the everyday experience from a lived perspective. So this is very important and these are the ways in which we can we can use that argument to sort of compel public policy option to not do away with their own approach\, which I think is important\, I’m not saying Transparency International Corruption Perception Index is not important. It puts pressure on and leads. And to that extent\, you know\, they want to do better. But I think ultimately it misses the point of the social engineering and social dynamics that is at the heart of corruption. And that’s what I would say.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. We’re going to take another round of questions. We’re going to start on Zoom this time. So\, Danny\, if you can. Those of you in the room\, if you could just raise your hands and then I can at least assign where. You don’t want to ask anymore? One\, two\, three. And then we’ll come back to you guys.   \n\n\nDaniel Barjum All right. We have two questions on zoom.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great.   \n\n\nDaniel Barjum First. Did you find a difference in the experience of transport operators from different ethnic groups or religious groups? And then. I find you’re interesting. Well\, the first one was Faisal Hamid. The second one from Monticello says\, I find your research interesting and your journey to document your experience a very brave undertaking. How do you think the role of unions like NURTW and RTEAN has contributed to a transmit of corruption in that sector.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Surely we have got Nigerians on Zoom who are asking very detailed questions. Thank you for your questions on Zoom. We’ll go to in the room. Microphones coming.   \n\n\nAttendee 4 Thank you\, Daniel. I love original research and this is an example of one. So congratulations for this. My name is Jamil and I am a mid-career student from the Harvard Kennedy School here\, and I’m the editor in chief of the Africa Policy Journal. I hope that we can publish something out of your work. I did my NYC\, the National Youth Service in Ogun State. I’m from Kano. So and I pass by Lagos sometimes and I’ve seen how difficult it is navigating the transport system. Which made your research even more interesting to me. Equally also\, I did my research on corruption and\, you know\, and I’m quite interested in the cultural context of corruption because I have heard you make a reference to Joseph Nye about\, you know\, the use of corruption\, you know\, the use of public office\, you know\, for private gain. So how do we create or how do we use a culturally\, you know\, defined notion of corruption within the Nigerian context or within an African context or within the developing countries context to understand corruption? And isn’t the lack of that understanding an impediment to the way\, you know\, we approach corruption?   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you.  \n\n\nAttendee 5 Hi\, I’m Kruti. I’m from the Education School\, and I’m learning more about policy right now\, but at heart will always be an educator. I’m also from India\, so no stranger to corruption. What I’ve experienced and what I heard you say as well was that we have this dialog about how corruption is bad\, but we go on perpetuating it by being part of it right in various ways. And that’s what we do in India as well. We keep telling our kids that all corruption is awful. You should be honest. We have this moral dialog with them\, but we also show them that this is how you get work done by bribing a government official to get things done. What I was wondering about was that\, how do we change that conversation about corruption\, similar to what he was also talking about? How do we change that conversation about corruption? And how do we talk to kids about it being a real issue. And because I think that changing the narrative for the next generation is really important to help them combat this problem. So what do you think about that?   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. And our final question.   \n\n\nAttendee 6 Thanks\, David. Sorry\, Daniel. I am Shruti\, am from the MPID program here at the Kennedy School. And I just wanted to take you back to the point that you made when you said that you’ve got to make\, you know\, you’ve got to learn to live with corruption. So I’m curious to know\, when you went into the process\, were you like a staunch optimist? You said\, you know\, waging war against corruption. And what was it that made you make peace with the fact that you got to live with it? And how did it\, like\, did it come about from your\, must have come about from your research but also from your experience is one of them. So I’m just curious to know the turning point there. I’m sorry for the name goof up.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you so much for the excellent questions. Daniel?   \n\n\nDaniel Agbiboa These are great questions. Where to start from? The first one on the ethnic sort of reading of city\, the religious dimension. The ethno religious register is something that registers quite powerfully in Nigeria. But in Lagos\, what’s interesting is that it’s almost like a struggle between the Yoruba as well as seen as the original owners of that land and Lagos being such a melting pot for people from different parts of Nigeria and more broadly West Africa and Central Africa\, that it’s often called no man’s land. So there’s that tension between that. But I think in the transport sector was where I saw sort of that nepotism\, that favoritism even among transport operators that the motorpark touts\, would have to collect more money from people who were seen as outsiders than they would from the bureaucrats who sort of spoke their language and were seen as children of the land\, omonile\, people of the land. So they would have that sort of favoritism or the level of conviviality would be a little bit more warm and then they would identify people like Igbos\, as we are called [unknown]\, which is almost derogatory\, people that are not from here. So there was that that aspect. But I think more broadly\, there was a mutuality around the frustration with corruption that cuts across ethnic identity in such a way then that for a change\, this was not a space that ethnicity and religiousness were dominant\, even though people would appeal individual slogans to\, I think that was where you saw sort of the non homogeneous nature of religion. So people would talk about Christianity\, people would appeal to Islam\, their own traditional religion\, for protection. But I think in terms of the the feeling around corruption and its impact on them\, there was a shared nature that cuts across ethnicity in Nigeria. So that wasn’t prominent\, perhaps because Lagos has been sort of normalized and popular imaginary as being this no man’s land\, in this place where it doesn’t really. And that’s perhaps a very\, that’s a problem because being historicized and hence there’s need for more scholars who historicize this is space and ensure that this is not just something that is rendered anonymous. We always have a history and this is partly what you’re advised to try to do. The whole aspect of the the union? The role of the union. It’s really it’s funny because there’s barely any book about the National Union of Road Transport\, which is shocking because it’s a union that dominates everyday life so much and you don’t have anything\, perhaps because we’ve been socialized to think that this is a no go area\, you don’t deal with the union. It’s almost like a mafia like space where people\, you know\, life itself is very\, very short. So you don’t want to dabble into this space. So there’s this sense in which\, and the union is not just a puppet of the states co-opted by the state to co-opt the state. In many ways they are the own agents. Nobody co-ops the union. So in that sense that the relationship between the union and the states is that of cooperation and conflict. That has always sort of this shifting mutuality that has always and it’s that creative tension that has always kept them going. They have managed to avoid any kind of reform. Even when Lagos was praised for being one of the most progressive cities in Africa in the early 2000s\, you know\, doing away with all sort of informal sector\, the transport sector managed to evade that kind of reform. And they knew it because I was talking to them\, say\, nobody is taking us away from anywhere. In fact\, there they are names [unknown]\, which is children of the government. So they they are regarded\, they are owners of their land. And they said nobody is holding us here. And there’s sort of the performance rhetoric where the state puts out the rhetoric of reform or they tell us that actually they will be here long after that reform has expired. So so they they states. And so if you want to call it an entrenchment of corruption\, that’s one way to put it. Or you can just say it’s the way in which fear\, the fear imposed by union now governs everyday life. So fear has become a way of life in that in that sector\, in such a way then that when you’re an outsider coming in\, when I initially came in\, you know\, I did not understand the language of that space\, and I had become removed from the language of that space that\, you know\, after a while I started to understand what was going on here\, that there was a certain mutuality and you knew there was a mutuality from looking at the money. Like\, where does this money go to? Right? The money is distributed in a sort of a trickle up mentality that goes to the local government\, goes to the police officer\, goes to the party officials. You know\, there’s this circulation. There’s a whole distribution of what Nigerians call the national cake. It’s for sharing\, it is for distributing among all the party holders. In that sense\, then that’s both the party holders\, both the police officers\, both the union officials\, they are all in a precarious position. They need each other in this sort of partnership that is essential to survival in that particular space. So there’s that sense in which entrenchment can figure in the relationship between the union and the states. And there’s the whole aspect of the culturally defined notion of understanding corruption and how it can maybe inform policy. I think\, as I answered earlier\, I think there’s is a sense in which even policymakers are beginning to recognize that for all the anti corruption movement that has happened in Nigeria\, you cannot meet any Nigerian who would say we are less corrupt now than we were before\, which says that there’s something not quite right about it. And culturally\, and I like to say critically cultural\, because there’s a sense in which elites sometimes abuse the notion of cultural to be primordial and say\, well\, gift giving\, bribe\, what you call bribe is gift giving\, this is how we do things here. I think that is not at all how I’m using it. And I spend a lot of pages trying to deconstruct the notions of culture and how it is used and abused in that sense. That’s not what I mean. I mean\, corruption is a global phenomenon that has to be understood in its local context. So there’s a sense in which we can speak of corruption\, but there’s also a sense in which we have to understand the language of corruption. And it’s not just a language of stateness\, it’s also a language of societies\, a language of a dance between state and society. And I think the societal element\, street logic is something that’s not always been there\, because anthropologists come and study this street level\, political scientists come and study the politics at the state level. And perhaps maybe you need development scholars to look at how the street and the state combines and circulates and not demarcates petty corruption from grand corruption and political. It doesn’t make sense. Because actually the corruption that people feel most aggrieved about is not the one that is noted by leaders with somewhat abstract. It is the one that they experience right after they leave their door and their house is on the queue in the checkpoint. Those are the ones that they feel particularly angry about. So one has to bring that in. So there’s also the whole aspect of the paradox of corruption\, which was raised using India. And India\, the literature in India is one that I have found a kindred spirit in. I’m thinking about the work of Akhil Gupta on the blurred boundaries of the state. And he says not just in India\, but on the post-colonial societies\, the fact that a formal state\, street level bureaucrats like the police\, often are not found in their offices. They are found\, you know\, in the informal spaces in such a way\, then that completely blows that. And the question\, I guess\, that I always ask and this also goes into this the other question is what is the incentive of political leaders to change a system that benefits them? Why would they want to change it? And I’ve never really found a convincing answer for it\, because this is a system that that benefits the people in positions of power and a sense almost like a deliberate sense in which police officers\, for example\, they see a whole literature that they are underpaid. But it’s also a sense in which they they lobby to find themselves in lucrative spaces where they can exploit money from these these offices. And it reminds me of the work by one of the Indian scholars\, Anand\, who talks about a hydraulics city in India\, where he talks about how water pipes are deliberately left to leak because people\, because in a way\, the leaky water pipes become tap water and not protest against the states. And so they see sort of a leakyness around the whole idea of the state itself. So I think that’s that’s the paradox at the heart of corruption\, about the question of political will and public choice and why people want to change a system that actually they get so much from. And I think this is a challenge that I still try to figure out. But I think the staunch optimist\, I went into the field being a staunch optimist. Yes. I left feeling like I was a cruel optimist\, knowing that I was wedded to a system that ultimately hurts the people I know and hurts the people that I don’t know. But I think that the movement\, the EndSARS movement against police brutality tells us that there’s a new generation that is rejecting this normality of corruption\, this fact that we should live with it as a way of life. This fact that this is how it is. Something that we are critiquing past generations for doing. And I think that comes with a lot of hope that is not maybe cruel optimist but maybe informed optimists. Optimists that want\, are pushing their government to be more accountable and more responsive. And I’ll give you an example quickly from the field that when I was in the field\, transport operators who had been removed from the center of the city to the margins to make way for the bus rapid transit systems\, which are supposed to be icons of the modern\, took the state to court. They took the state to court because they were angry that\, they were trying to assert their right to the city\, which essentially is the right to be part of decision making processes that affect their lives. And initially won the case in court. So we see ways in which the informal is appealing to the law to sort of reclaim their rights and not always true forms that are seen as non-conventional\, violence and the like. So there are all these spaces there. But I think before we can even answer that problem\, we need to understand what the problem is. And we need to\, so before we can move to this space of fixing this issue\, we need to avoid just seeing it as a problem from the understanding. Let’s understand what this problem is and what is happening here\, because as I argue\, there’s a vulnerability at the heart of corruption\, because all these actors\, if you look at it\, starting with my parents\, if you just look at it from the point of view of the workers\, then you miss the precariousness that is part of the ownership dimension. If you just look at corruption for the part of the state\, you miss the local dimension of it. So if we understand that aspect\, then maybe we can build policies that are not just inclusive because there’s a division between inclusion and exclusion. And sometimes it’s not a matter of black or white or inclusion exclusion. It’s the terms under which people are included\, because you can be included in policies in the way that do damage to you. What some scholars called adverse incorporation. So we need to look at attempts on which this transport operators are allowed to work in the city\, but they don’t make their way in any sort of formal constitutional document in many African countries. So in a sense then they are part of this space\, this necropolitical space where they are allowed to die. They could be exploited\, their lives are disposable\, but at the same time the government has not properly recognized them as right-bearing persons. They are not incorporated. They are mere danglers in this space\, as the African philosopher Feynman puts it. So it’s a case of trying first to understand this phenomenon called corruption\, and to understand that to move beyond this as a single phenomenon\, because we’re using the English language here to try to see what is the language of corruption in this local context. I said there are 520 something languages in Lagos and I would like to know which one defines corruption single with one line or two lines. I don’t see it. So. So if that is the case\, then why are we talking about the same thing when we talk about corruption? And if we’re not sure we’re talking about the same thing\, where does our ranking come from and who is doing these rankings. And you can ask the same questions and to scale it up to developments\, developing\, public\, private\, and you can find a whole lot of modern\, pre-modern\, a whole lot of problems\, a whole lot of leaky concept that we need to deconstruct. Not throw away the baby with the bathwater\, but deconstruct and make sure that we are we’re dealing with it from a flexible sort of approach.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful. Thank you very much. With that\, I think we’re going to end this talk. For those of you would like to stay back and have a conversation\, we can do that. But thank you very much\, Daniel. I think particularly I really liked this unpacking corruption because it is often thought of as a black and white thing\, which it is not. Right. Petty versus grand versus public versus private. These are all in the classroom\, things that are easy to teach. And then you go live your real life where everything is blurred. And I think your book really is a contribution in helping you understand the life in the blur of all of these phases. So thank you very much for being with us. We can give him a round of applause. Thank you.  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nThe informal transportation network\, characteristic of many African cities\, is notoriously dangerous. In Lagos\, drivers are constantly threatened and forced to pay bribes; they suffer health problems like hypertension and partial blindness\, and accidents are common. Fear is a form of governance. The police and the union extract money from transport drivers and share it with each other. The money passes up the ranks\, to the union authorities and to political leaders.  \n\n\n\nIn this book talk\, you will hear about the author’s first-hand experience as a minibus conductor in Lagos as a way to better understand the culture and complexity of corruption\, and learn more about how such a harrowing and corrupt system can endure. \n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/they-eat-our-sweat-transport-labor-corruption-and-survival-in-urban-nigeria/
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SUMMARY:From Elections to Governing: Getting Beyond Politics to Get Things Done
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\nSteve Kadish\, co-author of “Results: Getting Beyond Politics to Get Important Work Done” \n\n\n\nSteve Kadish has just stepped down after five years as a Senior Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local Government. Previously\, Kadish served as Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker’s first Chief of Staff\, where he helped shape and implement policy and operational improvements in key state agencies\, working with the Governor’s cabinet\, Massachusetts state legislature\, and external stakeholders. Steve and Governor Baker co-authored: Results Getting Beyond Politics to Get Important Work Done A Leader’s Guide to Executing Change and Delivering Results\, published in May 2022. \n\n\n\nPrior to this appointment\, Kadish served in a number of roles in the public and private sectors\, including Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at Northeastern University\, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at Dartmouth College\, Director of Global Health Equity at Brigham and Women’s Hospital\, Massachusetts Undersecretary for Health & Human Services\, Massachusetts Assistant Secretary for Administration and Finance\, Senior Vice President for Administration at Harvard Pilgrim Health Care\, Associate Vice Chancellor of Operations at UMass Medical School\, and Assistant Commissioner for Operations at Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance (Medicaid). \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome. We are so excited to have you at our fourth and final Building State Capability Event series for this semester. And we have some pages outside with QR codes where you can learn more about Building State Capability\, our events\, who we are\, what we do\, etc. Our tagline is Resolving Public Problems with purpose. So you can imagine my delight when I picked up this book results earlier. I think I heard it on NPR that Governor Baker had written a book about results\, and I thought\, That’s interesting. And so I looked it up and I was like\, This actually sounds very interesting. I’m going to buy it. I bought it. I actually took it on a vacation to Europe. I kid you not and I read the entire thing and it was like music to my ears because here was a group of people we’d never met in the state that we live in buildings. That capability has been around for more than a decade. We’ve never met each other so close and had such similar approaches to doing implementation and solving complex public problems. So we’re delighted to have Steve here today. I’m just going to read a little bit of bio of Steve. Steve Kadish has been the senior research fellow at the Center for State and Local Government here at us for five years. And previously\, he served as the Massachusetts Governor\, Charlie Baker’s first chief of staff\, where he helped shape and implement policy and operational improvements in key state agencies working with the governor’s cabinet\, Massachusetts State Legislature and the external stakeholders. Steve and Governor Baker have coauthored this book Results: Getting Beyond Politics Important Work Done A Leader’s Guide to Executing Change and Delivering Results. It was published in May 2022. Prior to this appointment. He has served in a number of roles in the public and private sectors\, including senior vice president and chief operating officer at Northeastern University. Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at Dartmouth College. Director of Global Health Equity at Brigham and Women’s Hospital\, Massachusetts Undersecretary for Health and Human Services. Massachusetts Assistant Secretary for Administration and Finance. Senior Vice President for Administration at Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare. And I think that’s where you work with Governor Baker. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Four or five times\, actually\, through those through those through those positions where it looks like I couldn’t hold a job. \n\n\nSalimah Samji So the associate vice chancellor of operations at UMass Medical School and Assistant Commissioner for operations at Massachusetts\, Division of Medical Assistance\, Medicaid. We are so delighted to have you here\, Steve\, and we’re excited to hear your talk. Welcome. Give him a loud round of applause. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Can everybody hear me? Okay\, great. If anybody can’t hear me\, wave. Okay. I intend to talk softly\, so I’m going to practice speaking loudly. I am delighted to be here. I am so impressed that you guys are here on the last day of classes as I’m walking around. It seems very quiet and I thought\, oh\, no\, but here you are. I am\, I have about a 35-minute presentation that I’m going to race through which I’ll make the…the…the PowerPoint available to you. And you see my contact information there. If you have a question or if there’s a follow-up that you want to do\, write me and tell me. Tell me who you are so that I have some idea of where the connection was made. So without further ado\, I’m going to\, I’m going to walk you through\, I’m going to run you\, I’m going to jog you through the slides. And we can always come back at any point. This will allow us time for questions. So\, so\, so\, so\, so. Here we go. I’m just going to move this chair a bit. So I start here and I know that folks are both domestic in the United States and international\, but this book is not about political results. This book is about programmatic operational results that help individuals\, families\, communities really thrive. And we love this quote. Let us not seek the Republican answer or the Democratic answer\, but the right answer. Let us not seek to fix blame for the past. Let us accept our own responsibility for the future. John F Kennedy. So for us\, this vote is strongly\, strongly\, strongly nonpartizan and that’s not what not what it’s about. So here’s me. You can see Governor Baker. This was in January 2015. Interesting time\, right? This is the time of gubernatorial transitions. I don’t know if any of you all are helping with any of the gubernatorial transitions or or following them. This had to have been in the first couple of days that we were in office. So why am I starting with this picture? Well\, first\, Governor Baker’s about six\, five\, six\, six. He’s this very tall man. He is a lifelong Republican. I’m not as tall. I’m a lifelong Democrat. So the fact that Governor Baker asked a Democrat to be his chief of staff to start with was incredibly unusual. I wasn’t involved in his campaign. Yes\, I did a donation and made some phone calls for him. But I wasn’t a campaign operative. \n\n\nSteve Kadish I had worked together up until this time\, three or four other times\, both in in in the public sector and in the private sector. And I served as his chief of staff for about two and a half\, close to three years. And as I was stepping down\, we talked and we talked about writing a book\, and we wanted to write a book about how we had approached things and we had shared. Other books\, other monographs\, other articles over a 30\, 30 year period about how to do things. Every single one of these articles\, books that we shared\, they were private sector books\, and they were they were interesting and they were good\, but they all required a translation from the private sector to the public sector. So the purpose of this book\, our idea about this book was to write a book about how to do things in the public sector\, not a not a translation of how things work in the private sector\, but to write it from our experience\, which was both public and private sector or for the public sector. So we wrote this book for public sector leaders\, by public sector leaders\, and it’s about improving public sector services. The book started off as a book about how and it fundamentally is a book about how to accomplish things. When the January Six riots occurred in Washington\, D.C.\, we actually asked ourselves\, did the book make sense anymore? And we…we…Thought that we doubled back on it and said if there are strong public sector services\, that in a way is a contract between the citizenry and the government about delivering things. So we wanted the book to be a book about not only how\, but also about hope. So now I’m going to go through the results framework. There are four parts to the results framework. People or policy. Follow the facts. Focus on how push for results. There may be a quiz at the end. So take note. So\, but these are the four pieces. The book is written in two parts. The first part of the book takes each one of these major precepts\, describes what they’re about\, uses some examples\, and then we have tips\, tools and tactics throughout\, and I grab a couple of them here. The second part of the book is our four case studies. One is on the Health Connector\, a way to access health care in Massachusetts. The other is on transportation. A third is on the Department of Children and Families. And I’m going to spend some time there. And the fourth is on COVID and the co-op. I think they’re all interesting. I know several people have read that through all of them. The COVID chapter may be especially interesting because it has to be one of the first times of a sitting an elected official actually writing about what was happening with COVID. \n\n\nSteve Kadish So so here we go. We always start with people in policy. And it may sound. Funny\, but this was a learned thing. We were such fact geeks that we would focus on facts\, assume that the facts would tell us about ways about the problems to solve\, and then go at it. But it became clear to us\, through both successes and failures\, that if you did not have the people in place to start\, you did not have the capacity actually to act. So we always start with people or policy. We start here to assure that you have the capacity to act. We will actually. We have stopped stop the start of some things until we’ve had a core group of people identify. This is about selecting the leader who is responsible and the team. And it’s about selecting people who have the knowledge about what to do and importantly\, the know. How about doing it? We like to construct teams and approaches that include both current staff and new staff\, especially when you’re tackling existing problems\, when you’re tackling existing problems. They’re there for a reason and the current staff may be okay at identifying the problems\, but they just may not have been able to actually figure out what to do. Bring in new folks\, new ideas\, new approaches\, and the constructive tension there is incredibly important. I I’ve really come to appreciate the concept of a dedicated team on a project\, and dedicated doesn’t mean that I am personally committed to it. Dedicated means that you’re 120% focused on that and really not anything else. And I can talk about that more. But the concept of a dedicated project team on a project helping to pull together various pieces has been a critical piece in our success. A second piece of you have people are policy. The second precept is backs. There are two kinds of facts that we look at and facts for us. Define the problem. We look at these two kinds of facts to define the problem. First\, and you hope this is true\, particularly in the public sector\, but in general. But it’s it’s not. We call it data evidence. And it’s the reports\, the budget\, the the current staff\, the program descriptions. It’s the hard stuff you can read or or view and if there are performance metrics there as well. The second part of follow with facts are points of pain. And this was actually a. A learned activity for both Governor Baker and I as we were so hard data oriented that we it wasn’t until we actually were back in the private sector. We’re working for a health health company where we spent time with the medical providers\, the our our our customers and the people who are getting the health insurance to understand what their problems were. And what this did for us was flipped the focus\, as opposed to being hard data driven\, to being focused on the customer\, to be focused on the individual and to hear those stories and to honor those stories. And the combination of both that that that hard data and the points of pain together were providing an incredibly important perspective of what is the problem to solve. We look at both of these. We think that both of these are important. I’m going to do two tips. As I said in the book\, there are maybe a dozen or so tips\, tools and tactics. They’re called out. I’ve had folks that have read the book to say\, I have literally copying this this tip\, and we’re we’re now using it in our work. This tip is an interesting one and it can be used anywhere. I just use this in another class at Ohio State University\, a class of nurses. And we were talking about COVID\, and I wanted them to talk about their experience experiences. But the idea of this is with the leaders in the room and the other folks that are involved in the project is to literally go around the table\, around the room\, either at the beginning of a project to identify what are the points of pain. Or as a project is going on at the end of a meeting\, a project status meeting\, so that somebody could say\, I don’t understand what that point is. Or\, Yes\, we said that was accomplished\, but there’s still a gap between what that is done and this is done. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Or somebody could say\, I’m still looking for X or a celebration\, but the idea of around the table and it’s it’s anti hierarchical and it throws lots of leaders off. But the leaders that do use that\, it’s incredibly empowering for the entire team and it would be literally would be if we had more time. And if I were to ask you. And I’m going to do I’m getting to green kind of thing. It would be literally going around the room and saying\, How do you approach X or what? What do you what do you think about what we just talked about? Or if we’re talking about an issue\, what do you think the point of pain is either personally or what you or what you’ve heard? But the round the table is something that I strongly encourage you to do. And it’s incredibly empowering for leaders and for teams and getting something done. And it’s something you can build into the agenda and there’s a little bit more about how to do it in the book. The second tip that I have for you and Charlie Baker\, Governor Baker is great at this\, and it’s too often organizations just listen to what’s inside their organization\, whether it is the the reports inside their organization\, the individuals inside the organization\, but getting\, quote unquote\, out of the tower\, out of the Kennedy School\, out of out of your organization. It’s literally getting out of the office\, talking and listening to people\, going beyond internal reports\, seeking peer data\, making site visits\, and. There’s nothing like it. There’s nothing like a conversation with the folks that you’re working with\, a partner that you’re working with\, going\, visiting an office\, etc.. And so these two things are incredibly important about the facts\, but they’re also important to help you determine what the problems are. So the first precept of the results framework are people are policy. The second is follow the facts. This is the third focus on how and. \n\n\nSteve Kadish This. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Was really the initial core of the book of where we started and where we realized we intuitively do this. So how do you set it up and what comes after? But the focus on how is the. It’s the it’s the requirement to have a structure to approach your work. It’s not enough to have good people. It’s not enough to have a good understanding of the facts. It’s not enough to have money. But it’s it’s the requirement that you actually have an approach in terms of how are you actually going to deliver the new program\, solve the problem\, solve the problem. And on and so we use that. I’ll talk about the work management triangle in a minute. We always now when we’re tackling a major issue is create some kind of dedicated team. I’ve been focused on project management in a variety of forms. I’m a big believer in that. There’s a variety of ways to do that. I’m going to talk a little bit about Agile Scrum and particularly a daily scrum\, if you’re not familiar with it\, if you find it an interesting tool. And I’ll end here with the focus on how it’s not enough for a good team to be working on something. It’s so important for that team to have regular reports into the leadership in crisis situations. I’ve been involved in regular reporting where there were four times a day where there was reporting other\, sometimes twice a day\, more often once a day or once. If it’s less than once a week\, you’re not moving urgently enough. And the reason you have these leadership reviews is not only to quickly do project status update in terms of what’s going on\, but importantly\, it’s to describe where you might not things might not be going well\, where you’ve hit a roadblock and what needs to be done. And the idea of these leadership reviews is to engage the leadership to as quickly as possible\, make decisions to move these things along. So there are two parts of. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Of. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Focus on how the what to do. And that is often where\, honestly\, a lot of the Kennedy School and a lot of government get stuck or done with good stuff. They stop. It’s the announcement. It’s the drafting of a law. It’s the budget. It’s all really\, really important stuff. But the work is not completed until you focus on the how to do it\, because you need both. And we emphasize. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Both what. \n\n\nSteve Kadish To do because that provides the guidance and how to do it. And I hope these diagrams work. But my thought here is\, is that too often politicians\, government sector focuses on the what and on the announcement of the budget and the law and so forth. And if you were to diagram that a little bit on the why\, some on the what and then a little bit on the how\, and that’s a diamond set and you could easily tip that over in too often it does tip over\, but if you build your work on a foundation of a strong Y\, which is a lot of the idea piece which I think Salima can speak to\, but with building state capacity can speak to a strong word. But most of your energy resources intelligence is on the how are you going to stand the best chance of succeeding? So there’s something in project management work or in your work\, which you probably do intuitively\, but but we call it out. We call it the work management triangle. And there’s three pieces to this scope. What are you trying to do? Time and then? Resources. Now\, I approached the the work management triangle for a couple of decades. Plus I’m focused on scope and I would I would spend all this time developing what the problems were and an incredible. With detailed plans about how to resolve them. That almost always took a year or two or three years and. I thought I was pretty good at it. My success rate was maybe 5050. And and coming into this administration eight years ago now\, we\, we we decided to flip and approach things within an agile scrum way. And we started to focus on time as the first thing. And then what could you get done within that period of time? So it’s flipping the work\, the work management triangle on its head and starting with time. In some cases\, Governor Baker would say would say\, you’ve got two weeks to do this or you have 45 days to do this. It was so energizing. It broke through a whole bunch of. No crap\, actually\, in terms of getting things done\, it really helped things help help people focus. And it wasn’t to say that you were getting a year’s worth or two or three years worth of work done in that 45 day period. It was the start of a series of releases\, but you were getting the most important thing done to solve the problem and starting to make progress. So this is a really important concept that I would like to stress with you. One is people\, another is the dedicated project team and this idea of leadership reviews and then starting time. So I’ve been alluding to this concept of a release now of our phones. Right. They they have releases our laptops\, they have releases technology uses releases. All releases have bugs\, but they have dates when they when they’re when there’s a new set of functions and they go out. We started to approach our work in a series of releases\, time based. At. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Most typically 6 to 12 weeks\, depending upon what was going on a couple of times\, just two week periods. And then did did a project project management approach. You can see here some of the things that we did that were important in terms of breaking the work and the work problem down into Workstreams and then within the Workstreams\, having dedicated teams to those Workstreams and that they had deliverables that they needed to get done during a certain period of time. Very powerful. Another way to use time as an urgent tool. So this is the last element of of the framework. So you have people are policy\, right? Then follow the facts. Then focus on how to push for results. And push for results is about actual measurement of performance. I love this quote from John. John Wooden\, who was a famous college basketball coach in the sixties or 70 here in the United States. Never mistake activity for achievement. Your your emails\, your text\, your messages\, your meetings. That isn’t the same thing as actually getting things done. And so we focus on performance metrics and we focus on a red\, yellow\, green in terms of project status. We’re going to talk about why we. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Ask you. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Not to distrust averages. Whenever somebody says the average is\, is is X\, we almost always roll our eyes and then we go\, go\, go at it. I talked about the importance of discussing things in leadership reviews. And then this last point is the most important point. Besides actual measurement. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Of. \n\n\nSpeaker 4 The performance metrics\, it’s measure. See what’s there\, honestly and objectively\, evaluate it\, make adjustments\, and then do it again. And so the idea that a budget\, a law\, a program rollout is perfect when it rolls out is is a crazy notion. But\, I mean\, that’s how that’s how I thought. And it’s it’s typical for how the public thinks. And I think many leaders and managers think. But the power of acknowledging that. Get it started. Tackle it. Be measured the results and be honest about the adjustments that need to be made is very powerful. So we use a green\, yellow\, red methodology over and over again. Green means that the deliverable is going to happen on time. Yellow means that the team thinks that they’re going to hit the deliverable on the date. But there are issues and they’re flagging the yellow and red means that they there’s no way that they’re going to be able to accomplish the deliverable by the date set. And so red\, yellow\, green isn’t a nice feeling about how you’re doing it. It’s\, it’s whether you are going to meet the deliverable date deliverable by date certain. So it’s it’s a hard it’s a hard measure and red and it’s really hard for all of you in credit. You all are brilliant. Every single one of you\, you’re all tops. And what you guys do\, it’s really hard for you guys to say\, Guess what? Three elements of my project are red. You want to tell that to your boss? You want to tell that to the commissioner? You want to tell that to the governor? Really\, really hard to do. And so you might squash that yellow or try to move out a date and so forth. And so we it’s really important to be as honest and objective as you can. And you guys who are either leaders today or will be leaders is to create an environment where it’s okay for people to say\, my project isn’t all great. There are three issues that need to be dealt with. I need we need help. Our team needs help. An important and important thing. So I want to start I’m going to spend maybe six or seven\, maybe a little longer minutes on talking about the Department of Children and Families and. \n\n\nSteve Kadish I had. When I had this. \n\n\nSteve Kadish And I had a standing desk. And when I was in the governor’s office and I had this on my wall\, it’s this front page of the Boston Globe. Her name was Bella. I’ll describe what this is. But I was the chief of staff of the governor. I had the governor’s office on one side of me\, the lieutenant governor’s office on another side of me and all the lobbyists and the big power people that would come in. This would have been one of the first things that they saw. And it’s it is a tragedy. \n\n\nSpeaker 3 And but. \n\n\nSpeaker 4 But powerful. On Thursday\, June 25th\, 2015. So this is six months after Governor Baker took office\, right? 2015. A woman in Winthrop\, a coastal town just north of Boston\, made a horror discovery. She was walking her dog along the shoreline of Deer Island when she found an object that concerned dirt. And she called 911 the emergency hotline. The Massachusetts State Police uncovered the remains of a girl of a toddler age. And it was just horrific in terms of how this child was found. The news was stunning. As a community\, we had not yet recovered from the loss of Jeremiah Oliver one year earlier\, who was also found in her. In a suitcase along the highway. Just horrible. Now\, this the hunt for more information about Baby Doe. Drove national news stories throughout the summer. What happened to this innocent child would hang like a dark cloud over us. Well\, Baby Doe was Bella. So throughout the summer\, we would hear police announcements and calls about or rumors about Baby Doe. And on this day in September\, the Globe blasts this. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Headline. For her. Her name was Bella. By then Governor Baker had asked me to work with the team at DCF on a on a turnaround\, and that’s it. I said\, I’m going to talk about because it’s quite\, quite powerful and quite dramatic. So the…the that the leadership at the Department of Children and Families was responsible for at that time about 45\,000 children and their families in the most difficult circumstances. Linda Spears\, she’s one of my all time heroes\, and she has stayed with DCF for the entire eight years. And I hope that the new governor has the wisdom to keep her on. But we we we approach the work this way. We tackled it from a governance point of view. An executive team led by Commissioner Spears and Agency Improvement Leadership Team\, which you talk about in the book\, this included for the first time\, most most state agencies have a central office which sends out dictates to the local offices about what to do\, and there needs to be that. This was the first time in people’s memory that there was a turnaround effort at the agency that included both the central office leadership and the local office and regional leadership. A dedicated project team\, a release based project method\, agile scrum\, which I’ll get to get into Green\, which I’ll get to project management updates and then these five workstreams and then there were regular leadership reviews. We started three times a week and then went to twice a week. And one of the things that was interesting after after almost every single one at the end\, almost every single one of our leadership reviews after people went through their red\, yellow\, green status\, and we went through the metrics for each of those five things. Commissioner Spears let around the table. And it was this incredibly powerful\, sometimes emotional\, emotional experience. So many folks are familiar with Agile Scrum. Okay. \n\n\nSteve Kadish So you know what the daily scrum is at DCF. So DCF part of the children and families\, they’re not technical people\, they’re not policy people. They are social workers. They like to talk through stuff they like processes. The idea that they were willing to embrace something like Agile Scrum and a daily scrum\, they ended up doing it about three times a week\, not daily\, but follow these precepts was incredibly powerful. Now\, for each one of these five areas\, people\, people\, policy and practice\, people management\, structure\, metrics and reporting and communication\, think about those as the workstreams. And for each of them there was there was a single release date and that. We. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Wanted to make sure that each of these got launched in a way to succeed. We call that getting a green. And so a clear objective scope is to find the product backlog and sprint backlog are our terms with that. You guys who are familiar with Agile Scrum would know about whether there was a communications plan and whether there were metrics defined. So those six elements\, if they were green\, we thought we had a chance to succeed right at the beginning. So here’s an example of the report that each one of those five or six workstreams did the objective\, the scope\, the Sprint backlog\, the product backlog\, communications and metrics. There’s an example. So here’s an example of this is an agency\, the Department of Children and Families\, that to make a single hire\, it would take six months to a year to write. A policy would take several years. We were now asking this agency to hire hundreds of people\, develop. At least a couple of policies immediately\, if not every few months. So here is that this effort started in the middle of September. Here is the status update to the Agency Improvement Leadership team for October one. Two weeks later. It’s going to be hard for you to read\, but clearer about their objective. But I love this. Right. They had a goal of. By. Uh. November\, they had a goal of \n\n\nSteve Kadish Of posting 200 positions. Now\, this is an agency that is going to repeat. It would take them months to to hire people to post and to get 200 people hired was an amazing thing. And so so the people task force had these key tasks. And I love that this one is green. Within two weeks\, they had 83 positions posted and they were so ecstatic about it that at the of that at the leadership review team meeting\, they took this picture and posted it because they wanted to say\, we’re not just bluffing. We’ve actually posted these positions. And it was just a moment where\, as you could imagine\, everyone started clapping. So. ECF use the release. This release process release one was heavily focused on two major policies posting mace positions\, restoring a management region. And that was about ten weeks\, nine weeks from the middle of September to Thanksgiving. But now. Release two was focused on more stuff requires its first medical director and that was two more policies continued the onboarding and that was for March and then more hiring new medical social workers which hadn’t existed before a major foster parent recruitment effort. And then this last item I want to spend a minute on\, and this is that 95% of ongoing social workers have fewer than 20 families in their caseload. So in March. of 2016. So this is we started this effort in September 2015. This is six or so months later. That. \n\n\nSteve Kadish We had we had kept hearing that the caseload for social workers was a problem now. But the mean. Or the median for for social workers was 18 or 19. And so if the goal was to have a caseworker to have 16\, when Governor Baker and I and Secretary heard that the number was 18 or 19\, you think it’s not bad. But we kept hearing from social workers\, the union families\, is that people had crazy caseloads. So this is one of the things that this chart did not exist before Governor Baker insisted upon it. He said\, okay\, break down this\, break down the median median by every single social worker. So what this chart represents is this all line in the middle yellow is that there are 186 social workers who have a caseload of 19. Here there are 96 caseworkers who have a caseload of 22. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Six\, 60. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Caseworkers with a caseload of 24. So it’s green\, yellow\, red. So anything that was 16 or below was green\, 16 to 20 was yellow. And it was over that. That’s a dangerous situation for the kids. And so what you had is 42% of the social workers with a caseload not of more than 16\, but of more than 20\, a dangerous situation. No wonder so many bad things were happening. \n\n\nSteve Kadish So jump. Are. \n\n\nSteve Kadish So 18 months later\, something like that to 2017th August 2017 from March 2016. And you see\, what’s the median read? Good\, right. That’s what you want it. Then when you break it down again\, there were only 11% of the social workers that had more than 20 cases. Dramatic improvement for the kids and for their families almost. So this is a data now which we can go over. You guys can go over and take a look at in terms of what was accomplished with DCF from September 2015 to the end of December 2017. It’s quite remarkable and the work continues. But I wanted to end with a couple of quotes. This woman\, Mary McGeown\, is the executive director of the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. When there was a major incident that happened. Just a couple of years ago where it looked like that the Department of Children and Families had failed to take care of a couple of children with disabilities. This was Mary’s quote. And she said\, you know\, this is a different agency. It’s a it’s a different way\, the way they work. They when they say they’re going to get something done\, they do. And this is a quote in the Globe. If I could change just one thing\, I think we should stop referring to it as reforming the department. That suggests there’s going to be an end. Our child welfare system needs to be continually enhanced. This is true for all of our work in terms of no matter what it is. But to have an advocate come out and say\, this is so important. And then finally. One of the greatest humans to walk on this earth in 100 years. Plus\, we will use this quote in our book. But a similar thing to Mary McGeown\, but more eloquent. After climbing a great hill and he climbed many great hills\, one only finds there are many more to climb. And I close with this a story in the. \n\n\nSteve Kadish You know. \n\n\nSteve Kadish I don’t know if anybody’s written a book. It’s a bear. But at the end\, the publisher says\, okay\, now you have a chance to write. The dedication is for or career acknowledging. And so we had two versions. One was to the folks that are doing the work and the other was to our spouses and Governor Baker and I going back and forth on the phone. And so long story short\, he says\, you know what? This is our chance to actually dedicate the book to the. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Folks. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Who are doing the work. And we will acknowledge our spouses\, as we did in the acknowledgments piece. But this is for you guys. To those who believe in public service\, in the good it must do\, and who constantly strive to deliver on its promise\, that is that’s the show. So I don’t know how long that took. So I apologize. \n\n\nSalimah Samji No worries at all. Thank you very much. So we’re now going to turn to questions and answers. But before we do that\, I just wanted to comment on how incredible this was and some things\, you know\, you talk about releases\, you talk about short sprints. And in media we call them iteration. Yes. So everything is an iteration. The tighter the better. But it has very similar flavors\, which is why I was so excited when I did read your book. And I think your when I read your book\, the\, the Red\, Green and Yellow\, what I found really empowering because you’ve seen these kinds of either checklists or dashboards and people just misuse them because you want to be in the green. But what I really like that you guys did differently is create the safe space to be able to put something Red\, because by putting something that should be Red\, Green\, you cause more damage. And they actually highlighted that with the people who are doing it. And when someone raised something as a Red\, it wasn’t pointing fingers at the person. It was the message\, not the messenger. Right. And that’s really powerful. So it’s not just about thinking about Red\, Green and Yellow\, but creating that safe space for someone to say\, this isn’t working\, I need help. And then people being able to jump in and with the tight iterations\, you can make change and turn things around. So thank you very much for that\, Matt. I’m going to come to you at the end to share your reflections. Matt is our faculty director\, Matt Andrews\, and he happens to be here. So I do. I wanted him to come and see this because I’ve read the book. I gave him a copy of your book\, but I thought since you were here\, it would be really great for him to kind of listen to you. And he’s from South Africa. So the fact that you ended with Nelson Mandela\, I’m sure he was like he worked for him\, too. So I think that was also very exciting. We’re going to take three questions at a time. If you could just share your name\, the program you are at and ask your question. We will then turn to Steve to answer your question. Yes\, we have a microphone Nishant? \n\n\nSteve Kadish And are our folks listening? \n\n\nSalimah Samji Yes. And for the people who are online virtually listening to the session\, please put your questions in the webinar Q&A and we will ask one of our colleagues to ask it on your behalf. Yes. \n\n\nMatt Andrews I thought. \n\n\nAttendee 1 You might. I might\, but I had a question. Okay. Oh\, I’m Sravya. Yeah\, I have an MPP 1 and I was asking. So sometimes what I’ve noticed is the high level\, like high level executives are like very keen on\, you know\, implementing things like this and like people on the bottom more like suffering\, like are keen on implementing change. But like the junior management\, like are sometimes the most reluctant to implement change because they kind of like how things have been going and maybe they feel like this is sort of invading on their space like. Did you encounter that at all in your work and do you have any suggestions on how to deal with that both from like the bottom up perspective and also like the top down perspective? Thank you. You could just pass them like. Thank you. Oh\, you have one. \n\n\nAttendee 2 Hi\, I’m Alwyn. I am a second year MBA student here at each class. My question is that I saw that you kind of like encourage us as public service officials to be in the customer’s shoes when we’re like assessing projects and doing stuff. Have we ever thought of doing an Undercover Boss style of intervention where\, let’s say\, someone from the higher ups goes down and disguises as someone else and see whether is complete? Because if you like\, for example\, let’s say you are Governor Baker\, go down to one of your agencies. They know it’s you or Governor Baker. They would probably try to like\, you know\, hide somewhere the bad stuff or tend to be nice\, be polite. That’s my question. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Thank you. \n\n\nAttendee 3 Great question. Thank you. Yeah\, we’ve had Yung Jun and MCMPA I’ve always been curious about the round the table because I’m like\, one thing I’d be nervous about is groupthink\, especially if the leader goes first in sharing their opinion and then others not being or others being afraid to share their honest opinion. So it seemed like that didn’t happen as much in the team. So can you say a little bit more about how you prevented groupthink? And people began to be honest. \n\n\nSteve Kadish So. \n\n\nSteve Kadish And I’m not going to take names. But for the first question\, I. One of the most important things to it. And. It’s a tip that we have and I should have included the slide\, but it’s a focus on the status quo. And it’s when I talk about the potholes of what can go wrong. One of the major things that I talk about is not being aware of. And in a way\, respecting the status quo and understanding the status quo. So for any kind of change that you want to do\, whether it is to move from paper to a laptop\, changing a form. Having one system connect to another system\, changing a vendor\, changing a schedule. You have to tackle what the status quo is and be aware of that. And and that is. And there’s a combination of honor and. But don’t don’t let it be like gravity and just pull you down. But it’s it’s an awareness so that you can tackle things from where people are and then work with them to where they need to go. A lot of projects say this is where we’re going without starting with where people are at and respecting what’s there. And sometimes that fear is legitimate. Often times the fear is legitimate because. And this is where the the iterative piece is is important\, but it’s the ordering awareness and then being directly tackling the status quo is really important. And if you don’t do that\, you’re going to get the kinds of situations\, whether you’re at a leadership level\, a mid-level or at a at a service level. On the undercover boss idea that that could be a fine\, fine\, geeky\, you know\, public service TV show. The you’ve never done it the closest. We came was. At the Registry of Motor Vehicles where we had. Folks just normally dressed go and literally tie how long it took for certain things to be done and how the offices worked. And we did that in three or four different places\, and as a result of that completely changed to…How to do queing\, how you actually count time. But that was the old. And so I like your idea. I don’t know that. I don’t know if Charlie Baker could never pull it off. Right. But but a lot of us could\, you know. But I like that idea. And then round the table. One of the important concepts of round the table is that the the leader goes last. And the leader could open it up to say\, okay\, now I’d like to hear this. The leader goes last. And that the leader does not respond to every point. You know\, too often in a meeting\, whoever is leading the meeting feels like. You know. Charlie’s made a point\, and I have to respond to it. Around the table doesn’t. You can capture what those things are and then address them. And sometimes when you’re going around the table\, other people will. Respond to what is said earlier. So the roundtable works. When the leader does not respond to every point\, the leader goes last and it’s. It’s pretty cool. I just did it\, I said the other night with nurses. It was a remote class\, but with nurses talking about COVID\, I was like\, I was exhausted after hearing their what they had gone through. But it works. I continue to use it. I’ve used it in in some of my work at the World Bank as well\, and I’ve used that at times in state government. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Right. Thanks. Or look\, more questions. We’re going to start with Zoom. But before we do that\, one of the things that came across also in the book is this idea we might have that people don’t complain to the governor. That’s not true from the book. Whenever they do town halls\, people would be lined up to yell and scream and tell them what was not working\, especially the broadband when you guys went out west and then say\, Why do we not have broadband? And they actually ended up fixing it because the people were just yelling at the governor and saying\, What are you doing for us? So some things I think if you are out enough\, also\, people will yell at you. And I think getting out of the tower is really important to make yourself accessible so that people can actually talk to you and tell you these stories. All right. We’re going to do the Zoom question first. And then you can raise your hands. \n\n\nNishant Singh We have two questions from Joshua Valet. Coming back to the how\, how did you sustain motivation in the teams? Joshua is a PDIA graduate from Malawi\, the warm heart of Africa. The second question is regarding being aware of and respecting the status quo. Any advice on how best to deal with stretch codes? Use release dates to map the way all the way to the ultimate results. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. All right. We’ll start in the front. And then you think go next. \n\n\nAttendee 4 I am Kofi from the GSD. And I have this question here in terms of getting out of the toilet\, would it be more personality driven so that your life experiences shape you to go towards that option? And also when probably an agency feels like they are the only one in that space? How easy is it to also seek views outside as it was. \n\n\nAttendee 5 My name is Nandita. I’m a MPP One student from India. It’s kind of related to the first question\, but in a different way. Do you consider this process as an ebb and flow\, or is it like nonstop because this seems like a high pitched rate of activity? So how would you sustain that? Because especially unless it is the top driving this mid-level official\, don’t get a lot of control over programs and results. That’s why I said it’s related. How do you sustain that? And if it is top down\, would you have suggestions on how as perhaps not that senior level of official? There are ways we could incorporate some of these learnings. So. Welcome back to you. Hi. Sylvia Brodie. I’m a mid-career MBA and I have been living in Boston for the last 16 years. So really pleased to be here. My question is\, I’m really interested in how to create an environment where people can say that the project is in the red. And I think that is really different than what is so often the dominant culture. And so I would love to hear more about how like how you made that happen. \n\n\nSteve Kadish These are fantastic questions. And so the. The combination question about sustaining motivation and honestly\, what what level does this effort work? Well\, let me tell you a little bit where I think this does not work to solve policy differences. This does not work to solve where there are. Irreconcilable fields\, like political differences that are different than policy differences. It works when there isn’t an understanding of doesn’t have to be a total 100% agreement\, but that you’re focused on the improvement of a public sector service or private sector service or rolling out a new program or solving a problem. So. It. It works best when the top leadership is imbued with the process. And you’ll see in each one of the examples. Commissioner Spears at Department of Children and Families\, Luis Gutierrez at the Health Connector\, the leadership at the MBTA\, Governor Baker and Secretary Sudders leading the COVID effort. So it works best that way. And. It. And then I would say it works best in a…Spears at DCF and at the Health Connector…Spears and Gutierrez have made this part of how they do their work. The agency does its work. The MBTA started doing some of this and some of it’s fallen off. And so is that leadership? Is that culture? Is that so at COVID… Fortunately\, the COVID\, the COVID experience has passed us\, but the approach was taken for two plus years. So I have experienced and I’m sure you guys have\, too\, you can tell when you’re when the person you’re working for doesn’t care. When you’re doing a project update or you’re in a meeting and you could see you could smell it\, you could feel it. And no matter if they’re nodding their head and sort of saying the right kind of thing. And so like other processes\, this works when the leadership is engaged\, is asking the questions you might not want to ask or might not be able to answer. And as far as motivation\, I have found that the shorter time frames with deliverables that matter are incredibly empowering to get something done. And. And I’ve seen that over and over again. People say\, Wow\, we didn’t think we could get that done\, period. Never mind get that done in a short period of time and then go on to something else. I feel like I’m forgetting the last question. Help me. \n\n\nSteve Kadish In the red…Oh. Really? Really. So the last question about. Creating a culture where people are okay\, not saying everything is green or even\, you know\, being able to put a yellow up there\, but is in fact to say this efforts in the red. I\, I think. You know\, when Governor Baker and I started doing this at. When we were at Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and the health insurer was going into bankruptcy. And he asked me to establish a project management unit. And before when they would do project management\, all their projects were always green because they would always push the date out. And which works. Right. But. When we were focused on these deliverables needed to be done by this time frame or actually the the entity was going to go into bankruptcy or not come out. We had a…We did two things. One is our dedicated team did an objective review of where the projects were and said\, this one is yellow\, this one is green\, this one is red\, and these are what the issues are. And then it ran that by the project team\, but it took the experience of somebody having their project read and seeing that the world didn’t tumble down and that it actually became an opportunity to get help is where that that that became proven. And so I think it takes some experience actually. Of. Of living the living red\, yellow\, green dynamic. And. At honoring that and never shooting the messenger. Right. You want to you want to respect the person that was brave enough to say I need help. I’m an all star. I believe I’m an all star. I’ve always been an all star. But\, ah\, you know\, we need somebody else to do this piece. You don’t have enough resource. This isn’t working. We thought we could do this really hard. It’s really hard for any. I’m going to say it’s going to be hard for any one of you that are sitting around in this room right now to be able to say their projects in their head. To their boss or their bosses boss. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you. And if there’s any other questions\, our last set of questions. \n\n\nAttendee 5 Yes. Yeah. Hi\, Steve. Thanks so much for your time today. My name is Zipporah. I’m a Mid-Career. The question I had was on the teams. You talked about mixing both new members and current members. How do you manage that tension and create psychological safety? Because you want them to scale and work together really fast\, but they have different ways of working. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Yeah. \n\n\nSalimah Samji I wonder\, Steve\, if you could also answer why you do that. Right. And then answer a question as well. \n\n\nAttendee 6 Thanks so much for coming in and taking the last question. Can you speak to your role as chief of staff? And\, you know\, you have the strategic operations division within the governor’s office. I did. How was your time? How did you decide to focus your time within the different contexts and projects that you would need to quickly deploy on and then to? Can you speak to what happens after that team? The strategic operations team needs to like move on and do something else. Is there a key to this happening back to your team in your office? \n\n\nSteve Kadish Any other question? \n\n\nAttendee 7 I’m Valeria. I’m also an MPP One. And my question is about and that those management techniques are very\, I think\, more frequently used in the private sector. And I would love to hear your perspective on why it is so hard to implement those in the public sector. And what are the most common roadblocks you found? \n\n\nSteve Kadish Before people go. Do you want to do your book thing? \n\n\nSalimah Samji Yeah\, it was free books that were given out. So if you look on your chair\, it’s an Oprah moment and you find an orange sticky\, you get a free book. \n\n\nSalimah Samji So you’re just you’re close to. Or if you’re close to one\, yeah. I’m there. I thought\, okay. You have a book. Okay. There’s one on the front. That’s right. Yep. And just keep it because you will then come and get your book. There’s one in the front if anyone wants to run. Sorry. And since. \n\n\nAttendee 7 There’s a book copy here. \n\n\nSteve Kadish And if you run out\, I have a few\, too. \n\n\nSalimah Samji All right\, Steve\, you get answers\, questions at the three. \n\n\nSteve Kadish Be. So. It’s really hard to get. It’s really hard for new people to work in an existing team. And so. It’s one because of all the status quo stuff. And to a new person coming in is new and people are trying to figure out who\, why\, where\, where do they stand and. I knew it works best. When the new person is. I don’t want to overuse the word humble\, but is humble enough to appreciate that there are always good people in an organization and that and how to learn from that. And that isn’t a jerk. And is actually bringing something of value that wasn’t there before. It could be an approach. It could be a facilitation skill. It could be business process redesign. Could be the development of metrics. It could be. Here are three other different ways that something could be done. But it’s hard. And so. But. I’ve found that where that organization is in trouble and you simply ask the existing team to tackle\, it never works. So you do need to bring in and sometimes it’s raising somebody up into a new role and that’s new for them\, but it’s bringing in new thinking\, new ways of doing it and often the resources themselves. I’ll come back to the chief of staff question. I’ll end with that one\, but. The the. The. How do you know what’s valued in the public sector? If you just follow the media. It’s about somebody who did something wrong. Or an agency that did something wrong. It’s rarely a success. And. And then our processes that we see here are our ways of doing things are so heavily process-oriented that\, you know the John Wooden quote don’t don’t mistake activity for actual results. Is that. Unless you are holding either private sector or public sector organization. Responsible for an actual result\, a measurable result. Then all you have is a talking process. And a lot of our leaders are one have grown up and aren’t experienced with that to be more policy oriented than the results oriented. So that that’s what I’ll say. They’re chief of staff. QUESTION Well\, there are three people in this room who interviewed me extensively that I don’t know if you guys want to take a take a crack at that. So I appreciate them being here\, but I’ll start. But these guys might want to jump ahead. Oh\, you are? \n\n\nSteve Kadish Okay. So. There were two innovations that we did at the start of the Baker administration. The first is less talked about. But\, you know\, as important and it’s I wanted to have a deputy chief of staff that was responsible for access and opportunity. This was before I was aware of the term D.I. And it was specifically focused on the\, the people who were employed by the state and by the by where the state was spending its dollars\, actual contract dollars. And so we had a team of people that were focused on that. So boards and commission appointments are figuring out helping the state state purchasing agent\, figuring out how to do things incredibly important\, and that we would then have regular meetings at a cabinet level to go over where things to it. And it was a powerful thing. The second innovation was what we call the strategic operations team. And it would be like. Hiring you guys is what my thought was. I wanted to I wanted to have read the paper\, but for those that have it\, I wanted to not have to go out and do a bit for the you know\, the McKinsey’s\, the Bain’s\, the Boston Consulting Group’s other consultants\, where I knew we needed their their kind of expertize to get something done. I wanted to have that ability in-house and to be able to deploy it immediately and not be in an argument about the dollars and the scope and all of that. And I thought that\, for one. Six week. Eight week. Yeah\, I could buy her six people full time. And. And so that’s what we did. And it and it proved to be incredibly important. These four people that like you guys\, that you could go in\, know how to do things and add value immediately on stuff. And in my one other thing about creating this\, I didn’t want these people to be there forever. I wanted them to be there for a year or two and then roll out ideally to other state agencies so that their methodology and their experience could be out there. So how did I divide up my time? I know this is a certain amount of your time that is focused on the meeting\, stuff about an organization and cultural stuff\, certain kinds of meetings in an organization from a problem point of view. I would I would personally and a couple of members of this team focus on whatever the most critical issue was for the governor. And we started with the MBTA failure during this\, the snowstorms of 2015. And that. I’ll start and I’m sure I’m keeping you guys way late. So\, yes\, so. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you very much for giving a round of applause. And before before we end\, Matt\, I was wondering if you could just share some words. And there are people who are virtual… \n\n\nMatt Andrews Okay. So thank you for coming and sharing. And even even more than that\, thank you for. Thank you for doing all this work. I always think just thanking people for doing public services. And it is something we should always remember\, but it’s just like it to me. And it’s it’s always thought me to see how some of the things that you did\, all the things that we’re doing all over the world. And what’s so interesting to me is how these practices\, people will say\, well\, they look like this\, but this isn’t how governments work. But whenever you see results being delivered and I really mean this\, it’s like it’s always this\, it’s it’s always this. It’s not the other stuff. The other stuff is just delivering on stuff that we know how to deliver. And we’ve been doing that forever. And that’s where bureaucracies work. But but but the world is so\, so\, so complex right now. And all of the things that we did know how to do\, we don’t anymore because we’re delivering to different communities than we did before. And and we’re delivering to bigger communities and we delivering to more complex and diverse communities. But even the things I think that we knew how to do\, we need to be working. But to me\, as I listen to what you’re saying and all of the questions that are being asked\, that there’s there’s one thing that just comes down to it is where you started. It’s really all about people. And I think that if you remember that it’s about people and the process is not just about kind of mobilizing people at the end of the day. And and as you say\, you know\, when you know\, when a boss gets that and you know when they don’t\, you know\, in middle people get that. You know\, when people at the bottom get that\, when they all realize that this is about them and the people who they serve\, not just the people they serve. Right. Because it’s also about that. It’s about yeah\, it’s about them doing their jobs in a more vital way than they’ve ever done it before. It’s about them feeling\, feeling like they’re making a difference like they haven’t before. It’s about them being on the best team that they’ve ever been in before. When people realize that they are people and this is all about people\, I think all of those other things kind of just lock into place. You know\, they had a final cause today and I had Peter Harrington speaking to the class and he’s been work with us all over the world people. But also to ask us to some of the questions I said\, I kind of think you get the people who don’t want to be involved\, involved in that. How do you get this and how do you get and and he kind of said\, you know\, there’s a weird thing about like progress and momentum. It’s like with when he said\, like the problem in public policy is often when when we spend the time tinkering with the car\, then all of those debates and arguments and all that status quo stuff that allows itself to just creep in. When you just say\, let’s get into the car and it’s just like drops the end of the road\, see what it’s like. It’s like it’s like people change their mind and they realize that it’s that people thing. And I think feeding that people thing is the key to this. I think the one thing that we are we are pushing into quite a lot with the PDA work is is the the area of that. This is very\, very useful when you kind of know where you’re going and enough people agree. But this becomes harder when you have those political disagreements. Yes. We find that that the one of the things that we spend quite a bit of time with is the questions on the Why. \n\n\nMatt Andrews And the questions on the way are really kind of like\, what is the problem? Why does it matter? Who does it matter to? Who does it need to matter to more? And how do we get people into that conversation that it’s it’s almost like that the first part of what you do but spending a little bit more time on it but actually doing it in exactly the same way\, just kind of saying\, okay\, we’re not going to get to the water right now\, but we’re working on an agreement around the way and we’re just going to give ourself two days to have this part of the conversation. A week for this part of the conversation\, ten days for us. And part of it is just getting the right people into the conversation\, allowing the conversation to grow. And and and it’s the same principles just on that question rather than on the what. But we can see people see even there that they can make progress on these political differences that they’ve had or these deep seated policy differences between agencies\, because sometimes that can exist there and they see that just going in these kind of like these quick released activities can even help you to come to agreement with people. It’s incredibly powerful. And as soon as you get this momentum\, I think\, you know\, you almost you you almost don’t have any problems anymore. It almost just it almost just resolves itself. So\, yeah\, very powerful. Thank you very much for everything. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you\, Matt. And with that\, we’re going to end our zoom. Thank you for all the people who are online and have actually been here to watch this presentation. We really appreciate it. Another final round of applause. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nIn government\, the focus is often on policy\, legislative wins\, and budget dollars. However\, the key components of what makes government work are successful execution and implementation. In this book talk\, you will learn about a methodology developed by Governor Charlie Baker and Steve Kadish to move from identifying problems to achieving results—one that grew out of their experiences in government and was shaped by their experiences in the private sector. At its core\, their approach is about capacity and capability: about recognizing people’s capacity to lead\, evaluate\, propose\, and act; and about an organization’s capability to focus\, operate\, and execute. It doesn’t reduce important\, complex issues to a single\, simple intervention. Instead\, it is a comprehensive approach that respects the complexity of implementation. It maximizes the resources available and embraces the best ideas\, no matter their source. It is a step-by-step process that leads to sustainable results. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/from-elections-to-governing-getting-beyond-politics-to-get-things-done/
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UID:13192-1668556800-1668643199@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Agile Responses to the Ukrainian Humanitarian Crisis: The Power of Cell Phones
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nRita Vinokur\, COO of Rubikus.helpUA  \n\n\n\nZhenya Leonov\, Freelance Software Engineer  \n\n\n\nOlga Yulikova\, State Director of the Massachusetts employment and training program \n\n\n\nSasha Segal\, Daughter of Olga Yulikova \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Okay\, welcome\, everyone. We are excited to welcome you to The Building State Capability Talk Series and the title of our talk today is Agile Responses to the Ukrainian Humanitarian Crisis: The Power of Cell Phones. On February 24th this year\, Russia invaded Ukraine and no one was prepared and thus unable to respond quickly. In today’s talk\, you will hear how our panelists leveraged the networking power of cell phones to gather resources\, organize people and mobilize hope. Our first speaker\, Rita\, will share how her organization mobilized to evacuate Ukrainians into Europe. Our second speaker\, Zhenya\, will share how he organized to help refugees who are stuck at the border in Tijuana. Our third set of speakers\, Olga and her daughter Sasha\, will share their experience volunteering with Ukrainian refugees in Germany. The way that we’re going to run this session is each of our panelists will first share their experiences\, and then we’ll sit here in the front and take your questions. So without further ado\, I’d like to welcome Rita to be able to share with us from her organization\, Rubikus Guiding to safety. Rita\, welcome. Let’s give her a round of applause. \n\n\nRita Vinokur Hi\, everyone. I’m honored to be here. It’s my first time here and I’m so glad. Thank you so much for inviting me and having us. And I would love to tell you a little bit about Rubikus\, the nonprofit international organization\, which managed to bring lots of Ukrainians to Europe to safety. And I some questions for you. Could you please raise your hand if you own a cell phone? Ok\, keep it up if you own a laptop. Great. If you have\, like an hour or two of free time daily\, just keep it up. If you have Internet access\, just keep it there. Just look around. Actually\, every single Rubikus volunteer is a person like you. Like\, no any other skills or abilities needed. And that’s us. Rubikus is more than 150 people around the world\, from South Korea to west coast of United States. And what we do\, we help Ukrainian people\, being ourselves at home\, and we are basically guiding them to safety. Being in the safety of our house ourselves. And I really want to tell you how it all was created\, how it all started\, and how we managed to help not being really there in Ukraine or in Europe. So that’s the point of my speech. I believe many of you already know how many struggles the Ukrainian people went through since Russia invaded Ukraine. And today we are not talking about those terrible things. They are really well covered by media. I think we need more\, we still need more coverage. But I really want to show you tiny bits of how we work and what we do to help them. Because I would say it’s pretty unique. And now when I’m looking at our organization\, which is an international team\, as I already told\, working 100% remotely and just using our cell phones and our computers to help people. I would say it’s a unique experience to build this kind of organization\, and I want to share it with you. We’ve managed to save more than 20\,000 people. When I doubt myself\, when I wake up in the morning and I have second thoughts\, like if I’m doing the right thing\, if what are we doing is enough\, I just read this number out loud. Like\, several times. I’m like\, okay\, we are good\, we keep working. So that’s how I motivate myself. Because it’s kind of\, I mean\, this number is huge. I mean\, I would never believe that people who never worked with war refugees could do that. But actually\, actually\, you can. You wake up in the morning\, you start working\, and at some point you achieve the goal. And how it all started\, it started with a group of Russian speaking people from Europe who were organizing a nice little camp in Germany\, like cultural event for Russian speaking families and their kids called Rubikus. That’s where the name comes from. And when the war began\, everyone was shocked. Like everyone was trying to do something. What they’ve done\, they just made three Google forms. For the refugees themselves\, for the drivers who are willing to help them by driving them from the borders to some safe places\, and for the hosts are willing to host them. That’s how it all started. Just one day. Three Google forms. Here we go. And they spread the word around. They tried to engage as many people who are willing to help. And they were trying to reach as many Ukrainians who were trying to flee the war zone and to escape and to find a safe place in Europe. And they would like technically match those in groups of three. One family of refugees\, one driver and one host. Well\, let’s make a guess. For how long could that go on? It took them a week to realize that they have way more refugees than drivers and hosts\, which was pretty obvious. It was the very beginning of war and it was a very quick response. So they started waiting. They started waiting for the big guys to take over\, like UNICEF\, IOM\, Red Cross\, like whoever it is\, someone big\, someone who had like some initial funds and experience. They kept waiting and working\, waiting and working. In months or so\, they realized that the big guys are them\, us I would say. Because some countries would respond better\, some countries would still be kind of\, you know\, a big mess\, like trying to figure out what to do. But actually\, those people who started early\, they became the experts. So when we would ask\, like\, who could maybe help us to bring that disabled lady from that place to the other one\, they would tell us\, oh\, maybe we should ask Rubikus. There is an organization which knows better and they’re good and they’ve been doing that since the very beginning of the war. We’re like\, okay\, that’s us. And that’s how we started gaining the experience. We started gaining the experience from every single case we helped and we created like the whole knowledge\, like\, database\, and we started putting things together. Actually\, that’s how I started Rubikus\, because after the first week of war\, I joined the team as a knowledge keeper\, and then I started teaching people how to deal with information. And then somehow I became a CEO of the company. So I don’t know how\, but well\, it happened sometime. And actually when we realized that no big guys are coming\, we created this three step way to help people. They would still complete the form\, the online form. And then the first person\, the first responder\, whom we would call operator would take the case and ask them couple of questions\, like where are they from? Were are they going? Do they have any special needs? Disabled people? Animals? Little kids? elderly? Like all the question\, like a triage. Like when you come to the hospital first you meet the nurse\, the operator is our nurse. So the second person is a coordinator. In Ukrainian language\, there is the word and the word is Kuma. Kuma is a godmother of your child. And it’s very important person in like every Ukrainian family. And Kuma is the most trusted person. Like the government could tell you this country stopped receiving refugees\, but Kuma told you is a good place to go\, you will go. Like seriously. So the idea is that our coordinator should become such Kuma for every family because that should be really like most trusted person for the whole way. Otherwise it won’t work. So the coordinator should establish a good contact with the family and should become like a very trusted person who can give advice\, who can guide\, who can help\, who is able to answer all the questions\, and then it will work. And that person would work through telegram chat with the family\, sometimes phone calls\, sometimes messengers\, like all the resources they can use to establish the trust and then to guide them safely to their final destination. And of course\, we all work remotely\, but there are tons of local volunteers everywhere. Each country developed like the whole system of how they help the refugees. And one of our goals was to meet every local volunteer we possibly could and establish good contact and earn their trust and start cooperating. That’s how we can help the most vulnerable people who really need a supporting hand\, like a physical hand. So we would arrange the chain of local volunteers meeting our families\, feeding our families\, providing them with some temporary accommodation on their way and so on. So that’s the chain. Every single one of our people\, of our coordinators\, of our operators\, they would have some special superpowers. And I believe\, every person here in this room\, you have those kind of powers\, but they just need to be discovered. That’s what I would tell to the very new volunteers who would come and ask if they may volunteer in Rubikus. That all of you have superpowers\, all of you have something to offer. For example\, Sveta from London\, she’s the co-director. We like two directors. She’s the COO\, I’m the CEO\, but it doesn’t matter actually. We run it together. So her superpower is connections. If Sveta writes something on Facebook\, in 2 hours\, she’ll get the person at that particular country who could help. She would write\, we have a person\, like disabled lady with three cats\, two kids\, and one newborn grandchild\, and we need someone to drive them from that place to this one. In a couple of hours\, she’ll find someone through her network. Or\, for example\, Hanna. Hanna is researcher. She accomplished her first hundred cases\, drew that map\, and she became our expert in roots. And she is now our consultant. If someone needs to figure how to get people from Georgia to Italy\, they would just go to Hanna. They would just tell her that they face that problem and they need to save some money and find the cheapest route from that place to that one. And she would just consult them because she’s a great researcher. I mean\, she’s an actual biologist. She’s like doing cancer research. So that’s a super skill. Well\, Kate from Thailand\, who can handle 40 cases at the same time? She’s a stay at home mom. She has two kids. She knows a lot about multitasking. So she’s great. And she lives in Thailand\, which is a great time zone\, which means when everyone is really tired because on a peak we would have like 72 requests per day. So the Europe is asleep\, America is falling asleep. We would have this chat for coordinators and we would need someone to cover the last ten cases no one took. She would come in and she would tell me\, okay\, give me everything you have left. And she would handle them til Europe wakes up. And then she can somehow distribute those cases between her colleagues if she couldn’t manage. But that’s the person with her superpower. Or Vlada\, who is 18 year old Ukrainian refugee herself living in Germany. She’s our operator. She’s amazing because she knows the map. And when the person tells her\, I’m from Kherson\, she understands that we need to bring that person to Europe all the way through Russia\, because otherwise this person won’t be able to cross the border\, which is like artificially made because Russian army has invaded some of the parts and the other parts are under control of the Ukrainian army. So she would be the one who would tell everyone how to better evacuate the person from Ukraine. What’s my superpower? Well\, I used to be a business coach. That’s me with the book I published when I was 30. Then I moved here to the United States and I became a stay at home mom in Pennsylvania. Little like a village. When the war started\, I was devastated. I was trying to find some ways to help. I was trying to arrange some information of how to send the humanitarian aid\, just how to do something. In a week\, I was there at Rubikus. Because I know how to build systems. I know how to create business processes that work. So that’s my superpower. And the way we work is the system of telegram chats. And there are geographic chats\, which means that every country has its own chat. We would have a couple of local experts. So if\, for example\, I’m guiding people from Ukraine through Poland and then Germany to Switzerland\, I’ll just need to join the Polish chat\, the German chat and a Swiss chat\, talk to the experts\, figure where the best place is for the temporary one night stays are\, and how much the transportation and stuff like that. And also there are service chats. There are people there\, same volunteers as us\, who\, for example\, have credit cards with some time. So they would help us to book tickets. So if you need a train ticket as a volunteer\, as a coordinator\, you’ll need to stay in touch with the family. But the other volunteers will be able to help you to buy those tickets because you enter a special chat\, you send them a request and you’ll get your tickets in like half an hour. And also would have chats with local volunteers. For example\, the bus is coming and we have some people with several animals or kids on a bus\, so they need special assistance. We would enter that chat and we would try the questionnaire and the local volunteers would respond. So that’s how the system works. And also all the volunteers who join the chats\, they would soon become the experts. So they would give good advice to those who are new to this particular chat. And that’s how we are able to give people a supporting hand\, even being away from them. Those are all examples of actual\, how to say\, like\, little pieces we would send them like the maps\, the guidelines\, how to fly\, for example. Some of them have been to the airport like never in their lives. They were born and raised in a small village next to Mariupol. They never flew on a plane\, so they would need\, like\, guidelines. That’s exit\, that’s entrance\, that’s luggage. That’s how we do this and that. And some people would need a map how to get around and how to get to the hostel we rent for them. And so on and so on\, so would spread those like little pieces one by one\, not to overload them and to provide them with all the data needed. Translation would send them a little pieces of text to show at the cashier’s desk\, to show at the airport\, to show at the train station when they ask them for tickets. Like I’m Ukrainian refugee. I do not need a ticket because this convention covers me and I can go free. And that’s the link. So we would provide them with those like little screenshots they can show to the local authorities or maps like whatever they need\, the coordinator will provide them with that information. For those who are still choosing\, we’ve created a nice app. It’s an interactive website called Varenik. Varenik is a dumpling in Ukrainian\, so Varenik is our little helper who would help people to figure what are the benefits in different countries for refugees so they can choose wisely? Because one of the main issues for people who are figuring if they need to leave now or later\, if they need to go here or there\, is lack of information. If you try to Google it\, you’ll find lots of pages with how to donate\, but not how to get to safety. So Varenik helps you to figure where to go and to compare different countries like accommodation advice\, job opportunities wise\, payments\, and animals\, and transportation like all\, all the topics. So that’s what we do. And we do that for everyone who’s in Ukraine now or who’s been in Ukraine since the beginning of the war\, wherever they are now\, for example\, they could have been already in Russia\, but we would still help them if they left Ukraine after 24th of February. So we would help all the Ukrainians\, no matter whether they are healthy or injured\, could they pay for their own tickets or they have little or no money\, thankful or not. Some people are not\, and it’s also normal because I mean\, they all are really stressed. Those people like no one else\, they they didn’t deserve to be invaded\, bombed\, killed\, injured. So those people are under a lot of stress. So we don’t ask questions. We don’t judge. We don’t do any filtration. We just help. And the thing\, like for us is to pick our own fights\, to help those people we feel like helping. Because I would honestly say that some of our coordinators would rather help an old lady than grown up men. Some people would take care of a family with five dogs. Some others would say\, ok\, it was their own choice. I’d better help a family with a tiny baby. Some people would tell\, okay\, we’re going to help these single men. Some people would say\, no\, he should go back to his country and to fight for it. And those questions are hard. That’s how people are getting burnt out. Because every day you ask those questions\, should I help this person or that person? Should I ask\, how much money do they have? Maybe they can handle it by themselves. Maybe I should find the way to put them in the right order. But those questions\, I mean\, everyone volunteer is a grown up person\, and we volunteer because we feel like we are willing to help. And what I would usually say to everyone who is about to start volunteering\, pick your fights. Find the people you really willing to help with all your heart. And the others? There are other people who are ready to help\, there are other the grown ups who make their own decisions. And that’s what we do when I sort people and every family would find a volunteer coordinator which is ready to help them. The other thing is you ever think about joining the volunteering team\, you should always get closure. You should always find a point in time and space to say\, that’s it. It’s time to say goodbye. It’s time to say thank you. It’s time to wish us some good luck. And it’s time to transfer you to the caring hands of local volunteers. And now I should go and help the next family. And it’s a very important part\, which we are working on. And that’s what I’m telling every single person who is starting to coordinate. And the one of the most important thing for us that I learned recently is it’s very important to think of your own feelings\, not only feelings for those people you help. So if you ever think about helping others\, just do not dismiss your own stress. Do not dismiss your own feelings. Do not dismiss something which could look very small\, comparing to the devastation of the person who lost the part of the family or who was terribly injured. Your feelings matter. And that’s how you’ll keep going. And the very final words I would love to say. I would love to say thank you to our sponsors\, to our donors. Those are two great organizations. It’s Nova Ukraine and it’s Cash for Refugees. Both are based in the U.S. and Nova Ukraine is the organization who sponsors our tickets\, and Cash for Refugees provides all the refugees with a small amount of cash\, which could help them to buy a suitcase and food for the baby or for the pets and like all those kind of expenses. But most of all\, we are thankful to you\, to just random people who would deny the cost of their cup of coffee or the meal prize or like whatever dearth of gifts to make bake sale\, to organize like a little charity event that they work. And it helps a lot. I would say doubles the amount of money we get from the sponsors. It’s what we get from people. And we are really thankful. There are many of you here now and there are many of you watching us via Zoom. And I guess some of you would ask yourself a question\, how could I help if I don’t speak any Russian and I cannot really coordinate the refugees and help them to get to safety in Europe? Like\, what could I do? The best advice would be to start your own project\, whatever it is. It doesn’t mean you need to bring someone to safety. You can teach someone English. You can help someone to get around in their new country\, new environment. You can help someone with paperwork\, like whatever you feel like doing you remember\, pick your own fights\, or if you want to spread the word about Rubikus. We do have our social networks\, we do have Facebook\, we do have Instagram\, Telegram. So just sharing our posts\, raising awareness\, that’s important\, that’s what we are looking for. And of course\, you may help us to fundraise. You can organize a little event here and there. You can donate yourself. I brought some nice Christmas cards with me they are over there on that far away table. And the local artist\, she is a Bostonian artist Marina Robin. She drew this wonderful picture for us. So you may always make a donation and grab a couple of those cards and then send them to your loved ones. On the back side\, there is a QR code to our website\, so your loved ones could also make a donation or send a card to the person they would love to share this information with. So that’s a little way to help us. Thank you so much. I think I gave you a little bit like an overview and I’ll be ready to answer any questions. So now it’s time for Zhenya I guess. \n\n\nZhenya Leonov Hi. Okay. Never know how far to stand away from it. Good? Okay. So I’m going to talk about my experience with the refugee camp in Tijuana and how that got started and how a small group of people could make a big difference. So very similar\, I’d say. My slides won’t be as impressive. All right\, so let’s give it a shot. So a little about me. I’m Zhenya. It’s the English translation. It would be Eugene. Okay. Closer. So I moved to the USA when I was nine. I’m from San Francisco. I studied computer science at the University of California\, Santa Cruz. Currently I’m what they call a freelance programmer. Previously I managed the big data team. Little bit of background. So I have an interest in behavioral economics and I think I’ll talk a little bit about how that changed my view of everything that went on at the refugee camp. And sometimes I moonlight and pretend I know how to do other things. All right. Let’s talk about how things happened. So Russia invades Ukraine on the 24th of February. Pretty soon after Ukrainians started arriving at the San Ysidro border. So for those of you who don’t know California\, that’s the border between San Diego and Tijuana. And so right away we start seeing news reports\, this is Vice. Homeland Security today. This is\, I believe\, Rutgers. And we see this all on our phones\, right. We immediately\, conversation started going right away from all the people in the Bay Area\, people in Los Angeles. So this is what starts happening right away. This is the underpass where you cross by foot and by car from Tijuana to San Diego. So this is probably around March 1st\, March 2nd\, something like that. Both Ukrainians and other former Soviet Union people running away. So soon after\, neither Mexico\, Baja\, California\, that’s the local state nor the U.S. really wanted this to be happening on the border. So they allowed us to set up a refugee camp. So what happened? So they gave us a corner in the airport. Now\, for those of you who have never been Tijuana\, the airport is pretty small. So you could actually set up a corner right by the exit and then anybody who was flying in would see it. So we had a big sign that said Ukrainians\, come here\, we have information. We had hot food and everything for that. For most people\, it was a 36 hour flight or a 36 hour trip. They had to get out of Ukraine\, some with the help of Rubikus\, they had to do three layovers to end up in Tijuana. So this is the airport. This is already an organized operation. So we provided hot food. We organized people. Mexico gives us a gym where we could organize a refugee camp. Side story\, when I first wound up there\, I didn’t know it was a gym and I saw a bunch of workout equipment\, and I thought I’m not sure this is the best use of resources to get workout equipment for incoming refugees. So this is going to be kind of like a photo album as I go through it. So some of our volunteers\, we’re open 24/7. All grassroots. Arriving refugees. This is more or less a registration area. Legal help. Our attempt to pass out some flyers of what to do next. The main gymnasium. We had people sleeping in the gymnasium and people outside in tents. A lot of children\, mostly mothers and children. A lot of pets. Medical tent. Staffed by doctors and nurses\, nurse practitioners. This is on the California side when people cross the border with children with need to have car seats for everybody wherever they were going to go. In Mexico\, not so much. You can put a child on your lap and nobody is the wiser. So what did we quote unquote\, accomplish? Well\, the refugee camp was built in two weeks. So from start to finish\, we had an organized camp with a medical tent with legal help in two weeks. Kitchen. We had hot food for everybody. So arriving refugees could get food. Children could get care. There were quite a number of people who needed medical help. Quite a number of people who needed legal help. We had a controlled process to get people from the airport to the refugee camp to the customs and border and help them cross the border to the U.S.. So who is we? A big contribution was made by a church coalition. So lots of churches in California\, from Sacramento\, from Fresno\, from San Diego. So the coalition united with Ukraine. Not to be confused with the program name Uniting with Ukraine. The program provided by the U.S. government was not active back then\, so there was no official program for Ukrainian refugees to come to the U.S. at that point. CCFR\, Coordination Council for Refugees. This was just a grassroots organization that popped up on Telegram. Coordinating at first. Friends of mine went to the border when people were out in tents and they just said we should create an entity that was a grassroots organization. Nova Ukraine\, was mentioned before they helped us with funding and other stuff. Al Otro Lado is organization that provides legal help on the Mexican side of the border to a lot of migrants. Doctors from San Diego set up a medical tent and volunteered their time. Others\, there was lawyers that went there from Los Angeles\, from San Diego. A lot of people came to help. Everybody on their own. Nothing was organized. We also had the same experience as Rubikus in the beginning. We said\, okay\, well let’s help these people out until somebody from those what they’re doing takes over. Nobody took over. Eventually we became the people who took over\, the proverbial we. So Uniting for Ukraine starts in late April. And the camp closes pretty much later\, April\, early May. So we ran the refugee camp for a month. Okay. So this is where kind of my previous experience running teams and my interest in behavioral economics comes in\, kind of the way I view things. So this is my experience\, right? People may have a different view of things. So this is my personal opinion. So it seemed to be in the beginning that the grassroots organizations are a lot like startups with the same\, you know\, ups and downs. So initially everybody is excited. We’re helping people. It’s very addictive\, we’re making a difference. And then eventually cracks start to form. People have different ideas about how to help\, how to coordinate\, who is in charge\, etc. Coordination is very hard as it is in the corporate world\, as it is in the startup\, as it was there between the different groups that were starting to help. Case in point\, we had a bunch of volunteers who arrived who didn’t get in because the group of people at the door weren’t aware who they were. And nobody gave a list and nobody knew who was coming. And we were trying to maintain some kind of security. It occurred to me that there was a lot of us who had corporate experience running teams working in large companies\, you know\, directors\, managers\, etc.. And how you can be very good at that\, but there’s walls when you’re in the company. When you’re given a free for all\, suddenly those skills aren’t just transferable. So case in point\, we had a group of translators who were doing an excellent job translating U.S.\, you know\, English documents\, legal documents into Ukrainian into Russian or vice versa. And one of the things we had them do is translate all our ORR Office of Refugee Resettlement documents\, because they were responsible for transferring minors across the border. We couldn’t transfer minors across the border that were there with without parents. And they would be taken into custody. And then we’d have to get them out. And by we I mean legal help\, the lawyers that were working with us. And to do that\, we decided\, okay\, let’s translate all of these documents from ORR. And nobody kind of had time to realize how many documents we need\, what do we need\, etc.. So we had people all over the world. Translators in Ukraine\, in New York\, all took 24 hours a day trying to translate this library of documents. We probably needed a few documents. There would probably be safeguards if you tried to do that in a corporate environment. Just get a bunch of highly paid\, highly skilled people and say\, translate this dictionary. So\, another serious point. So we had the Undersecretary of Immigration from Baja\, California\, coordinating with us. All the volunteers\, all the volunteer groups. We had the U.S. State Department coordinating with us. We controlled the line with Customs and Border Protection\, meaning they told us\, you know\, we can process 200 a day\, 500 a day\, 1000 a day. And if we had more than that\, people would be on the waiting list and we would prioritize\, you know\, single moms\, sick\, elderly. And at some point\, it occurred to me\, like\, why are people listening to us. Who are we? Like\, we’re not assertive. I’ve never taken a training course in\, you know\, how to triage people\, right? It was a real surreal experience. But just like Rubikus\, we became the experts\, because nobody else was doing anything. Are we child trafficking? We had the number of minors that came with older siblings or came by themselves that had relatives in the U.S.\, etc.. And we were helping them get across the border. And we were strategizing about how to get them across the border and not have ORR take them into custody\, which they’re mandated to do by U.S. law. And Al Otro Lado who have lawyers\, one of their lawyers actually said\, you guys realize what a unique situation this is\, because if this was any other situation\, you’re actually right now violating both Mexican and U.S. trafficking laws because you’re strategizing about how to get unaccompanied minors across the border. And that was a moment of pause. Sometimes simple is best. So all these websites are flying around from Nova Ukraine\, from others with information about what to do when you get into the U.S.\, who to contact\, etc.. And everybody has different pieces of information. I took and I created a Google document and I just put everything there. It didn’t look nice. It looked pretty ugly. There was a few bookmarks\, but all the information was there and that that turned out to be really useful. And it just reminded me again how when you’re working in the free for all that sometimes you’re thinking\, okay\, we need to create a huge website because this is what you would do if you were working in the corporate world. You would hire a designer\, you would create a website. I was surprised at how much it was a matter of who you know. So part of the situation was like a movie. The CBP\, Customs and Border Protection\, eventually they had their numbers. All the lawyers working at the border\, they have everybody’s emails\, they coordinate. When Ukrainians would end up at the border without with\, you know\, who did we miss\, who didn’t fly into the airport\, or somehow got there\, they would call us and they would be like\, go pick them up\, you know\, give them a number\, process them\, etc.. And it just occurred to me how much of this is done\, you know\, by a handshake. Not under the table\, per se. Nothing illegal. But the entire system at the border runs on some amount of who you know\, you know\, goodwill\, etc.. The Mexican side of the border. So sometimes it takes hours to cross the border if you don’t have the fastpass\, if you don’t have your car registered. So we had the Mexican side of the border their analog of customs and border\, get into our cars when we needed to cross\, drive us on the Mexican emergency lane to the U.S. side. Get out\, shake hands and let us skip the lines for 3 hours. Mexico is still Mexico\, so there was some security issues. There is a lot of people trying to game the system and make money on the situation. A lot of people promising to get you over the border for some amount of money\, telling you they’ll help you buy a car\, telling you how to get across the border. This is mostly for non Ukrainians now that the program is active. You can’t go to Mexico without tips and bribes and do something like this\, even if it’s very small. I got stuck in the lane to the U.S. by accident during peak traffic\, and it was going to take me 4 hours to come across and go back. I drove in reverse on the side til I got to the exit I missed. There was a police officer there who said tip or ticket and I said\, tip. And this is the photo of the U.S. Border Patrol opened crossing point just for Ukrainians in coordination with all the volunteers. And this is Ukrainians getting across the border. Initially\, we had about three days for people to get processed after they fly in\, so they’d have to spend three days at the refugee camp. By the end\, it was less than 8 hours. So that said\, that’s my experience with this. The only other thing I will say is that I was speaking to a friend of mine who was helping in western Ukraine and I was like\, what’s your experience? Without telling her my experience. And the first thing she said was\, my experience is that churches and other small groups are key in the acute phases of the crisis. We haven’t even had U.N. agencies\, other agencies. They’re just starting to come here. They’re looking for housing for themselves. They’re trying to understand the situation. It’s already a month during the war. But grassroots organizations are the only ones right now making any difference. And we had the exact same experience. So questions will come later\, I guess. All right. That’s me. \n\n\nOlga Yulikova So. The people eventually arrive into safety. Correct. And they get a lot of help from other organizations\, from government. They have shelter. They have food. They have medicine. Most of them. They’re all set in some way. My daughters and I decide to go and help those who are already in safety. We decide to travel to Germany this last summer\, in the month of July to help individual families. That was our mission. We volunteered our time to help individual families\, to help them adjust to their new life. Because it’s one thing you run away\, then you settle somewhere. Then what? Our mighty team consists of one mother and two teens. One of them is here. Another one is watching us through Zoom. Hi\, Natalia. Our budget was huge ($0). We had no sponsors. Our technology was phenomenal. We had a T-Mobile that barely worked in Germany for some reason. Our iPhones. We used WhatsApp\, Facebook and Telegram to do everything we’re doing. And we started to meet our clients or our families. Who\, as I said at that point\, had a shelter\, they had medical insurance. Their children were going to school. They had food on the table. The very first family we helped was the family of Taras. Taras is also with us today on Zoom. He and his family continue to live in Hamburg. And Sasha will share with you our experience with helping Taras. \n\n\nSasha Segal So Taras was the first family that we worked with. He escaped from Ukraine with his mother\, who’s in the picture\, his wife\, who’s also in the picture\, who is also disabled\, and their very young daughter. And so they miraculously were able to come from Ukraine\, they ended up in Hamburg\, Germany. And so we connected with them online on Facebook. And the first thing we did with them is we went to doctors appointments. So as you can probably tell from the picture Taras is in a wheelchair\, he is disabled\, he is completely paralyzed on his left side. And so there are a lot of medical complications with that that needed to be addressed immediately. And so we went to doctors appointments and our role there was translating. So Germany had set up a great program and so they already had housing\, their young daughter was going to daycare\, you know\, they were getting food. But their one problem was translation. There was no one to help translate and they don’t know any English. So as you can probably imagine\, it’s a big problem. And so that’s where we came in. So we went to doctors appointments and translated for them\, which got most of the medical things figured out. We set up doctor’s appointments in the future\, so all the appointments that they’re attending now\, we were there to help them set up. We got them groceries\, of course\, set up transportation. Also spent a lot of time on legal documents. Again\, everything was in German. There was no translations\, German or English. There’s no translation into Ukrainian\, no translation into Russian. So my mom would do the translating with the documents as me and my sister\, you know\, were there in the house\, either talking to them\, playing with their daughter\, spending time with them\, did a lot a lot of worksheets and legal documents to get an electric wheelchair for Taras. And just a couple of days ago or last week\, I think\, we got the text from him that he did in fact get the electric wheelchair. So that was a big win. Yeah\, that’s basically what we did for them. The next family you can take. \n\n\nOlga Yulikova Sure. So as you can see\, one thing leads to another. And of course\, our next family was also quite disabled. A young woman\, Inna\, who is blind and has mobility issues she uses\, she can walk a little bit\, but she uses a special wheelchair\, of course and a walker. And the only care giver and other person on her life is her 81 year old mother. It’s fantastic to have an apartment perfectly adjusted to their needs. They have a bank account that they don’t know how to use. They have all kinds of letters in the mail coming in\, and they have no idea what is going on. Literally\, they’re completely isolated. Nobody speaks Russian or Ukrainian around them. So we came in. And got a little scared when the number of letters we had to translate. Luckily\, I had a childhood friend who lives in Germany and she quickly jumped on the telegram through interface with a phone. We figure it out what exactly German government was willing to do or not willing to do\, and what was expected from Inna and her mother who were inside the apartment. We kind of snuck into their fridge to under the pretense that I wanted water and realized they had no food. So the kids ran to the nearest grocery store and we bought the entire store which we wheeled in on the grocery cart from the grocery store to their door. It was pretty entertaining. After we translated the documents\, we realized that what was really needed is some kind of case management system\, and definitely volunteer interpreters were needed\, which we managed to get. My only skill is I work for state government here in Massachusetts. So one thing I know is how to work with bureaucracy. So that was the only useful case in that sense of organizing the case management system\, because in Germany and the United States it’s fairly similar set up. Somewhere\, someone knows what they’re doing. You just have to find that person. So we found that person. We’ve got several volunteers set up. I was extremely nervous leaving this family\, this particular family in Hamburg\, by themselves because of their extreme limitations\, obviously. But they’re all set. They got their case managers. Everything is translated. They learned how to use a bank so they have access to money. And fingers crossed\, we’ll see them at some point soon. And then we’ll move to Berlin and meet our third family. \n\n\nSasha Segal So towards the end of the trip we moved to Berlin\, as my mom mentioned\, and met with our last refugee. His name is Dimas. He left Ukraine when he was only 17 years old. That is exactly the age that I am and I can absolutely not imagine doing that myself. He left his mom. He left his grandparents. He left his friends. And he escaped all by himself and ended up settled in Berlin. He had an apartment that was given to him by the government\, but basically everything else\, clothes\, computer\, etc. he did not have. So we brought a suitcase of a computer\, an extra phone\, clothes\, jackets\, shoes\, socks\, everything that you can imagine\, everything that you need on the day to day basis. We brought that from the U.S.. And so\, when we went to Berlin\, our intention was to simply meet him somewhere outside\, drop off the suitcase\, and that was pretty much it. That was our plan. But as you can see here\, we took him to lunch. We sat down. He told us his story of how he escaped by himself. He told us everything he’d been through\, you know\, sleeping\, standing up on a super crowded train because there was no room\, etc.. And as you can see\, the third bullet point\, we immediately fell in love with him\, almost adopted him\, took him home to the US. Ultimately\, we decided not to because the German system is running much better than the US system. So his future looked a lot\, a lot better there. But we continue to support him daily. We call him all the time\, message him through WhatsApp and me and my sister\, who is in Montreal\, Canada\, she and I are going to be going back to Berlin this winter in December to visit him and make sure that he’s doing well. Get him some new winter boots and jackets and make sure he’s all set up for the rest of the year. \n\n\nOlga Yulikova And as you can see\, I’m going to try to stay sane. Thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Those of you on Zoom. We’re going to move to Q&A. If you have any questions\, if you can post them in the chat. We have someone here in the room who will be able to voice your question for us. We’ll start with questions in the room\, if there are any. But first\, I think let’s give our panelists a round of applause. This is just phenomenal. I mean\, I am just I don’t know about you\, but I am so inspired. You know\, people sitting in their homes\, we spend so much time complaining about the weather\, about all sorts of things that are just so not important. And here are people with busy lives just have done unbelievable things. And\, Rita\, your numbers\, 20\,000. That’s\, you know\, when these large organizations whose job it is to do this work can’t step up and do it\, and it takes individuals just mobilizing. I love your first spreadsheet. You created a Google spreadsheet and just ask people who wants to go\, who wants to volunteer. Simple free resources that have just such a huge\, huge impact and made you an organization. It just is incredible. And Zhenya\, also\, listening to your story of just like\, again\, waiting for someone to pick up and be the next the transfer. And you were basically it for a year. You know\, you just open up a refugee camp and then run it for a year without even thinking. That’s what you’re going to do. One month\, sorry. Yes\, one year would have been really hard. One month. But that’s a long time to be able to do that. And you know\, Olga and your daughter\, Sasha and Natalia\, who’s on Zoom\, it’s just phenomenal that you can up and go and give of your time of yourself to such an amazing cause\, you know\, for humanity. So thank you for sharing. So I want to open it up for questions that we have. Super. \n\n\nAttendee 1 Hi. Thanks everyone for your presentation. My name is Leonardo\, I’m Brazilian originally and of course pursuing here a mid-career master’s in public administration. Yeah\, everything you mention. So thank you. And I used to work with the U.N. before coming to Harvard. And I also appreciate that in January\, I will be joining a course organized by the HKS and the School of Public Health\, which will happen in the Ukrainian border with Poland. And we will be interviewing and discussing mainly the situation of Ukrainian refugees and how to handle the civilians that had to flee the war. So we’ll be discussing that with government representatives\, U.N. agencies\, everyone involved in that. As a preparation for my trip and for this course\, I would like to ask you to like what would you like to discuss or what would you ask these key people\, like these key organizations\, about the situation of refugees like. So I can also ask these questions on your behalf. Thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful. We’ll take some more questions. Did you have one as well? Yep. Thank you. \n\n\nAttendee 2 Hi\, thank you for sharing. My name is Khalil and I’m from Saint Lucia and the work that you do is really inspiring. I have a couple of questions. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the partnerships that you sort of developed as you created the programs\, especially with the private sector. How did you engage them? Did they come to you or did you have to go to them? And then how did you formalize it? And then the other question is\, you know\, if there is some sort of situation\, a scenario where you need to set up programs to accommodate refugees\, what are the first or the biggest\, most important 3 to 5 things that you think needs to be done immediately. Thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Okay. Do we have any questions from our. We have one question from Zoom. Najwa? \n\n\nAttendee 3 Does Rubikus do any background check on their operators\, coordinators\, local volunteers? And are there any situations when volunteers fail? \n\n\nSalimah Samji Okay. We’ll start with Rita. The last question first. \n\n\nRita Vinokur Well\, about the background check. Well\, talking about the first volunteers\, they were people we would know personally and mostly it was a bunch of friends and coworkers and\, you know\, lots of immigrants tried to stick together. I guess we all know how it goes when you move to another country and you don’t know much people here and there. You just try to stick to your own kind who can speak your own language. So basically\, every single volunteer who comes to us would most probably personally know some of us already. It could be someone’s good friend\, family member or coworker. And that’s like the first part. This person would be usually brought by someone. And it really helps to build the trust. And that’s like the very first step. And then every person goes through the interview with one of our most professional volunteers\, one of the oldest ones\, we would call her our teacher. Her name is Margarita\, and she lives here in Boston\, by the way. So she would do the first interview and she would try to figure out the person’s motivation. We cannot do like a background check\, like an actual one. We are not like an organization who can do it legally. So the idea is to figure out what person is looking for and what’s their motivation to help. And then people would come to me and I would do like a little introduction course\, which is like one two hour webinar where we talk and discuss the Rubikus and discuss what do they want to do. And mostly after that\, we can figure out what kind of person is in front of us and what kind of job we would trust this person with. The person would never get to like any database without proper training. So we would rather afraid they’re going to like ruin the database not because their evil\, but because not like skilled enough. Or they would put like the documents to like wrong folder\, not because they want them to get away\, but because they just mixed it up. And that’s what we do. We trust people. We teach them how to work. That’s basically the whole thing. We would never run them through some like serious background check because it’s like we have nothing to hide\, don’t have much private information which would be afraid to like share with someone. The only thing is finance and we have people from Germany because we’re officially registered in Germany and we would have our content who is\, hi\, [01:05:58]Badeen\, [0.0s] if you are listening to me right now\, who’s in charge of like all the finances. So he’s the only person who delivers the money to those who spend them. But mostly people are trusting us. They would spend their own money on tickets for refugees and then they’ll get refunded. So I would ask them if they’re planning to do any background check on us before spending money on refugees and then waiting if we return them or not. So that’s basically it. I hope I answered your question. I don’t know who you were\, but yeah\, I hope so. As far as the other questions\, well\, I’ll let my colleagues respond. I’ll think about a little bit about them. Okay? \n\n\nZhenya Leonov Okay. Well\, let me remember the questions. One of the questions was how did we build relationships with the private sector and things like that? So that happened really organically because we are fortunate enough in the greater we do have connections in a lot of places. What does that mean? So I’m a programmer I guess by trade. A lot of my friends in the Bay Area and a lot of people helping out either work in Google or Facebook or Salesforce or whatnot\, and eventually the chats on Facebook\, the chats on Instagram\, mostly they got very organized and it would be something like\, you know\, we need housing for this family\, you know\, who has some connections\, where do we go\, etc.? Does anybody work at the Airbnb? Can we get a voucher\, which we did get a bunch of vouchers from Airbnb. Or it would be like\, this kid needs a laptop\, he’s going to school. I get an old laptop from work. I’m sure you have it in the closet\, what’s required? And that just kind of grew organically. And\, again\, Nova Ukraine\, I know a lot of people in Nova Ukraine\, which is a big mid-size NGO\, I guess the only one that I’m aware of or decent size that has been around since 2014. And they do a lot of coordinating and we know a lot of people there. They have contacts with a lot of big companies. So that kind of just grew organically. You had another question. Right. So. I think that’s really dependent on the specific place. I mean\, what you need to set up in Europe is probably different than what you need to set up in Tijuana. But I mean\, universally\, it’s\, I guess\, pretty simple. So they need to stay somewhere. Right. So\, um\, housing. So one of the problems we had is that gymnasium\, broken bathrooms\, no showers. And there’s women with kids. They need to\, you know\, the baby hadn’t had a bath in like three days\, etc.. So basic infrastructure like that\, things we take for granted. So first things first\, right? It’s like it’s an emergency and then you go from there. So I mean\, I guess that would be my answer. And then\, what would I ask of these organizations? You mean like the big organizations like U.N.? Are they asking where are they? But if I was a little bit more eloquent\, I would say what is required for sort of so the military as a quick reaction force while they get everything else in gear. What’s required for a quick reaction force from these U.N. organizations\, from all the other organizations that are supposed to do this? The feeling I got that it takes them years to ramp up. You know\, the crisis is over by the time they’re ready to take over. So that’d be that’d be my question to them. And I would like to say one more thing. I was just thinking about how many people were involved in the refugee camp. I mean\, I played a really small part\, so I don’t want to sound here\, sit here and sound like I ran the camp. I played a pretty small part. I was driving at night\, which is something I like to do and they needed drivers at night\, and that’s how it started. And then I was helping at the legal desk from time to time during the day\, and I am doing a lot of work right now in the Bay Area with a lot of people who actually cross the border. And I was like\, Oh\, wait a minute. Were you in the camp? Yes\, they were in the camp to get benefits\, to get health care\, things like that. I volunteer at the legal clinic. So there is actually a lot of things happening right now in the States now that the program is open. But I just want to be clear\, I didn’t run the camp myself. I played a small part. \n\n\nOlga Yulikova I just want to say Zhenya’s being extremely humble. That’s one thing I want to make sure you guys understand. That both these wonderful individuals\, Rita and Zhenya\, they do an enormous amount of work. Enormous. I don’t know if they sleep at all. Zhenya is chatting with people nonstop\, answering legal questions\, giving advice\, sending documents\, providing information\, redirecting questions\, finding the right contacts. Maybe he’s not the one who could really boast about things\, but he is definitely the one who’s going to get it done. Okay. \n\n\nRita Vinokur Now\, the main question was already said out loud. I mean\, Leonardo\, is the answer for Leonardo’s question\, yes. Where they are? That’s the biggest question for the big guys\, for their organization. Like\, U.N.\, like why are they not here? But I really want to add something because for now\, for example\, we started establishing the partnership with IOM\, which is International Immigration Office\, and that’s what we’re actually doing\, trying to ask the right questions to build a partnership. So I have an answer. What we’ve done and what worked well\, what didn’t? Our first question was\, what do we need to do to meet your standards that you’re willing to help us now? Because all those organizations that have really high standards\, it’s like you cannot send the person’s like passport. We\, they like email\, for example. You can just put it to some special secure folder. Or for example\, you cannot start arranging the process of buying tickets when the person didn’t cross the border yet. Or you cannot do this\, you cannot do that. You cannot buy person like a flight ticket before there is a response from the other side that someone is meeting them there and accommodating them there and so on so on. We are really agile on that and I would say I’m proud of it. We can buy a ticket and then find a host and then find a volunteer. They cannot work like that. That’s not how it’s organized in the bigger companies. So if you really want to get them involved\, unfortunately we are the ones who need to make some extra steps towards them in understanding needs. That’s what I would say. That’s my experience. Maybe it’s different with the other organizations\, but that’s what I’ve learned. And for the other question\, like what are the needs of the like basic needs of the refugees\, what we need to establish\, what we need to build\, what kind of infrastructure? For us\, it’s all dependent on numbers. We do like lots of research\, like how many people are coming through each of the borders\, especially when we opened the northern route. We call the northern route the way where people would leave Ukraine and go to Russia first and then all the way to Europe. Like all these\, people from Mariupol\, lots of people from Kherson and the other occupied territories\, they would have to go through Russia. Some were like brought to Russia against their will. So it was like tons of people\, thousands and thousands. And we were actually like doing numbers. It’s like\, okay\, 50 people daily are crossing the border in Narva\, which is tiny Estonian city\, which means we need to find accommodation for 50 people daily. We would rent everything in Narva\, like literally every single place\, then we’ve built our own hostels. Now we have two hostels in Narva we basically own. And then we realize that Narva is so small that we need to send people somewhere. So we started renting buses and we have three buses weekly. Guess we just did the math. We realized that to bring people somewhere out of Estonia\, which is a dead end\, if you don’t want to go to Finland\, you need to leave Estonia\, like to Latvia\, to the south. So we started renting those buses. And it was kind of funny because I was the one sitting in Pennsylvanian village sending those buses\, like announcing\, okay\, Mr. Ivanov\, boarding the bus right now. And now the families\, of five people with two cats boarding the bus now\, and it’s like 45 people. And then I say\, bye bye\, good luck. And then I hang up. So that’s what I was doing\, like in the morning\, sitting at my home when I send my kid to school. And then we rented the whole hostel in Riga and it became a hub. So we realized that with that flow\, we need people. We need space for every single person who arrives by the bus\, which means 45 people just from the bus. And then we would have a Latvian border as well\, which means even more people and so on\, so on. And we had to be like really agile because that would change over months. Estonian flow has decreased\, but Poland has opened. The other flow going through Belarus to Poland has opened up and it was like hundreds of people coming through Poland then. So you need to rearrange the whole infrastructure and find some partners in Poland and stand renting hostels in Poland and so on so on. So I would say it’s an agile response and you can never predict what’s going to come next. But hostels and buses should always be ready for like the bigger groups of people. Otherwise\, just too expensive to accommodate them. Like one by one. \n\n\nOlga Yulikova Just very quickly\, I wanted to see what my daughter actually has to say\, because this is the generation that’s going to do the work you’re going to establish\, right? What do you think is going to be needed? What kind of questions? No? Come on. Okay. While she is thinking\, you’ve got to have language and culture expertize\, this is what we’ve learned. You can have the best set up like the families showed you with mother and daughter and the best apartment in the best part of Hamburg stuck home with no access to anything because they don’t have a single person who speaks their language. Did you think enough? No. No. All right. We have somebody else. \n\n\nAttendee 4 Can you hear me? I have both an answer and a question. So I’m also\, hi guys\, I work with all of them in the U.S.. I was part of CCFR that Zhenya mentioned and then founded a different organization called Svitlo\, and we are helping Ukrainians in the U.S. primarily right now with information. And that’s\, well\, couple of the answers I want to give you is when you ask what is needed\, of course\, you know\, people need shelter\, people need food. But at the same time\, people also need information. And in the U.S.\, unfortunately\, unlike a lot of countries in Europe\, that information is not readily available because the German government\, Polish government\, very quickly created the websites that are free. You know\, from current standards\, it’s pretty user friendly\, you know\, like in a great layout\, the way U.S. government is organized\, both at the federal level\, at the state level\, completely decentralized. So there is not even one entity which theoretically would be able to provide it. So\, especially\, again\, speaking of like large organizations’ speed of response with a new program like this. So it falls in that and especially to provide it actually in the language that people can understand so in Ukrainian and Russian or actually in the\, you know\, non-legalese language. So that’s what we are doing. On the other hand\, answering your question on partnerships\, so that’s actually we’ve done a lot of that. A little less so right now with private sector. Even though my personal background is. I went to business school at MIT\, I have a lot I know like and a lot of people that way\, but and we actually may create partnerships with like in a lot of private sector to help people get hired\, you know. But what we’ve done so far and it has been like since March\, like seven or eight months\, we’ve created a lot of partnerships with public sector. And that means I’m basically on the task force in Washington state\, in California\, in New York\, I’m somehow in a task force of immigration lawyers. And no\, I’m not a lawyer. And half of the time do not understand what they talking about. But it turns out I still have a lot of valuable skills to add. And so I’m doing advocacy. I went to D.C.\, I met with like some most important people who do immigration reform in the U.S. I was able speaking with like how you do it\, like I was the person who was able at the beginning when the Uniting for Ukraine program was announced and nobody knew\, like how to get people\, for example\, who are stuck in Mexico to the U.S.. I said\, okay\, we need to go to the source and this source is USCIS. So we just need to since like easy enough\, we need to find the person or like even the clerk at the USCIS who works on this program\, like in my private sector experience\, like that’s not hard. I know person who works Google\, I ping them\, they contact me you know put me in touch with somebody else who works at the Google and that USCIS doesn’t work like that. But if you know enough\, you pull in your LinkedIn account. And I literally my first step was like so I went to MIT for business school. There’s a joint program of Harvard Kennedy School. I was like\, okay\, every friend of mine who went to Harvard Kennedy School\, I’m going to ping them and then I’m going to ping like\, you know. And within two or three weeks I got in touch and I have a cell phone number of a person who is in charge of Uniting for Ukraine program. So that is to say\, just use your personal connections that like\, you know\, pretty much things are not that hard if you’re willing. And surprisingly for me\, my background is in private sector. I did not have high expectations of the U.S. government and all in all\, actually\, especially state governments far exceeded what I expected of them. Yeah\, especially I got to give a shout out to Washington State. Really great. So\, yeah. So that’s the the answers that I have for you. So the answers that I have maybe to the panelists and maybe like whoever is here from Kennedy School\, is that. Okay\, so we now it seems like we have a structure where we have like large organizations on the one hand with slow response\, a lot of bureaucracy\, and God knows how they operate\, I don’t know. And then we have like\, you know\, a very speedy response. I’m part of that as well. And they don’t exactly overlap. And is that how we see that going on or there is some kind of integration that can possibly\, you know\, what’s the model of the future. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Questions from Zoom as well? \n\n\nAttendee 5 There have been many challenges at the southern border over the past several years\, and it seems that CBP is not really equipped to handle how to move people safely without harming them. What was your experience working with them in getting refugees across the border safely? That’s the first question. The next question is how did it feel scaling up Rubikus from peer to peer help to massive operations with dedicated buses\, hostels and schedules? Was it scary? And how does one become a volunteer for Rubikus now? \n\n\nZhenya Leonov Okay. I guess the first question goes to me. I guess I should start by saying overall\, I don’t know what my opinion of CBP was. It probably went up a little bit\, which may sound strange. The people we’ve worked with were there to do a job and they worked with us and they tried to accommodate us and what was happening. One of the problems is\, without getting political\, it doesn’t matter if you think we should let a lot of immigrants into the U.S. or a little. We need the working system and right now we don’t. And that manifests itself in the following ways. A lot of times the CBP doesn’t really have guidance\, so they have to make decisions on their own. And what ends up happening is they make one person makes one decision one day. One person makes another decision another day. And a lot of times those decisions end up hurting people. And you can’t have a situation where if you meet the right CBP officer\, you know\, one thing happens. If you meet the wrong one\, another thing happens. For example\, whether or not an immigrant gets put\, a migrant gets put in detention is up to the CBP officer and the guidance is lacking. With Ukrainians before the program was active. So Ukrainians in the program get two years parole in the United States and perhaps that be extended. But before the program was active\, the length of their parole was basically up to CBP and somebody got guidance for a year. So they were given parole in general for a year. And then we found out that some of them were given parole for less than a year for about 360 days. And there was various questions as to why that was happening. And one\, the answer was cynical\, but perhaps it was true. A lot of benefits a Ukrainian doesn’t or any parolee does not get if there are paroled for less than a year. That has since been remedied by the program and by the laws which were passed at the federal level\, which said anybody who entered the United States from Ukraine under parole of any length of time is eligible for the following benefits. But before the program was active\, a lot of benefits weren’t available for anybody who got parole less than a year. So we asked the State Department\, because we had contacts from our work with a few people in the State Department\, so we asked them who gave the guidance? And the people at the State Department were like\, I don’t know. We don’t know\, we didn’t give this guidance. And then we asked the CBP\, you know\, who gave this guidance? And I don’t know. Somebody wrote some memo. So what’s happening is basically you have people who are using their judgment\, so to say\, but they don’t have guidance. One day it’s one thing\, one day it’s another thing. And it’s really chaotic. So that’s not a working system\, regardless whether you’re on the left or the right or the center\, right. And I think that ends up hurting a lot of people. And right now\, we have to we the the point here is we are figuring out what to do with the Ukrainians that got paroled for less than two years because their parole is going to be\, for some of them\, ending around April the first ones that started coming in. But I\, I would like to emphasize that the people we were in contact with\, you know\, as I said\, I think my opinion of CBP went up. And I’m sure that a lot of bad things happened. It’s inevitable for the way that the system doesn’t work for a lot of bad things to happen. But my experience has been more positive than that. They were trying to accommodate us. They were working with us\, the minors that got put in ORR custody\, which is a separate set of shelters. It’s not a detention\, but all minors\, because of child trafficking laws\, are put in ORR custody. We were able to get them out. There is a process and\, you know\, that process worked\, we got them out. So to that end\, the experience I’ve had was positive. \n\n\nRita Vinokur Wow. Well\, the question was\, how scary is that? Well\, I have three types of nightmares. We are running out of money. We are running out of coordinators. We are running out of refugees. And depending on the situation\, it would be one or another or another one. So\, well\, my favorite nightmare would be running out of coordinators\, I guess\, I’d like the easiest one because\, well\, I certainly have some people who are ready to pull an all nighter. And when I do have like seventy  requests per day\, which is insane\, I would just tell people\, okay\, we have 70. No one is going to bed til we contact every single family because that’s how we operate. I mean\, that was told everyone in the very beginning that we are taking 100% of  our requests. We do not do any filtration. We do not choose. We take them all. So if there is 70\, it means\, well\, we are not sleeping tonight. And it’s not like every night. I mean\, we have a huge team. The team is great. We’re resourceful\, lots of people. So\, I mean\, it’s okay that sometimes we need to put some extra effort. So it wasn’t scary when the number of requests went by really high. Last time it happened when they announced the military drafting in Russia. So those refugees who were going through Russia\, they were so scared that somehow Russia going to close the border to prevent Russian men from running away and they’re going to get caught in Russia and just like trapped there. So the number of requests increased like that. So it was dramatic. I mean\, and we didn’t sleep for a week\, but we managed. So I would say that that’s the least like scary part. Run out of money was scary when you have like ten requests per day and then 20\, then 30 and then 40\, you go and you fundraise. And the best way to fundraise is to be loud. Is to tell everyone what you’re doing\, like every single person. And at some point there is someone who knows someone who knows someone who has money\, you know. So that’s how it works. I mean\, sometimes I tell this story\, I think it’s alright to tell it now how we got the funding from Nova Ukraine\, because one day I was a breastfeeding mum and it was a community of breastfeeding moms like international community and it was some girl who was volunteering for Nova Ukraine as one of the case managers. They do have like lots of case managers who would take care of a couple of projects\, like every single person would\, you know\, be responsible for some of the projects. So we happened to be in the same breastfeeding moms group. And when I told everyone in that group what I’m doing\, because we have like lots of Ukrainian girls there and they were trying to find a way to educate their loved ones and their relatives. So I advertized that there is Rubikus\, we can help. And it was this lady she just wrote to me like and I’m working with Nova Ukraine. I’m volunteering for Nova Ukraine and we are providing some funds to the nonprofits like yours. So maybe you need some money. And like\, yes\, we do need. Well\, honestly\, at that point\, I said no. Because at that moment we have everything covered by free volunteer like services\, and everything in Europe was free for the refugees. But in the months when the Northern Stream kicked and we started evacuating people through Russia\, then we would start like needing lots of money because those Baltic countries like Estonia\, Latvia\, Lithuania\, they were not prepared and they didn’t have all the free stuff. I contacted her back like\, you know what? Now I need some money. And she arranged a first grant from Nova Ukraine. And then I happened to meet the board and I introduced the company. But actually she was the one who provided us with our first money from Nova Ukraine. So you never know when and how it will happen. Just be loud\, just spread the word and that’s how it works. So\, yes\, it’s not scary when you know that you can do it. And actually\, that’s what we believe in. That’s why we kept attracting new refugees. And then when you have requests\, you build the model suits best. I think it’s not like about scaling. It’s about being responsive and being agile and trying to find the way to handle the situation you’re facing today. Because tomorrow the situation could be difficult\, different and you can’t really predict what’s going to happen tomorrow. Yeah\, that’s what we realized. \n\n\nSalimah Samji One of the questions was how to be a volunteer for Rubikus. \n\n\nRita Vinokur If you’re a Russian or Ukrainian speaking person\, you can go to our website and we do have a Google form. We have a Google form for everything. So we have a Google form for a person who wants to be a volunteer in Rubikus. So you just fill the form and then Marguerita will get in touch with you\, ask you some questions\, and then you’ll meet me over Zoom and I’ll tell you all about Rubikus and here we go. If you do not\, well\, Russian and Ukrainian are the only two languages which we use to communicate. Otherwise it’s going to get like\, it’s going to be way slower. So unfortunately\, if you do not speak Russian or Ukrainian\, the only option for you to volunteer for Rubikus is to organize something\, to spread the word\, to fundraise. For example\, those wonderful Christmas cards I already mentioned you\, can do like little event in your church\, school\, in your university to send some cards to the refugees\, to send some cards to the people you know\, and want them to learn about us\, to sell some postcards\, like whatever you want. We have plenty of ideas how to raise money for Rubikus\, so feel free to contact me on Telegram. I hope you’ll send around some information how to contact us. Yes\, so that’s it\, I guess. \n\n\nOlga Yulikova I guess in conclusion\, I would like to say that there is a job for everyone. If you’re interested in helping\, we’ll figure out where to plug you in. Trust me. So that’s number one. Number two\, to get back to Lisa’s question about now what? So we’ve got the big guys\, the little guys\, the government\, the continual war. People are still struggling. They’re still running away. In fact\, there’s someone here in the room who is a refugee from Ukraine who survived\, came here to really save her daughter\, 12 year old daughter\, while her 31 year old son is in Zaporizhia\, the city that’s always in the news where the bombs are falling every day\, he’s there to protect the country. So her journey is not over. Her struggle is\, if not just beginning\, but it’s like at the height of it\, that’s for sure. So there are people who constantly need help. How to link the big guys\, the small guys\, the corporate world\, the government world through personal energy. Put your energy in it. If you don’t know how to do it\, called the experts. The experts are right here. The experts are probably in your breast feeding group or other midnight drivers. And once again\, I want to just give a shout out to the younger folks\, the generation of my children. Engage your children\, people. They are the future. They know how to use technology. They know how to mobilize everyone at the push of a button on there. Which app do you recommend? \n\n\nSasha Segal Instagram. \n\n\nOlga Yulikova Tada. All right\, use your kids. They’ll get it done. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Super. On that note\, we have gone way past the time we thought we’d end by 5:15\, 5:30. And we are we’ve gone past that. But this has been really excellent. Thank you for your great questions and for coming here. And thank you to the panelists. I think this has just been awe inspiring. Anyone who thinks that they are just sitting at home and there’s nothing that they can do\, I think you’ve proved them wrong\, that there is something that everyone can do. It’s just about whether they really want to try. And if there is a will\, there’s definitely a way. So thank you for what you do and what you continue to do. And thank you all for joining us for this talk. Thank you. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nNobody was really prepared for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine … especially the refugees. The traditional sources of help – NGOs and government agencies – were unable to respond quickly and efficiently to the humanitarian crisis facing them. The urgency demanded imagination and energy to help refugees who have weeks\, days\, or sometimes hours to find ways to survive and then to construct a future for themselves.  \n\n\n\nThis event features three organizations that leveraged the networking power of cell phones to gather resources\, organize people\, and mobilize hope amid confusion and despair\, stepping in when larger organizations would not or could not. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/agile-responses-to-the-ukrainian-humanitarian-crisis-the-power-of-cell-phones/
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SUMMARY:The Curious Case of the Powerful yet Powerless Bureaucrat
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC) \n\n\n\nYamini Aiyar\, President and Chief Executive of the Centre for Policy Research\, India \n\n\n\nIn 2008\, Yamini Aiyar founded the Accountability Initiative at CPR\, which is credited with pioneering one of India’s largest expenditure tracking surveys for elementary education. Yamini’s work sits at the intersection of research and policy practice. Her research interests span the fields of public finance\, social policy\, state capacity\, federalism\, governance and the study of contemporary politics in India. Yamini serves on a number of government and international policy committees as well as boards of nonprofits and think tanks. Her recent policy commitments include: Commissioner and Chair\, Governance Working Group\, Lancet Commission on Reimagining India’s Health System; Member\, Chief Minister’s Rajasthan Economic Transformation Advisory Council; Member\, United Nations Committee of the Experts on Public Administration; Council Member\, United Nations University; and Member\, Technical Advisory Group\, National Data and Analytics Platform\, NITI Aayog. Yamini is an alumna of the London School of Economics\, St. Edmunds College\, Cambridge University and St. Stephen’s College\, Delhi University. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Welcome to the Building State Capability Talk series and welcome to all of you who are joining us online. We’re really excited to be able to have virtual participants for this talk as well. My name is Salimah Samji and I am the director of Building State Capability. I will be your moderator today. For those of you who want to know what Building State Capability is\, who we are\, what we do\, there is a page on that pillar and that has a QR code that will give you all the information about us. Our next event will be on Wednesday\, November 16th at 4 PM\, and it will be on the agile responses to the Ukrainian humanitarian crisis\, the power of cell phones. So we look forward to seeing you at that event. Today\, we are delighted to have Yamini Aiyar with us to talk about the curious case of the powerful yet powerless bureaucrat. Yamini is the president and Chief Executive of the Center for Policy Research\, CPR in India. She was previously a Senior Research Fellow and Founder of the Accountability Initiative\, housed at CPR. And through the Accountability Initiative\, she is credited with pioneering one of India’s largest expenditure-tracking surveys for elementary education. She is also a regular columnist in newspapers such as the Hindustan Times\, Live Mint\, and the Indian Express. Welcome\, Yamini. The format of today’s session is Yamini is going to spend the first 20 to 30 minutes talking and then we will sit down and open it up for a Q&A. So if you have questions\, just hold them to the end\, hopefully on paper and pen so you can write them down. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar So Salimah and I ventured out into the big\, bad world of trying to understand the impact of some of the accountability efforts that were unfolding on the ground in India around social service delivery\, specifically the social audits. And I think we did one of the first studies on not so much the impact\, but the process of the social audit and what kind of immediate effects it has on the ground. And it was particularly interesting because and actually a real privilege for us\, because this was a very crucial moment in which the narrative of state capacity was building out in the Indian context\, in the sense that it was the early 2000 or the mid-2000. So India was at a particularly different juncture at the time than it is today. There was a lot of enthusiasm\, excitement\, the economy was growing and bursting and the possibility of us overtaking China was very much in the mind space of all that ran the Indian economy\, ran the Indian government. It was a time of hope\, but it was also a time when that hope couldn’t ignore the reality of the failure of the Indian state\, the abject failure of the Indian state to deliver even some of the most basic things to all Indians\, and the questions of inequality\, or more importantly\, the questions of what it will take to ensure that there is equitable participation in the Indian economy\, as it was growing\, were front and foremost in minds of civil society activists of the Indian citizenry that dealt with the Indian state on a day to day basis. And it became impossible for the public discourse to completely ignore that\, even though it would like to ignore it. And a lot of the framing around it was around the challenge of corruption. The Indian state fails because the Indian state is deeply corrupt. Petty corruption is a reality and certainly was a reality back in the 2000. And it built out indigenous\, grassroots\, public discourse around questions of accountability\, questions of transparency\, and really thinking about the challenge of state capacity from the point of view of the of the cutting edge of the citizen state interface. You know\, at the core of this whole thing was the idea of citizenship\, a concept that I’ll come back to through the course of my talk and the social audit was this sort of practical\, tangible attempt at converting this imagination of these or these high level concepts of accountability\, transparency into a very real experience of what it takes for citizens and state to interface with each other\, to make claims of accountability\, and for the state to respond to those claims of accountability in more ways than one. It was a heady and exciting moment\, and I think it framed the challenge of state capability or state capacity. I’m going to use these two words interchangeably. I know that they are conceptually very different. I use them interchangeably because capacity is a better understood term in the Indian context\, so it’s easier to just take capacity and get around the problem. But really what I mean is capability and we can talk about that in the course of the Q&A as well. But\, but at the heart of all of this was the idea that deeper\, more robust democracy with tangible tools of articulating democracy in its every day would be at the heart of what would build the Indian state. But I think in some of one of the consequences of that imagination\, which we came to through the course of our work as well\, was that it didn’t\, it didn’t pursue a deep inquiry into the Indian state at all. And in the course of that early work with Salima\, one of the questions that kept lingering in both our minds\, if I may\, you know\, you can always absolve yourself of all all that I attribute to you later. But let me attribute away for the moment. But\, you know\, one of the things that was very tangible and visible was in these moments of direct contact\, of directly making\, there was a complete inability of the state to respond. So\, you know\, one example was at the time\, we still hadn’t gone into this fancy mode of digital digital payments. Payments were being made under the National Employment Guarantee to those who were working in these programs through the post office system. But the Postal Office is a central bureaucracy and it is completely distanced from the rural development bureaucracy that was implementing the National Rural Empowerment Guarantee under which the social audit process was unfolding. So even though there would be a lot of complaints about delays of payments or possible fraud\, ghost beneficiaries\, etc.\, etc.\, those who were doing the social audit simply did not have the power to do very much with vis a vis the postal office except open a file and will come up. We have come to that as well. But\, you know\, all of this sort of reminded\, reminded us or brought home to us the reality that any discourse on accountability\, any discourse on state capacity or state capability needs to begin with an inquiry of how the state functions\, its organization\, its own internal sociology in order. To be able to better understand both why it feels to be accountable or is reluctant to be accountable\, and what it will take to make it genuinely accountable. Salima then moved on to do bigger and better things\, and I stayed on in India\, but I had become curious. And so while Salima was here\, I spent the next few years roaming around parts of North India doing work on expenditure tracking and elementary education\, and in the course of that process\, spent an inordinate amount of time with frontline bureaucrats. The block\, which is the last mile of the administrative architecture in India\, which has a block education officer and a block development officer. Extremely powerful people. Almost everyone I spoke to and you know\, I’m talking about a range of states. So I spent a lot of time in Bihar\, but Rajasthan\, Madhya Pradesh\, Andhra Pradesh. At the time it was the undivided Andhra Pradesh and eventually broke into two states\, but also saw subnational governments with different levels of capability defined in terms of the ability to actually deliver on service delivery outcomes. Yet across all of these places\, I would encounter very similar kinds of people. These were largely men\, but some women who had spent the bulk of their twenties applying\, taking every conceivable examination that there is to be part of the Indian state. They all started with high hopes of the Holy Grail of the Indian Administrative Service taking the UPSC\, and then ended up eventually in taking whatever jobs they got and eventually found themselves in the state cadre\, which is extremely prestigious. And you know\, when we would talk about why a government job matter to them\, they said all the things that we know. It’s all about the power\, it’s all about the status. And you could see that visible and palpable all the time. You know\, every time we go in\, there’s hordes of people. But the people would be treated in a particular way\, shoved to the side. The bureaucrat was always really busy. The bureaucrat had really important phone calls to make. The bureaucrat is balking. I mean\, it was all a very important projection of power. Yet in the conversations I had with them and we would sort of once we’d move beyond the sort of artifacts of power that were visible and talk to them about their daily work and what their daily lives were\, it was always a conversation of powerlessness across all types of bureaucracy. Now it’s true that\, you know\, you go from the politician\, you go from the prime minister all the way down to the local panchayat in India\, and you’ll find everybody blaming the other because they lack power. But it seemed to me interesting that as an outsider\, I’m a visible outsider when I was talking when when we spend time in these offices and there is a lot of sort of projection of power and a very concerted attempt to make that power visible\, tangible and expedient\, especially for a party\, the outsider. When we talk about what they do\, it was always a narrative of I am just a post officer\, what can I do? And my post office\, they didn’t mean post office in the efficient sense of mail moving from one place to the next. They meant post office in the sense of moving people from one desk to the next. They spoke about how they spend all that time responding to orders. They come from the top. We respond. We respond at the bottom. Now\, overbearing bureaucracy is defined on the back of rules and order. There’s a reason why these rules and orders exist\, but they seem to have become prisoners of those orders and prisoners of them in more ways than one. But most importantly\, we would push when you push the conversation and talk to them about what they can do. After all\, they are the powerful state and this they because they are the cutting edge of the citizens state interface\, they are the state where people come. I mean\, the most visible bureaucrat for the average Indian is not the prime minister. It is a block education officer is the Punjab Secretariat and people depend on the state for many things. The state is all powerful\, especially in rural areas in India. So people are coming in hordes and they like the people coming after all\, that is also a way of exuding your power yet. So when you would say so\, what can you do to improve education or what can you do to improve the state of healthcare? There would be this struggle on their shoulders and say\, well\, they say this in Hindi and then I translated into English because it’s more powerful in Hindi. Sarkar You hear the whole podcast that the mother magazine and others like that. So the government\, one story of the state\, one story\, it can do a lot of things\, but I cannot do these things. And I heard this so often that I’d become completely immune to it until a research associate of mine who would come with me to the rural Bihar for the first time and full of observations\, was much more powerful than mine sort of said. But this is very odd. This guy is the state. So what is this notion of being the state\, presenting yourself very much as a state and yet saying the state is something that can do a lot\, but I’m not in a position to do it. Now it’s easy to dismiss all of this because it is a well-established fact that the frontline Indian bureaucracy barely shows up to work. They are deeply corrupt. They are very much part of the elite social structure. And in fact\, significant part of the problem in the early days of our work at the World Bank Salimah and I\, it was the early days when all the absenteeism studies were coming out. And\, you know\, we’ve drawn and used all this data are 25% teacher absenteeism\, 40%\, doctor absenteeism\, 5050 chance of encountering a teacher in a school that’s actually teaching. These are all the lived realities of the Indian state. And so you would dismiss all that I heard as well. This is just yet another excuse of an apathetic bureaucrat trying to justify their own inability or unwillingness to do the job that they want. They only want the power. They do not want to acquire the responsibility of what it means to be the Indian state. But I heard this too often to allow myself to just let it go. It was what I felt a sense of a deeper inquiry\, simply because I thought if someone comes to me as the head of an institution from the outside and asked me about my job\, it is true that in my everyday life\, no matter how much I try to get my colleagues to do things\, they always walk all over me. So I am the face of the powerless head of an institution. But I wouldn’t want to tailor abject outsider to whom I wanted to project power that I have no capability to do the job I’m supposed to do. And it you know\, my entire engagement with the question of state capacity\, therefore\, came precisely from these experiences\, from these stories. And that’s why I like to think about the problem of state capacity very much from the bottom up. And I’m going to return to all of these in a few minutes. But let me frame how I see the problem. If you think of if you talk to all the years when Sallie Mae and I were first engaged with state capacity back in the 2000\, the ones that had got legitimized and had entered into the lexicon of bureaucracy or thinking about the Indian state. Were ideas of transparency the right to information\, accountability\, social capital. These were words that bureaucrats had begun to use. I was once in a meeting where a bureaucrat said\, “We are here to talk about social accountability”\, because\, again\, that was a phrase that nobody fully understood. Nodded\, especially me\, and I’ve written papers on them. But it was part of it was something that people used to talk about\, and they said it’s not like we’re not socially accountable\, but now we have to be more socially accountable. Well\, you know\, these words had become part of how bureaucrats try to describe themselves. Over the decades the word state capacity has very much entered into the lexicon of bureaucrats\, bureaucrats writing books about state capacity. The Indian state politicians talk about state capacity. And that’s why the state capacity initiative uses the phrase state capacity at CPR because everybody understands what it means. There is a widespread recognition. India\, like most of the world\, is deeply polarized in its politics today. But everyone will agree on one thing The Indian state lacks capacity to do what it’s supposed to do. The question is why? And what are people’s perceptions of where the problem lies? At one level\, this is perceived or understood as a policy problem. Lance Lant Pritchett\, the famous failing state\, is used and abused by everybody and we all choose to interpret it our way. But the general perception that India has good policy but really poor implementation. So the challenges in the implementation\, the challenges was is with that bureaucrat was pretending to be powerless\, but what does that mean? Implementation is treated very much as a challenge of incentivisation. Can we change the terms of contract? These are full time employees. They don’t really have any motivation to do anything. No one’s monitoring them. Let’s change the terms of contract\, improve the monitoring. That’s how you’re going to suddenly solve the problem. What does all of this mean and how it’s articulated? It’s articulated as a problem of plumbing. The pipelines exist\, but they’re not working because they are blockages. You need to unblock them. So we need to do plumbing reform. Again\, a word that is used commonly\, although it’s a phrase that to me sounds a bit icky. Nonetheless\, we have to do plumbing reform and it’s also all about disciplining the front line. The problem is not on the top. The problem is with the bottom. The bottom doesn’t show up to work and do their job. Let’s start disciplining them. And accountability is really all about that. Disciplining it is about accounting. As land would have rephrased it\, it is about trying to ensure that there is a paper trail to ensure that the you do what you are supposed to do as defined by me. People also recognize that it’s a political economy problem. The lack of political will comes up again and again. And I did a history of what Prime Ministers of India say about the bureaucracy. And there’s a really nice chapter in a book on Indian politics of the 1990 by James Manor. From Nehru onwards\, we have always said everything. The Prime Minister\, no matter what political color they come from\, has always said the problem is with the Indian bureaucracy\, it’s design\, it’s the elite service. It doesn’t feel accountable\, it’s completely distanced. And it was we need to reform the bureaucracy. So then…you know\, at one level\, all politicians say bureaucratic reform is essential. No politician actually does it. No Prime Minister has actually done it and done it well. And the bureaucrats will always say there is no political will and is complete political capture\, by the way\, which makes it even harder. For bureaucrats to do their job. The reality of denials\, for instance\, barely to two months\, six months that you are a district magistrate\, particularly in parts of North India. This has all been well-studied\, well documented. So the problem is politics. And then the politicians will say the problem is not politics. The problem is bureaucratic wherewithal. Even today\, our Prime Minister is known in the world as a sort of a quote unquote “doer” rather\, he positions himself to be a doer. And you if you track his speeches in parliament\, it’s always about the bureaucrats that are not doing their job. And a lot is being done to try and improve\, quote unquote\, “monitoring of the bureaucrat to be able to ensure that they do their job”. Because the assumption is that there is no bureaucratic weight in the bureaucrats will say absolutely not. Full of bureaucratic will is a politics…it’s a politician problem. And we go back and forth. And then last but not the least\, the poverty problem. There are huge fiscal constraints. It does not\, particularly now that we have fiscal rules and state governments have to pay for these permanent employees. Then we deal with wages and liabilities and long term pensions. It’s not worth investing in the chicken and egg. It’s not worth investing in a state that is too big and too inefficient and doesn’t do the job well. So let me congratulate the state. Let me reduce my investments. And then you get a remarkably thin state that is meant to do all of these massive amounts of things\, because the average Indian deeply depends on the state for almost everything. This is how the problem is framed. But I think in framing the problem this way\, we completely missed the reality of these powerful\, powerless bureaucrats that I spoke about. They walk in. This is a nice picture. So it looks less like a slightly better office. And everything that you hear about digitization may well be true\, but they are still only on paper. When you walk into a local government bureaucrats office and it’s full. Not just paper\, it’s paper files and lots of dust\, and they say things about themselves as being the post officers\, being these people who are when you ask them\, will you give any suggestions on how to improve things? And the first thing they say is “What suggestions can I give? Nobody asks me any questions. My job is to implement. I just follow orders.” We’ve been tracking the daily lives of many of these bureaucrats and really it is like that. They now work on order\, they get on WhatsApp and then they do whatever they are asked to do based on that. And in fact\, we also thought that there’s no such thing as I mean\, it’s not you shouldn’t be surprised. But we tried to look for some reason for job descriptions of positions we have on government orders\, but they don’t really say anything about the reality of what it means to be a bureaucrat. So\, you know\, we have all of this other discourse\, but we’re not really talking about what the life of these bureaucrats are. And one of the critical issues with all of this is that if it if it justifies and legitimizes\, I would argue\, the absenteeism\, the lack of the corruption and the inefficiency in the following way\, it creates a narrative of disempowerment that enables bureaucrats to cast themselves as passive agents responding to orders rather than active agents responsible for change. So when the citizen walks in saying\, as they did in the social audits that we were following back in the 2000s that money has been siphoned off or a work site has not been opened or the teacher doesn’t show up in the school. Frankly\, the grassroots bureaucrat doesn’t really have much power to do anything. They are really busy responding to orders given to them from the top. If they don’t send that paper at the appointed moment\, they really get shouted at by their District Magistrates and the District Magistrate doesn’t send the papers at the appropriate time they will get shouted at by their state officers. So it’s a chain of command that creates a particular perspective. And in all of this\, the bureaucrat is sort of left convincing themselves that my role here is to be a passive agent responding to orders rather than an active agent trying to do something\, because I really have very little under my control. When we used to track expenditures for government programs\, you would find that this is a slightly dated three or four years ago. Things have improved\, but only marginally so. Bulk of money for what you have to implement will show up towards the end of the financial year on March 31st. My institution gets some money from government and I know that we have to rush to to plan what to do with this money\, because it shows up on March 29th and we have to give a utilization certificate on April 1st. Otherwise\, the next year’s money will not come. So you’re going to do some useless conferences\, and that’s the end of everything. So and that happens very much as part of the daily life of bureaucrats. So how do you actually convert yourself into an active agent\, even if you’re willing? And that’s also part of why reforms get resisted\, distorted at the grassroots\, because the bureaucrats are not actually empowered to do what they are\, what you would expect to do\, at least in your imagination\, of the role of the state. So how do we try to solve this? And this is where the biggest challenge for me comes\, because we have framed the problem\, as I said\, as a problem of policy\, as a problem of political economy\, as a problem of fiscal constraint. We spend all the time not trying to solve the problem from the perspective of the individuals or the system or the organization\, but from the point of view of how can you fix the policy problem. So we end up trying to do all kinds of things that\, in my opinion\, sort of reinforce the rules or reinforce the low equilibrium model in which the Indian state is stuck. Here are the things we love to do right now—Outsourcing. We are outsourcing the Indian state in ways that are unimaginable to me as somebody who has been in and out of Indian bureaucracy now for the last two decades. The biggest change at the top. So if you go to the state headquarters or if you go to Government of India\, is that you see this IAS and it’s very tangible. You can see the difference basically in the form of the dress. The IAS is all it looks\, you know\, much more in Indian dress\, at least the women and the men are wearing suits or shirts and pants. And then there’s this whole gang of consultants who all look like suits. And he is very business\, very\, you know\, private sector\, fully purposeful. But that difference is very tangible because they all come from very different ecosystems. They look different. They are different in the most basic things of how they approach work\, what they wear\, and therefore then how they work. And they are everywhere. They mostly come from the big four—PwC\, BCG. Many of you here\, I’m sure\, have work for them. I think Rohan here who studied this big question. But I mean\, essentially the Indian state is completely outsourced and it’s not outsourced because the Indian state doesn’t want to do what it’s supposed to do. The Indian state is outsourcing because the bureaucrats at the top have a very short window in which they can do anything. And the only option they have then is to try and outsource because they have completely after the state below have completely atrophy. So so there is this large presence of the private sector and in addition\, there is a large presence of institutions outside of the state as a means of getting around the problems of the state. So they’re project management units\, TSUs (Technical Support Units). The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation\, God bless them. They support all of us\, but they are hugely part of all of this. Create these institutions outside of the states to do the job of the state. We then love technology. After all\, if the answer to all our problems\, it’s really cool to have the Digi Locker identity. But they didn’t allow me to use that to enter here. We use technology-based phone apps now that have our ID. Every problem that the Indian state confronts is now being solved by an app. There are more apps and more startup versions inside the Indian state than they are in Bangalore City\, which is a city of startups in India. We assume that you can solve the problems of the Indian state\, which to my mind the very real problems of active individuals. So algorithms\, without asking the question about who’s making the algorithm and who has to use the algorithm for decision making. So in some of the work we do with states\, it’s our job to actually start analyzing the data. But there’s nobody inside the system who has the power or ability to absorb the data that you’re collecting all these apps and all this use of technology. But it also creates an imagination that I can solve the problem of the grassroots Indian state by creating\, quote unquote\, command and control centers. They actually exist that are with CCTVs\, with biometrics\, with all kinds of things\, actively monitoring the everyday life of the local bureaucracy. Now\, that’s fine. If the problem is to run an election\, you need to make sure somebody is there. But it certainly is not going to help you with talking about classrooms and health centers and the complex political economy realities in which the average Indian bureaucrat who has been cast as a passive agent actually functions. All you really get are people who are going to try and get around the system rather than people who are going to convert from being passive to active. And in my view\, the passivity is a bigger challenge. And what does it do to the idea of citizenship for all the failures of the attempt at deepening democracy of the thousands? The fact is that I see it as at least some attempt at creating an imagination of the state and the citizen\, which is embedded in a notion of citizenship\, where the citizen is an active agent and not a passive recipient. The minute you bring in elements of technology and the minute and this is not to make an argument to say we shouldn’t have it\, but we should recognize its limitations. The citizen is spoken off as an ineligible beneficiary. To get them out. They need to verify themselves to be part of a data system. The citizen becomes becomes a number\, the citizen becomes a data\, a data point. The language we use for the citizen. The citizen becomes a beneficiary in our politics. Now\, the welfare state is being the citizen in the welfare state is being articulated as a in the word collaborative\, which essentially means beneficiary. It’s not a problem when we talk about beneficiaries in classrooms like this. It is a problem if you step away from that and think about the welfare state is about a relationship between citizen and state and you reduce the citizen to a passive beneficiary that has to receive things through technology as the cash flowing all the way down. And if it goes to the wrong person\, then that person is an ineligible beneficiary who needs to be deleted from a list. But that person is an actual citizen\, and the act of entering into the state system through these so-called lists is also in\, in and of. Itself an act of democracy. So this framing of technology and the beneficiary also shapes how we think about welfare\, the Indian state and the citizen. And I’ve said a lot in a very short moment. There’s a lot to unpack here\, but I hope we can talk about this particular point in the Q&A. So now I’ll come to a little bit of what does it mean if you think about the Indian State capacity challenge in the way that I just describe to try and change things around from our perspective as a research institution\, as a think tank that is actively trying to work on the question of state capacity. It’s really easy for us to fall into the possibility that they are both available\, that they are the demand of the moment\, and they are somewhat where bureaucrats want you\, which is to come in and fill in a gap that the bureaucrat wants to fill in in the immediate. But as a think tank that is not a consulting institution\, the question for us always has been is that our role and our role is not just to do research\, it’s to do research that is relevant\, that tries to influence or change things. So it’s not just about asking the high level question of what is state capacity\, but also actively trying to ask ourselves\, where is that last chapter? How do you build it? If you define state capacity as something about reimagining purpose of bureaucrats away from passivity to active to being an active agent\, what does that actually mean? How do you build a professional identity away from responding to orders and towards actually being able to respond to the purpose for which the bureaucracy exists\, which in my understanding is to deliver public services to citizens rather than just beneficiaries. So what does all of this mean for us? The way we’ve been thinking about it\, we feel that it’s important to start conversations about institutional norms and values and really try to push these ideas of purpose inside the bureaucracy. Sounds really fuzzy\, and no bureaucrat has the time for this. So when we convert it into practical thinking\, what we trying to do is to shift the way we think about civil service training and produce regular surveys that become sites of discussion for bureaucrats to talk about themselves. During COVID\, we did a survey of the IRS on how they think about challenges of public health\, the role of civil society\, private sector media. I mean\, you know\, perception based surveys have all the limitations. So it’s not good research. But it became a fight for a conversation among the IRS officers. And many said to us\, this is a good opportunity for us to talk about ourselves\, otherwise we get support in the day of firefighting for the IRS naturally. So given the nature of the job\, the short term is the long term. But really for a policy research institution\, the question of policy\, think of all of you who are going to go out into the world of practice. You have to push hard to say what is the long term and how should how do we work a short term in a way that it doesn’t undermine the long term? So that’s what we’ve been thinking about civil service training. I’ll give you just two examples and stuff. We’ve been working very closely with the government of Meghalaya on trying to implement some of these ideas. We’ve been doing this through training for the Meghalaya Civil Service Office. So there’s the state level civil service officers by introducing into the pedagogy idea the values and skills for what a 21st century civil servant would be. It is it was fascinating for us to learn how much the state training institutions actually have been completely undermined or rather just left to atrophy because there has been no active thinking on this. Too much of the thinking is on the IAF\, so we work at the top end of the administrative training\, but too little is done at the bottom\, which is why you need the BCG is and the PwCs to come in and fill gaps. But really there is a whole cadre of state officers who need training and no one goes there. So can we spend more time reactivating\, re-energizing these crucial in public institutions that we have ignored so far? We’ve also introduced in there elements of studies. We are doing a cohort study of the medical service officers. It’s a long term study. We’re going to track these officers over a ten year period\, really trying to understand how their motivations evolve\, how they see norms and values evolve as they go from being trainees into the bureaucracy and so on. And we hope that all of this would be ways of enabling conversations. Even in actual fact\, research on the Indian state is remarkably thin. The field of public administration has been reduced to the field of what technical app I can produce without any knowledge base. So there is no conversation apart from the thinkings or the the the writings of former bureaucrats who write their biographies. So can we create a whole body of this active knowledge that would allow for discourse and dialog to take place? How do you embed all of this into institutional and organizational design? We’ve been working to redesign the training institution. We’ve been learning\, working to create centers of excellence\, and we’ve set up with the government to make a state capability forum that we hope will be\, again\, a site that takes the focus away from New Delhi into state capitals where these discussions and dialogs are most necessary. So I’ll end by saying all of this together. How do I define state capacity and how do I place this powerful\, powerless state into an analytical framework for me? I want to give you four. Proposition State capacity is about policy and implementation. So it’s not just the flailing state\, it’s about how we imagine the state and how we think of the state as something that has to implement things. It’s about the design as well as the regulatory practice of the state. Let me state capacity is about systems that fix their own pipes\, not systems that require BCG or Center for policy research to fix its fights. It’s not a plumbing problem\, but it is about public institutions and systems. We in India have allowed public institutions to fall apart. Then we complain about them and the solution is to outsource their roles to others. So what does it require in the 21st century? The state has to be active. It has to be nimble. It has to be innovative. It has to be integrated. Very nice words. None of them mean very much\, but it essentially means you have to think of rules as more flexible that allow for a organizational structure to have structure\, but at the same time ensure that there’s inbuilt enough discretion and technology becomes both an opportunity and a challenge because technology by definition is centralizing and it called discretion\, which is helpful from an efficiency point of view. But there is a tradeoff of capacity\, capability\, accountability and most importantly\, democracy point field So it’s something that we need to be more alert or alive to and think about as we develop apps\, strong institutions\, organizations and systems get the incentives right. But these incentives do not come from biometric monitoring and command and control centers. These incentives come from reimagining their purpose. I am here talking to you today. Not because someone’s monitoring me. I’m here talking to you today because it is my sense of purpose to share my ideas with a group of thinkers like you. You will talk to me. You will shape my ideas. You will improve how I think\, and hopefully you like some of what I say and talk about it in other places\, and hence I feel a stronger sense of motivation. And so that that is my incentive and purpose. But you know\, if someone was monitoring my every move with a GPS tracker\, I’d probably just come here and give my phone to Salima so that she could come to the Kennedy School. And I could say to my bosses back home that I came here while I’m out shopping or enjoying myself. State capacity cannot be an if only then\, story\, and I think this is really important. Much of the policy discussion in India is centered around the fact that the Indian state fails. Therefore\, we should not be doing things. You cannot expand the state in the way in which you want to because the state is too efficient and inefficient and therefore it’s much better to put your money somewhere else. Or we’ll just cash and we’ll do the bare minimum we want\, build out our public health systems. We won’t build out our education systems. We are the most privatized health and education system of any country at our level of GDP anywhere in the world. We are completely disenchanted as a population with the ability of the state. The only people who believe the state can actually deliver high quality education\, mostly when a bureaucrat does mean on them\, but it’s their job to do it right. So how do you break this sense of complete disenchantment and move away from the idea that it’s in you know\, we get things done in spite of the state. We get things done because we are able to do a few things right\, but not everything else. And we should limit ourselves there to really getting rid of this disenchantment and exposing our first to the possibilities of what the state can do. Because I still don’t know of a state that has been able to improve the economic opportunities of its citizens without being able to produce high quality public schools and high quality public health systems. The private sector exists. I’m I my children go to a private school. I go to private healthcare. I will continue to do so. But having said that\, with that caveat\, I do not believe that that is the answer for a country where a vast majority of our young need to have greater economic opportunity. In the end\, the problem of the state capacity is closely and entirely linked to the problem of the or the challenges of the Indian economy. We used to say in the 1990s\, India grows while the states sleep at night. That was a nice phrase in 2022. India will only grow when the state has purpose. The public has to be its citizens and the public has to be driven by the citizens aspirations for being part of a growing\, burgeoning economy. And this framing has to come right back in for us to move ahead as a nation. Thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you very much. What we’re going to do now is we’re going to take questions. The nominees giving us a lot to think about here. And the way we’re going to do that is we have a microphone that will come around. We’ll take three questions at a time. And if you could just be sure\, you should introduce yourself briefly before you ask your question. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Super. Microphone. And then there’s. \n\n\nAttendee 1 Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I am Noor Ghazali from Malaysia. I’m a Fulbright visiting person here. You speak 99.9%. What is Malaysia? If I want to say 100%. It might be because for one thing\, there is a regime of bureaucrats coming from British to India to Malaysia. Hmm. Mm hmm. I just want to make it quick. Two questions. You mentioned about political problems. In the case of India. What is that? Borderline between the bureaucrats and the political masters? You know\, I mean\, we have the experience. Political masters tend to stay for a certain point of period and therefore reform and change are not much of a priority. Number two is that where do you think the roots of the problems? What makes them I mean\, yes\, I agree with you. They are very powerful. But when you talk behind the doors\, this. What can I do? Yeah. Thank you. You speak Malaysian? Thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. More and then we’ll… \n\n\nAttendee 2 Hi. Thanks for the talk. My name is Pranay. MPP one candidate here. My first question is very similar. One of the phrases that I’ve heard time and again is bureaucrats. Politicians are completely bureaucrats\, but bureaucrats and politicians. So this actually and this actually puts a bureaucrat as all powerful being up in the air when it comes to policymaking in India. So I would like to understand your perspective is a little better. My second question is you you mentioned about the role of the BCGs and PwCs etc. in terms of in-house for us is our post policymaking. And I\, I particularly see themselves organizations like BCG\, organizations like PwCs\, not only as a banking solution but also as a solution which is\, which is more outcome driven and which is more which is more results driven. So is is that a particular problem in the sustainability of the solution as a fix to policymaking? Do we not see this as a new norm that is going to emerge in 21st century policymaking? \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. \n\n\nAttendee 3 Hi\, I’m Alwyn from Indonesia. I am an MBA student here at HKS. My question is on empowering young bureaucrats in public institutions. I work for the public sector in Indonesia. I’m a young bureaucrat\, but sometimes I may feel that I have good ideas\, but I can’t convey this to higher ups within the organization because of my ranking. Do you have any suggestions? Resolutions? How can a public organization empower or delegate more to its young employees? Thank you. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you very much. Yes. Okay. Thank you. Thanks for these wonderful question. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Oh\, sorry. Any from Zoom? Yes\, thank you. We’ll start with them for the next round. Thank you\, Najwa. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Okay. Okay. To the issue of politics. The relationship between the politician and the bureaucrat. It is\, as both your questions I think highlighted\, an extremely complex one\, because there is truth to both the politician being the problem for the bureaucrat and the policy and the bureaucrats being the problem for the politician. And but but but I think that so I think we need. For me\, the starting point is to just accept that reality. Because if we spend too much time inquiring that reality\, which I think is where a lot of political science literature has focused\, there is a lot of literature there already. We’re not going to be able to get past that problem. And I think that at an analytical level and at a practical level\, it serves as a really effective tool for\, you know\, for passing the buck on accountability. So\, you know\, like I said\, if you go through the whole sort of narrative of prime ministers and how they talk about their bureaucrats\, they always complain. I mean\, that’s the that’s the the the in the end\, that’s the final bottleneck. I want to do all of these things. I’m not be able to because Prime Minister Manmohan said the instruments. I forget exactly the terms that he used. But basically the idea that\, you know\, he had this phrase about no country can progressive the instruments that are of the state are not aligned or designed to respond to the challenges it confronts. Prime Minister Modi had this very nice phrase because he’s all about really nice phrases. 21st Century India is now dealing with 21st century problems with a 19th century bureaucracy. And in speech after speech\, there’s a lot about how the bureaucrat is the problem. And when you talk to bureaucrats\, they will rightly say\, I’m simply not able to do very many things. There’s a huge problem with tenure. I’m being pushed to sign things on fire that I’m not supposed to. And and the bureaucracy\, by definition\, at least in how the Indian Constitution frames it and I think it’s the same for for most post-colonial bureaucracies\, is that you’re essentially expected to serve under the will of your political master. I mean\, it is a job of the bureaucrat bureaucrat to implement. It isn’t the job of the bureaucrat to make policy. That’s where politics comes in. That’s where accountability of voters comes in. Right. So it’s not to run away from the problem\, but it is the thing. If we keep focused on that problem\, we won’t get to what I think is one of the critical aspects of what could make the bureaucrat political politician relationship a far more functional one\, which is in empowering the capacity of the actors within the bureaucracy to do the job that they’re supposed to do\, rather than disempowering them to make them only accountable to the orders that they have. So\, you know\, in some of the work I’ve done\, just to give you an example of what I’m trying to say and some of the work I’ve done on the city state of Delhi\, which is where I live\, got a new government in\, I think it was 2015. And one of the aspects\, one of the political agendas of that government was to do massive reforms in secondary schools in the city\, in the government\, secondary schools in the city state. And it had all the elements of what political science would look for political will\, top bureaucratic will and\, you know\, a long term agenda\, because this is a government that came in with almost no opposition that was going to be there for the better part of five years. And so I was really curious to try and understand how does all of this then unfold on the ground? And\, you know\, you really the minister was really into this like I’d be driving to work and put on the radio and all I would hear is the minister telling me things that used to be music to my ears. We’ve done a survey in schools. 70% of children in on standard six can barely read the standard six textbook. We need to do a lot to improve learning quality. These are all the things that we had worked on\, studied\, talked about for for nearly five or six years\, until suddenly here was a politician who was trying to build public consensus around this. So we went into these schools and the everyday life of the school was very much driven by the tools of bureaucracy. We tracked the database of over 8000 government circulars\, 8000 government circulars\, and this is only half of what was actually issued over a period of three years to try and get the local school bureaucrats and to them\, the teachers and the head teachers to implement parts of the reform\, because this is the only language that the bureaucrats knew. So then circle back. It allows the political masters to say how well we want to do all of this reform\, but it all gets distorted on the ground because a bureaucrat doesn’t do it. But frankly\, the bureaucrat only knows this tool. So I think it’s really important for us\, without losing sight of the challenge of politics\, to also understand that the dynamics of internal dynamics of organizations shape the narrative that politics then picks up and builds on. So how can we change that internal dynamics? Because you and I can change politics all we can\, but we can change it this way. And I think it’ll be more powerful. Sorry\, there were a bunch of others\, but I think let’s take a few more and then I’ll come back to some of these others as we go. Wonderful. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Let’s take them from our virtual participants Najwa. \n\n\nBSC Team Yeah\, thanks. Someone ask\, what? Why is that? Indian bureaucracy is always looking for orders. Rule-based states should promote opposite. Is it only based on merit of transfers? How much is corruption or corruption part of the problem? Another one is. You slip\, you slip back and forth between using the dome’s capacity and capability. Do you use these words interchangeably or do they have different meanings? What is a good distinction between the two\, alternatively or alternative? The mean the same thing should be settled on one. What do you see as the role of public policy schools such as HKS and their graduates in this debate? In what ways do they currently contribute or fail to contribute towards building state capability? One more question is how do you envision civil service implementation from. Another. \n\n\nSalimah Samji A lot of them. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Okay. Let me try. Let me try and respond to a few of these. So I think one question was about rules in a rule based system. Why does the rule become the problem? And is it about incentives and is it about corruption? In some senses\, I think corruption. I think that to be provocative. I think that we have framed too much of the discourse on state capacity around the challenge of corruption without trying to get to the root of why corruption happens in the first place. And that’s what leads us to solutions that are about command and control\, biometric monitoring and everything else. Without getting into the complexity of the political economy or the reality\, or rather the realities in which bureaucrats find themselves. And that’s what sort of generates this. So so the internal hierarchy is one of the reasons why the order has become a problem. It’s not about the audit itself. It’s about the way the order commands you to do things. So indeed\, 8000 orders that we were looking at\, it was very regular for the order to say things that you must all you should do\, you have to do. Otherwise you will be penalized. If you don’t do it\, it’ll come into your records. And so from the perspective of the bureaucrat at the grassroots\, they recognize that if anything\, they will be monitored on. It’s going to be this. So I better get my act together. And also that\, you know\, I am part of a hierarchy where somebody is basically doing me down and not doing me up. So\, you know\, when you ask them questions around\, you know\, what can you do to improve the pedagogy in your classroom? For example\, in the instance of\, of\, of\, of\, of teachers\, they will say\, well\, I would like to teach\, but I’m not being able to teach because this order has come in. The order has taken over my day. And it’s really put me in a more in a frame of mind where I came into the government\, I came into becoming a schoolteacher because that is a job that has great amounts of social status and social mobility. And it gave me a sense of identity of myself. But my everyday life is being told what to do. So it costs you as somebody who is basically responding rather than as somebody who has genuine agency. It reduces your identity and purpose to nothing but being a cog in a wheel of a system that’s so deeply hierarchical that it really sort of beats out a lot out of you. So that’s too much. Got too much thinking around carrots and sticks\, in my view\, based on the story. The reality of corruption shaped that and too little thinking about what it what will it take to develop genuine agency. And I think part of the problem is also because our constitutional imagination of the Indian state created its own hierarchical caste system in the Indian state\, that the state was going to be the agent of large scale social change. And in order to be the agent of large scale social change\, it needed to have a balance of outsider insight. So you get a lot of this that comes from the outside into states. And really their job is to try and keep the distance between the complex social realities of the embedded state and then be the anchor of social reform and social change of all kinds. I think it created a dynamic or historical dynamic of an internal hierarchical caste system which made the use of can do\, should do\, must do. You will be penalized if you don’t do grandma very much part and parcel of the grammar of bureaucracy. So it’s fascinating to me that most discussions at the district level with the office are discussions about a system that doesn’t function are also discussions about a system that is the problem. And as somebody who does my project\, I know that if I don’t get my team to go along with me\, nothing would happen. But the hierarchy doesn’t allow for those conversations to happen. And where you see change\, you see change. When ideas\, leadership suddenly decides to make that local bureaucrat part of the feedback mechanism\, bring them into a meeting and do something very simple\, like saying\, Don’t tell me where you are on targets. Tell me what you need from me to help you achieve those targets. Now\, this seems like rocket science doesn’t seem like rocket science to most of us\, but when you are embedded in a culture of hierarchy\, it becomes that much harder. So I’m really pushing for us to change the terms that we use when we think about the Indian state not ignoring the reality of politics or the reality of corruption\, but trying to ask ourselves whether that has set limits on the imagination of the Indian state and can we look at the problem somewhat differently? Otherwise\, we might end up in this dystopia of command and control centers with characters all the way at the bottom who are running far away from any command and control that you would want to have. But you will create a data system that will tell you a good story and reality be damned. So\, so. And that’s where the capacity and capability question comes up to me. I think that the Indian state both lacks capacity and capability. By that I mean capacity is often understood in terms of the nuts and bolts of what it takes. So do we have enough people for the job? Do we have enough processes for the job? We do. Why is it that our block offices\, they were the first one to point this out to me. When you walk into the middle of nowhere in a government office\, it’s like a really hellish place to be. The computer is dead. The dust everywhere that CCTV cameras and TVs like this now everywhere. But even those only have always have the plastic around them because you don’t want the dust to get in because there’s no one to clean it properly. I mean\, they’re basic capacity things that need to be fixed. And we’ve only been talking about state capacity. The film has got popularized at least in the Indian context\, as a capacity problem. But capability is really about all these more complex issues. It’s not that people don’t want to do it. Have we actually created enabling conditions for people to be able to do it? And those enabling conditions for me revolving around issues of purpose\, norms\, values\, professional identity and what actually gets systems to work collectively. If all systems work in the world on the basis of hierarchy\, then you know the world would be this is not a factory shop\, it’s it’s a state. And it deals with citizens not ineligible or eligible beneficiaries. So it needs to be able to move differently. On the role of public policy schools. I’d also add into that the role of think tanks\, because that’s an existential question that we deal with on an hourly basis. And I think that\, you know\, precisely this kind of conversation is an extremely important role that we need to play today. There was\, I think\, in the in the phase of the 2002 thousand intense\, a lot of emphasis on trying to figure out what are the technocratic solutions to the big challenges of state implementation or of public service delivery. So do we have the pedagogy right? Do we have the public health system right\, etc.? I think increasingly across the globe and in India\, very tangibly\, the whole nature of the state and citizen expectation of the state is undergoing a very dramatic transition. And the nature of the challenges is is is getting far more complex as economies are going\, becoming more complex as the development path is becoming more complex\, as the globe is converging itself into fairly into a space of deep turmoil. I think we kind of need to go back to the drawing board and push ourselves much more in terms of the ideas that we have or how we are articulating or framing the problem. And from that process of framing\, try to bring the technocratic solutions that we became really good at. So a lot of these ideas about outcomes that it’s to\, you know\, again\, I’m going to be provocative\, but and I don’t mean that we shouldn’t focus on outcomes. I started Accountability Initiative talking about the importance of outcomes. But we have got so focused on the outcomes that we’re not really talking about the process that enables the outcome. And it actually\, you know\, it’s you can’t the two are not separate from one another. But when we talk about process\, we need much more in a much deeper. We understand the nature of that process and the context in which that process is embedded. So for me\, the role of public policy schools like yours\, that’s the role of a public policy professional is to bring the space of ideas back into the discourse\, but also recognize that there’s a distinct difference between a public policy profession\, which is a private sector professional working on public policy. And I think we need to be cognizant of that distinction. In CPR\, we make that distinction by saying\, I’m not going to walk in. I’m not going to partner with a state government to deliver just an outcome. I have to leave something behind. Otherwise\, I’m not doing the role of a public policy professional and not leaving behind should be some form of capability or capacity. It also means that I have to be very self-critical as an institution and as a participant\, because every action that I am introducing into the system will have a long term democratic consequence and I am not accountable for it. So how you have to constantly be very self-aware of that reality. And I think that’s the distinction between the services that are provided by extremely agile\, extremely innovative\, extremely capable messages. And BW sees words as public policy institutions or public policy professionals. And it comes back to the last point I want to make\, because I get office a lot in India\, but it’s worth thinking about as you become the next generation of makers and shapers of public policy professionals. It’s a it’s a profession that is only about beginning to emerge. Back when we were working in 2000\, you know\, I would say to people\, I work in the World Bank and I work on state accountability. And they would be like\, oh\, you work in a bank. Do you think you can help me open a bank account? Now\, suddenly\, this idea of a public policy professional has emerged\, and we’re still trying to make sense of what it is. And I think one important aspect of this is what does it mean to work with the state and to work for the state in? What has entered into our lexicon are also notions of a public policy think tank. If something is not good enough\, what we are doing\, i.e. we are doing the job of the state and I think we should be careful of all of this. I see our role as being the brokers of knowledge. I see our role as being the brokers of ideas. And our impact is not in the idea being adopted or in the knowledge being adopted or in becoming the the implement all of these. Our impact is in being able to constantly provide a mirror or constantly provide critique in the public discourse. If you don’t do that and you fall into the trap of doing what is asked of you\, then you’re not being a public policy professional. You are a policy professional. Move the word public out of it. And I think we should be conscious of that distinction\, because increasingly it’s becoming challenging to speak to ideas in environments where\, you know\, democratic exchange of ideas is no longer seen as a necessary component of democracy. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful. Thank you. I just want to add a little bit here before we have more questions on Zoom\, before we take some more questions from Zoom. And if you have some in here\, the name of our program is Building State Capability. And when we decided to name ourselves\, we really thought through this capacity versus capability conversation and we on purpose chose to use the word capability. And yes\, people don’t understand the difference\, but we chose capability because that’s the word we wanted to use\, because capacity alone is training and training alone without\, you know\, all of you in your questions say that they don’t have the power. Right. The the student from Indonesia who left said no one asked me. I can’t tell anyone. Trained yes. Capacity. The person clearly has but is not empowered enough\, doesn’t have the capability. So you need the capacity and you need the empowerment to give you the capability to be able to do something. And\, you know\, these questions around incentives and carrots and sticks is something that we hear so often and we don’t believe in at all. We’ve been doing this for ten years\, and what we have seen over and over again is intrinsic motivation. When you tap into the intrinsic motivation of public servants around the globe\, that’s when magic seems to happen. That’s when and you empower them to be able to do something because they all they didn’t. This officer exams are not easy. You don’t do that because you know. Yeah\, it’s a cool thing. No\, it’s really hard. It’s really\, really hard. It’s because you cared about public service and but what happens is like what anything you get on the ground\, you do this work and you get that love of serving your public beaten out of you with those 8000 circulars. And even when we were working\, I think we counted there was 99 centrally sponsored schemes. How do you actually administer like 90 centrally sponsored scheme in a district house yet that’s their job. You try to do that\, you know\, and it’s really easy to your point of like the blogs and whoever. It’s very easy for them to come in and like do something. We have like cookie cutter solutions to everything. They deal in the world of black and white and not in a world of gray\, which is the real world we live in. It’s too easy to say they’re all corrupt. That’s naive. That’s because we don’t understand the difference. One of the talks we’ll do in January will be on Nigeria. There is an author at MIT who wrote this brilliant book on corruption in Nigeria\, and we’re bringing him in January to unpack. Corruption is too easy. It’s become like this catch all praised for all sorts of things. But let’s understand why. Why does status quo prevail? And kind of digging deeper and building not just\, you know\, we’ve both worked at the World Bank together. And one of the things that we saw is they will build similar structures of a PMU. That will then be a scaffolding\, but they never lay a brick. You come in five years\, you’ve built the whole nice scaffolding. You don’t have it. You don’t. You leave. You pull all of the scaffolding down. Not one brick was laid. How is that building capability for anyone? Right. And so if the private sector was serious about training people instead of doing their job for them\, then sure\, they’re a welcome partner. But to be able to just build a parallel structure\, to be able to do that\, then that just takes away. Like the self-help groups in Andhra. You know\, Naidu created that as a parallel structure to the government on purpose. Right. We can’t do that. We need to work with what we have and build that out. So we have two in the room\, and then another will come to you after the two of the room. \n\n\nAttendee 4 Yeah. Hi. Thank you again for coming and for your presentation. I got a chance to briefly introduce myself\, but my name is Akshay. I’m with the mid-career MBA program here\, which is the one year program. And before I got here\, before I came to Harvard\, I was with multiple think tanks in India who were 12 to 13 years before that in the corporate world. My question to you\, Yamini\, is what I what seems to be missing for me. I don’t know if that’s an emergent behavior\, your emergent behavior that you’re referring to\, but I. I do not see an empowerment here on your slide. And the reason it’s it’s striking to me is because one of the one of the big advantages in the private sector where I have work is that if it’s a CEO or a director of marketing or a regional manager at every level\, there is a sense of you being able to make a decision. And while that decision can be challenged\, but it’s rare. I mean\, there’s a lot of thought process\, whereas in this role\, from my limited understanding\, and particularly for a state agent like a bureaucrat is challenged all the time in all directions and makes it very difficult. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you\, Najwa. \n\n\nBSC Team You said the proposition for the state. What is the concrete roadmap you suggest to make the state responsive towards the citizens in India and improve the performance of bureaucrats? You said you work in MTI in Officer Training Academy. What ought to be when an officer hits the field and encounters what is? The second question is\, is there a role for the judiciary in mediating the inaction caused by the blame game between the politicians and bureaucrats? And if so\, what is your opinion on the current state in India? Third question What is the role of the policy bureaucrats changing with technology tools and open data? How will that role look like in 2050? And there are two questions based on a pause. \n\n\nSalimah Samji There\, and then we’ll officially and there’s one more here. Sure. We’ll take that one. \n\n\nAttendee 5 Sorry\, I’m a PhD student first year here. Building off of Rohan’s question. Like what? How do you see the role of\, like\, academic research in\, in sort of addressing these questions? And also in the past\, there were there were like ten years\, 20 years. Do you see like any constructive sort of role of academic research on India in adding to this debate at all? Yeah\, I think. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Thank you. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Thank you for these great questions. Okay. Following your question about our city’s technocratic solutions\, I actually think it’s even if bigger than that\, I think that there is and I don’t have a good way of articulating this. So forgive me\, but it’s an argument I’m trying to frame in my mind. I’ve been trying to frame in my mind for some time and let me test it out. I think that the the thought of post 1990s entering into the 2000 India’s coming out party on the back of technology and combined with the complete the significant atrophy of the social sciences in our public institutions that have created the perfect storm or perfect moment for a consensus to be built around the technology imagination of how to solve the problem. So we all celebrated the uses of words like plumbing\, etc. We said data is the new oil. We\, you know\, and both the producer of the research through mechanisms\, through tools like the RCT and the Fed can do more of the research\, which is largely the Indian bureaucrats\, many of whom also now stem collectively putting together this imagination of the challenge of the Indian state can be fixed through a combination of data and technocratic carrots and sticks solution. So it sort of fed into each other and and and a lot of it also and the reason it fed it with itself\, fed into each other and created a sort of intellectual consensus\, had a lot to do also with the public understanding of the reality of the Indian state\, of its failures\, particularly at the grassroots\, the experience\, the immediate experience of the both of the globalization context\, where getting the state out of the way sort of unleashes the animal spirit and the sort of India grows at night as the states sleep. The imagination\, which gave a much larger space for the thinking than than critique of the thinking. And it’s not just India. I mean\, look at households\, look at what’s happened to social sciences\, but look at what’s happened. I mean\, I find it stunning to see so many political science job talks that are all about\, you know\, about the regression. They’re not about the question. I think this is political science. It’s not in some way the question you’re asking has to have some relevance to the context within which the question was framed\, but it completely disappears. So I think that there is this there is this big challenge. And and\, you know\, into this game\, the outcomes based framing of accountability\, which the World Bank and many of us swap out in and of itself. None of this is wrong. You do need data\, you do need outcomes tracking. You do need to have a ecosystem of evaluation with a multiplicity of of of techniques. You also\, as a bureaucrat have only three years that the best case scenario. And if you really want to make a difference you’re looking for something tangible\, practical immediately that you can do because you don’t know how three years from now or even two years from now that you will be there. So having someone come in and go away\, you know\, it’s a lot about norms and organizational sociology is like\, Yeah\, that’s fine in a classroom\, but I have a job to do. So this helps\, right? I have a set of short term things that are proven that I can do. I think the challenge is that a lot of it came without recognizing the embedded realities in which things happen. So who is framing the question? For me\, one of the best uses of our city has been in the way in which back home has used them. Right? There is a grassroots implementing NGO that has spent an inordinate amount of time actually engaging with the client with the challenge that they confront. And they are experimenting. And along the way of experimenting\, they both want to learn for themselves\, but also want to be able to have tools and ways in which they can build the credibility and legitimacy of the experiments that they are doing. So in a sense they are city is not decide determining the question and then coming to use you as a field site. The city is co-creating the question and then coming up with answers and protect. Never wait for or at all the time that I’ve spent with them. They’ve not waited for the JD paper to come out before talking about it. They’ve taken bits and pieces of the data that they find useful and then use those as levers to leverage conversations with bureaucrats. But it actually becomes an enabler to build capability for discourse rather than as an end in itself. So I think that’s the big push that we need to make. All kinds of research are welcome. It should never be one that gets full ahead of money and they should always be space for different types of research. So that’s one of the things. I mean\, what’s interesting about CPR is that we actually are completely multidisciplinary. So you have an anthropologist who heads the state capacity initiative and somebody wants us. Me rather puzzled when we just set this up. Really? You an anthropologist who’s setting up who’s going to walk on set capacity anthropologists like why don’t you have an economist and anthropologist? They actually talk real people. And really\, that’s where\, you know\, if you actually start looking\, you’ll get deep inside. So\, yes\, anthropologists use terms and vocabulary that is completely obscure to anybody who is real. But\, you know\, frankly\, it’s always a regression. It’s completely applicable to anyone who is doing so. How can we get these walls to communicate and engage with each other? That’s where I think many of the answers come from. I think the point about empowerment you made\, it’s a really important one. And\, you know\, it never struck me until you said it\, because for me\, empowerment is so self-evident\, but I never even articulated it. I wanted to unpack empowerment into ideas of purpose\, values and norms. But you are absolutely right. They all come together in the form of empowerment. And of course\, the big challenge there is around this tradeoff between discretion\, discretion and efficiency and accountability. And I’ve always been a great believer in more decentralized empowerment and deeper and greater discretion all the way to the grassroots. But the tradeoff always has been around efficiency gains. And I think again\, right now\, in the context of a deeply inefficient state\, efficiency is what is just grabbing the attention. Right. So why do we offend? The Indian welfare state right now is a big\, huge cash transfer and suddenly not enough to resolve any of the problems. But it is a big\, huge cash transfer. Why is it that if there’s a complete bureaucratic and political consensus around this and it has emerged from the fact that there’s a complete sense of disenchantment with the ability of the state to do any of these other things. So\, you know\, we don’t invest properly in the National Employment Guarantee Program or in rural infrastructure\, in public health systems\, or in the public school system\, because we are completely disenchanted with it. We have brought in technology\, but technology is a hugely empowering for an individual at one level\, but hugely disempowering for a system and another. How do you balance these straight? I think these are the questions. So somebody asked about the practical convergence of these ideas into implementation. If civil service training does not have this discussion in the comfort of the training room\, you’re basically not going to be able to find these solutions. They have to come from within the system. And what we are trying to push by training\, because it does sound like after all this\, you’re just going back to do what everybody else does\, which is training seriously. But the question is\, how are you using that side of training? Is it just about a set of skills or is about creating a public ethos of consensus and or a site of deliberation that can build a consensus around how do you balance these trade offs? Some of this stuff simply doesn’t exist. We don’t have good case studies\, for example. So when bureaucrats finish their field work and then I’m going to go into more policy positions\, they only have anecdotes which they share with each other. But those who come in\, especially senior bureaucrats\, to do the training\, they’ve forgotten that I’m in the field or that things change so rapidly that their time in the field is not the world in which you could create an app for a solution. So\, you know\, there’s no space for this kind of live discussion. I think this is what is really important\, and this goes back to the role of research and academic research. I think its relevance is in building actually breaking all of these silos using multiplicity of methods and allowing for more space for this kind of discourse to take place. So think of your research as a provocation for policy as opposed to an answer to a policy problem. And maybe we’ll have a much more interesting enabling ecosystem for this discussion to happen. \n\n\nSalimah Samji Wonderful. With that\, I think we’re going to end the session over one. Yes\, please say. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar I definitely don’t think the judiciary is the answer to the problem. I think in their overreliance on the judiciary and the judiciary is not accountable and right now is also not exactly the moral compass that I know that that a judiciary ought to be. So. So. No PILs please! \n\n\nSalimah Samji Super\, thank you very much for asking incredible questions. \n\n\nYamini Aiyar Thank you. This is incredibly fun. \n\n\nSalimah Samji And for engaging with us. We’ll be here for a little bit\, but this ends our session. Thank you very much for joining us virtually as well. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nDrawing on over a decade of studying and active practice of “building” state capability in India\, this talk offers a deep dive into the dynamics of capability gaps at the frontlines of the Indian State and offer a provocation on why current frameworks for building state capability often fail to address the roots of the problem. Based on emerging experiments in different States and across sectors it also offers glimpses of some promising innovations that offer important lessons on what it will take to do the hard work of state-building away from the glamour of technology and dramatic\, sweeping reform politics. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/the-curious-case-of-the-powerful-yet-powerless-bureaucrat/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220923T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220923T133000
DTSTAMP:20260907T014801Z
CREATED:20230302T161512Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014801Z
UID:14056-1663923600-1663939800@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Learning and Working Together: Effective Strategies for Team Projects
DESCRIPTION:Online \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\, Faculty Director\, Building State Capability & Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development (HKS)  \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Director\, Building State Capability (HKS) \n\n\n\nJocelyn Chu\, Director of Community Engaged Learning and Instructor (HSPH)  \n\n\n\nCarrie Conaway\, Senior Lecturer on Education (HGSE)  \n\n\n\nFacilitated by: Karina Lin-Murphy\, Manager of Faculty Development (DCE) and Allison Pingree\, Senior Instructional Coach (HGSE)  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nTeam projects can build real-world collaboration skills and deepen learning\, but also bring added complexity and challenge. In this HILT 2022 Conference session\, Harvard instructors shared their practices and strategies for engaging this complexity\, sharing how they teach students to be effective in teams and how they use teams to deepen students’ learning. How can we create the best environment for students to learn collaboratively in teams? What structures\, processes and other approaches can instructors use to launch and sustain student team project work? What skills do students need to learn to be effective in teams?
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/learning-and-working-together-effective-strategies-for-student-team-projects/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220922T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220922T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T014706Z
CREATED:20230213T194245Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014706Z
UID:13185-1663804800-1663891199@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Learning\, Failure\, and Blame in the Public Sector
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nDan Honig\, Associate Professor of Public Policy\, University College London  \n\n\n\nLant Pritchett\, Research Director of the Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE) Programme and Labor Mobility Partnerships (LaMP) \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Director\, Building State Capability (BSC)  \n\n\n\nMatt Andrews (Moderator)\, Faculty Director\, Building State Capability & Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nProblems in the public sector are numerous. It is an arena where critique is constant\, mistakes are magnified\, success is taken for granted\, and the risk of failure has public consequences. In this complex landscape\, how do you pivot from finger-pointing positions of ‘winner-loser’ and ‘we-they’ to creating a learning environment of “us?” Is failure without blame possible? We explore these questions in this panel discussion on “Learning\, Failure\, and Blame in the Public Sector” with Lant Pritchett\, Salimah Samji\, Dan Honig\, and Matt Andrews. \n\n\n\n\nSlides\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Photos
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/learning-failure-and-blame-in-the-public-sector/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210401T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210630T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T014839Z
CREATED:20230228T203200Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014839Z
UID:13877-1617235200-1625097599@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:PDIA in Action Event Series
DESCRIPTION:Online \n\n\n\n\nAbout This Series\n\n\n\nBSC Faculty Director\, Matt Andrews\, and Program Director\, Salimah Samji\, have been co-teaching PDIA in Action: Development through Facilitated Emergence (MLD 103) at the Harvard Kennedy School since 2018. This is a field-lab class where students learn a research-oriented version of PDIA by working on public problems – they learn by doing.  \n\n\n\nThis event series features presentations of students across Harvard who worked in teams on real-world problems nominated by Implementing Public Policy (IPP) alumni who served as their clients. The collection of student projects are also showcased in the PDIA in Action book. \n\n\n\nTeam Presentations\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPolice and Community Relations in Lancaster\, PA\n\n\n\nThere have been deepening tensions in Lancaster\, PA between the police department and the community\, heightened by a 2020 police shooting and nation-wide protests against police brutality. Students worked with Milzy Carrasco\, Director of Neighborhood Engagement for the City of Lancaster and Chief Bey\, Chief of Police\, to better understand this problem and identify entry points. Students learned to embrace multiple perspectives\, resist confirmation bias\, work effectively as a team\, and examine unknowns.  \n\n\n\nPresenters: Anne Dietterich\, Awab Elmesbah\, students at the Harvard Kennedy School; Amreen Bashir\, Revanth Voothaluru\, Seun Akinfolarin\, students at the Harvard Graduate School of Education; Milzy Carrasco\, Director of Neighborhood Engagement for the City of Lancaster and Implementing Public Policy executive course alumni. Moderator: Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability (BSC). \n\n\n\n\nSlides for police and community relations in lancaster\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTackling Safe Blood in Nigeria\n\n\n\nLocal health facilities and organizations do not have the capacity to attain or maintain safe blood supplies in Nigeria. Students worked with Dr. Adaeze Oreh\, Country Head of Planning National Blood Transfusion Service (NBTS) to assess this problem and identify entry points for action using the PDIA approach. Students learned the importance of teamwork\, staying focused on the common cause\, and leveraging the diversity and expertise within your team to enrich your knowledge and inform your process. \n\n\n\nPresenters: Allan Franklin\, Dana Radojevic\, Lauren Truong\, students at the Harvard Kennedy School; Hesham Gaafar\, student at Harvard School of Public Health; Dr. Adaeze Oreh\, Country Head of Planning NBTS\, Nigeria and Implementing Public Policy executive course alumni. Moderator: Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability (BSC). \n\n\n\n\nSlides for blood safety in nigeria\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nRadicalization in France\n\n\n\nThere is growing perception that radicalization is expanding in France\, but no consensus on how best to approach it. Students worked with Raphael Kenigsberg\, Cyber Security Expert at BNP Paribas\, to explore the increase in radicalization and identify entry points for action. Through the PDIA process\, the team learned to maintain open channels of communication with teammates and stakeholders\, expand engagement as much as possible\, and to regularly revisit and reevaluate the problem. \n\n\n\nPresenters: Sasha Mathew\, Imara Salas\, Kishan Shah\, Katie Wesdyk\, students at the Harvard Kennedy School; Raphael Kenigsberg\, Cyber Security Expert at BNP Paribas and Implementing Public Policy executive program alumni. Moderator: Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability. \n\n\n\n\nSlides for radicalization in france\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAccess to Childcare in Burien\, WA\n\n\n\nCurrent childcare benefits in Burien\, WA are limited and restrictive\, leading to broader social and economic impacts on the community. Students worked with Kevin Schilling\, Burien City Councilmember to better understand the issue and detect entry points using the PDIA approach. Together they discovered the importance of teamwork\, frequent communication\, building strong relationships and networks\, and maintaining a dynamic mindset which acknowledges the problem as continuously evolving. \n\n\n\nPresenters: Crystal Collier\, Doreen King\, and Sasinat Chindapol\, students at the Harvard Kennedy School; Kevin Schilling\, Burien City Council member\, and Implementing Public Policy executive program alumni. Moderator: Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability (BSC). \n\n\n\n\nSlides for childcare access in burien\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nExploring Trade between Kenya and Canada\n\n\n\nWhile the absence of bilateral trade agreements between Kenya and Canada hinders trade between the two countries\, there are several other barriers contributing to the problem. Students worked with Dr. Imbenzi George\, Honorary Consul General of Kenya to Canada to investigate this issue and help identify entry points for action. Together they learned to think outside the box\, harness their creativity and flexibility\, crawl the design space\, and focus efforts on manageable steps to make forward progress.  \n\n\n\nPresenters: John Diing\, Mayra Hoyos\, students at the Harvard Kennedy School; Bishal Belbase student at the Harvard School of Public Health; Stephanie Shalkoski\, student at the Harvard Business School; Dr. George Imbenzi\, Honorary Consul General of Kenya to Canada and Implementing Public Policy executive program alumni. Moderator: Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability (BSC). \n\n\n\n\nSlides for kenya and canada trade\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nImplementing Reparations in Asheville\, North Carolina\n\n\n\nAsheville passed its historic reparation resolution in July 2020\, but there has been a lack of progress and consensus in designing and implementing the reparation initiatives. Students worked with former Asheville City Councilor\, William Keith Young\, to assess this problem and identify entry points for action. Utilizing the PDIA methodology\, students learned the importance of building capacity before scaling\, the power of iteration in tackling complex problems\, and the value of taking small\, incremental steps forward. \n\n\n\nPresenters: Bethany Dill\, Student at the Harvard Graduate School of Education; Isabel Mejia Fontanot\, Kent Shi\, Kerianne DiBattista\, Students at the Harvard Kennedy School; William Keith Young\, Former Asheville\, NC City Councilor and Alumni of BSC’s Implementing Public Policy Executive Education course. Moderated by Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability (BSC). \n\n\n\n\nSlides for reparations in asheville\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAbandoned Infrastructure Projects in Nigeria\n\n\n\nNigeria has been struggling with several key public infrastructure projects being abandoned before completion. Students worked with David Wuyep\, Chief Technical Advisor in the office of the Governor of Plateau State\, to better identify and understand the problem and determine viable entry points for action. Together they learned the importance of teamwork\, staying humble\, taking incremental steps forward\, and the power of dissecting problems into underlying causes while questioning assumptions. \n\n\n\nPresenters: Nathalie Gazzaneo\, Tendai Mvuvu\, Rodrigo Tejada\, Matt Weber\, students at the Harvard Kennedy School; David Wuyep\, Head of Projects Management and Results Delivery Office\, in the office of the Governor of Plateau State\, Nigeria\, and Implementing Public Policy executive program alumni. Moderator: Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability. \n\n\n\n\nSlides for abandoned infrastructure in nigeria\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLegal Education Reform in Ukraine\n\n\n\nPoor quality legal education in Ukraine is perpetuating corruption within the country. Students worked with Artem Shaipov\, Legal specialist with USAID New Justice Program to assess this issue and identify entry points using the PDIA framework. Through the process\, the team learned the power of networking in opening new doors and potential entry points\, the value of teamwork and optimizing each other’s strengths while being cognizant of weaknesses\, and to continually question “why” and deconstruct the problem to its root causes. \n\n\n\nPresenters: Frederick Tarantino\, Ilhom Aliyev\, Manoj Kumar\, Mike Ramirez\, Yousuf Folathi Alkhoori\, students at the Harvard Kennedy School; Artem Shaipov\, Legal specialist\, USAID New Justice Program and Implementing Public Policy program alumni. Moderator: Salimah Samji\, Director of Building State Capability (BSC). \n\n\n\n\nSlides for legal education in ukraine
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/pdia-in-action-event-series/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20201008T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20201008T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T014918Z
CREATED:20230215T031634Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014918Z
UID:13263-1602115200-1602201599@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Message in a Battle - Why Communications Matter in a Pandemic
DESCRIPTION:Online \n\n\n\n\nSpeaker\n\n\n\nPeter Harrington\, Natural Resources and Energy Team Leader\, Oxford Policy Management \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nPeter Harrington Salimah got in touch and asked me to talk about communications in a pandemic. And I’m so excited by the title that I came up with because I love a pun. So that was reason enough to do it. And it’s really exciting to do this and I’m looking forward to a good discussion. The sort of background of this\, for me\, is a bit of experience that Salimah just referred to. I worked on Ebola in Liberia. I had lived in Liberia before. And I came back to work on Ebola and I was focused on behavior change communications. I worked between the office of the President\, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf\, and I also worked in the National Ebola HQ\, which was run by Tolbert Nyenswah. Lots of the stuff that we experienced and learned in that time became super relevant again in 2020. But I want to talk about today\, mainly about behavior change and why it matters\, why it’s important and how to do it. How to use communications to affect change and how to make communications effective.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington So first of all\, why does it matter? Well\, some of you might be familiar with the late Swedish statistician Hans Rosling\, who was in Liberia at the time. He was working in the Ebola HQ with the Liberian data team. Really amazing that he kind of\, he was there\, he was really committed and spent a lot time out there. But something he said to me really stuck in my mind\, which is this quote\, “Ebola is but the biological and a social phenomenon.” And I think this is true. I think if you talk to epidemiologists\, you talk to people at the CDC and places like that\, there’s a real understanding that communicable diseases are all about human behavior if it’s communicable through\, you know\, whether airborne or by human touch. It’s about what humans do. These diseases\, these viruses\, prey on human activity\, human compassion\, our desire and on our norms to be close to one another\, to have physical contact\, to be around one another. We’re social creatures and that’s how viruses spread. And so it’s a social phenomenon because what humans do determines what happens to the virus. If you enforce a lockdown\, you enforce behavior change and you get a very\, very clear and unmistakable change in the end.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington There’s a bunch of resistance factors. Main thing is risk psychology. Human beings have a bunch of psychological quirks around risk\, around in crisis situations which you have to work around. Social norms matter in Liberia and social norms and cultural matters. In Liberia\, the number one transmission of Ebola was funeral practices around touching dead bodies and bathing their bodies. And try to tell a parent whose child is sick\, don’t touch your child\, just forget it. You know it’s not going to happen. Some of it is human and universal and some of it is culturally specific. And it’s that’s enormously important. I’m going to come back to that point several times. Economic conditions matter as well. You know\, it’s easy. It’s a social distance in Soho than it is in Soweto. So where you are and the situation really matters enormously.  \n\n\nThere’s also changes in the communications environment. There’s changes in the trust in authority where we get sources of information. So the way the public seek health advice\, this is quite universal\, but it obviously varies by country. The way the public seek health advice has changed. People now tend to focus on online sources\, social networks. Mainstream media doesn’t have people covering health anymore. You don’t have that kind of authority source in the mainstream media. There’s much more opinion. If anyone’s been on the Internet recently\, you might have noticed that there’s a lot more opinion and a lot less news that’s really changed the way people consume information and what influences what they think and what they determines how they behave. Experts and authorities are less trusted than they’ve been in the past. This is universal. This is in Liberia. I’m not exaggerating: the most prevalent belief about Ebola was that it was a CIA intervention\, it was a CIA creation. You only have to go look at a 5G cell phone masts\, you know\, in your area to see how misinformation\, conspiracies\, mistrust of authority can play out. All the controversy over masks\, the politicization of mask wearing in some countries\, not naming any names.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington Trust is now the pivotal factor in health communications. It was always important\, but it is even more important now because it is in so short supply. Scarcity has made trust just inflate in its value because it so scarce in the world that we’re in now. And that’s the really key thing\, and that’s the concept risk communication has to grapple with and work with. So pandemics are complex\, adaptive problems that require massive amounts of learning and context. It has to be released into context. And you need risk communications to bridge people with the policies that you’re trying to put in place in your context. The scientific facts\, quote unquote\, the epidemiological expertize\, as we understand it\, is an input and that needs to inform policy and policy also says this is the required behavior we need to get the outcome we want. Right. But what policy you create was also causally links to the economic circumstances of the people whose behavior you’re trying to change. You’ve got a bunch of different drivers of how people are currently behaving. Misinformation\, that context of mistrust I just spoke about. Their risk perception\, which I’m going to go into in a moment. Their social values\, their cultural norms and their economic circumstance is so important\, you know\, if you’re asking them to do something that they actually just can’t do because they’re going to starve then you’re not going to get to change in behavior. The policy has to be realistic and aware and adapted to that context. But it’s the way it’s how you get close that gap between the kind of behavior and the required behavior that you need to get the outcome you want.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington So let’s talk about risk psychology\, I’ve mentioned it a couple of times. Humans are terrible at risk. We’re really bad at it. We misperceive risk in general. There’s a great quote from Dan Ghana that we live in an information age\, but our brains are stone age. So we really struggle to process all that complexity around us. Right. It’s kind of overwhelming. And our little brains are pretty smart\, but not that smart. And another quote from a guy called Peter Sandman observed that the risks that actually kill people and the risks that really upset people are completely different. People get like super\, super upset about certain things. There’s like other stuff kills you way more like shark attacks versus road traffic accidents. This is true. This is statistically true. Right. He did research to kind of show this. And so this kind of outrage\, the risk that upsets people is the risk that people change their behavior to avoid. They don’t go swimming when they’re in Australia. I would never go anywhere near the sea if I’m in Australia. Forget it. I’m not going to get attacked by a shark. But I think I am. So those are the ones that change your behavior. So just keep it in mind. What gets people upset and what’s that about? That’s about emotion. We’re also all subject to cognitive biases\, which massively cause us to overestimate or underestimate the likelihood of all sorts of events. So that’s the kind of backdrop of risk psychology.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington There’s a few more specific things about risk psychology\, particularly related to crisis situations. This guy\, amazing guy\, Vince Cavallo did a load of research that the AGL is your average grade level. It’s a kind of measure of like peoples like cognitive functioning. And he did a lot of research that showed that in a crisis situation\, people’s average grade level drops four levels\, in a situation of stress. So we get slower. We kind of get dumber in crisis situations. That’s a human thing\, right?  \n\n\nPeter Harrington 1N equals 3P\, one negative message roughly weighs about three positive messages. Right\, so people remember negative stuff way more than they remember positive stuff. It’s just the bias that we have. Probably some real good reason for it some heuristic kind of logic. But you’re swimming against the tide when you’re trying to manage and get messaging out if you’re a government or a policymaker or a leader\, you’re already walking uphill because for every one negative message\, three positive messages.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington Primacy recency is another phenomenon observed in the trials and the studies. So people remember the first thing you say and the last thing you say\, they have no idea. So we’re roughly in the middle of the Powerpoint now you’re going to forget everything I’m saying. You remember the first thing and the last thing you know\, this is a very\, very well established\, well observed phenomenon that this primacy recency.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington And this equation\, which I love\, which is kind of the perception of risk\, is the actual risk\, plus emotion\, some kind of emotional quotient\, some kind of emotional factor. And that’s quite actually subjective to different people. Depends on who they are\, where they live\, which bubble of Facebook they inhabit or who they follow on Twitter. You know if you think about how balkanized society is now in terms of different views\, you start to see how if emotion matters this much you have a serious problem when you’re trying to kind of get people to change their behavior to kind of all get on the same page. So that’s very universal risk psychology.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington A great bit of work that Vince Covello did was he showed that in high stress situations. What are the things that people pay attention? First of all\, they make up their minds in about 10-30 seconds. In terms of\, you know\, if you’re talking to them and if they’re stressed\, they’ll make up their mind about you in 10-30 seconds. Right. They’re judging your competence and your expertize\, your honesty and openness. They’re listening for your caring\, your empathy\, your compassion. Does this person care about me and my situation? So the problem that we have all the time\, the mistake that leaders made is they talking to people who are super stressed\, upset\, riddled with cognitive biases. And it completely misses. Right. It doesn’t land because we dealing with the right hand low stress more ordinary kind of comms. But we’re talking to people who are on the right hand side.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington So risk communication takes all these things into account. It looks for ways to generate consent and understanding and behavior change and it’s based on this kind of science this understanding of how people think and how people behave. It’s recognizing the centrality of trust in emotion\, it’s evidenced-based and it’s looking at what’s effective in a crisis situation when stress levels are elevated.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington What are some of the things that work? There’s this famous three nine twenty seven. So you’ve got basically for people’s attention span in high stress. You’ve got time for three messages\, about nine words and about twenty seven letters. It’s not a lot. That’s what you’ve got time for before people switch off.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington What Vince Covello has shown to work is the\, “I don’t know” template\, which is when people ask something\, if you’re a leader and you don’t have the answer to. You have to be willing to say\, “I do not know the answer to that because of this this this reason. However\, this is what we’re gonna do to get that information. And this is our plan.” That’s very effective\, to be honest and straightforward and say\, “I do not know the answer.” Don’t pretend. You know\, let’s say. But dot\, dot\, dot. And explain to provide that reassurance.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington Compassion\, conviction\, optimism. This is a kind of you know pneumonic that has been fancy\, really effective in environmental disasters\, different crises. First of all\, you show compassion because remember that fully half of it is all about how you connect with people emotionally. Then you got to say\, however\, we are going to do the following with conviction. And if we adhere to that it is going to address and solve this problem. Also\, if you want to get into the kind of technical skills there’s a methodological message mapping\, which I’m not going to go into in detail here\, but you can look it up if you’re interested in it. If you work in communications\, there’s a methodological message mapping where you map out the kind of structure and you use these techniques and these insights from topology someone to kind of address that. It’s not about how well you construct the message and are you within twenty seven letters? There’s a lot more to it than that. It’s also about clarity and regularity. So that kind of combination of giving information\, empathy\, but also hope and optimism. And we’re going to talk about the importance of who who’s actually talking\, the medium.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington So harking back to Ebola\, what West Africa learnt\, and we can talk about what we’ve learned this year as well. I mean\, behavior change is partly driven by what people see if\, like someone\, you know\, gets sick and dies. Then you change your behavior. In West Africa\, we learned a lot about risk communications. And I think some of that learning was apparent this year. But some of it was not. And it depends really. There is enormous variation this year. West Africa\, we simplified everything down to a very simple one page message map from 70 pages into one page. We simplified the message. We put it in vernacular language. We went and engaged with different\, local communities and understood what the concerns were and what the challenges around you know funeral rights\, for example. Taking those social cultural norms into account connected to the values and most importantly\, using and delivering the message through existing networks of trust. Remember the communications environment that we’re in. People don’t want to listen to a national leader behind a podium\, they do listen to their community leader in Liberia. In other parts of the world\, they might listen to someone else. You’ve got to look at in a context specific way\, who will people listen to? Who do they trust? Mainly\, actually people in the developed world\, OECD countries\, listen to their peers and that kind of immediate network more than anything else. And social media is a kind of extension of that. Some people depending on their generation might turn on the Prime Minister or the Queen\, and different people take authority from different place. But that trust infrastructure\, whatever that looks like in your context\, you have to use that trust infrastructure you can’t bypass it because this is emotional. And people don’t trust anyone\, trust is so scarce.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington So I’m going to take U.K. examples. A lot of messaging started badly with COVID. There’s a huge amount of variation from country to country places that did really well as it did really badly. U.K. started pretty badly\, which it shouldn’t have done\, really it had enough people with enough experience about this. So some people got better\, some didn’t. The early days of COVID in Britain was it was a muddle for about a month. Then they came up with a good slogan which was Stay Home\, Save Lives\, Protect the NHS. If you know anything about the UK\, you know that the NHS is this is kind of revered institution. And so that’s a nice concise\, it uses three parts\, roughly six and three nine twenty seven rule\, it’s good. Then they got confused a couple of months later and did a really weird one which was Stay Alert\, Control the virus\, Save Lives. I mean\, no one really knew what stay alert means. What I did to control the virus. So everyone got confused again. And now they’ve come back to something even simpler\, which is hands face space\, which is not terrible.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington So I’m just giving in one example\, the UK\, which is kind of some learning around what messaging was working\, what wasn’t. And you probably know from all from all over the world and you will have seen examples of good messaging\, bad messaging that is not concise\, is not clear giving people information about what do they have to do. Coming back to this point about what actually motivates people to change their behavior and who do they listen to? My beloved Prime Minister\, Boris Johnson\, who gave us sort of daily briefing. I think a lot of people didn’t really pay attention or listen to that. And actually\, in the initial stages in March\, no one was really changing their behavior no one was taking this seriously because they weren’t hearing these messages from people they care about. No one listens to Boris Johnson\, but everybody worships the NHS and the intensive care staff. And so it’s a message from people that you’re actually listening to and care about and it’s appealing to people’s sense of responsibility and citizenship. People know good messaging from bad messaging. They respond to people they trust. And that trust is influenced by a lot of different drivers\, which I’ve spoken about. \n\n\nPeter Harrington So leadership I’ve spoken a little about is really important part of this. I think let’s look around the world a bit. There are people who’ve done this really\, really badly. I think anyone can quite easily think of a couple of leaders who have done this spectacularly badly. Very unclear. Very inconsistent. But there are some people who have been very good. So the Premier of Singapore. He’s excellent. And he’s been very clear\, very calm\, composed in his communications. His body language. It’s very culturally appropriate\, it’s balancing emotion\, factual. It’s simple messaging. I think another person who I would say is very good has been Jacinda Ardern from New Zealand’s been excellent in the clarity and consistency of our messaging. Andrew Cuomo is a more emotional kind of  speaker\, but there’s people from all over the world. I think Ramaphosa in South Africa and other leaders in South Africa have done actually pretty good in just putting that balance. And it all depends on context. Singapore is different from New Zealand\, from South Africa from other places. But this calm body language\, talking to people\, acknowledging the emotion\, but providing reassurance and clarity. Emotion is crucial. Target the values rather than the science. Mobilize people. So good leadership is about people’s delivering the message to the public trust and listen to most of what I talked about is pretty applicable in any country. I would say a lot of these things are human traits. I emphasize cultural specificity a lot. I think some of the communications environments that I talked about might apply a bit more to the high income countries. In lower middle income countries trust maybe low\, but you might have stronger existing networks. You know\, community networks\, community leadership. People in the community\, who people listen to. Whether that’s through their church or other religious structures that exist. The key thing is that you still need consent for any mass measures that you kind of bring in you still need people to agree and go along with what you’re doing. You can’t forcibly locked down the country. I think every lockdown that happened around the world\, it was still needed. Even the lockdown in Wuhan\, it needed consent. It had the overwhelming consent of the public. Even though it looks kind of enforced. Yes\, it was straight\, but it had consent on a fundamental level.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington When we look to COVID\, when we go back in sort of April\, this is what it was meant to look like\, right? You’ve had this kind of rapid response\, you have this overload period. Then you had this kind of exit and this kind of recover and reform kind of process. Right. That you’d have this spike and then it would gradually we’d kind of we’d kind of hammer the curve\, really lockdown’s behavior change and so on. And the messaging needs to adapt as you go along. So emergency behavior change is about adherence then it’s about new behaviors and new norms. What it actually looks like is extremely problematic. And that’s what we’re seeing in a lot of countries at the moment. And there are reasons for that. And the most powerful reason for that is people’s behavior is lapsing. It’s going back\, right? Yes\, it’s partly driven these second waves are partly driven by returns to economic activity. We couldn’t maintain the sorts of restrictions of March\, April\, May for indefinitely. So we had to return to economic activity in the hope that we can do something with new norms and new behaviors. But this yo yo-ing that we’re seeing in a lot of countries\, these multiple waves is I think primarily driven by behavior. Whether people are really adapting to a new normal and really in a sustained way\, changing their behavior\, whether it’s distancing\, mask wearing. It’s really important to note that there’s a lot of uncertainty about what measures and interventions are going to have the most impact. There’s nothing was known about COVID before it arrived. That’s a massive learning exercise. People knew a lot about Ebola already when 2014 happened\, no one knew anything about COVID so there’s a huge amount learned. Message fatigue is a is a really well documented aspect of this field right. People just get tired and they kind of get “Ugh I’ve heard that…” At first t’s kind of it’s a little bit exciting and a bit new\, a little bit of novelty\, though\, we’re all home\, I can make sourdough or pick up Italian. Or in other parts of the world. It was impossible for people to make that lifestyle change or not go out\, but wherever they are in whatever part of the world\, message fatigue is is a human trait. So it’s very difficult to counter that\, actually. Also\, messages just lose effectiveness over time\, even if the people aren’t sick of hearing it\, it just doesn’t really land in the same way.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington What countries are going to need to do now is to reset their risk communications. It needs a kind of like a reboot because if you keep going with the same tired stuff\, people will say\, “Ok\, I have heard that.” Their sort of\, you know\, ears get closed. I’ve heard that before. And actually\, the dangers will get stuck in that kind of yo yo-ing situation because it’s lurching in and out of lockdown\, which is going to obviously be extremely detrimental to all kinds of things\, not just economies\, but all sorts of vulnerable groups and people’s mental health and all the other things that have been so impacted in this past year.  \n\n\nPeter Harrington So I’m going to sum up controlling something like COVID or Ebola is all about human behavior. All of these policies\, all of these measures\, it’s all about changing human behavior so that the virus\, cannot just jump from one person to another. Right. We have to change our behavior. We’ve all had to do that this year. Everybody on the planet has something in common this year. We all have to change our behavior. Right. But how much? And different people have different views on how much necessary or whether they should do it. Just to recap\, it’s driven by lots and lots of different factors. But communications absolutely can influence behavior\, if it’s done well adhering to the kinds of science based on evidence-based techniques and methods which I’ve talked about. There is a science of risk communication and an art and it works. It actually works. I mean\, we’ve seen it work this year. Yes other things influence changes in behavior. But if you go with the grain of what people are doing and draw their attention to the right things\, and utilize people they trust that it works. So that cultural sensitivity and context is absolutely essential. You know\, the messaging in Uganda has be completely different from the messaging\, not completely different\, but framed and delivered in a different way from the messaging somewhere else. And if you take away one thing from this\, it’s if the whole ballgame is about human behavior and the whole game of human behavior is about trust\, fundamentally\, that is the most single\, most important currency this year\, maybe for the next few years. It is an incredibly short supply and effective leaders\, effective policymakers\, effective anyone trying to work to stem and cancel this epidemic or in any context\, their ability to be effective is going to hinge very significantly on their ability to build trust with their audiences and with that\, back over to you Salimah.  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nAs part of Harvard’s Worldwide Week\, Building State Capability hosted Peter Harrington\, who worked with the Government of Liberia to craft their communications strategy in response to the Ebola crisis. He prioritized simplicity\, conciseness\, and truth in this crisis communications initiative as a means of creating awareness and influencing social behavior to reduce the spread of the Ebola virus. Peter shared lessons from his experience in crisis communications that can be applied to the current COVID-19 pandemic response of countries throughout the world. \n\n\n\nLink to podcast of this session (including Q&A)
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/message-in-a-battle-why-communications-matter-in-a-pandemic/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20190618T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20190618T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T014947Z
CREATED:20230216T030517Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T014947Z
UID:13325-1560816000-1560902399@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:PDIA Conversation with Alieu Nyei and Ganga Palakatiya
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nAnisha Poobalan\, BSC Teaching Assistant \n\n\n\nAlieu Nyei\, Liberian Economist\, Public Sector Reformer\, and Public Finance Management Practitioner \n\n\n\nGanga Palakatiya\, Senior Deputy Director · Board of Investment\, Sri Lanka \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nMatt Andrews These three are in our teaching team. We have worked with them around the world and when I say we\, it’s Salimah and myself and this is Tim McNaught who is also part of our team. We worked in Sri Lanka and the government’s problem was that it had not found foreign direct investment in new sectors for about 20 or 30 years. So the country had\, in the late 1970s… Managed to attract investors to help create a clothing sector that became incredibly competitive. Very very good clothing sector. So you know before I worked in Sri Lanka I didn’t understand that the clothing sector could be really high tech. But Sri Lanka is the place where most of Victoria’s secret clothes come from which are really you know I don’t want to say high end because it’s not that it’s kind of high tech clothing. It’s also where a lot of the clothing that is designed by Nike and places like that\, you know\, the kinds of materials where they take your sweats and they get your sweat out of the shirts immediately. A lot of that stuff came from Sri Lanka. The problem is that the clothing sector\, no matter how high-tick it is\, is something that is really affected by the cost of labor. And as your country moves from being a low income country to a low middle income country people start to get\, you know\, businesses start to say is there a cheaper place to go to and the people in the sector start to say we don’t want to work in clothing factories anymore. And so Sri Lanka started to run into a situation where the sector plateaued in terms of growth and they needed other sectors to look into. But if you want to get other sectors\, you really need to get investors who can bring their know-how and they didn’t have those investors. So seven or eight teams from the board of investment came together focused on finding investors. And one of the members of the team was Ganga. And Ganga was on a team called the R-Team\, which is the investment promotion team. There were a bunch of other teams. Ganga is a research officer. Research that you’re taught throughout. At the Board of Investment\, and one of the coaches was Anisha. Anisha was coaching\, she’s\, oh you’re like the therapist\, Anisha! Alieu worked with us in a different way. We worked with a group in South Africa called Cabri. And Cabri worked with seven or eight countries at a time. And we helped train the coaches in Cabri to work with the countries. He worked with the Liberia team. And there were a bunch of other teams. A key part of their work was developing peer relationships across countries. As we said\, he met Alieu there\, so it’s a good peer relationship. I thought that Anisha could host a conversation between the three of them. So let me invite them up here now. I said to them\, let’s have the conversation go 20 to 30 minutes. If you guys have any questions after that\, that’s great. And remember that we also have the next couple of days\, they’re going to be with us all the time so we can carry on those conversations. They don’t all have to happen tonight. Okay. But\, welcome guys. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Thank you. It’s been great getting to know all of you the past couple of days. Great meeting everyone\, and just thank you for listening to our stories as well. So I don’t think I need to introduce Alieu and Ganga\, but we’ve heard a bit about Alieu’s problems\, so I’m probably gonna start with Ganga and just ask her to tell us a little bit about her problem. And how the construction of your problem went\, how the deconstruction went. \n\n\nGanga Palakatiya Thank you\, Anisha. Hi to all of you. Actually\, I think that you have heard of Sri Lanka. Matt told you more and more about Sri Lanka\, but I have to tell you that the problem actually arises It was rare. It’s a country\, we actually have been experiencing post-conflict economy\, but in 1978\, we open the economy for foreign direct investment. So until 2018\, from 1978 to 2018\, that means 40 years\, we actually could have attracted only about US$17 billion. So which is less than the few countries like India\, Indonesia\, they attract more than that in a year. So it’s kind of a Like actually we need to think of it and when it comes to the exports actually\, our export basket is very limited. As Matt said\, the more portion is from the upper set. So we are not actually engaged in manufacturing other technical productions\, so that actually made us thinking of why we fail to attract FDI. The problem is actually the lack of export catalyzing FDI\, we found the problem\, the lack of the export catalyzing Fdi. So that is the problem that we need to look at and to find out the solution. The solution we thought was to attract foreign investment and to make Sri Lanka as their most preferable destination for the value-added manufacturing. So that was the rise in that race. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Yeah\, so the process of the Sri Lanka PDIA project was a little different. We first met with the teams in a workshop where we had about five teams who kind of convened. They did not have\, for example\, Ganga had no experience in promotions\, for example investor promotions. And so this was a completely new area for them. The problem was completely new. Their team members\, some of them were from your department\, some of them from other departments within the organization\, and some of them from other organizations as well. So they were meeting new people for the first time\, too. So that’s just the context in which this workshop was happening. And so then we got down to the problem construction and the problem deconstruction\, which is what you all did today\, kind of drawing up your fishbone. So can you tell me a little bit about your first impressions\, maybe your teammates’ first impressions on that first day\, what was everybody kind of thinking of this new crazy food process that Matt was talking about? \n\n\nGanga Palakatiya Actually it was an amazing experience for me and the Board of Investment as well. So initially actually we had around 7 to 8 members from different departments of BOI. For an example\, I am from the Research and Policy Advocacy Department. There were members from investment appraisal and also from the Promotion Department and also the Legal Department. Initially\, I was actually thinking why that actually has to be done by the promotion department\, why research\, why legal\, why investment appraisal\, why sole management as well. But at the end of the day\, I realized why actually we needed all those expertise to attract the right investment. And also\, as Anisha said\, we found out the problem. And we deconstructed the problem into pieces\, like we constructed the fish bone analysis and there we found so many reasons why we could not achieve export catalyzing FDI to Sri Lanka. Mainly\, the main problem was actually we didn’t have a master plan for the FDI attraction. So the government actually was not thinking about a master plan\, which has to come from the top of the government. So we thought of formulating strategies to attract investment. In that case\, actually\, we needed to be very specific\, be very and also we had to thought about the base and means of attracting investments so in that case where there were so many problems we identified through the fishbone diagram if I say some like we don’t have we actually have only 21 million people in our country in a 65 000 square kilometers of space\, so we don’t have a very large domestic market. So most of the investors\, they look at the market. And also\, we don’t have a large amount of FTS signed with other countries. We have only two FTS. Now\, actually\, it’s three\, which we signed recently. We had only with India and Pakistan. And also our utility cost is so high. So the manufacturing sector. We need some kind of subsidized programs for the utility sector\, especially for the electricity and water. So those are the problems we identified through the FISH Diagram. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Alieu\, I’m going to ask you a little bit about the team\, the team that you are working with. Because all of you are now going to have to go back to your teams\, your respective teams\, and work with them. You know\, sometimes it’s easier\, you might think it’s just kind of convincing yourself this is a great process. How are you going to go and convince your team members and also work with them towards solving a problem? So do you want to tell us a little about an experience. What were the key challenges and also how did you motivate your team members to go on this journey with you? \n\n\nAlieu Nyei Yes\, I think it works. So in Liberia\, you know\, when the project document was submitted to Calgary\, the political authorizer actually formed the team. So there was a selection of the team that was sent along with the proposal. And in a way\, the team was drawn from various departments and sections within the ministry that were deemed to be important to finding a solution to some of the issues. So for example. We’re looking at challenges in budget executions though. We have someone from the Department of Budget\, we have someone from the Comptroller and Accounting General’s Office\, we have some one from Revenue and Tax Policy\, and we have one from Aid and Debt Management. So… The idea behind the formation of that team was okay\, by bringing people from these various offices is going to help in putting together the information that was required in order to get things done. But what we realized after the inception workshop\, the framing workshop\, when we came back\, Initially\, to get teams to work together is really\, really difficult\, especially for our team. The first thing why that was so was because when we started to look at the problem\, especially during the deconstruction\, if you want to say\, oh\, maybe there is a problem with the aid data or the data on debt\, the representative from the deaf management office who’s on the team. That particular person saw it like oh\, okay\, maybe he tried to tell us that my office is very inefficient So no\, that’s not an issue So it was almost like at the beginning everyone basically tried to say no\, this is not the problem\, but eventually the team was able to come together. And in order to get the team to work together\, we have to be very specific on team dynamics. So we were able to assign tasks and responsibilities to various members of the team. For example\, someone was responsible for sending out a citation for team meetings\, even though we all knew when the meetings were happening\, but a reminder email had to be sent out. And when we were having our meetings\, someone was responsible for taking the notes. Engaging political authorizers\, someone was also responsible. When we had to update our assignments to the group assignments to Canvas\, there was somebody responsible to do that. And there was also someone\, basically like the team lead\, responsible to follow up with team members to ensure that team members were submitting their assignments on time and some of the roles and responsibilities we have clearly defined for the teams were actually being followed through. So we were able to do that and that worked. In our institutions\, it’s pretty simple and easy to find people putting these rules together\, but the issue is\, do we really end up following those rules? So we decided to go a step further for our team. So we say\, okay\, because when we had the\, after coming back from the inception workshop\, we had a first two\, three team meetings. There were cases where other members of the team would come to the meeting a little Okay\, maybe next week. Late. Other people won’t come to the meeting\, there won’t be an excuse\, so we say\, okay\, let us maybe develop a rule\, I mean\, various rules for the team. So we have rules\, for example\, if you are not coming to a meeting\, you need to make sure you do a formal email to the team members stating the reason. If you did not come to a meet without providing a justification\, you had to pay a fine. Yeah. And uh \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Did that work? \n\n\nAlieu Nyei It worked! If I would actually… \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Did you make a lot of money? \n\n\nAlieu Nyei We generated some money\, and if you came to a meeting late\, you also paid fine. Yeah\, if you have a task to deliver and you did not deliver it on time\, you pay fine. So what we did was\, the money we raised from some of those meetings\, we used the money actually to get water when it came next\, and that really worked. But I think the key message for that is… There was real commitment from the team\, the entire team\, because we were able to collectively put together our own rules to guide the operation of the team and in ways we were able to hold each other mutually accountable. So when we had team meetings and there were other members of the team that were not basically coming up to speed with what we needed to do\, we basically had it all. And also one thing that was important\, even though I was the most senior person on the team\, what we did and it really worked was\, we decided to make sure that we do not enter into the team with our formal titles\, because if you go in the team and you say\, okay\, I’m the minister\, I am the director\, so if there is disagreement on a particular issue\, my views should stand\, you’re going to basically make it really difficult for ideas\, for nation\, for people to come out with ideas\, especially sometimes to even challenge your own views on issues. So we were able to do that\, and that really helped. So from the beginning it was tough\, but he said that eventually\, over time\, the team emerged stronger\, were able overcome some of these things\, and that was really\, really important. So even after… The political transition in Liberia\, sometimes the team members still meet and the bond\, the friendship that was established because of that particular work we did together has remained\, has remained. So that was the team dynamic that really helped us to push through with some of the things that we did. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Yeah\, and I’m so glad you brought up\, if you can’t hear me\, just let me know. I’m just gonna try the project. I’m glad you’ve brought up accountability because that was something that we saw a lot in Sri Lanka too. So part of my job was to motivate teams. And we had\, like we said\, five teams\, and these were like whole teams\, so whole groups of people had to be motivated. And I found too that accountability was a huge factor\, like accountability to the other teams\, because we suddenly\, they started to see this other team is actually dependent on our team’s work\, and what we produce\, because they’re waiting for us to do our work. And then\, you know\, they’re going to learn from us\, we can learn from them. So that accountability. But also we talk about authorization. So accountability to your authorizers\, you know\, like they’re\, they are giving you authority to do the work\, but now you are accountable\, you’re responsible\, like you said\, to come back and say\, we’ve done something and we’ve learned something. And so I think that was a huge motivational factor. We did not collect money\, but I’m glad it worked for you guys. So now I’d like to talk a little bit about\, you know we call this process also like facilitated emergence. So I’d love to talk about emergence in both of your experiences. So I like to get Ganga’s kind of thoughts on like what did you try\, what did learn from that and how did that change your next steps and like how did change the trajectory of where you thought you might be going and where you. We’re going now. I think\, is your mic on? You can use that. \n\n\nGanga Palakatiya So\, first of all\, I have to tell you that when it comes to our team\, I told you that there were seven to eight members at the initial stage. But what I realized was\, in the initial stages\, the members were not actually in a very confident level of what we are doing. So they actually had a very\, like\, this will be another course\, another project that we will do\, like we will learn theories and then go back to the office and do the same thing. So\, but at the beginning my difference was actually I realized that this will… Because I saw that this will be another course\, but there will be a more practical approach. So with that belief actually I started working. There were some members who left the group and again we appointed other members. But with the time\, our members also\, maybe they took about two to three months to realize that. Our members realized that this will be really amazing experience for us and will be result oriented. So that was one thing I learnt from this\, we need to believe\, if we do something we need to be believe it and we need start it at the beginning and we had to work hard to achieve the targets. So that part actually I wanted to give you this message. So believe this cook\, this is result oriented\, so we actually experienced the result\, that’s why we are talking here\, Alieu and me. So\, if I talk about the things that I have done\, so I was actually\, our team\, we divided it into several\, I mean\, we actually assigned several sectors. Initially we selected sectors There was a targeting team also\, they were actually conducting a very comprehensive research to find out what are the sectors\, what are potential sectors that we can\, the Sri Lanka can attract more and more investment. But actually we could not wait until there are findings. So we\, in our team\, we realized that we need to initiate work. So with our understanding\, we selected some sectors. At the end of the day\, some of the sectors actually that matches with the findings of the targeting sector team. So in that case\, I was assigned for solar panel manufacturing. Oh my god\, I didn’t know about solar. Even when I thought of that\, I knew only that solar panels\, they are fixed on the rooftop. That’s the only thing I knew. So Matt was telling me\, so you have to do solar panels Matt\, actually. You have to attract anchor investors. Not just investors\, anchor investors to the country. So it was really an exciting thing. I was thinking how to do this\, it was really a challenge because it’s a really new set of Sri Lanka. There was no any manufacturing plants\, only one assembly plant which was in the construction stage and even it’s very small plant and also there was some small assembling like small scale assembly plants all over the Sri Lanka\, 102. So I was thinking how can I do this? It was actually kind of a challenge that initially I thought\, no\, I can’t do this. So\, but with the time\, I started to do research because I have a research background. That’s why I told you that our team members with different\, different expertise. At the end of the day\, I wanted to utilize their expertise as well. I will tell you how I utilized this. So I did research. And even that\, at the initial stage\, I realized that India is doing massively\, and China is also doing massively. Being a very small country\, like a pearl\, so how can we do this? So that was the initial thinking. But with the time I realized\, we have\, we\, Sri Lanka actually has really very advantages\, is really competitive advantageous. Just like if you take the strategic location of Sri Lanka\, which connects East and West\, so that will be the real advantage for the company to come and set up their plants here. If you take Europe is the main buyer\, main consumer of solar panel. We have that connectivity. And also we have the duty-free facility for the 28 EU countries under EUGSP+. So those are the things that I could realize. And also I was looking at how to manufacture this solar panel. I have seen this but I don’t know how to manufacture it\, what is the process\, what are the raw materials they use. When I was searching\, I was surprised that the main raw material the codes\, we have plenty of codes in our country\, which has the 99% purity\, which needs to manufacture solar panels. So that\, actually that impressed me and step by step\, I got confidence on why\, I thought why he told me this kind of a challenge\, why he might give me\, but I realized why he gave me this. So\, with the time\, actually\, we constructed a strategy. That strategy was not written in anywhere\, but with the time\, I told you that this is a practical course\, practical project. So with the times\, I realized and our team realized how to do this. So in that case\, we construct four strategic approaches. Shall I continue? The four strategic approach\, the first one is to understand the sector. Without understanding the sector\, we can’t promote it. When the investor comes to meet us\, we should know the sector We should know what is the product and how it gets manufactured\, the process and what are the benefits. And what are the benefits that we can offer to the investor\, those actually we had to have in our mind. So that we believe that we have to have a very good understanding of the sector. So we did best research. First we did research using the internet and reading the reports. And there we thought that it’s not enough. Then we moved into practical approach\, like we went to see the\, I told you that only one manufacturing plant was there\, but we went there. And we saw the manufacturing pros and we talked to the people and we knew the problems. That was really effective. And then we turned to the experts. There were experts\, we could find some experts in the solar sector\, so we could talk to them and build up our knowledge more and more. In that way we actually understand sector. We understood the sector and the second strategy was to construct promotional materials. So in that we constructed promotional materials\, we had a lecturer at the workshop\, a top entrepreneur\, so he suggested that we should and to have a attractive pitch book to offer to the investor\, so we did that with full effort\, with the we get and we really share it at the first time. When we do it and when we share it\, it was not that attractive\, but with the views and suggestions and comments\, we constructed it in a way that we can develop it in like a very attractive and informative way. So then actually we started to build up the network to engage with the investors. So that actually we were helped by the MAT by introducing us to the embassies\, high commissioners and the business community and also the Chamber of Commerce. So we provided our materials to them and we requested them to engage us with the investors. In that way actually\, we could\, step by step\, we would… We could go through the process in attracting investments. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Would you like to talk a bit about the strategy for engaging investors\, a little bit\, you know\, the 300\, like\, you had to call just\, yeah. \n\n\nGanga Palakatiya In this course\, we actually learned about the 300:30:3:1 rule. That means to attract one investor\, one substantial investor\, we had to first talk to 300 investors. We had to engage with 300 investors and then… There will be continuous engagement only with 30 investors and out of that three will submit proposals and only one will land. So we went through that strategy and we tried our best to engage with more and more investors. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Yeah\, so it was quite a daunting task when Matt brought this strategy to the team. I mean\, it was a lot of just cold calls and emails and just\, you know\, creating just a network and trying to engage with as many investors as possible\, you know\, just that\, I mean I remember that experience was just\, yeah\, it was crazy. Alieu\, is there something you’d like to add about the process and\, you know\, what you guys tried\, what you guys learned? And then kind of how you will follow it from there. \n\n\nAlieu Nyei Yes. When we started the process\, actually when we came back from the inception workshop we had a pretty different view about the problem. We thought that the problem was more of the ministries and agencies and less of the responsibility of the ministry of finance. And then… One thing that we decided to do was to have conversations within the Ministry of Finance meeting key stakeholders. So we talked to some of the line technicians\, the directors\, and the ministers. And that enabled us to understand the problem in a much more deeper sense than we knew prior to the conversation. So as a result of that\, of the conversation\, one thing that we decided to do next was to have a forum where we will bring all of these people together. So we call it internal coordination workshop. So we have a working session wherein we’ll draw all of the key stakeholders together to just talk about the issues. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan And have you ever done that before? \n\n\nAlieu Nyei We’ve never done that before because we talk about problems basically about going to offices and learning about what’s happening\, what’s the challenge here\, but to bring all of these departments into a single office\, I mean into a room and talk about what the challenges are and then at certain point in time it was really really heated because you have people talking across the room about. Where the responsibilities\, I mean who’s not doing their job properly and what needs to be done in order to get things done and eventually after all of the Eventing we’re able to get them to to commit to working together\, so After that meeting\, in fact\, that was how we say\, okay\, this has been a success. We’ve been able to bring all of these people together. We now know about this problem better. In fact\, it was from that meeting that we were able to understand that the Ministry of Finance\, in fact\, had greater responsibility for the challenges\, I mean\, for the problem\, than the Ministry and agencies. So essentially we say okay after this meeting let’s now call a meeting of the ministries. So that’s how we develop a presentation based on the issues that were shared with us from the various layers\, from the technicians\, the directors\, and the ministers that attended our meeting. That’s how we call the Ministries and Agencies to our meeting\, they were so excited to find that for the first time\, the Ministry of Finance was making a presentation to them and not… Casting blames at them. We’re basically saying\, we understand the challenges that the budget execution has been faced with\, and we take responsibility for everything\, I mean\, at least for 80 to 90% of the things that have gone wrong. So we want to start a new engagement with you on the basis of working together so that we can improve the quality of information exchange in order to make sure that we improve budget execution. And that worked. After that\, we said\, okay\, now that we’ve had this meeting\, the next step we need to now do is\, let us try to understand also why is it that ministries and agencies are not sending in their reports. So we just collected the report\, I mean the information on submission of the report. We realized that just about 30% of the institutions were submitting the report So we went to a bunch of them\, talked to some of the institutions that were submitting their reports\, why they were submitting the reports\, what were some of their issues. And then talk to a bunch of those that were not submitted because if you want to understand the challenges that people are facing\, you also have to be able to compare what are the incentives that lead people to submit their reports on time and what are issues that prevent others from doing the same. And that really\, really helped us. We realized that our training programs were not targeted in some other institutions. Simple things like\, They didn’t have certain skills\, and when we called them for these workshops\, you have everyone in one room. People are sometimes ashamed to ask specific questions about things that they don’t know. That was one powerful message that we got from the interactions. So the approach was to send teams of people to go and work with some of the reporting teams in the ministries at their desk. So what about the reporting template that you don’t understand\, and then provide some insight. And there were also issues about making some revisions to the reporting templates\, and we were able to do that. So once we did those things\, we realized that the next reporting period submission jumped up to 68%. From about 33% and that improved over time. So that was significant improvement in just few months of interaction and the key driver of that was the way we engaged the ministries and agencies. That normal arrogance that ministries of finance staff were used to where you are the problem\, you’re not doing your job well\, if you don’t do your report\, we’re not going to give you money\, we realized that that was not working because initially we had said\, okay\, if we don’t submit a report\, you’re now going to get any money and that’s not going to work\, for example\, in making health\, in education\, even without submitting reports. They’re going to get their money. We said\, okay\, let’s revise some of our execution rules. We wrote new rules\, more robust rules\, and we realized that no one followed any of those rules. So it’s more about engaging people and making them feel part of the process and bringing them along and also really\, really valuing the impulse that they make in order to get things on course. So that was really\, very powerful in the project we were able to make for our families. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan And the recognition to you. \n\n\nAlieu Nyei Yes\, so one other thing that we did was because the nature of our problem in Sri Lanka\, we had a small team that basically had to inspire a whole bunch of people sitting within the Ministry of Finance and also across government to do their work. How do you do that\, man? Yeah\, so you have a team of five persons. The entire reporting team in the controller and accounting general’s office\, there is a reconciliation and reporting team that has to go out to the ministries and agencies to encourage them to do their reports on time. How do you motivate those people in order to get them to their work? So one way we did it was when we engaged them\, we got them to work when we really got some good ideas from them. We arranged the presentation where we did presentations to the minister and other members of the senior management team we bring them along at these presentations and we gave them credit because in the public sector what normally happens is You find out that there are maybe some line directors or other senior people that will go to lower level staff and pressurize them\, get them to do stuff\, and they go to these senior management meetings\, sit there\, do elaborate presentations. The ministers are so happy that they have really\, really good senior staff that are doing excellent job\, but we actually changed that dynamic and we realized that that was really\, powerful because Just by doing that and bringing people to senior management meetings and recognizing their effort\, that really got them to do more\, especially in getting things done and engaging other people across the administration\, outside of the administration. So that was really\, really important in terms of recognizing people’s effort and appreciating them. That was really really good. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Right\, so it’s been great to hear about both of your journeys\, but I know we are all wondering about a very big challenge when it comes to implementing PDIA\, and that is authorization. I guess I’ll start with you\, Alieu. How did you go about getting authorization and then also maintaining that authorization and expanding your authorization? \n\n\nAlieu Nyei When we started working on the problem\, the first thing is\, you know when you’re talking about issues about off-budget expenditure\, on-budgets transfers in an environment where it’s so rampant that many people will just see it as\, okay\, this is part of standard practice in our budget execution. So how do you change the narrative around that? So what we did was we were able to get real-time data. From our execution\, we went up to four years backwards to look at how many transfers have happened in the budget and how they started\, for example\, allocations that went to education\, went to health in order to deliver on basic social services. And we actually have a narrative around it. We met the minister. But more importantly\, besides just getting the numbers\, we’re also able to carve stories around the numbers. Because we were also in a period of political transition. We were very keen in making the minister and the senior management team of the ministry to understand that there’s going to be significant pressure and the numbers were there\, the requests were already piling up from across government for increasing of budget expenditure. That if you continue at this rate it is going to actually reflect badly on the in. The ministry now because in a few months when the political transition happens it’s most likely that all of you are going to be out of this place. What sort of a legacy do you want to be remembered for? Do you want to be remember as someone who actually left the ministry of finance in a mess state or someone who had the a system in place that basically was robust to deal with some of those issues. And when we did the presentation\, clearly outlining how these things could help\, we got the support of the minister and our political authorizer. But then every one of us that work in public sector\, you realize that getting political authorization. It’s difficult\, but sometimes it’s not that difficult. Maintaining political authorization is the really\, really difficult thing. So what did we do in order to maintain it and grow it in fight over time was to basically bring in our political authorizer into the process so we get regular updates. So each time we go to the political authorizer\, we’re able to make progress. Okay\, what we were able to achieve\, what were the next steps we were considering\, and we basically asked\, what are your thoughts about how do we do the next step better? So in a way\, the authorizer once saw that the team was making progress each time we made updates. And also the suggestions that were coming in from the authorizer were also finding a way to incorporate them so that we can make sure that we are able to achieve a lot. So that was very\, very much important for our team in building and getting things done because at the end of the day we’re able to do that. For example\, when we’re even planning the budget workshop or the reporting workshop. When we went to the authorizer to tell you how involved the authorizers were\, the authorizers basically took the phone and called some of the cabinet ministers that were finding difficulty in getting them to come to the meeting\, personally called all of them and they all came on board. That’s not going to happen easily to find a level of involvement of the authorizer unless the authorizer is pretty much certain that this is a team that’s doing a good job and that needs to be supported. But most times what you find people do is\, okay\, you just have a… You have a long interval during which time you provide update to the authorizer. I personally think that may not be a good option. You need to be able to make sure that the authorizer is regularly updated so that the authorizer understands that that team\, my team\, is doing a good job. And the only way the authorizers will believe that you are doing a good job is for the authorizer to be regularly updated about private\, about challenges\, so that basically\, all of us\, the team\, the authorizer\, can basically find a way to solve the challenges together. So\, in a way\, we’re able to bring the authorizers along. And I know that this may not necessarily be an approach. That’s going to be suited for every other content\, but that’s exactly what the PDIA. So it’s about basically watching your own content and seeing what really works and how do you design interventions that work. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan And eventually\, after a while\, if you didn’t update the authorizer… \n\n\nAlieu Nyei Yes\, so in fact\, there were a few instances\, because she was so much involved with the team and the projects we were making\, so there were one or two instances where our regular scheduled meeting for update didn’t happen\, and the other rather was calling\, oh\, we need to meet. Yeah\, and then we got the team who went\, we had a meeting\, and they provided the update\, and the authorizer was pretty much happy about the team progress. So that is one way of really\, really building authorization by getting the authorizers involved in the work. To also be clear about authorization\, you do not only need authorization from the political authorizers that you need their support\, but the technical thing that I was talking about\, maybe you call that acceptance that we engage\, you also need to make sure that you always have them along\, because we know that in our institutions in public sector\, there are so many political directives That comes from… A political authorizer minister that don’t get implemented. It is because of most times if you sit in the institution and think that you wouldn’t need a minister to say this and things will happen\, you are actually mistaken. When the minister says\, okay\, I have proved this\, we need to be able to find a structural way through which we can get the institution to move along in order to make sure that we achieve things. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Yes. Thank you for sharing. So we’re going to wrap up soon. I just have one more question for Ganga\, and then we’ll move into a time of questions. So you told us about the journey\, you told us about how you started off with absolutely no knowledge of the solar panel manufacturing industry. What happened in the end? Were you able to get your one at the end\, Would you like to share kind of what? How you finish that. \n\n\nGanga Palakatiya Actually\, I’m really happy to share this and finally we had a very hard\, we did hard work and we tried our best to talk to the investors and to attract the investors. Eventually actually our\, there was a meeting\, it’s like a story. So there was a meeting and I was called for the meeting\, I was informed that there is a solar panel investor\, so we need to have a meeting\, just inform me. So I went to the meeting and when I saw the investor\, when I see the business card of the investor I was really surprised\, that was the world number one investor. So I was really surprised because I knew that because I did research because I worked hard and I knew\, that was the investor I was targeting. So he has already counted\, so I was really surprised and that was a real opportunity for me to share my knowledge with the investor and to get their knowledge and to understand the requirement of the investor. So if I didn’t know about the sector\, if I hadn’t done any research on the sector I would have ended up with just having a meeting with an investor. So that actually I realized the value of this task. So when I was talking to the investor I nip the problems in Sri Lanka to get their investment to establish in our country. I nipped all this. They are talking about the requirements\, they are talking the problems\, but I need that. So that was the language that I learnt to talk to the world class investors. So we never said no because we have some kind of thoughts\, we have some kind strategies in our mind\, how to solve that problem. When the investor tell us\, OK\, we have this problem\, so we actually already have that knowledge\, and we actually have kind of a solution. So we said no. So we said\, okay\, we knew the problem. We will definitely look into that. We don’t know whether we can do it or not\, but we told them\, okay we will look into it. And in that way\, actually\, they arose three problems. Those are policy issues. So we had to work on that policy issues that authorization matters in that case and also I told you there was a legal person in my members\, out of my members there was legal and zone management. All that expertise I needed to solve those three issues. So one issue was on the import tax. We have to change the regulations for the legal person I wanted to have their contributions. And the other one is\, it’s also kind of a\, because the BOI Board of Investment has issued a regulation\, Investors\, manufacturers can only allow local market up to 20% of their production. So the investor wanted to release 50%. So then we’ll have to again change the regulation\, again the legal matter. And also they wanted to establish the company in a… In a BOI zone\, they wanted to change the ground rent and they wanted to have some kind of concessions. So in that case\, I needed the zone management person. So\, in that way\, actually\, we collectively did that and we had to get the board\, board of\, board of investment\, the members of the board approval and then we’ll have to go for the Prime Minister’s approval and then we had to go to the Cabinet approval. It was a long process and very hard\, difficult process. Finally\, we could achieve that. That was the result we had with the understanding\, with the hard work we did with this course. \n\n\nAnisha Poobalan Thank you. Thank you both for sharing with us. Thank you everybody. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nAnisha Poobalan leads a discussion with Alieu and Ganga about their experiences working on PDIA teams in their countries of Liberia and Sri Lanka.
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/pdia-conversation-with-alieu-nyei-and-ganga-palakatiya/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20190409T080000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20190410T170000
DTSTAMP:20260907T015032Z
CREATED:20230215T025445Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T015032Z
UID:13259-1554796800-1554915600@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:GEM 2019: How Can Governments Better Implement Policies?
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\, Faculty Director\, Building State Capability\, Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development\, Harvard Kennedy School  \n\n\n\nJorrit de Jong\, Faculty Director\, Bloomberg Harvard Center for Cities\, Emma Bloomberg Senior Lecturer in Public Policy and Management\, Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji (Moderator)\, Director\, Building State Capability \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji All right. Welcome to the fourth panel of the day. This morning\, you heard in Lant’s panel on state capability being stuck. This panel should hopefully give you some exciting ways forward potentially. In Ricardo’s words\, a secret sauce of how do you actually build capability. I’m here with both Jorrit and Matt\, who both have been building capability with\, whether it’s city governments or governments in many countries. And they’re here to talk about their work. So what I’d first like to start with is ask each of them to make some opening remarks before we get into some questions. Would you like to share the work that you do?   \n\n\nJorrit de Jong Thank you\, Salimah And thank you for having me here. It’s I’ve been a big fan of the work of CID for a long time\, and I’ve had conversations with you and with Matt and with Ricardo for a long time\, but never in such a distinguished audience here. So it’s great to have a conversation. So I’ll keep my remarks very short and I can come back to some things if you’re interested\, so feel free to ask. So the Bloomberg Harvard City Leadership Initiative\, the mission is the strengthening the leadership and organizational capabilities of cities around the world. Thanks to our donor\, Mike Bloomberg\, who was a mayor himself in New York\, of course\, he felt like the private sector has many more opportunities to basically support leaders as they rise through the ranks. And the public sector doesn’t necessarily have those same opportunities for leadership development and organizational development. And so he felt that mayors who do arguably one of the hardest jobs in the public sector around the world should have access to that same kind of opportunity. And so the idea was to focus on leadership development and organizational development in close connection. So it’s not leadership removed from the actual work of problem solving. It’s leadership firmly anchored in the work of public problem solving. So there’s no navel gazing\, there’s no kind of fluffy stuff. It’s it’s real hard work. But\, you know\, raises the question\, well\, what is the kind of capacity that cities need to do their work? As you all know\, cities are at the forefront of social problem solving\, especially when national governments fail to deliver or are arguably in the way of problem solving. Then it really comes down to mayors and their staff to do the best possible job with limited resources and limited formal authority. So the work of mayors is really to leverage everything you can to make sure that you understand the problems that your city is facing and that you generate actionable solutions to do something about it. And that requires a bunch of different capabilities. So we started by developing a theory of change for our own initiative that that started with the notion what is it that we that we’re looking for? What is the kind of what are the kind of capabilities that city and city leaders need to actually make progress? And\, you know\, we withdrew from a lot of different kind of bodies of academic work. But most importantly\, we spoke with many city leaders and and kind of tried to design a curriculum that was ultimately responsive to what their needs are. And the big themes were\, first of all\, performance review capability. And that’s kind of a\, you know\, a technical term. What we mean by it is the ability to actually diagnose the problems that you have to this aggregate data set. So you really know where your problem is\, where who it is\, why the problem occurred and so forth. But then also to develop a theory of change that helps you articulate what you’re really trying to do and how you would know if you’re actually making progress towards that goal. And as simple as that sounds\, we universally find that in most policy areas\, even if it’s not just that the theory of change is imperfect\, it’s like there hasn’t been a conversation about it. And so what does it take for an organization or for the leader of an organization to orchestrate that conversation and to build consensus around that and then to\, of course\, implement? And then the second set of capabilities all around collaboration. And collaboration is the easiest word to say\, the hardest thing to do. And so we broke that down into a couple of things that are important for mayors. First of all\, how do you lead a team even within your own organization that has so many different departments if you want to reduce. And crime in your city. You can just work with your police department. You have to engage the education department. You have to engage transportation\, public works. It’s a city wide problem and it requires a city wide response. And that means then that leaders are looking for ways to form teams that are diverse enough to tackle that problem\, to lead those teams in a way that brings out the best in those different\, you know\, in that collaboration and to kind of sustain the collaboration. So it will go beyond talking and actually deliver. And the final set of capabilities is all about data and evidence. And so\, you know\, many cities have a lot of data\, but they don’t know how to use it. And data access to data\, availability of data is a preliminary condition’s a necessary condition\, but by no means a sufficient condition. So what do you need to do as a mayor to ask your staff at a meeting\, you know\, what question do you ask that forces them to actually look at the data\, to run experiments\, to see what works and what doesn’t\, so that you can make decisions about what to continue and what to discontinue and what to innovate and what to improve and so forth. So those three sets of capabilities\, performance capabilities\, collaborative capabilities and data analytic capabilities can inform the heart of our curriculum. But then\, of course\, the leadership part requires many more things. So we include public narrative\, the ability of using the bully pulpit as a mayor to engage others that don’t necessarily have to work for or with you in a collaborative problem solving. So that’s basically what informed the curriculum. And then what we do is we have a yearlong engagement with 40 cities each year from over the world. About half is American and the other half is from from all over the globe. We start with the mayor. The mayor participates in a three day in-person program that’s a very intensive pressure cooker\, really focusing on the particular development challenges that she or he is facing. And then throughout the year\, we engage that cohort in virtual sessions. We have a dedicated studio here on campus. It’s like Skype\, but then it works and it’s really great. And so\, so we\, we actually have those 40 mayors on big screens and you can really talk to each other. It’s phenomenal technology and otherwise we wouldn’t be able to do this\, but we convene that cohort. So it’s not just a one off. It’s not just you go there and\, oh\, that was fun. You know\, maybe we got inspired\, but we keep having that conversation with the mayors and we facilitate peer to peer conversation all the time. The second thing that we do is we ask them to nominate two of their top leaders in the organization. But because we know if the mayor is all enlightened and inspired and empowered\, that still doesn’t mean that the rest of the organization is able to execute on that. So we ask them\, nominate your two top agents of change and they get a whole separate program that is also starts with an in-person and then continues through virtual sessions. And then on top of that\, we have a field support and so the field support is around three tracks and they can self-select into that. It’s data using data and evidence where we ask like\, is there a particular problem where you feel that you are not data driven? And so they may choose homelessness or economic development and then we help them through technical assistance to kind of translate those ideas into practice and to use that particular project as an example of how you could get more data driven. The same thing with experimentation and innovation. We all know the public sector\, you know\, has a proclivity for long term planning and blueprints and master plans and policy. But the kind of agile approach to just trying to get to a minimum viable product and to innovate and to engage others in redesign\, that doesn’t happen a lot. So we support them on that too. And there’s individual supports as well. The mayors get a 360 degrees assessment and we thought this would never fly\, but we thought it would be worthwhile trying it out. Will a mayor\, an elected politician\, will she or he actually ask other people what they feel of their leadership style? So we do this analysis of discrepancy between the self-perceived capabilities and what other people perceive\, and then they get debriefing of the discrepancies with a professional executive coach. Don’t ask me about the legal and technical safeguards that we had to build in to make this happen. But it was there’s a big take of 75% of our mayors do it. They really benefit from it. So we have this whole year of supports for the mayors. And then the third question\, the last question is\, how do we know this is working? And I think it’s really important that\, of course\, as an academic institution\, we believe in what we do. And but we also need to apply the same principles of performance measurement\, of using data and evidence to see if this kind of training and support works. So we have a dedicated impact assessment function\, and we use a variety of different research methods to find out what the results are. And we keep coming back to the mayors. We do impact surveys\, but also interviews\, and then we have our graduate students who are phenomenal\, who get placed into mayors offices as Summer Fellows\, and so they’ll be working with the mayor on whatever their priority was. But they also serve as a feedback mechanism for us. They do some interviews and they they tell us as a more neutral observer\, if those capabilities if there’s any evidence that those capabilities are actually taking root. Let me stop there.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you very much. Matt\, would you like to share what you.   \n\n\nMatt Andrews I’m almost breathless just listening to everything that you do. And the first thing that comes to mind is just to say there are so many things that go into getting things done in government. Right? Like just all of the things that you’ve just described\, working with teams\, coordinating across bureaus\, working with leaders\, working on day to day stuff\, working on big picture stuff\, managing politics. Like this is complex stuff. And that’s our experience as well. I started my career as a public sector economist. My dearest wish was to help policies get implemented in the world. And my understanding was that the closer you were to money\, the better chance you had to getting policies implemented. Because governments implement things in two ways. They implement things through projects\, or they implement things through budgets. Those are the two primary ways in which things get implemented. So then I joined the South African government. I worked on the budgetary side for a while\, and what I saw on the budgetary side was we budget had a lot of great things and very few of them ever got done. So then I left that and I went and joined the World Bank where we worked on the project side and we did lots and lots of projects. And then I left there because I realized that very few of the projects ever got done. Then I came to the Kennedy School and I started looking at numbers and saying\, Okay\, what in the world is going on here? And my observation was\, we’ve kind of sanitized this process that you’ve just described\, all the mess. And to get a good idea\, put it in a budget or put it in a project document plan\, it really\, really\, really well and even a bit better after that and then tell people what to do. And I started to look at organizations and say\, well\, how well is that working? Was my experience a failure or just kind of the odd thing or was it common? Now\, the interesting thing with policy is that there’s kind of two ways to measure success. And the one is that you deliver on the kind of stuff that you said you were delivering on. And the other one is\, did that stuff solve the problem that prompted you to planet in the first place? And I’d say this in the most functional places that I find\, the success rate on the first is about 30%\, and the success rate on the second is about seven or eight. That’s the number of World Bank project successes. World Bank projects deliver what they say they’re going to do 30% of the time World Bank projects that deliver what they say they’re going to do\, but that the World Bank teams actually think they’re going to solve the problem that they started off solving. So a lot less. It’s about six or 7%. So this issue was really hot. That’s the first thing and we haven’t solved it. So we kind of find ourselves in the same place. I think that that that you’re at that a long time ago before you started with Bloomberg and when he started with the Caprio Brigade\, which it was trying to work with governments to say\, okay\, how do you do this little bit differently? How do we up those numbers? And when you’re working in some places\, like we were mentioning in the previous session\, if you’re working in Honduras\, if you’re working in Albania\, if some of those numbers are lower. But historically\, whenever governments try to introduce new policies\, the success rate was lower than that. And you started to read evaluations\, which is we are beginning to say\, well\, why did we fail? And you’d see things like\, well\, it’s complex. Okay\, well\, you need to get people to work together. Okay. And the best one is\, well\, there was politics involved. It’s like\, okay\, like\, you know. And I started to realize that the management mechanisms that we were suggesting were the ways we should do this assumed that there was no politics. And they assumed that people wanted to work together. And they assumed something even more staggering was that we actually knew what we were doing. Right. So in education policy\, in my country of South Africa would say\, we’re going to train teachers\, we’re going to introduce a new syllabus\, we’re going to do X\, Y and Z and very confidently has like $50 million for the next five years to do all the stuff as if we know how to train teachers. As if the teachers who get trained attend school. As if we know how to execute a syllabus. All of these things are really just gigantic mysteries to all of us. And so we started to see that\, you know\, even if we were executing on these things\, we weren’t solving the problem because we were pretending that we knew what we were doing in the first place. It’s like Lance was talking this morning about doing business indicators\, and I know that I’ve been Will maybe speak about this later in Albania\, that somewhere along the line some people said\, if you do well on these indicators\, you do these 14 things\, businesses will come to you. My country did really well at this. And you know what? No one came because actually the mystery as to why\, even when it was doing well\, South Africa couldn’t attract business has not been solved yet\, right? Ricardo mean\, we think we have some answers\, but they don’t want to do them. We don’t really know why. So we started to say\, how do we develop a management mechanism that is less imposing and less based on assumptions and more empowering and facilitating of learning? And we started exploring in a bunch of different places\, a bunch of different policy areas\, a methodology which we now call PDIA\, which stands for problem driven\, iterative adaptation. It’s a very simple approach\, which says instead of pretending that we know the solution\, let’s just really start with the problem. It’s just really start by saying what’s going wrong and can we scrutinize that as much as possible? Because the only thing we really can lay any claim to understanding right now is what’s going wrong. And we probably not going to have a good understanding of that when we start either. So let’s understand the problem. Let’s try to mobilize teams within the context to address the problem rather than external experts\, because external experts aren’t the ones whose capability we want to grow. Lant was talking about consultants and outsiders this morning as mosquitos. I don’t want to get there\, but I do want to say if you’re running a government and your government can’t do stuff\, I don’t really understand why you would hire a consulting firm to come and do that for you\, because they just going to go back to their consulting firm. Why are you building their capability to do the thing that your people need to learn how to do? Your people need to learn how to do that. It’s fundamental. So whatever your management approach is\, it needs to involve that. They need to be the ones to do the work. So we would say\, let’s get this team together\, let’s understand the problem\, and let’s start to find some entry points where they can start working. And then let’s just get them to work and let’s coach them again and again and again very regularly in tight iterations so that whatever they try\, they learn from. And let’s do that again and again and again\, ad nauseum. Until something happens. And see if they can achieve some things that are surprising to them and see if maybe they can build some capabilities that they didn’t have at the beginning. So we’ve done this now for about ten years\, experimenting with the model. The model now comes with tools\, and we come with the tool kit because we’ve kind of worked up how we think it can be done. And we have worked directly with about 50\, 60 teams across the world. And we find that they kind of achieve things. Probably 60 to 80% of the time. So consider earlier I said 70\, 30% success rate. We’re kind of like way above that. And the thing that I would say is it’s not really because we do great stuff. It’s just because you’re taking these teams and you’re giving them\, firstly\, the responsibility to act in the face of their problems. And secondly\, the autonomy\, the space and the power. And you’re also putting them on a learning trajectory whereby they can try things out and learn and expand their ability. A lot of the things that Europe is all important are very key to this\, too. One is they work as teams\, so they’re collaborating from the beginning. We even find that collaborating within a ministry is difficult. Collaborating across cross boundaries is very hard. But even within the ministry\, people in governments don’t like to work together. We find that building networks is crucial. We find that being able to go and speak to people is really important. Speaking to citizens\, speaking to business\, learning what’s really going wrong. Learning how to respond to that. We find that learning how to manage up to political masters is really important. We’re learning that the leadership of the political masters at the top is absolutely vital and that interaction matters. What we’re finding is that the specific solutions to these kind of issues of how to get people to manage better\, to lead better\, differ across different places. The ways in which you get people to work together\, the ways in which you get people to mobilize themselves is not the same in Albania as it is in Sri Lanka\, as it is in Honduras\, as it is in Mozambique. They are different. But it is those solutions to those very same issues that are the ones that seem to unlock opportunity. And we’re finding that over time\, when we’re working in these places\, not only are they getting better results\, not necessarily always solving every problem for forever. And I have some people who we’ve worked with in the room\, and they can tell you about some of our failures and some of our successes. But we finding that the cohorts of people who are capable to do stuff are growing across governments\, that when we going to a government\, you’ll say to someone\, you know\, we want to work with a team of 50 people. And they say there aren’t that many people who can do stuff in the government. Think about that and think about how serious that is as an indictment of governments that hire 30 to 40 to 50\,000 people\, we only trust five. Well\, we’re happy to say that wherever we work after two or three years\, there’s maybe 200\, maybe 300\, there’s maybe 400. And we think that that’s how you build state capability. You empower people to take responsibility for their country’s future and to learn how to do that on the go. So that’s kind of how we work. We’ve worked in a bunch of places. As I say\, there’s people in the room here. I think Auburn will tell some of the stories later about the work in in Albania. I think the approach is very similar to how you working with the mayors. We have different models. One of our models is we actually come and coach teams in the countries and we usually work with six or seven teams at the same time. I stand by my previous experience. I will never\, ever assume that success will happen more than about 20% of the time. So I always insist that we work with five teams\, so it guarantees at least one success. But we also find that working with these six or seven teams\, we have a very short workshop with them at the beginning\, maybe two days where we have them identify a problem\, break the problem down\, identify entry points\, and then they start working. And every week we come back to them and we say\, What did you do? What did you learn? What are you struggling with and what’s next? And every month they come together and they celebrate their progress as all six or seven teams\, and they learn together. And we usually work on six or seven months kind of\, uh\, programs. And we’re finding that this is kind of really successful\, really interesting\, really dynamic\, very different to the norm. We\, we don’t\, we have coaches rather than experts working with people. So even our students who want to come and work with them\, one of the first things we say to them is never tell the government what to do\, no matter if you have the answer or not. They need to find it. And some people say\, why do we need to recreate the wheel? And I’ll say\, because the wheel of a Mercedes is different from the wheel of a tractor. It’s different from the wheel of a Fiat and different countries\, the wheel might be the same shape\, but it is very\, very different in most other respects and they need to find it themselves so that they can use it.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you. We do. In the agenda there are links to a blog that gives you more information and links to your work. There’s a link to the toolkit. So there’s a lot of information out there that you can already find. What I want to do is ask some questions to them and kind of get into the nuts and bolts of how these methods work. I’ve had the good fortune of working with Jorrit and his team on their Cross-Boundary collaboration in January. So I’ve actually worked with their program and I am the director of Building State Capability\, so I work very closely with Matt and kind of from that vantage point\, one of the things that is so striking to me is that both of you come to this building capability from four lenses. One\, you always start with the problem both of you write and you all have heard it. Problem\, problem\, problem. Right. They both said problem\, right. That’s kind of the stance. And then the second thing that you do is you talk about teams. None of you said\, no\, the mayor is going to do this or that. No\, it’s the team. Right. That’s kind of the second thing that you guys talk about. You guys both talk about the learning. And I know I was that I remember at the opening dinner in New York when Amy Edmondson starts off to\, you know\, all the teams and they were from there was ten teams from ten different cities. And she says\, I’m not here. We are not here to teach you anything. And I was really struck by that because that’s very much the kind of sentiments that we take. We are not the expert here telling you what you need to do. And so that is something that’s very common\, this kind of shared learning. We’re here to learn from each other and to get things done. And then the fourth thing is the time\, right? Neither of you talk about this one kind of short instant that you do. I’m going to come in\, do a training and walk away and boom\, you’re going to change your country. No\, neither of you talk about that\, right? You were talking about this continued engagement\, whether it’s a year you’re talk we work six months\, a year\, three years in Albania\, you know\, depending on where we are and how long we work. And so those kinds of things were really striking in terms of teams. I kind of want to kind of ask some more questions. How did you guys come up with the idea of a team and what’s been your experience? If you could speak both to the challenges of having a team as well as how successful has it been? Would you kind of change that?   \n\n\nJorrit de Jong So. I think that the very first intuition with regards to why we focus so much in teams is that the most pressing problems span multiple boundaries\, and if you want to do anything about it\, you will have to collaborate with others that are very unlike\, unlike yourself. They have different professional perspectives. They come from different organizational cultures\, they have different political biases. There are different legal frameworks guiding the work. There are different budget streams that can or cannot be repurposed. So we have coming from an all the way Berrien view. You know\, we’ve created public sector organizations that are all structured in a way that’s aligned with whatever the task was before. And now the world has changed and problems manifest themselves in ways that do not conveniently fit or are silos. And therefore it is almost like a premise that you will have to collaborate if you want to do anything about real world problems. And so if you if you even accept that premise\, then the question is\, well\, what is the problem? Right. And so\, you know\, both through the program and through our research on this work\, we find that there’s a fundamental Catch 22 situation. It’s like\, do we start by defining the problem and then identifying who should be working on it? For example\, if we say there is an achievement gap with regards to education in our cities\, which is almost everywhere. Right. So that’s the problem. Okay. That makes sense to then invite\, you know\, the education departments\, you know\, maybe some employers\, you know\, maybe neighborhood organizations and so forth. And then you start working on it. But then\, you know\, people come to the conclusion\, well\, actually\, the problem is that we’re facing\, you know\, hundreds and hundreds of years of systemic racism. Right. This is a symptom of another problem. And so we won’t be we don’t want to be fighting symptoms. But if that then becomes the problem definition\, you need a much broader coalition of people to work on it and your interventions might look differently and so forth. So where do you start? Do you start by saying\, this is the problem\, we have to find a team? Or do you start with this is a good team. This coalition actually has the muscle and the will to do something. Let’s have them work on a problem. Now\, I don’t think there’s an answer to that. But this is where this key concept in your work mat is. In your work Salima is iteration. You know\, you have to go back and forth between problem definition and stakeholder identification. And that is why you can never do a one off. You can never do a one off. I mean\, like\, unless that’s what you want to do. But if you’re really interested in making progress\, you’ll have to kind of accept that. Now\, what we find in teams is that this ambiguity and this uncertainty and this kind of lack of permanency is excruciating to people. Like\, they won’t sign up for your project. They won’t come to your program if they know that everything is going to be subject to change. Like\, what do you want to do here? What are your deliverables\, you know? And who’s going to be part of this? And like almost everything you say\, anything you say will appeal to some and deter others\, which is why this work requires\, you know\, a sustained engagement with the issue. Being comfortable with the anxiety that is inevitable when you put people in kind of in this kind of situation\, and you have to kind of create an accountability structure around the learning process and that around individual tasks. This is why we use the mayors to say\, like\, mayor\, you have to nominate these people and hold them accountable as a group for progress. Then\, of course\, that’s the accountability piece of it. Then the team process itself becomes really important because people respond differently to this kind of challenge. To be held accountable for something that you can only contribute to in part is really hard. Like\, well\, you know\, I’m a\, you know\, I’m in the Department of Public Works and now I’m co responsible for solving systemic racism in the city. Like\, I was never trained for it. I’m an engineer or\, you know\, like you can think of all the other examples. So we have brought in Amy\, you mentioned her\, who focused a lot on the psychological safety required to actually do this work. And it’s not the soft skills. I think those are the hardest skills\, the skills of real empathy\, listening\, overcoming kind of completely conceptual differences. Like they talk back to each other for quite a while before they actually start listening and supporting teams. To do that work is incorporating what we do\, but then pay continuous attention to the accountability structure that keeps that collaboration going because the pull back to their departments and to their own organizations and sectors is so much stronger than the poor. You know\, that comes from the problem. It’s easier to kind of go back to your organization and keep doing the work that you did. And it’s like\, Oh yeah\, I collaborated for a little while. But then this is\, I think\, one of the biggest explanations why 6 to 8% of the projects do not really move the needle on something\, right? Because there is no sustained accountability structure that has people focus on the task rather than on the department.   \n\n\nMatt Andrews You know\, when I before we started the idea about 15 years ago\, I did some research on leadership. And I was really interested in in what leadership looked like when governments did special things. So people were mentioning Lee Kuan Yew earlier. I spent a lot of time engaging with people around what happened in Singapore. I spent a lot of time trying to understand what happened post 1995 in Rwanda\, just a bunch of different areas. And what I really expected to find was people who worked within web in bureaucracies very effectively and kind of made stuff happen. What I found was something completely different. I found that in every single. Including Lee Kuan Yew. And I’m happy to speak to anybody about this. It was not about the individual. It was about a group. You know\, even if you read his book\, you’ll read that he’ll tell you there are all sorts of names in that book that nobody has ever heard of. Anybody heard of a chin\, chin book? Okay. In Singapore\, he’s a hero of the country. I encourage you to go from Third World to first by Lee Kuan Yew\, because it will disabuse you of any idea that he thought that he was the hero of his country. And what we found was there were many people involved in the stories. And one of the reasons why there were many people is there were many roles to be played. You find some people who were the authorizes. You have some people who were motivators. You have some people who are identifying problems. You found some people who were coming up with ideas. You found some people who were funding resources. Then you find people who just implement it relentlessly implement it\, and lo and behold\, they were not all one person\, right? All of these roles are required in getting started on them and they cannot be done. But we do not have to put people in the world. We are all mortal. And so when I started to realize that\, I started to say\, Well\, how do these people work? Because our organizations aren’t really set up for these people to be working together like that. And you started to find that they were actually breaking out of the boundaries of their organizations and working in flexible arrangements\, which is what we call teams. Right. They were they were working in these mechanisms that could go across organizations\, could go down organizations where everybody had an equal voice and when things happened in a much more organic way. And that’s where the observation of teams came up. And we find that they are just tremendously vital. Now\, people play different roles in teams\, and so finding people to play those roles is truly\, truly important\, but very hard\, which is why we to exactly like you said\, you know\, you don’t know who you’re going to start with. I would also say this\, in most of the cases where we start\, people will say\, well\, you have to have the right people in your team. And I say\, you know what? Just find a team and find something to start with and just see what happens. Because you find that the people who aren’t meant to be on the team\, they drop off the team\, the people who are not on the team and who should be on the team\, they kind of find their way to your team and they say\, I want to be a part of this. And over time you kind of end up with the right thing. The key is learning\, and I think both of us say it’s about learning is that most of the policies we dealing with our policies to do with novelty\, the government’s trying to solve problems that haven’t been solved before\, which means that they trying to find things that they haven’t done in the past. And the only way that you find things you haven’t done in the past is by learning how to do them right. And the learning that is required is what record labels as kind of know how. And it’s tacit learning. It’s the learning that happens when you’re on the journey. And so that is why we like action learning too. It’s not just about learning where you teach people in the classroom\, it’s about people working together and learning from what they do now. We also found that the team is vital to that because people often don’t learn well and people on our own. I don’t think we realize how bad we are at learning from our experience. And I really mean this. We find that on the team\, people will go through something they’ll do\, they’ll do something in a week and they’ll come to the team meeting and you’ll say\, Jim\, what did you do this week? And Jim will say\, Nothing. It was a bad week\, everything was bad. And then Jane will say\, But Jim\, didn’t you call this organization? So yes\, I called them. Well\, what happened? They didn’t answer the call. So you learned something\, Jim? What did I learn? Well\, you learn that they don’t answer the phone and you literally have people on their say. But that can’t be a lesson. No\, no\, no. It really is a lesson. Right. And anybody who’s worked in a government knows that it’s a really important lesson that people don’t answer the phone. It’s like it’s like learning that I don’t respond to email because the next thing that the team member will say is\, Jim\, how about next week? You go and visit them and they’ll say\, okay\, I’ll try that. And the next week he goes and visits them. And what happened\, Jim I went to visit them. What happened? I got all my answers. We’ve opened some doors\, things are happening. But you need that dynamic of multiple people working with each other to let them see the hidden lessons for that to happen. And it’s not something that is easily done in a power relationship. It needs to be done in a relationship of peers\, which is when done well\, what a team is about.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. This morning\, Lant talked about experts and consultants and compared them to mosquitoes. We’re talking about teams and learning\, right? So I wanted to like a quick response on is there a role for experts and consultants? And if so\, what is that role? Are they mosquitoes or another kind of bug?   \n\n\nJorrit de Jong Well\, there is\, there’s a large variety of mosquitos\, some carry diseases. And\, you know\, I don’t know. You know\, like you made a joke about the consultant. It’s the person that takes your watch and tells you what time it is. Right. And so and I think in academia\, you know\, there is the stereotype that\, you know\, we teach. And\, you know\, I think what we try to do is to not be consultants. So\, you know\, we rarely give advice on what to do. I mean\, almost never we will connect them to resources of people who are really great at economic development or health in cities or zero carbon emission programs. Like we see ourselves as a broker role to connect them to people who really know\, you know\, deeply what needs to happen in certain steps of the various. But all when it comes to leadership and organizational development is to help them ask the right questions. And the right questions are questions that are better than the superficial questions and that kind of there’s a process of sustained inquiry. So you get to the bottom of what you need to do. Now\, the other thing I would say is like\, we don’t teach\, but we facilitate learning. And the learning is between people in a team\, but also from city to city and even from previous cohorts to the current cohort. So we’ve been writing about\, I think\, almost ten teaching cases. For those who don’t know\, like the teaching case is kind of the Harvard case method is a\, is a discussion based\, participant centered pedagogy where there is a story that doesn’t contain analysis but presents a dilemma from the perspective of a protagonist. So for example\, writing cases about the removal of the Confederate statues here in the South and many of our mayors in the first cohort\, we’re dealing with the aftermath of the Charlottesville riots. And they were confronted with protests\, and they were they were asked\, like\, what should I do? And even if you believe that the statue should go\, that’s easier said than done. If you got a\, you know\, a large violent mob that wants it\, you know\, etc.\, you can imagine the dilemmas\, the legal dilemmas\, the political dilemmas\, the cultural dilemmas that a mayor faces. And so we were writing three cases of mayors and the first cohort that responded very differently to that situation\, and then we will be using that in our second cohort. So this is one way in which I think external people such as ourselves can be helpful because we\, we get the learning from them\, but we curated\, right? We bring it to them in a way that actually helps them think and internalize the knowledge rather than just throw information at them. The second way in which I think we can be helpful and of course we’re measuring if that actually is true\, because I don’t want to assume that it’s helpful\, but it’s it’s the coaching model that we use here on campus for students as well as for executives\, is that\, you know\, you have to do two things to help people learn and learn deeply back to match point one is you got to support them\, meaning that you get to connect them to the information that they need. You got to\, you know\, almost hold steady a process where people kind of grapple with the issues\, both the substantive issues and the team issues\, and you have to challenge them. So we’re not all about Kumbaya and\, oh\, let’s all work together. You know\, if people have kind of an artificial harmony and they are too polite to each other\, they pretend like they’re on the same page with the problem definition. They pretend like they’re going to be working together. They pretend they’re committed. We will call them on it. And you actually did a great job on this with your team\, but that’s kind of the spirit like\, you know\, it’s if you don’t challenge a team\, they\, you know\, they get complacent. If you don’t support them\, they get burned out. And so\, you know\, I think I see your job as to kind of get that balance right. And that balance may be different from team to team\, but all of our teachers all over or I should say facilitators\, they all focus on\, you know\, noticing when a team needs to be challenged more and noticing when it needs to be supported more. And then we try to have a kind of a tailored approach to that.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. It’s interesting. We use the same terminology. We use facilitator\, we use coach. We never use PDIA consultant or PDIA expert. It’s always facilitator or coach. Matt\, did you want to comment?  \n\n\nMatt Andrews To I think what I would say is you need to differentiate between expertize and expert expertize matters. The thing that is always interesting. To me in the places where we work is we working with teams where things have been tried before. Usually outside experts have been brought in before. Usually they’ve offered really\, really good ideas that have sat on the shelf somewhere. So even if you get someone who really knows what they’re doing\, you need the expertize within the government to use those experts properly. And that is often not there. And so\, you know\, even where those people are not mosquitos\, but they are whatever and what they eat\, there needs to be a it’s actually a skill and a capability to use a consultant. It’s not an easy thing to do. So we think it’s about expertize. The other thing that I’d say is in most of these places\, there is subject matter expertize and there is country expertize. And\, you know\, the expertize required to to deal with the electricity problem in Honduras is partly about electricity\, but much more about Honduras. Right. So an expert in electricity is going to give you a small part of that solution. But the people who you’re working with in the government are the ones who have most of that expertize. And what we try to do is we are trying to lay on the response\, the responsibility on them\, that they are the experts for a significant part of the problem. When they run into a part of the problem that requires the subject matter expertize that they do not have\, then I say absolutely\, we need one of those people to come in\, but we don’t want a mosquito. We want someone who’s going to come in\, who’s going to give them the ideas that they need in a way that they can use it. And they need to be at a place where they can use it as well. And so we found that that is kind of a really important balance. I think there is absolutely a role for outside people to come in with smart ideas\, but those smart ideas need to find fertile ground and they need to not crowd out the expertize of the people there. I think probably even more than that\, they need to not be provided with the message to people in the government that\, don’t worry\, someone from the outside will come in and tell you what to do. And because we see that happening again and again and again\, we have a problem. Let’s bring the expert in. And all they’re doing is that we’re was saying earlier\, all they’re doing is they just they just avoiding the responsibility. Right. Avoiding the responsibility. But absolutely. I mean\, they are people and hopefully we teach some of them in our programs who just have subject matter expertize. That is going to be important in specific situations\, but it needs to be put into the process rather than come and subvert the process.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. I have several other questions\, but I’m going to open it up because we have 30 minutes left for this panel and I’m sure you have a lot of questions. We’re going to take a set of three questions. If you could just raise your hand so we can bring the mikes to you. Yes.   \n\n\nAttendee 1 Thank you. You’re preaching to the faithful. But the idea when you go to and you talk to the decision makers to two problems. First of all\, the definition of the problem itself\, it seems we talked last night about this. I mean\, it seems kind of naive saying\, oh\, let’s agree on the problem. Take Syria\, for example. If you get in\, talk to people about reconstruction\, for example\, the definition of the problem itself\, you might not get there. I mean\, even you might not get to the definition itself of the problem. How do you deal with this? And number two\, you’re talking to decision makers who have short periods of time. Maybe they’re elected officials they appointed for three years\, four years. And you might come across as people who are doing this for the greater glory of knowledge. You know\, let’s try. This seems like we don’t we have an unlimited time. We have unlimited resources. While the decision maker is boiling\, he’s trying or she’s trying to solve a problem within a definitive parameters in terms of time and resources allocated to a problem. How do we deal with these two questions\, if I may get your thoughts on this. Thank you.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Any other questions? Sorry. Back there\, Amar.   \n\n\nAttendee 2 Thank you. So earlier this month\, 100 Resilient Cities flagship project\, the Rockefeller Foundation abruptly announced that they were going to stop implementing this $160 million program around the world. It came as a surprise to many\, but perhaps not to others. If you look at the evaluation report\, it basically finds that they tried to create a private sector marketplace for goods and service providers. That failed. They tried to institutionalize Brazilians and silo how people think about resilience. It has created a\, you know\, appointed chief resilience officers and created this these plans. So the idea was that around this problem\, we will\, you know\, bring people together. But what they found was that the actual benefit to a lot of the mayors\, a sort of the chief resilience officers\, was this network of resilience practitioners that was created that they didn’t really anticipate happening. But of course\, this was a major\, major investment. And the idea that sitting in New York\, you can start a global movement that percolates around the world. Do you think that was destined for failure or were there elements here that you teach perhaps to your mayors that could be replicated in future programs?   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. And the other question. I’ll take those two.   \n\n\nJorrit de Jong Did anyone? I can start with the last question and then touch on some of them\, then turn over back to Matt. So I heard that that program is going to be defunded. That’s bad news. I don’t know them very well\, but I admire the work that they do that they did and still do\, I hope. Well\, I don’t know why it was defunded specifically\, but I do know that these networks of people in similar roles are extremely important. So what we do with our program is the mayors when they get together. It’s started with when we started designing this program\, we had five worries. The first worry was\, would we build it? Will the mayors come? And secondly\, if they come\, will they do their homework because we actually have them read the cases\, otherwise you don’t ever. Secondly\, even if they’ve written the cases\, will they be on their phone all the time under the table? And then thirdly\, you know\, will they actually stay in the room or will they be called out for crisis and emergencies? And\, you know\, will they find this useful? Can they take this back home? That’s the most important question. And so what we found is that\, yes\, they showed up\, all of them twice because we’re in their second year now. They did the reading. Apparently\, we had given them that stern message that we really have to do. Thirdly\, yes\, they engage with each other. We have a purpose built classroom that it’s almost impossible to kind of\, you know\, to check out because there’s peer to peer accountability. Fourth is that they hardly ever left the room. And fifth\, they said that this program was extremely useful in a very practical way. But what we didn’t know\, and this gets to your point\, is that one of the things that they value most is the ability to talk to people who are in the exact same situation that don’t need anything from them except learning. And so it’s a you could call it the sanctuary if you like\, but it’s definitely a peer support network. We have a group of African-American mayors that created a WhatsApp group and that started kind of an advocacy coalition. And we have a group of mayors that focus on education reform. They’re in touch with each other. We have mayors from coastal cities that are in touch with each other because they face similar issues. And so that network is is extremely valuable. And it doesn’t that network doesn’t necessarily happen in these events where there’s a lot of a lot of vendors trying to kind of lobby them. There’s a lot of convenings for mayors\, but the fact that this is mayors only is helpful. But it’s true for the chiefs of staff\, too\, because we convene them and the budget directors and so forth. And the chief resilience officers\, I think\, had a similar support network. And then to your point of how do you deal with the problem if it’s clear what the problem is? It’s easy to say\, well\, you got to agree on a problem. So one example that I’ve been involved in\, in another effort to organized crime field lab\, which is against organized crime\, it’s not supporting them. It’s just I have to say that is that we were focusing on human trafficking in Amsterdam. I’m from the Netherlands. And the problem was. We can’t get to these organized criminals because human trafficking is a very lucrative crime and it’s international\, it’s extremely well-organized\, and it’s some of their capabilities that we talked about performance\, orientation\, collaboration\, agility\, data driven. They’re better. They’re like two or three steps ahead of the government. So what do you do if you you know\, how do you define the problem in a way that makes it actionable? Well\, if you look at the root cause\, it’s deep global inequality and\, you know\, and economic disparity. And this is what drives a lot of crime and immigration and so forth. That’s if you’re a prosecutor in Amsterdam\, that’s not something you can work on necessarily. Now\, does that mean that everything else that you choose to work on is just fighting symptoms? Well\, maybe and maybe not\, because the way we can convince them to actually take this on is to say\, well\, look for an entry point\, let’s try and\, you know\, start somewhere in kind of sabotaging and frustrating the enabling infrastructure in Amsterdam\, the hotels\, the that the lawyers\, the accountants basically all the car rental companies\, the tax lawyers\, everybody. That’s part of the infrastructure that that that enables basically human trafficking. And if you start destroying and putting grit in and a machine of that infrastructure\, then you’re not addressing the root cause\, but you make it a lot harder for them to succeed. And if you only did that\, it wouldn’t be enough because you want to see if you really are effective in sabotaging those enabling factors. See what happens in the system. Make sure to give a learning orientation and see\, well\, where does it move? Now\, let’s say we take one city and we make it really hard for modern slavery because that’s what it is to really occur there. Then see where these traffickers go\, see if the prostitution moves\, see where the the forced labor moves\, and then\, you know\, see what next intervention you have within your scope of authority and capability that you can do. And that way\, it doesn’t feel like you’re doing something that’s not effective. But it also doesn’t feel completely overwhelming to take on this huge global problem. And I think that kind of approach we’ve taken with many of the teams is even if you can’t address a root cause\, that doesn’t mean you can work on it\, just good at something that you can work on and then see what happens if you do.   \n\n\nMatt Andrews So let me raise the two issues. The one is about the problem. These intractable problems that I want is about leadership. I’ll get back to the problem in a second. How do you speak to authorizers? I have a few of them in the room actually\, who are convinced to try this out. So you could speak to them afterwards and see what their thought process was. My sense is this we say you want to fund it\, authorize it within it. An authorizer with an edge. So someone who is basically saying\, I only have three or four years\, but I need to try something different because that’s what this is. And usually I think\, you know\, I started off by saying the success rate is somewhere between 8% and 30%. What I’m looking for is somebody who has a position of power\, who wants to do a little bit better than that\, and who’s actually done things the old way multiple times and realizes it doesn’t work because they are they taking a bet on this rut? And I think it’s explicit. This is different. This is out of the norm. It looks fine. It feels smells different. So I’m looking for an authorizer who is looking for something that is different? And there are lots of them. There are lots of them. We engage with the authorizes a lot very regularly. A key thing that the authorizes buy into is the idea that they not just getting delivery\, but they’re getting capability and that we’re going to be coming back to them again and again and saying\, this is what we’re learning about your people. This is what we’re learning about your context. This is what we’re learning about information. This is what we are learning. This is and they’re going to be kind of part of a process that is very aggressive\, where it’s not something that in three years time we’re going to see\, did we work or not? It’s going to be regular\, regular conversations about what’s going on in terms of the problem. You know\, man\, I don’t want to start with saying kind of what’s going on with Syria. Who’s part of the problem with Syria is that that’s where the problem is being discussed right now. The problem is Syria. Hey\, let’s break that thing down. Ricardo has a great saying\, why make something difficult when you can make it impossible? Right. So I say many civil servants\, they deal with something and we want to have the conversation at the level of impossibility. Kids aren’t learning in your country. I don’t know what to do about that\, but. So why don’t we just break this thing down? Why don’t we fund it? Why don’t we make it smaller? Every big problem is just. It’s just the combination of many\, many\, many smaller problems. And if you can break them down and you can find an entry point and you can start in that entry point\, you can start building confidence in your system. You can start building confidence in your people. You can start penetrating the problem. I like the idea of being a little bit subversive and you start to kind of almost work your way into it. So we have teams that take these big problems and then they use very simple tools like problem trees and things\, and they just identify what the roots of the problem. And then we say to them\, Where do you think you can begin? And you know what often happens? They often say\, we’ve already started on a bunch of these things. So that’s fantastic. How do we just go faster? Right. And then they start going faster and then they start to build confidence and they say\, we can jump to the next thing. We can jump to the next thing. It’s about starting where you are empowering your people. Having them take responsibility to actually invade the problem where it is learning and moving to the heart of things as we move along. We worked with the Albanians and Orban has just stepped outs and I can tell the story just in case it’s he questions that a team that was working in the clothing sector in in Albania and the clothing sector was struggling a little bit. And the government said\, our problem is that they are our major source of foreign exchange. We need them to bring we need them to increase their performance so that we have a good reservoir of foreign exchange because they were coming out of a financial struggle\, which I think he will describe. When we got together with a bunch of government of government officials\, they were three or four in the room. He said\, well\, the clothing sector isn’t producing enough foreign exchange. And they said\, Why are you coming to us with this problem? I don’t even work on the clothing sector. I know nothing about the clothing sector. They said\, Well\, let’s just start breaking it down. They started breaking the thing down. And they identified firstly by going to business\, they identified over 50 different problems. Right. And you might say\, Oh\, that sounds terrible. But it wasn’t terrible because the thing of it\, increased performance of the clothing sector is intractable. You can’t get there. But then there’s 50 things you say. What do you think about these? I said\, Well\, we are already doing ten of them. And so they initially sort of they said we are already doing ten of them\, so we need to make sure we get them done. And then they said the next ten\, we think we can really get on two. And then they. And then they left five or six and they said\, We can’t do those. So we said\, okay\, why don’t we just. Why don’t we just start with the ones you’re doing? After seven months\, they cleared the decks. Everything had been done. Everything. Even the ones that at the beginning\, they said\, we can’t get there. And part of it was that their capability grew. Because capability is not just ability. It’s not just competence. It’s also power. Right. And power is something that is bestowed on you and something that comes from inside you. And what we found is that as they started to kind of see successes and see that they could do things\, they just became more and more empowered. And that connection of power plus stability just allowed them to clear the decks with everything. But you can’t start with. Syria is in a mess. It’s asked the question why it’s asked a thousand times. Let’s break it down to many\, many of the areas and let’s find entry points. And it’s mobilize people to work on those entry points and let’s see how long it takes them to invade the whole thing. That’s\, I think\, a common belief that we have. Don’t start with the thing that that today is impossible. Find the thing that is possible that makes the impossible possible over time.   \n\n\nJorrit de Jong I can add to that. So it’s funny. Many of the problems that we’re talking about are so complex that people feel often paralyzed\, that they don’t have enough information or understanding of what the problem is. And like\, we’ve been trained in public policy schools\, including this one. It’s like you can’t act unless you understand\, you know\, like it would be foolish and irresponsible to engage without having done all your analysis. And then the problem is we don’t have the data because\, you know\, we don’t have those data capabilities and so forth. And even if we had the data\, would we really agree on the analysis? Right. So a quick example of from the same organized ground field lab\, there was a $20 billion from a particular area in going every year. You know\, it was it was an informal economy around synthetic drugs. And they knew that there were going to be deposits. And there was an international financial network that was\, you know\, channeling all this money laundering and so forth. And it was a group\, a team put together of 12 different people from different agencies. And they and they were doing this analysis. They were trying to put all their data together. They were really willing to come up with a better approach. And they couldn’t get there. They didn’t have real time data. They couldn’t agree on data standards. They had a lot of expertize\, you know\, among them\, but nobody really knew where it was coming from. And they didn’t have the capacity to investigate because the problem is hidden\, and particularly with hidden problems\, including human trafficking and\, you know\, large scale organized crime\, you know\, it’s kind of a convenience not to look. And so\, you know\, this problem was in equilibrium. So what they did is ultimately this took like months of hard work. We said\, why don’t you go try deposit $25\,000 in Rotterdam in one of those money transfer? Why didn’t you just do that and see\, first of all\, if they’re in compliance\, if they because they’re legally obligated to report unusual transactions and like they were looking at us like\, what do you think it was? You could get $25\,000 somewhere. And it it’ll be a good investment even if you lose it. Right. But you won’t lose it because you can arrest people if they. And so in one day\, in one day\, they closed down three of those money transfer offices. They arrested 11 people. They confiscated a ton of laptops with crucial information. And that led them to very specific investigations. And but it took like three months to actually get out there\, get a\, you know\, a gym bag with unmarked bills and then and then go to two\, you know\, and sometimes you just need to try something clumsily and then really focus all your attention on the learning that comes from that first clumsy intervention and then take it from there. The\, you know\, the analytic approach may come later than the action.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Ricardo\, you had a question\, Frank. Oh\, sorry\, Frank. Ricardo and that lady.   \n\n\nAttendee 3 So I have a question. You know\, yesterday we started with a discussion of Clovis and the\, you know\, the Germanic tribes had a practice. And\, um\, and here we are today. And that’s\, that’s why we do the things. That’s why some countries do things one way and other countries do things another way so that some of these practices are are very long term and in general\, etc.. In a you people can read you as at different levels. If you are the head of a department in a ministry that is going to solve a problem. How do you empower your people in your department to solve the problem? Or suppose I’m the minister. And so how do I implement this? Or suppose I’m the president. How do I implement this? And and how do I beyond beyond sort of like actually doing the work. A change the culture so that\, um\, you know\, people start thinking about organization and good practice and performance and merit in a different way.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you\, Frank.   \n\n\nAttendee 4 So I am curious how interventionist you are with PDIA. So I’ve had experience running my own program where your teams and we saved\, you know\, set a problem and come up with solutions and so forth. A lot of times they will come up with a completely absurd problem. Usually it’s too big. It cannot simply cannot be solved. Or sometimes they come up with a hobbyhorse solution like they’ve got some technology they want to use\, and you just know that it’s not going to work. Right. So do you just let them make mistakes until they figure it out for themselves? Or do you actually say\, actually\, you know\, you got to go back to the drawing board because we kind of the outside experts sort of know that this sort of thing doesn’t work in other cases. And.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. Why me? You back that up. Thanks. I want to ask Matt a question and maybe it’s similar to what Ricardo saying. I’m not sure\, but not everyone can afford your services. So what does it mean if I’m trying to organize a department or a city or a presidency? How do I think about this? And what would you change? So often you’re intervening in\, let’s call it a very big in top bureaucracy of one kind or another. What are the implications of what you’re saying? Which makes a lot of sense to me. Well\, how you would organize an institution or a bureaucracy from\, you know\, not from de novo\, but what does it mean in terms of the theory of how you organize the state?   \n\n\nMatt Andrews Can I go first? So just a couple of things. Firstly\, Frank. I agree. I think it costs us when we intervene because I think this is a learned practice whereby people welcome the intervention and they therefore they will they will defer to you. And we’re trying to create the culture whereby people take responsibility. So it is costly. There are times where we will intervene\, though\, because sometimes we intervene because I’m concerned that people are going to. One of the things we have to be careful of is we’re working in environments that don’t always facilitate the autonomy and the empowerment that we’re thinking of. And the team might actually want to go faster than we think is good for them. And so the time when I really will intervene is when I’m trying to say to them\, Slow down\, right? Because I’m concerned I first do no harm. If they come up with silly definitions of the problem\, we have mechanisms in our problem diagnostic that kind of deal with that. So in the diagnostic\, you know\, if they say our problem is this\, I’ll come back to them and I’ll say\, apply the tool again\, apply the tool again\, apply it\, because they always start here and essentially we just funnel them down. Right and so I can deconstruction also. Yeah. So\, so it’s kind of we have a process that is called a deconstruction process where we\, we just apply. They just ask why many\, many\, many times. And within the scope of their tools\, those tools\, I’m not going to them and saying you’re wrong. I’m going to them and saying\, Do it again\, do it again\, do it again. We have a bias towards action\, though. So our workshops\, if at the end of a workshop\, they aren’t where we want them to be\, which I used to really fret about\, and I would say this team isn’t going to get there. And then I’d say\, maybe we should come back for another workshop. The best thing to do is push them to action because they will learn if the problem is too big and they choose something to do at the end of the first week. Remember we iterating correctly so we don’t come back after six months or even three months. The first planning with them is going to be after the first week they’ll say\, Oh\, we did this and we learned that we couldn’t do it. Why? Because we got the problem wrong. So we went back and we and there’s something about kind of having some faith in the process that this iteration actually works. So you\, as the as the coach\, don’t need at any given time to be at the right place\, you need to have faith that it’s going to happen now. It does mean\, though\, that if I think that they’re kind of doing something that looks like it’s not going to work\, I’m going to be very aware of that in the coaching process and I’m going to be looking for that and I’m going to be trying to find a way to coach into that\, but not in a way that takes the responsibility away from them. So it’s a little bit of a kind of a dance\, you know\, and but one of the main things we’ve done is created tools that allow us to engage in ways that don’t look like intervention. We never\, ever want to say to them\, No\, you’re wrong. We would rather say to them\, Try it again. Ask the question in this way. Have you thought about it like this? Never saw them know you’re wrong because they need to be the masters of their own destiny. And if you’re in a place where you know they aren’t where you want them to be\, just go with it. That’s the other thing that’s interesting to me in many of the experiments we’ve done. In many of them when I thought that idea is really silly and they’ve done it\, it’s turned out to be less silly than I thought. And when they’ve been team members that I’ve thought\, why are those people on the team? I don’t think they should be there. They’ve turned out to be a lot better than I thought. So there’s kind of surprises along the way. Your questions are hard. We work with people at different levels. There’s different ways in which people consume this at different levels. There’s different things that prime ministers are looking for\, ministers are looking for\, people in ministries are looking for from this. There’s different things that are required from them. I’m. We have free online opportunities for people to process and learn the tools and the tools. We have a very\, very simple. So we’re trying to make it something people can access. If someone were to say\, look\, we want to do this. How do I organize myself to do this? The first thing I’d say is there is no such thing in a government as organizing from scratch. You’re always working within what you have. Which is why I like teams\, because I can say to someone\, you don’t have to reorganize your organization\, just create a team. And a team is a a a flexible entity. And then we’d say\, now bring the team into this process with you. So if you know\, if anyone at any level of government said\, I want to do this because here’s has the problem\, I’d say we need a problem and we need a team. And that’s it. And we need and we need you to commit to do this for six\, four\, six months. That’s it. And I think maybe the last one may be the hardest one\, because the commitment needs to be even longer. We’ve been working in Albania for a long time\, and I can tell you\, you know\, whenever I go to Albania\, there’s people who are thinking in different ways. And it’s not just because we’ve been there\, it’s because the government has been the government has been\, in my opinion\, and we have some Albanians who are on a journey of rethinking how they engage with their people. That is way beyond our program for a long period. And it’s been patient and it’s been willing to say we don’t necessarily know the answers and we don’t necessarily need to see the result tomorrow. We’re going to work with people. So for us\, if someone were to come and say\, we want to do this\, I’d say\, Do you have an ice problem? Gee\, are you willing to work as a team and are you willing to kind of put real effort into it over a period of time and be patient? And those three things are the key. I think. But we can talk more after.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Thank you. Or do you have anything to add?   \n\n\nJorrit de Jong You know\, thanks to my Bloomberg’s generosity\, we’re able to offer these services for free so the cities don’t pay anything. And so we select based on their engagement. So I really like the phrase authorizer within it. We’re looking for authorizers within which we have the mayor of Freetown\, Sierra Leone\, in our program. And she is an authorizer with an issue\, and she doesn’t have the kind of capabilities in her organization to do what she wants. But that doesn’t hold us back. We’re like\, we’ll work with an authorized within it. And then another example\, the mayor of Fortaleza\, Mayor Claudio\, is part of a program. And to Ricardo’s point of how do you engage everybody from top to bottom and have them work together and play their part\, which makes it less important for you to stay engaged\, right? Ultimately\, you want to create a dynamic where everybody plays their part. And so what he thought when he came in\, he had run on a platform where he was going to dramatically improve the medicine distribution in Fortaleza. And this is\, you know\, constitutional rights to have access to medicine there. And he wanted to deliver. He’s a doctor\, so he thought he came into this program. Now I will know how to manage my people to do this. And then he came back from the program and his senior leaders that were in the program said like\, well\, he didn’t change the rest\, but he got he came back a changed mayor because he had been leading his meetings where he was just giving orders and\, you know\, holding people accountable for targets and so forth. He had never been asking them questions. So he came back from the program with a whole set of questions that he had never asked his staff that empowered his staff. And that changed kind of and he changed the team around a little bit. And so he reported back. He said\, like the big difference was in myself. And because I became a more effective leader\, my teams became more effective. Because they became more effective. They were they felt more empowered to try different things. And because they tried different things\, he was able to deliver on that promise. And so I think on our best days we do that right. It doesn’t always work. It takes a leader with an itch and it takes kind of some level of support. And\, you know\, where are we going to live? We’re in our second year. So in this fall will present the first impact assessment because everything we facilitate or teach\, we apply to ourselves to and we’ll find out\, you know\, what the correlation is between the level of support and the level of success and see is to look for patterns and see where we can best put our efforts.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you very much. We’re out of time. Jorrit and Matt will be around if you have any further questions. Thank you very much. A round of applause. Thank you.  \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nGlobal Empowerment Meeting (GEM19) where Matt Andrews\, Jorrit de Jong\, and Salimah Samji discuss how governments can better implement policies.
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/gem-2019-how-can-governments-better-implement-policies/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20181030T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20181030T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T015119Z
CREATED:20230215T024931Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T015119Z
UID:13257-1540857600-1540943999@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:How Do You Mobilize Political Elites and Citizens
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nAlice Evans\, BSC Associate and Lecturer at Kings College in London  \n\n\n\nRakesh Rajani\, Vice President\, Programs at Co-Impact  \n\n\n\nLily L Tsai\, Faculty Director\, MIT Governance Lab and Associate Professor at MIT \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Director\, Building State Capability \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you\, everyone. Welcome to our panel on how to mobilize political elites and citizens. Today we have with us Alice Evans\, who is a BSC Associate and also a lecturer at King’s College London. We have Lily L Tsai who is a professor of political science at M.I.T. and the director\, faculty director of the MIT Governance Lab. And we have Rakesh Rajani\, who is the vice president of programs at Co-Impact\, formerly at the Ford Foundation\, and then formed 12 Ways\, as some of you know him from there. And Haki Alemu is from where I know him from. And we’re really excited to have these panelists and to hear what they have to say. I wanted to just give you a brief understanding of what it is that we were looking for in this panel. We know that there is a lot of agendas out there that are really important\, whether they may be at a global level or a regional level\, at a local level that sometimes don’t get on the agenda. And sometimes even when they do get on the agenda\, and nothing really happens. And so what we wanted to do is how do we understand? How do we mobilize citizens? How do we mobilize political elites to actually get these agendas on and things and they actually get implemented and things actually happen. So what we did is we’ve given the panelists a series of questions to answer. And they’re basically how does one think about mobilizing the attention for policies that should be on the agenda and those that are not on the agenda? I wanted them to share from their own experience as examples of what they’ve tried\, what they’ve learned\, how they may have done this in the past. What types of capabilities need to be built and whose capability do we need to build? And then finally\, we are at the Kennedy School. What kind of capabilities do we need to instill in students here so that they are able to get these agenda items onto policy agendas and not just be on an agenda\, but something actually happens to get things done. So I wanted to start first with Alice. Do you want to share from your experience?   \n\n\nAlice Evans So I think one example of some kind of change that’s really hard to mobilize is if it’s concern for distant others. So not people’s everyday priorities too\, if you perceive there as being strong\, coordinated opposition. And three\, if there’s widespread despondency\, if people think it’s doomed to failure. And an example of that that I’ve been studying recently is corporate accountability in the UK\, Europe and wider USA. So this is concern for labor rights abuses and global supply chains\, you know\, distant others in Bangladesh or Vietnam where there’s strong business opposition. In any country\, it will be tremendously hard to introduce legislation\, increasing liability on our companies\, because they would immediately try to say\, if you make things harder for us\, we’ll become less internationally competitive\, so we’ll go elsewhere. So there will always be strong business opposition. Three is if we never see that kind of change happening\, NGOs might think it’s not possible. So instead of investing in that kind of activism\, they opt for a second best scenario. So work with companies to improve CSR\, even though we know CSO does very little to abate the problem. So Rana Plaza. So I’d say one of the hardest problems would be trying to get corporate accountability for those reasons.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Okay. Did you want to answer all the question?   \n\n\nAlice Evans Oh\, yes\, yes\, yes. Okay. Okay\, but this is the exciting thing.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji To go\, Alice.   \n\n\nAlice Evans As of 2018\, all large French companies are now legally obliged to identify and reduce risks of human rights abuses in their supply chains. And if they fail to do this and enough of these happens\, then they’ll be taken to court and they can be sued and the exact same. Similarly\, in Switzerland this year\, in July\, the National Council voted in support for similar legislation. We’ve now seen new campaigns opening up in Finland\, in Denmark\, Canada. They’ve just been to the International Development Committee\, which has had a parliamentary motion calling for similar legislation. So why did this happen? How did we come to mobilize people for change despite these huge obstacles? One is journalists publicizing crises\, eroding the legitimacy of the status quo\, getting people concerned that all companies were perpetuating these harms\, that CSR just isn’t working. So one to journalism two is providing credible reasons for hope by showing that corporate accountability is the direction of travel. So in both France and Switzerland\, they pointed to various examples and ways in which this was happening. So they pointed to Dodd-Frank\, where there’s a clause about conflict minerals. They pointed to some aspects of the Canadian legislation\, the French campaign\, the French legislation has emboldened activists in Switzerland. So people seeing that it’s possible that it’s credible and getting companies to think that this is the way that we’re going. So providing credible reasons for. For showing that this was the international agenda. And incredibly importantly here at the Kennedy School\, John Ruggie played an enormously important part of this. So John Rockey was part of the U.N. global norms where they were introducing this voluntary idea of due diligence. So they were setting up the idea that it was a voluntary mechanism just advising and encouraging companies to identify and reduce risks of human rights abuses. That wasn’t mandatory\, but by making it voluntary\, it was not threatening. Everyone got on board with it. Everyone came to understand\, and it was a very participatory\, inclusive meetings. And so by its being this sort of non-threatening\, consultative\, inclusive process\, more companies and governments engage with this idea of due diligence. Then the French companies strategically use that idea which had widespread support and said\, let’s turn this into legislation. But to do that\, what they needed is a broad coalition. So they worked with a broad range of environmental activists\, with development tangos\, with Catholic churches. They got a whole group of legal activists or legal minds to work through the legislation\, consumer groups. They got all these brilliant people together\, tapped into that. That was and the same is true in Switzerland. So the Swiss campaign is the largest civil society campaign ever\, and they’ve managed to do it by having like over 120 NGOs all collectively watching what they do in Switzerland is they are careful not to portray it or present it as a niche left wing environmental campaign. They purposefully amplify right wing support. So there are some right wing groups. So there are religious groups or their business groups. They say we’ve got 100 businesses on board. Now\, most of these are actually vegan ice cream companies. True story. But we’ve got these businesses on board. Right. And so you make it seem like it’s a broad\, you know\, socially inclusive agenda. So the broad coalition publicizing reasons for hope\, you know\, tackling that despondency because showing its international direction of travel does two things. One is it raises aspirations. You know\, it raises our expectations that people come. We only invest in things if we believe that it’s possible everything is doomed to failure. We’re not going to do it. We’re not going to even try. And that despondency\, you know\, creates the negative feedback loop. But once we think it’s possible\, then governments and politicians become less worried about undermining their companies competitive advantage because they no longer think that companies will go elsewhere because other countries are likely to pass similar legislation. So those three things were important. So what we need to do then? For me\, it’s partly about shifting expectations\, providing credible reasons for hope\, for getting us to think that we can achieve these things by highlighting examples of successful mobilization and responsive governance. Now\, what can we do? What can students do? What? How can we support all students to go into the world? Mobilize change. Right. Okay. So I’m sure you’re doing some of these things already. If it was me\, I. And it is me\, right? As a lecturer in my own\, what I think is three things. One\, encourage and support my students so they are equipped\, capable and ready to work with diverse groups. You know\, that was really key in the Swiss campaign and also the French campaign working for more with academics\, with linked with lawyers\, with environmental activists\, recognizing that we gain strength through that diversity\, tapping into different. So being ready for that. Two Being skilled in mass communications. Like the other day with my students\, we were writing blogs\, you know\, mass communications. That’s key. And I think learning through the sort of success of comparative social movements\, learning wise\, some of course\, in mobilization and more successful than others.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you. Lily.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai I strongly recommend.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji You go through catch.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai And\, like\, only 100th of an enemy. It is.   \n\n\nAlice Evans The only balance.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai I think is good. So\, like\, to get down.   \n\n\nAlice Evans A few slides.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai I guess I wanted to start. I mean\, actually\, I’m going to pick up on a lot of the points that elephants just raised and illustrate this morning in terms of them and specifically this like this idea of starting with feeling like you’re doomed to fail. So I guess one thing that I know as a political scientist is that mobilizing attention from citizens and elites for that matter. But a mobilizing attention is different from mobilizing action. And we know that you can get citizens to increase the salience of an issue for them to care more about a policy. You can get politicians to run on policy platforms\, so it’s more about substance rather than anything else. But nevertheless\, issue salience is not the main factor and it not a main predictor in whether or not citizens take action. Things like party identification are much more important. Or as my colleague Danny Togo\, who studies Brazil\, points out\, there are in the developing world different equivalents\, the party I.D. So in Brazil\, it’s loyalty to political family. So those things are way more important for determining action. So I just want to underscore that ordinary people increase attention to these issues that we care about\, but they don’t necessarily take action as so why? And so here again\, picking up on some of the things that have been already raised by Ellis\, I would argue that too often we try to mobilize the action of citizens without mobilizing the actions lead. And so I would argue that both in terms of my own work and the existing research out there\, that it’s really it is perhaps really important to mobilize elites first. Number one\, because I have started to become really uncomfortable with how external actors seek to mobilize the actions of citizens without knowing or being\, you know\, having a degree of confidence that the elites will respond. So I think I actually would put it forward that it can be somewhat unethical to mobilize the actions of ordinary citizens to advocate for these issues when you don’t know or you don’t have a pretty good idea that elites will also take action in response. But second\, also because if you don’t mobilize elite action first or you don’t have that lined up\, citizens are just going to stop taking action. Because with you know\, the research shows that that instead when you don’t get elite response to citizen action\, you get disillusionment\, disenchantment and exit and over its highly informed disillusionment. So they like they’re very\, very disillusioned because they know they’ve experienced it firsthand\, like the disappointment. So\, you know\, I think that we can all come up with examples of this. I’ve recently thought a lot about and written about the anti-corruption campaigns that have happened after the fall of communism. So\, you know\, those of you who remember that there was a rise of international anti-corruption advocacy campaigns. And\, you know\, I think it is it’s very easy to make the case that they might have done more harm than good. They changed. They did they did politicize the issue of corruption and they put anti-corruption on the agenda and good governance on the agenda. But because the EU\, for example\, in Eastern Europe\, the EU required Eastern European countries to set up anti-corruption institutions as a condition for accession to the EU. There was this external pressure. These institutions are set up. But what what didn’t happen is that external actors did not make sure that the elites were going to enforce. And so without enforcement\, what happened was politics was is that the question? Okay\, are just what.   \n\n\nAlice Evans Do you want to.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Give me opportunity to like? So. So what happened was politics got it became all about corruption and anti-corruption. And political parties were able to use anti-corruption as a key issue to accuse the other side. So\, you know\, in the case of Romania\, for example\, opposition parties banded together to accuse the president of corruption. They started impeachment proceedings\, you know\, their high profile investigations on both sides. There’s no there’s no there’s no there’s no prosecution. Right. And so as a result\, citizens in Romania are like\, this is just something that the politicians used to accuse each other. And politics continues to be about corruption in anti-corruption\, but without much change\, which just leads to a declining public trust in the political process. So I guess\, you know\, one thing that I’ve been cautioning practitioners nowadays is that that is that is a pretty instructive case for the current movement to advocate for anti-corruption and the more international initiatives that happen to try to put corruption and good governance on the agenda. You know\, they should take into account these historical lessons. So let’s see in terms of what kinds of capabilities need to be developed to bring these issues onto the policy agendas and whose capabilities need to be developed. I mean\, to keep in along the same line of reasoning\, you know\, I think that it would be important to develop the capabilities of external actors to work on getting reformist elites and reformist activists on the societal side to mobilize attention and action simultaneously. And in fact\, you know\, perhaps setting up the government response first\, lining it up first and then and then mobilizing action. It’s a little bit like capital campaigns in universities\, you know\, so that you raise like $800 million and then you announce the campaign. You’re like 80% of the way there. So\, you know\, just contribute. But I mean\, but it is a very similar kind of logic. And so\, you know\, I just wanted to briefly go over some of the research that I’ve been doing in China\, where it is this priming the pump kind of strategy. You know\, China\, of course\, I mean\, not to romanticize or glamorize what China’s doing because there are lots of potential problems. But when citizens believe that higher levels will punish corruption and malfeasance\, what I find is that there’s an associate that’s associated with an increase of 13% in citizen participation. It’s also increase associated with an increase of more than 25% in the likelihood that they will complain to the government if their if grassroots elections were canceled. So that’s a very high risk kind of engagement\, basically. But when they see that higher levels are willing to take action\, are willing to enforce\, then that actually stimulates more citizen action. And so I think that actually is an instructive example. You know\, you arguably could see similar things happening in Rwanda. And\, of course\, like I\, I come from this perspective of focusing on authoritarian regimes and a lot of my research. I’m going to move on. I was going to go over a case and the Philippines as well. But\, you know\, I think it would be more important to have more of a conversation with the group. So then what capabilities would we need to develop? And students I mean\, again\, I think it is this matter of like setting up some of the action and response by the other side or the government side first before mobilizing citizens. And\, you know\, I think there is an increasing amount of research and maybe you all talk about this at the Kennedy School already. As a political scientist\, you know\, we’re still stuck in this framework where societies\, the state needs to be insulated from society\, that there is this\, you know\, thinking from that paper that there should not be personal relationships across the state society boundary. But I think there’s an increasing amount of empirical research that suggests that actually building these kinds of personal relationships\, even having a revolving door between civil society and the state\, can be can result in constructive outcomes rather than cooptation. So I guess I would raise the possibility that it’s important to develop the capability of being multilingual and multicultural in the sense of having experience both on the government side and the societal side of the civil society side. Because I think in order to be able to prime the pump and to line up that government response\, if you’re on the societal side\, you have to be able to translate your goals into the other side’s languages\, concerns and values. So that’s what I would. Thank you.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani All right. So I’m just going to tell two stories. And I think a lot of the themes that I’ve said before\, I think can use those as lenses. One is a story about primary education in Tanzania\, where I read through Traverso\, and the other is a story of something I supported through the Ford Foundation about universal preschool in Cincinnati\, Ohio. So and I think that’s a little bit apples and oranges\, but I still think they are inseparable. So\, you know\, education in Tanzania\, primary education tends to be like in many other global south countries. And I think\, you know\, the story of independence\, very few went to school because only the elite were meant to be educated. So in terms of the end is less than 10% of school. So the story on what you did for post-independence was around getting kids into school and that involved a lot of money. So it was all about having enough money in ten\, 20 years after independence when so much money was going. But that servicing the story became how do we cancel the debt? So reduce the debt so that we have actually enough money for school. And the money was supposed to buy things that matter\, that are needed\, like classrooms\, desks\, books\, all these emails. And that captured the public imagination. And there was really a lot of consensus across there. You know\, maybe the IMF and the bank at times are outsiders\, but everybody else\, you know\, if you talk about teachers\, kids\, parents\, local officials\, members of parliament\, the local governments\, businesses\, donors\, media\, everybody agreed we needed schools and everybody should be in schools. And that’s what we spent a lot of energy on. And in doing that\, these this story\, this narrative and these images are and what we need is everybody in school and a good school is one that looks like this. You know\, you can it’s easy to visualize what a classroom or a school is\, you know\, is what we’ve had for 50 years. And it succeeded\, right. You did have debt cancelation. In fact\, when I was a student here\, right here at the Kennedy School\, there was work on the epic campus that Jeffrey Sachs\, one of the few good things he did then\, you know\, so there was stuff that actually succeeded in you know\, we succeeded in Tanzania\, for example\, in the course of a decade while I was working on this\, tripled in real terms\, this budget on education at that time\, you know\, spending about a quarter of all it’s in a quarter of government budget went to education. We did build the classrooms. We did enroll millions of kids. So it actually succeeded. But now the problem. The kids are not learning. And we knew that\, but it wasn’t catching. So what did I do? Borrowing the model from India is we did this simple test and measure the actual literacy and numeracy level. Some people supported that and we managed to show at a very large scale through this very simple test that kids that schooling is not the same as learning. And we showed this data and the data was good\, simple\, but robust. It could be verified. And it was it wasn’t just proxies. These were real measures of whether the kids could write\, I mean\, read or count. It would make a splash when the report was issued some headlines. But the initial view of the government was to just say and question the methodology of just spurious kind of questioning. It wasn’t taken seriously. The test was repeated every year. Every year it would make some headlines. Eventually\, the government kind of went along\, but really it was only the donors and a few NGOs like ourselves\, not even the NGO community that really important. Even the other NGO supported this course felt\, yeah\, this matters. But let’s also talk about there being enough books and enough desks and things of that sort. So\, you know\, we as well that did not manage to get a big coalition focused on these things despite the evidence that pouring more money was not going into the results. And then there was a key breakthrough\, at least we thought it was a breakthrough where the government was feeding a sense of crisis and they created something called big results\, not borrowing on a Malaysian model to say a government is too messy\, let’s create this kind of vertical\, high level unit unity. We’re going to push through something results. And we were very proud as powers that we got. The influences in the learning outcomes piece was the core focus. There was transparency on the data that we reward the schools\, that the better that improve the most\, get rewards and so forth. Huge energy put into it. So you could I could easily tell you a story now of great success of because this little official government policy was rolled out. And so this happened two years before the previous president in the last two years of the previous president’s term. Soon as his term ended\, the current president\, even though he comes from the same ruling party\, abandoned this entire effort. And the coalition that had come together to work on the be our end the big results workshop was too weak to fragment as they had no sense of identity. There’s no sense of belonging. There’s no sense of we are doing this for this to last. So if you go to Tanzania today\, it’s really not focused on learning outcomes in any serious way. The government is not focused. The community is not focused. Parents\, you know\, we thought if we give data to parents around the kids on off learning and we gave them ideas of what you could do\, that they will go. They have an incentive. It’s their own kids. They’ll do something. They didn’t really do anything. Teachers were I felt the feeling that I blame. So he has a story of where we we had some level of elites agree. We even had policy pronouncements and so on. But in the end\, when all it took was a little nudge from a new regime and the whole thing crumbled and there really isn’t much going for it. Now\, you know\, I can tell you a story and therefore when there are pieces\, but ultimately things are not coalition focus. Now\, let me quickly tell you the story of Cincinnati\, Ohio. So in November 2016\, Trump wins the election. He wins Ohio by six or 8% of. But in that same time\, the same moment\, the voters in Cincinnati passed a new tax for preschool by a margin of 24%. So so hold on. These are Trump voters who are also voting for by a 24% margin. You know\, voting for tax to pay for preschool and essentially preschool for poor kids would happen to be much more lower income and happen to be disproportionately black. So how does what’s the story behind what experiments? Drawing on work by Hari Hines\, a political scientist at Lilly and others. Important. And so I’ll let me give you a quick background. In 2001\, there was a young black man who was killed by the police. There was large civil unrest as a result of that. Remember\, Cincinnati has the second highest poverty rate of cities in the US\, despite it having lots of Fortune 500 companies. If you look at capital calculation. Cincinnati has more Fortune 500 companies than Boston\, New York\, Los Angeles\, Chicago. So the business leaders said\, gosh\, you know\, we but we’ve got to do something. I think a combination of being scared shitless about all the riots and\, you know\, maybe we had some responsibility. So they came together and and they decided we really need to focus on early childhood. If we focus on early childhood and get it\, it’ll help. It’ll help for people. It’ll get them to do better. Or maybe they’ll riot less and we’ll have peace. And they did a campaign. And this involved\, like\, you know\, the CEO of Procter and Gamble\, lots of big companies. And they did it to the United Way. So the United Way and these big businesses worked. And I’m for time. I’ll cut this long short. But they were from 2003 to 2013 for ten years. High level elite engagement in trying to do something in Cincinnati. What did they achieve? In summary\, they raised $10 million in ten years. These are big companies and they managed to get 5000 petition\, 5000 signatures to a petition. That’s all they were able to do\, despite having a consensus of the elite level of trying to do this. And what happened is that once the riots died down and so the commitments were they on paper\, but there was no energy behind it to make this work. In the meantime\, in 2014\, a guy called Troy Jackson became the executive director of a faith based organization called Amazon One of my favorite prophets. But that’s a sidebar. And when he became an executive director\, what he did was he went and had hundred meetings with people in his constituency\, face to face meetings. And when you talk to them about what’s going on and they all talk about a lot of them talk about their children and this issue of preschool education\, the same thing that these elites had identified more than ten years ago\, came up as the core. So what he did. Is he said\, okay\, let’s start working on this. But the way I want to work on this and I’m quoting Harry here\, is that I want to do this in a way that builds the interests\, capacities and leaderships of leadership in my constituency. So it’s not like I listen and I’m going to figure out the solution for you. He he proceeded to work in a way that involved his constituents and built their leadership. They went house to house\, engaged over 1000 people. Over 60 churches were involved. While this was going on\, there’s a church in Cincinnati called Crossroads Church\, Evangelical Church. More than 80% white. The largest is the fastest growing evangelical church in the United States. Its growth rate is\, you know\, still is very small\, like I said\, mostly white\, but not entirely. And they remember in 2015\, we had all these rash of shootings by police of black men. So there was a pastor\, an associate pastor\, African-American\, who said\, I’ve got to do something. What do I do with the largely evangelical white church? So he went to Troy Jackson\, the head of homeless\, and said\, Help me out here. I really need to do so\, but I don’t know what to do. So they’ve spent seven months. It was a slow process figuring out what to do. And they came up with this idea of undivided\, undivided\, maybe indivisible\, undivided. And they created a six week program expressly focused on racial reconciliation inside this large\, fastest growing evangelical church. Over 1200 members of this church\, one trained. And they launched a program in 2016 of training this. And from this\, 1200 people\, 750 volunteers emerged to form what is called the justice team. And there was the whole message talking about your point out actually was about this is our faith\, but how do we put our faith into action? What would it mean to do that? And they started being powerful. They had this network\, some of these big leaders who are like\, you know\, skidding in their tracks\, heard about this and said\, maybe we can get some help from them. So they went to Troy Jackson said\, can you basically get your people to help us behind this preschool initiative? And Troy said\, okay\, but here’s the deal. They have a I forgot to tell them\, come up with a people’s platform for ideas we have has to be the starting point to if you want to do this\, we have to do this in a way where you actually engage with the constituency. So you have Mr. CEO of Proctor and Gamble and you of you know\, you’ve come to our place and you talk not just to me\, but you talk to them. And so they came in literally in the in these Baptist churches and so on\, and started talking and had to listen to these people talk about everyday life and what was going on. And what happened is so\, for example\, the people’s platform said\, the way we’re going to finance this is not a bunch of CSR. We’re going to have a progressive income tax. The business leaders said\, no way. We\, you know\, business tax\, you know\, they will kill you. No\, no\, no progressive income tax. But through this negotiation\, you know\, and they want a no tax\, they basically settled on a property tax\, which was progressive in the sense that\, of course\, rich people have to pay much more again for time. I’ll just kind of skip the basically this tax got passed. And not only not only did that happen\, but the elite coalition\, the business agreed to all other aspects of these people’s platform that included\, for example\, a minimum wage to $15 and a number of other progressive\, progressive measures. So what I’m saying\, what I’m also achieved through this approach to the following one\, they won the they won the battle. They got the tax cut\, they got preschool funding. But the way they did it\, and I think this is the key that conscientious ised\, a low income\, marginalized constituency on the issue\, they developed positions on the issue. They figured out a pathway to action. They developed skills to do that. They were able to organize among themselves. They were able to actually also engage with these CEOs. They got to experience that sense of agency. The key word here\, I think\, is they were not mobilized\, they were organized. And we can talk about that distinction because I think it’s useful. This constituency got visibility and recognition and they built a vehicle through this action to create a coalition across black\, white\, but also across elites and low income that came together to win this. So I wonder when I hear the story and I was when I was doing work like this at Ford\, I was wondering what if we had done the work on learning outcomes in this sort of way? Would it have made a difference? You know\, I don’t know. But I wonder. And of course\, what this group has succeeded doing is raising money. And raising money is what we also managed to do in Tanzania. For the raising money is one thing. Improving learning outcomes is another. So I’m curious\, will this coalition being in place somehow be better at actually achieving the outcomes or not? These are some of the questions we have. And to close with what should students do? I really think the one thing students should do is absolutely personally get engaged in organizing themselves. And it doesn’t matter. I don’t care what the issue is. But you. Do that yourself. And I think that will teach you\, you know\, a heck of a lot more than just what the and others are going to do.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you very much. Before I open it up for questions\, I just had a question each for each of you. Alice\, you talked about some things that the students should do is teach them how to work with diversity. How exactly does one do that? Right. That’s a question I’ll ask all of you your questions and then you can answer. Lily\, to you. You talked about\, you know\, you have to mobilize a leads. What are some concrete things that one can do even if you’re working on citizen engagement of thinking about how you can mobilize the elites\, whether they be political elites or others. What are some concrete things that you can do where you kind of answer the question I have for you\, as you were telling the Cincinnati story\, which is a fantastic story\, at the back of my head was going\, what could they have done differently? At what ways? And can you just think of some things that you could have to create the vehicle\, right? Have these feet on the ground to change people. So that had the next president come in and said\, I’m putting this off\, people would have been on the street saying\, no way\, you can’t touch this.   \n\n\nSpeaker 2 So two things. One\, in my teaching\, I tried to highlight the benefits of interdisciplinary thinking\, like highlighting anthropological and political science insights that always make reading lists diverse to highlight different peoples\, you know\, the benefits of learning from diverse groups. So one is to show that diversity through the classroom tuition. But I think that she’s 100% correct that most of what we learn about the real world comes through our own observations and our own experiences. So to get students engaged in understanding or how to work with diversity\, you know\, do whatever campaign you like\, whether it’s a climate change campaign\, a sexual harassment campaign\, go out and campaign. And in that process\, you’ll realize you’ll achieve a hell of a lot more if you work with a whole bunch of different groups. So just what for? Cash says really.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai I just want to point out that when I was asked to be on this panel and it was just about mobilizing elites\, I said no\, because I that’s just my that’s not my area of expertise. And you’ve given me that question.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji No\, but you made a valid point. I misspoke saying that you do it pump priming the pump\, but and they’re on the other side that you kind of do need to.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai So I guess what I would say is that when an external actor or even citizens can reduce the costs of governance to the elite. So you have to think about what the governance outcomes they want are. And sometimes it’s tax compliance or another kind of compliance. If you can cut a deal\, if you could figure out a deal where. And so actually\, actually\, what I will say a little bit about this Philippines civil society organization that we work with. So they put together a pilot program that would be inserted into the Philippines’s Conditional Cash Transfer Program\, which is one of the biggest in the world. And what they wanted to do was to train people among the poorest of the poor\, the beneficiaries of the program\, to pressure local governments for better education\, health. And the reason they could do that was because the cash rich cash transfer program comes with the requirements that you have to take your kids to get their destinations\, and they have to go to primary school in order to get the cash transfer. So it was this kind of like piggybacking. So so what they proposed to the government was that what the civil society organization proposed was that\, you know\, what will help you monitor the conditionalities\, will help you help you with your complies with the conditionalities. And in exchange\, we’re going to train these leaders to pressure local officials. And so that that was a good enough deal\, right? Because there’s limited state capacity. And if the CSO can offer the government a service essentially that they need to accomplish\, then it leads can potentially be mobilized.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji And I really like your comment on the revolving door between civil society and government. It’s a very nice image to.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani The right wing in this country are masters at that they can they really great job and they are the reason.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji That.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani I think one of one of many mistakes I made was I just kind of assumed that people would self-organize and you would kind of have this you know\, I had this notion\, like\, if you look at the Roman Catholic Church\, they have these\, you know\, Bible studies and they organize and the teachers meet and this union and great sweep of it. So there was this notion that people will somehow self-organize. Even though I knew that historically that at independence the ruling party absorbed and co-opted everything. The workers movement\, the women’s movement\, the youth movement\, every movement was co-opted\, became part of the party with the sanctions against independent organizing. So the evidence of the history was very clear. And then unlike India and like Latin America\, we if you talk to. East Africans. There’s no real notion of organizing. And yet somehow I thought it’ll kind of happen. And we had we had no capacity\, but neither did we try to have a theory of organizing. And I think that that was the biggest\, biggest weakness. The other thing I think what put us off is I again\, I think that’s one of the is that I\, I made a mistake. I cared about scale. My worry was about creating little boutique projects. Anybody can create a boutique setting\, but it was moral. So if you want to have an impact at scale\, I just was like\, How are you going to organize? Familiar? I don’t know how to do that\, but that’s a mistake. It’s not as if you have to have an organizing infrastructure that is huge in order to reach huge numbers of people. You can if you look again\, if one had studied more\, you see that often these movements start with small\, very focused ideas and leadership. And so we could have pulled it off if we had just been smart enough to have got our act together.   \n\n\nAlice Evans May I just say one thing to tie Lillian Reproaches points together? So\, like Lenny was saying\, is that people are more likely to mobilize when they perceive the state as responsive\, as tolerant\, as capable and as nonviolent. So what we’ve seen from the research on transparency is it’s no good just providing information about financial flows and expecting people to mobilize in response to poor learning outcomes. They have to believe that the state will do something in response to their organizing. So it’s all about publicizing that state responsiveness wherever it’s happening and through that\, you know\, hopefully providing credible reasons for hope and showing in one district that the state is being responsive and that’s encouraging more people. So this is a great new book on India highlighting that Gabby Cruz occurs\, which shows that people when.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai A student of mine. Oh right.   \n\n\nAlice Evans Right. So she’s going to say.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai I will tell her that.   \n\n\nAlice Evans She’s got this fissure and this well\, well\, politics. A paper on how rural Indians are more likely to mobilize to push for better services if they’ve got broader social networks or spatial diversity\, where they see the state doing that. So when they go and travel and they see the state of action\, they’re like\, Huh\, I can get that too. I’ll push for that back home. Yeah. So it’s that small process of generating positive feedback loops\, shifting people’s expectations about how the state will respond\, and that of course\, as more people push for accountability\, then we get into the sweet spot of a positive feedback loop.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani Can I piggyback on that? Yes\, an anecdote.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Absolutely.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani I did a lot of work on open government and accountability\, and there was a time when I had access to President Kikwete rather than I would when I met him. I would make a long list of\, look\, this is not working\, this promise is not working. And I would give him lots of data on what needed to improve and he would listen and so on. And after about the third or fourth meeting\, he would say and said\, okay\, let me tell you a story. When I wake up in the morning and my wife of many years looks at me\, you know\, she might think I’m now much older on my face. Skin is not as fresh as it used to be. But she doesn’t tell me\, Oh\, you don’t look as handsome as she tells me. I just love you so much. And then she tells me what she wants. And so. So even if the government is being non-responsive 99% of the time\, if you focus if I spent my time now\, if I could rewind\, if I spent my time telling you this little thing and that.   \n\n\nAlice Evans Part\, that was really.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani Cool\, you know. Yeah. And then maybe that would have motivated for those things rather than the long litany of what was failing.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji So great. I want to add another anecdote to yours\, and this is from other Rukmini Banerjee ways I got this idea from. And so they’ve been doing this like testing on learning outcomes for decades\, for a decade and a decade. They did this one year where they did a multitude of things. So they did health\, they did education\, and they did water and sanitation\, they actually did water tests\, etc. So it was like looking at three different sectors and then they collected this data and then talked to the district officials and what they found and Rukmini told me this herself\, it was a game changer in the reaction they got from the government officials at the at the district level\, because they said\, now you’re telling me a story about things I care about\, what is my quality. And we can have a conversation about maybe thinking about what I can do about this. Because when you come in and you tell me that the children aren’t learning at that\, you know\, they can’t do fourth and fourth grade. They can’t even do first grade level math then that I know this. Don’t tell me something I don’t know. Come to me and tell me what I can do about it. And so I think that is really important\, right? A lot of these people\, they don’t have the rose colored lenses. They know things aren’t working. But what they would really like is a how to\, you know\, maybe you could try this\, maybe this just pointing fingers at them\, telling them that you’re doing a crap job isn’t really helpful to anybody. So I totally. You agree with that? I’m going to open to questions. We’ll take three questions and then just tell us who you are and where you’re from and the questions for. Thank you. Not everyone at the same time Dennis.   \n\n\nAttendee 1 Is actually a comment and I hate seem that guy because of that but I worked with Matt in Sri Lanka and one of the first things we did when we were there is he had Kennedy school student interns\, look for positive deviants\, look for parts of the government that were actually functioning very well. And I didn’t think too much of it. But\, you know\, I read the cases and I thought they were interesting. And then it was incredibly useful because whenever anyone I met with said\, stop expecting so much of us\, you know\, we can get anything done here. It’s always the same\, I would say\, well\, I’ve heard the passport office is really good but one our you know even in the states two days and they were like\, oh yeah that’s true. And not only that\, but you could point to the whole story of how that happened\, the change process. And it wasn’t\, you know\, outsiders coming in. It was completely local. So it was incredibly useful. And I’d love to have more stories like that.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji That’s your hopes. And you get.   \n\n\nMatt Andrew I’ll share a hope story.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Really?   \n\n\nMatt Andrew Two years ago\, I was involved in doing a big study of service delivery in the Middle East as a region\, and the standard way which that would be done would be to do a whole bunch of different country cases with bar graphs showing Egypt\, Syria\, Lebanon there. And everybody thinks that I was really good at testing\, but we said\, no\, this one\, we’re just going to take a look. Most of the lessons about what people really need to learn are domestic\, probably rather than international. Maybe we can sell to some positive deviants\, but the stories that actually use the existing data\, we have to be able to explain to both documents standard deviation as an empirical matter\, but then also to explain why you and where and how you got this diversity and use that as the basis for plugging into a domestic conversation. And we’ve written this report. It was all very nice. And then we my coauthor\, I got summoned by the Saudi executive director of the World Bank. But this is not good. You only get summoned by the Saudi executive director and he’s really pissed about something. So I sort of braced ourselves if we walked into the room and he said\, you know\, I’ve been to a lot of these regional reports and they’re always just this country should learn from this country\, this rigorous evidence of all about. He said\, you know\, that’s the first report I’ve ever read that really taught me something. Lots of us I didn’t know but helped to give a language to explaining why there was such diversity. And I said\, I really liked that approach. I want you to know about it. So I thought it was but it was really\, I think\, telling that this was also to be had a positive deviants discussion in academia. It’s all about such an independent variable\, always nerdy kind of discussions about whether it’s the right way to do things\, which and those are legit discussions. You should have them at Harvard and M.I.T.\, but. CS When you’re doing this stuff\, as this research are saying in the put in the political space\, you just you can’t just be the purveyor of truth of what appears to be an empirical reality of most things. Something is working somewhere some of the time. Where is it? How is it happening? And in this case\, in the Middle East\, where we’re doing it\, the methodological virtue is that you could control for policy consistency because these are relentlessly centralized countries\, though that policy is pretty much identical\, at least at the country level. So when you see this big variation\, it can’t be because as a policy issue and there’s a monster uniform compensation issue or an implementation\, its context issue and helping to illuminate all of that and provide hope and provide a basis in these really tough circumstances\, like in Palestine\, where it’s just it’s grim\, really\, really tough to do work there. And you find a school in your dataset that happens to be producing kids that get outcome performance tests in schooling that are OECD standard by the average level of spectacular. But you know what a school can do that’s in the middle of nowhere where 70% of the fathers are dead or in jail because of the circumstances they’re on there. And yet their kids are aspiring to these amazing things in the future. And you do some deep drilling to find and talk about that sort of stuff. You give a well by country directing. You give local politicians so much more actual material to work with that. I know then there’s a bias. I hope to use an Armenian kind of language to be able to unpack a lot of that. So I think that for us in a place like Harvard\, it pays to be methodologically astute with sort of what are the trade offs\, so to speak\, that you take when you engage in doing this kind of positive deviance kind of work. But the unappreciated component on the plus side is just how it works and feeds into a political logic of how change actually happens. And I think that’s underappreciated. Maybe hopefully a place the Kennedy School it’s that trade off is weighted a little bit more differently than it might be if you’re trying to get published in the American Political Science Review.   \n\n\nAttendee 5 As I’m trying to highlight in a postdoc here\, I have a question that I don’t think is fully formed mostly from Lily\, but everyone is welcome to take the bait. I was really interested by this idea of framing the pump and not sort of activating Europe’s broad based human coalition until you have the least in Line. But I see that as really kind of a two actor model. You have some sort of probably government elite and some sort of group of people that would like something and hopefully their interests can be aligned if they sort of all get on the same page. But what happens when you have like a third actor? I work in global food systems. Oftentimes the private sector is highly reticent or even working really hard behind the scenes\, or if you take climate change\, is another example to come on line. So then do you still have the same advice. That you can’t. Like activate citizen engagement? I guess that’s what 350.Org has done. But what happens? What do you even do at that point if the leads are not.   \n\n\nSpeaker 2 Ready to go where you need them to go? And yet what you’re saying is that you can’t activate.   \n\n\nSpeaker 5 Citizens\, are those just going to get kind of ignored? And I don’t know. So. That’s my question. I’m not very well informed.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Yeah\, I mean\, I that’s a really good question. I mean\, I think if you have the three after model and I think of\, um\, there’s someone at who was it at MIT who’s going to Oxford. I think he was working on the reactor model of like mining companies that are mostly mining companies\, indigenous communities and the government. Right. So when you have a reactor model\, it then it’s a different game and it is a matter of assessing where can you get two sides to put pressure on the third rate? And so it’s less it’s like a light up the government. Maybe you light up the citizenry and then get them to be people and then get them to go public and coordinate. Because I think with three\, you can pressure the third.   \n\n\nAlice Evans There was some behind me.   \n\n\nAttendee 6 My. My name is Kriti. I’m a mid-career student. I wonder if you have the examples of the elite in particular working to reduce the polarization that society seems to me increasingly our country is becoming increasingly polarized and more and more quotidian regimes are democratically elected. So it’s a cause of concern and people believe in what the need to stand up for. So that’s a strangely difficult situation. Mean see how people understand democracy is very complex and as a student of democracy\, it sort of follows me.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Let’s take two others and then you can all answer that.   \n\n\nMatt Andrew Matt and I had a couple of questions. One is to all of you\, and then the next is to a question I’ll start with\, because you said you would clarify the difference between organizing more lives organizing and that’s it’s more I’m really fascinated to see Lily. One of the things that all three of you said\, which is really interesting about both how you should teach students about what works\, is that you need actors to be engaging with each other and moving around\, and you need to be moving people into different realities and very much in the story. But I think also very much you noticed the story and it sounds like in the story too\, that it’s almost taking people outside of their tribal identity so that they can explore other people at the same time. And you made the comment that mobilizing attention and mobilizing action are different\, and that mobilizing action almost requires cited\, like appealing to them in their truck\, that appealing to them in their party. And so there’s something about this static identity that matters to mobilize that action. But it sounds like it’s something like the dynamic movement that mobilizes their attention. And I don’t know if I’m just hearing wrong\, but it’s a tension that I would just be interested to kind of care about is how do you how do you speak to people where they are\, but how do you simultaneously get them to move around and engage with different people?   \n\n\nAttendee 8 Yeah\, my comment or my question is actually very linked to what you said about the difference between mobilizing and organizing. And I just wonder whether there’s a time component there. Like we tend to think about mobilizing as a one off on elections or campaigns or something versus something that is a lot more sustained. So you think about the relationship. You’re trying to change the way the people relate to the government over time. So is there evidence is running? Is your stuff around that that component and link to that\, is there a mobilizing within the state as well? I mean\, is there kind of studies or evidence about how you mobilize within government actors?   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Okay. Anyone.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani Okay. So organizing\, mobilizing. So one feature\, I think\, is that mobilizing tends to be instrumental. You know\, you mobilize for a purpose. It’s typically you figured out what it is you want\, and then you just need the numbers of the masses of the elites or whoever is behind it. So in effect\, you say\, I figured it out\, come support my thing. You try. It’s more efficient. You know\, you you’re not at some level. You don’t care about the you don’t even care about the identity of the capacity or perhaps even anything else about that constituency that you’re mobilizing. You just need them to vote or you just need them to demonstrate the self. And ultimately\, it’s transactional. Whereas organizing is much more interested in the capacity of that constituency itself to advance its own interests. So that means you have to get to know them. You have to build relationships. And it’s not as simple as well. They know best. They know a heck of a lot. But there’s a whole bunch of things they don’t know. They don’t know how to organize. They may not know how to analyze. There may be differences. There may be a complete lack of hope. So it takes it’s hard work. It has lots of setbacks. It takes a long time. And a lot of that is about building hope\, but also building trust\, why people are making very rational choices like Lily or saying of not investing in doing anything because they have lots of experience that tells them it’s not worth it. You know\, the government won’t respond or whatever. So to be able to to work at it and find at least a partially viable pathway that you can work on\, manage expectations. All of those things. It’s a very\, very long slog and hard work and\, and yeah. It’s not easy to is it to do on the on the. I just want to make a quick comment on your question also about identity. I\, I think the mistake we make is to think that you are either a tribalist or you have\, you know\, you are a cosmopolitan\, you know\, and or like the small. I think I think the basis of any organizing is based on tribes that your tribe might be particularly interesting. But it is it’s more around the affiliations you feel with other tribes and how you find that there’s something in common between my tribe and your tribe and your tribe\, rather than some kind of dilution of our tribe that we kind of post tribe. I think is that is the key and a lot of the time and again in this country\, I think one side is much better understanding that fact than the other side. You could even argue\, ironically\, that one of Obama’s biggest failures is he tried to kind of point to a post tribal America. We are not red\, we are not blue\, we’re not white\, we just American lowercase. There’s no such thing as America if you’re not also the same time\, all these other things. Right.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Right.   \n\n\nAlice Evans To respond to Matt’s point about identities and diversity\, I think\, as Lily was saying earlier\, identities are salience. And when they’re triggered\, you can push people in various ways. So\, for example\, when Trump says trade is bad\, we see a big shift in what Republicans think as opposed to said what the what the leader says that can push people who identify within that cohort. But the same time\, we can mobilize even greater change through a broader\, more inclusive coalition. So to give an example from Bolivia\, Morales was an indigenous leader\, but he didn’t just market himself as indigenous. He marketed himself as anti-austerity\, and through that he was able to galvanize a broader alliance. So\, yes\, identity is salient. Yes\, you can pick people often selling\, setting yourself as being one of that group\, but you can achieve something even bigger if you should reach out through more inclusive language. I think.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Yeah. I mean\, I don’t know if I’ve got anything else to add to this. Very good responses. And I mean\, I guess I would just tie this polarization question together with what Matt raised\, which is to say\, I mean\, I think that you have to use what you what you got basically like. And if you have a tribe like that\, tribe has an organization and an identity and those are really valuable resources. So like you should organize through that. But I think this is picking up on this point about polarization. And\, you know\, Rick Perry’s heard me say this before that what ideally happens is that the leaders of those tribes are able to come to an agreement about the rules that will govern the process of interaction among tribes. Right. And that those rules ought to be like rules of civilized dialog and rules of civilized negotiations. And that is also the fact that you have tribes with leaders that. A resource. And so\, like\, we ought to try to make use of those resources in those ways.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani This one equipment supplemental. So I don’t have the answer\, but there’s a guy called Salim Chetty that you might think\, you know\, he’s here. So he’s asking the very same question that you are. And I think you should talk if you probably already are. But.   \n\n\nAlice Evans Any other questions?   \n\n\nAttendee 7 I have kind of a weird question when you’re talking about\, you know\, elites and having a plan for them\, how I think how much of it is a model where they want the opposite of what you want. And it’s\, you know\, the world is what’s the word win\, win\, lose that if your cause gains their cause loses 000 versus how often do you think it’s just they don’t quite understand what you’re saying. Or maybe there’s a way that everyone can win and it’s just a matter of getting them to see the right way or making an arrangement where everyone benefits. Just in your personal experience or in your studies in general\, which is true more often.   \n\n\nAlice Evans I mean\, I give an example from Latin America. So over the 2000s\, income inequality fell in many Latin American countries\, especially those that experienced the commodity boom. And how that happened is largely through sharing the proceeds of growth. So rather than tackling the structural causes of inequality\, rather than by redistributing land which is phenomenally unequal or pushing for more progressive taxation\, it was a win coalition of\, you know\, minimum wage hikes enabled by the commodity boom and growth\, so that they were able to achieve some wins for all as long as it was win wins. But the problem is that many of these Latin American governments didn’t tackle these structural causes of inequality\, and that formed despondency and frustration with the PTI and many other parties. So\, you know\, you tackle some bits that you can\, you get some benefits\, you don’t you miss out on the other bits\, you gain the support of the elites\, but they may not be long lasting\, etc.. So that’s a rubbish answer\, but I mean that there that there are\, there are bits that are good\, there are bits that are bad and there are all these sorts of trade offs and complications depending on what decisions are taken.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Any other comments? Okay.   \n\n\nAttendee 2 I have one other question. And so it’s. It’s a bit of an existential question teaching. And it’s about the last question you had about what we teach our students. I would say that\, you know\, in in so in August\, Frank Fukuyama wrote this this article that said\, Public policy schools teach people about I mean\, as I put it\, about answers rather than about how to do things. I think it’s worse than that because I think it’s that what you guys have said really matters is a lot of kind of how to know yourself\, how to know your trust\, how to build relationships with other tribes\, how to move in and out\, how to come from us\, how to how to agree on second best solutions at times. I think it’s not that we are we just teach answers. We teach the answers are needed. And we teach that the identity of people working in public policy is about your expertise and your answer and not about these other things. I just wanted to get your sense of my rights about this. And what do we do about it? If I’m right about that\, how do we steer? Because we want to keep teaching people how to analyze data. We want to teach the. You want all that stuff. We want people to learn. But we want them to learn that stuff with some humility and with some context and with some idea that this is a tool that you use in the process of engaging. This isn’t the end in itself. Just kind of wondered if there was any reaction and if you had any idea of kind of how do we how do we cut it through that needle of saying this stuff all matters. This stuff is important\, but let’s put it into its place and it’s kind of show you how to use a tool.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Yeah\, I mean\, I think that’s a great comment that makes me think of this op ed in The New York Times that was written by climate scientist in North Carolina dealing with this\, where\, you know\, he wrote about how he would visit the local government office and the local official that he visited would be like\, you’re an interest group.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Like.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai You know\, you like I don’t care one bit about your scientific expertise like you’re an interest group. And\, and he talked about how like it wasn’t until he visited repeatedly and built a relationship of trust and mutual respect that it’s you know\, it’s I think very similar to what you’re saying. Like you can it’s important to know the policy and maybe the best practice or whatever. But ultimately\, it’s you have to you have to persuade people based on interactions of mutual respect. Like even if they don’t believe even though if they believe you’re like a storyteller\, basically. Like so. So again\, it comes back to this process and norms like what are the norms that govern the process? Contractual.   \n\n\nAlice Evans I would like that introduction for all my speeches. Nice little book and go\, oh\, I just a segway. I was speaking to someone recently who is an aura for an IPA project and this person was not she didn’t have a glittering career\, but she was good at talking to people and rapport and they previously had a Harvard\, very qualified\, very brilliant young mind who was who they called a Harvard brat. And she was\, you know\, academically brilliant\, superb. You know\, she knew how to run a regression\, but she wasn’t good at working for this IPA project. So they had to replace her with someone else who was a nice\, decent human being\, who knew how to engage with people. So\, yeah\, absolutely. I’m totally with you. You know\, to get things going\, we need to be nice\, decent human beings. So that is something partly that we need to teach and inspire\, you know\, for me. And\, you know\, one thing I’ve really benefited from\, and maybe even more so than any sort of academic content is seeing how my professors interacted and engage with others and provided mentoring and provided constructive criticism and just seeing how they engage with others. You know\, those role models to me was so important\, you know\, so when I see how people respond to questions or how people engage with me\, so I think that role modeling process and how we engage with our students is phenomenally important so they don’t end up with being Harvard brats\, you know\, that goes for any place. Secondly\, I think it’s the process of continual critique and being aware of alternatives and questioning what we’re doing. One phrase that I like to tell my students is always embrace self-critique\, but never self-doubt. You know\, always listen to alternatives and think about other ways of doing things\, but never doubt that you can do it. So believe in yourself\, but be open to all the other criticisms of what you’re doing. And that’s I mean\, to your point about issuing hubris. So I think that’s so important to cultivate that awareness of alternative hypotheses\, alternative disciplines\, alternative ways of doing things\, but to have that sense of self belief. I think we’re okay.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani I think that’s pretty cool. So three things. When I was a grad student here\, I was also very excited and very motivated to do a small project. I want to get into the details of that with homeless guys\, men in Boston in the south end of Boston and I it was the hardest thing mostly didn’t work and ultimately\, you know\, even though I had lots of ideas and lots of skills\, lots of things going for me\, it didn’t work and that so\, you know\, I’m doing that and it means that I’m taking courses here and designing policies and so on. And so it was it was a kind of nice\, you know\, reality check. And I think that’s another reason why it’s good for people to get engaged in real world stuff while they are in school. Somehow\, some are trying to integrate that\, too. That’s 1/2. Gosh\, I should have written this. Uh\, where was I going? This. It’ll. It’s disappeared. So then I let it go. Maybe it comes back out. So impressed by that they haven’t. Oh\, yeah. Um.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji I thought it was going to move on\, and you’re like\, No\, I got it.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani I\, I teach a few classes\, not a whole course. I teach a few classes at the Columbia School of Public International Public Affairs\, where all I talk about is things I’ve done\, where there are\, you know\, there are not stupid\, there are smart\, there are well intended\, usually well executed. Like it’s a it’s not a it’s not a car. It’s not a cardboard story of a badly done project. It’s a story of well-meaning\, well-motivated people trying to do good things and ultimately not succeeding. And because they are stories about myself\, there’s a certain intimacy and a certain kind of responsibility that to that and the student feedback that comes either right in that class after those classes or at the end of the course\, they often point to that particular device being really helpful to them rather than kind of giving answers delicately\, stories of when you tend to the world or not. And I think that’s something that could be really\, really helpful to do. A final point I want to have is around. The design of policy matters. This is I mean a little bit like under a Campbell’s feedback loops maybe. I think connects with this bubble. You know\, a lot of the time we think that we focus a lot on just what is a good policy and\, you know\, what’s the incidence analysis and who will benefit all those really useful things. But we rarely talk about how can you design a policy that builds and hooks where constituencies will continue to be engaged? Right. How do you design a policy\, for instance\, which will require in its very structure for there to be annual reporting\, will require feedback loops where in fact it will keep fueling\, creating and fueling a constituency that has a stake in that policy and will be able to defend it\, keep it real\, to hold it accountable. And I don’t have the you know\, I don’t have research on this\, but my hunch is that that’s that design matters because ultimately the policy will go where the center of gravity of that country goes and even a good policy will kind of wither away and you’ll have otherwise. So more mimicry unless there’s a constituency. And so you can you can it doesn’t just accidentally happen. You can design policies to be of that sort. And that’s something that I think you can teach students.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji On your point on telling stories. I\, I really like that. And I personally am very moved when I hear someone telling their story because again\, it’s just like observation. It’s kind of an extension of an observation. How do you compare the two cases? Because\, you know\, a lot of people use cases. I have my own bias on cases. But I just wanted to hear your thoughts on the case that’s being taught in a class versus your personal experience\, where you are the one telling the story through your experience and can answer any question that anyone asks to the best of your ability.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani Yeah\, I don’t know. I haven’t thought. I mean\, I think I like cases. The problem with cases is that that they can often become kind of performance that’s right to come this to take you pull out the stylized elements of the case so and you often strip away the ambiguity and the really interesting parts so that’s they can come across as can. But I still think cases compared to lots of their jargon\, it’s always better.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai But I also think I mean\, I just want to underscore another aspect of what we’re saying\, which is that these are stories if I if I heard you write about like failure\, right. Which I think is another incredibly important thing to teach. Students said\, like\, you know\, to give stories about failure and learning from failure\, but also to inculcate the fact that like that should be totally upfront and normalized. And we still do a terrible\, terrible job of that\, like\, I think\, in every dimension.   \n\n\nRakesh Rajani And I think that stories of failure become are really interesting when they are not stupid failure. Right. Because a lot of stories of failure are like\, look\, they didn’t think of this obvious thing or they were just all misogynist. So you’re like\, those are easy to write off. Or you write them off because you never identify with them. You would say\, I would never do that. But the ones where you can identify with like could have actually done other ones\, I think\, that are more captivating.   \n\n\nAlice Evans Great. Michael\, you had a.   \n\n\nAttendee 3 Yes question for you. Actually\, just I can just riff a little bit more on this\, some of the virtues of targeting elites\, so to speak\, because I think that’s somewhat of a relative question. Everyone in this room\, by any worldly standard\, is a super elite. But was what you were saying? Authorizers like people that have political authority that can be from presidents down to local council\, people down to the chair of the school board. I mean\, this the elites at multiple levels. So in the Russian doll sense of there’s different layers of elites ness\, so to speak\, when I’m not just to speak a little bit more thoroughly\, because I think I’ve always thought the way I understood the ethics of what you were saying about the that you don’t want to be in a situation where one is acting an extra jurisdictional space\, so to speak\, to try and leverage and influence something that’s not your purview to to engage with. But I think a large part of our theory of change with the Building State Capability Program is that\, yeah\, we need to have these executive programs to sort of get the apex of the triangle\, so to speak. But we give that training away. We give our book away precisely because we don’t. Our theory of change is about the middle of the pyramid as much as anything else\, because those are the people that actually do a lot of the work that we really care about. So I’m sympathetic in principles of what you’re saying\, but just can just sort of riff a little more on sort of what you what what’s your theory of elite ness\, so to speak\, to that that we need to worry about?   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Yeah. I mean\, I guess there are two things that occur to me if I were to riff on it is I mean\, I guess first I’ll say I was thinking about government decision makers when I started\, so I had a pretty specific idea in mind\, which I didn’t make explicit. But but now that you bring it up and you tie it to this point of like not mobilizing citizens or ordinary people until you mobilize elites and realizing that actually I think there’s an important point about accountability\, that to take it a little bit further\, I think that\, you know\, we should think twice before mobilizing citizens when we as elites or an external actor or an international organization or some sort of international advocacy campaign\, if if those if we if the external actors cannot be held accountable by the people we are seeking to mobilize\, that doesn’t seem right. You know\, and so and I think that happens a lot. So but I was thinking of the specifically the government decision makers. And I think that in the buildings capacity program\, you know\, I think those mid-level bureaucrats\, the implementers are an incredibly important actor and they’re both principals and agents. And that’s the interesting pitch\, right? So\, I mean\, I could riff more on that. But yes\, I mean\, I think\, broadly speaking\, important to mobilize those people when their principals are principals. But the principals ought to be I mean\, are the principles I mean\, they should be agents. And so so actually it should be that the ordinary people can be enabled as principals to hold those people’s agents accountable.   \n\n\nAttendee 3 So we can build out that free press and model and the lateral license.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Of\, say\, right.   \n\n\nAttendee 3 When principals become agents and when agents become principals. And that.   \n\n\nSpeaker 3 That’s right. I mean\, you have to like. Yeah\, but you have to keep switching. But yeah\, yeah\, yeah.   \n\n\nAttendee 3 That’s good.   \n\n\nAttendee 4 Thanks so much. And I love your question.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji You can.   \n\n\nAttendee 4 Do this. So this mobilizing elite thing. How so? My experience of government decision makers is\, you know\, you rarely find the kind of completely callous person and you rarely find that completely amazing motivated reform. And they kind of in between. And most of the time\, they don’t take much initiative because that’s what usually gets into trouble. So they kind of so in the in the theory of mobilizing elites to questions like how do you nudge them to their kind of better selves? Right. And who does that right? And\, you know\, do you think that that can be kind of a bunch of technocrats or people like ourselves or\, I don’t know\, the World Bank person? Or do you think that there’s something around something powerful or maybe enduring if that is done by the constituency who most feels the pain of\, you know\, the lack of action on their part of inattention? Whatever is the is there something around of value\, both in terms of achieving the outcome\, but also of having that outcome last\, you know\, that pressure less if it comes from the constituents. Two questions. How do you not them and who the who does that.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Yeah I mean on how you nudge them. I have a two by two psychology\, intrinsic and extrinsic\, but I think that’s like how often that’s led to me. But yeah\, I mean\, I think\, you know\, as many of you know and I’m sure like\, you know\, the research there’s like intrinsic extrinsic motivation and moreover\, if you motivate them by. Creating or creating external incentives. There’s motivational crowding which crowds out like any kind of intrinsic motivation that they have to be really very careful about\, whether you’re using external punishment and incentives so that like the good types\, the people who are genuinely motivated don’t like switching to this different game\, right? So I mean\, I can elaborate on that\, but I’m assuming all of\, you know\, sort of that literature\, right? Like there’s this\, there’s really daycare center paper that I always raised\, right? Like you penalize\, teach or you penalize parents for picking up your kids late and all of a sudden they all start picking up their kids late because they’re like\, Oh\, this is a fee for service model. Now\, instead of like\, Oh\, I feel really bad about keeping my kid’s teacher late\, etc.. So\, so yes\, I mean\, I think that’s important to note. And then how nudge or how this the importance of the disempowered pressuring or nudging\, I mean\, I think comes back to what you were saying. And I also have a couple of examples or papers that I’ve written on this where there’s something incredibly there is something incredibly powerful. If you are able to get the elites to come to the to like level to re level to\, you know\, like if they come to the ordinary people or\, you know\, I wrote a paper where local officials in China were able to increase citizen compliance because they ceded decision making control over financial resources to village council or village or councils. And that was a really important symbolic like priming the pump\, kind of like trust or what’s called brave reciprocity in game theory. Right. So the in that case\, the officials were like\, you know\, we don’t know if you’re going to reciprocate by like giving us more compliance\, but we’re going to cede control. And if you reciprocate\, then you’ll start this like positive equilibrium going. So. So\, yes.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Matt\, I wonder if you wanted to answer that question.   \n\n\nLily L Tsai Yeah\, I mean\, but also.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Sorry to throw you off on this one\, but.   \n\n\nMatt Andrew Oh\, God. I’m just. I’m just thinking about it\, because I think in our work\, motivation is the hardest thing.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Exactly.   \n\n\nMatt Andrew And the motivation of the author. Right. You know\, we don’t speak about it because everyone is in it\, but we speak about the authorizers and we speak about the work piece. And\, you know\, and it motivating people is very\, very\, very difficult for me to do that. But being involved in it\, I think we would say I agree completely with Lily that you need to be very careful about how you use extrinsic motivators\, because I think that they do cut out other motivators very\, very quickly. And I think that the intrinsic motivators\, though\, are hard to find when you’re an outsider. It’s hard to understand what it is that’s going to move people\, that’s going to drive people. And I almost feel that we depend on like when we’re working in these places in and where we are lucky enough to\, to\, to kind of trip over a thing that mobilizes some of the people we’re working with. And then that becomes like a mobilizer for other people as well\, because that person then starts to mobilize people. Because I do believe one of the things that’s interesting is when you when you nudge one person\, there’s an impact on other people. And one of the things you guys are talking about is\, you know\, this isn’t about citizens versus the state. It’s about that. It’s about adults. And I think I would see bureaucratic reform as well. I think it’s the same you know\, we often think it’s like people\, public officials are in tension with politicians above them. And it’s like this constant battle that they’re in. And I think\, though\, it’s more like a kind of an interactive movement. And so if you can kind of identify and often\, if you like\, some kind of intrinsic motivator from someone\, then that person can become like a little bit of an intrinsic motivator for others. So it’s kind of an interesting thing about who I would say it\, how I think the nudges need to be intrinsic more than extrinsic. That’s\, that’s and we’ve kind of found that I don’t know what some of my colleagues are with the idea that that said\, I think that getting people in the room sometimes requires some extrinsic motivation. Getting people on board at the beginning is to kind of give them an external nudge\, so to speak\, which I think of as a story also from earlier\, is about kind of the extrinsic motivators at a global level. I think that part of it had a look at it at a personal level too. But I think that when you speak about who does the nudge\, you know\, we’re designing our we are kind of we have a role in designing intervention\, but it’s not our intervention. But we design the choreography of the intervention to a degree. So we are looking for ways in which how do we how do we become maybe the first much right. Knowing though\, that how much is not going to be enough to keep them going very long. But because we iterating a lot\, we are really very trying that early on in the process. We are doing the nudging\, we are convening folks\, we are holding them together\, but we are really looking for the person who emerges as the intrinsic motivator of everybody else. And you’re almost looking then to create a bunch of nudges that happen between the people themselves and to almost create like a\, I don’t know\, an interactive nudging like setting.   \n\n\nAlice Evans Right? Setting off a snowball.   \n\n\nMatt Andrew That’s exactly what it is. I think that that’s and I think that that’s what you’re off there. And I think that when you’re thinking about the motivation in groups\, that is what happens. And if you can get the group\, the individuals in the group to start mobilizing each other\, I think it’s really powerful. It’s one of the reasons also why we work. We try to always work with multiple teams rather than one team because we find that\, you know\, different teams can be kind of like at different points of their\, you know\, emotional roller coaster. And if some of them are mobilized and motivated because they had a good week or something happened or they had a conversation or something that really put them on a high\, they can kind of bring the others up. But it is\, I think\, a very\, very mysterious thing. I think I mean\, there’s a big literature on it and the literature is fantastic and very useful to a point. So but I think you are to me\, intrinsic\, very important. You do need some intrinsic motivators\, but you need to be careful to use them very sparingly. And I would say you use them sparingly at key points\, the beginning of the work\, and then maybe at points when you’re looking for some kind of tipping\, you know\, when\, when\, when it’s almost like people are moving to that place where they need something to kind of push them into a totally new level of work. But the key thing is to try and get that kind of like I’m almost thinking. It’s like\, what’s that game? All right. It’s like the lads keep banging because the ball keeps bouncing around and it’s\, it’s if you can get that going and the thing works is pinball. And if you can’t get that going in other teams\, then the teams kind of. But they just don’t continue so that it’s a big\, big deal. It’s very hard to do.   \n\n\nSalimah Samji Great. Thank you. Do you guys have any last comments you want? Well\, thank you very much. It’s been an honor to be on a panel with the three of you. I have to say personally\, I am so inspired and in awe of all of the work that you guys do doing what I love the most about it. It’s true. What I love the most is how humble each of you are\, you know\, for the amount of incredible work that you have all done in your lives. And you you’re on the ground. You engage with real things\, you care about them\, and yet\, you know\, you don’t have any egos. You don’t have any kind of a you. Have you seen where we’re sitting? I have a good comparison for my comment. So it has really been an honor. I have learned a lot. And thank you very much. Thank you\, guys.   \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nThere are a lot of important agendas at the global\, regional\, and local level that don’t get implemented. During this event\, panelists discuss how to mobilize citizens and political elites to get these agendas off the ground and progressing forward.
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/how-do-you-mobilize-political-elites-and-citizens/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20181026T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20181026T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T015154Z
CREATED:20230328T142709Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T015154Z
UID:17005-1540512000-1540598399@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Toolkit Launch
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\, Faculty Director\, Building State Capability\, Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development\, Harvard Kennedy School  \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Director\, Building State Capability \n\n\n\nTim McNaught\, Research Fellow\, Building State Capability \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews and Salimah Samji launch the newly published PDIA Toolkit\, a comprehensive resource to solving complex problems at the Harvard Worldwide Week.
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/toolkit-launch/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20170418T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20170419T235900
DTSTAMP:20260907T015245Z
CREATED:20230215T032509Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T015245Z
UID:13265-1492473600-1492646340@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:GEM 2017: PDIA For Economic Diversification
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nSpeaker\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\, Faculty Director\, Building State Capability\, Edward S. Mason Senior Lecturer in International Development\, Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSummary\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\, leads an interactive session on Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). Professor Andrews explains that PDIA is a process innovation that Building State Capability has been using within many countries to help governments find and fit solutions to complex problems that are specific to local context. He walks through an example of this process in Sri Lanka\, describing in detail how a team in the government has been building the capabilities and the authority to address a binding constraint to economic growth through action and learning by doing. \n\n\n\n\nSlides
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/gem-2017-pdia-for-economic-diversification/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20161117T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20161117T235959
DTSTAMP:20260907T015328Z
CREATED:20230215T030605Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T015328Z
UID:13261-1479340800-1479427199@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Doing Development Differently - London
DESCRIPTION:London\, UK \n\n\n\n\nODI\, in collaboration with BSC\, convened a private workshop bringing together a number of actors from academia\, civil society\, and donors\, to look at how the adaptive development agenda has been put into practice throughout the world. We attempted to draw out some lessons learnt\, and chart a way forward for both actors already working in this space\, and for actors new to and interested in how to do development differently.  It was an opportunity to share what we had since the DDD workshop in 2014.  \n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nJonida Pone\, Ministry of Urban Development\, Albania \n\n\n\nSalimah Samji\, Director\, Building State Capability \n\n\n\nPeter Harrington (Moderator) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscript\n\nSalimah Samji Thanks\, Peter. So we\, as we\, our faculty Lant\, Matt\, and Michael Woolcock have been traveling the world and they’ve been doing this for the last four years talking about PDIA. The amount of demand that they’ve generated has just been tremendous. And they do a lot of executive education courses for public leaders at the Kennedy School at Harvard. And at the end of almost every single course they teach\, government officials\, people come to them and say\, Can you come to my country tomorrow? We need you\, like\, we need PDIA. Can you teach us this? And you can understand that we just don’t have the bandwidth to be able to do all of these things. And so as we try to experiment with high touch\, medium touch\, low touch engagements\, we’ve always had this idea at the back of our head is\, could we teach this as an online course? Could it even work? And given that we really do believe in PDIA\, we thought about PDIAing a PDIA course and let’s do it\, let’s try it and let’s see what happens. And so we offered our first PDIA online course for free on November 8th last year. And the way the process we went around doing that is we had a series of 60 short videos\, 3 to 5 minutes that has either Matt Lant or Michael talking and explaining different aspects of PDIA and how they all fit together. So we developed modules where each module would have videos\, so there would be a video lecture. This is an asynchronous course\, so there was weekly homework that was due. Natalia took the course. She was one of the one of our experimenter who completed. And so you had to do weekly homework. And as long as you got that done by Saturday night\, it didn’t matter when you did it. So you would have the video modules and then you would have reading assignments and then we’d have two assignments. We had an assignment that would actually test whether you got what we were trying to teach you. And then there was the second assignment\, which we called a reflection exercise\, because we thought it’s one thing to test whether you’re actually learning what we’re trying to teach you. But we we’d like to see how you can apply what we’re teaching in your own life. And so you’d have to write a reflection exercise about how you saw whether it was isomorphic mimicry that we talked about\, whatever concept we talked about\, how do you see it playing out in your own life? And that was a reflection exercise which we then had peer reviewed. So each student would actually read somebody else’s reflection and comment on. Now\, when we designed even the assignments\, we had a lot of advice from Harvard X and all of these guys who do MOOCs who are saying multiple choice is the only way because you can’t grade text answers. And Lant\, Matt and I felt very strongly that that was not what we wanted\, because in multiple choice\, you don’t understand. If we were going to teach PDIA\, we needed to know that they understood the concept\, otherwise it was pointless. And multiple choice doesn’t get to the nuances that you understand. And so we took a chance\, and I remember the conversation that we had and we said\, success to us is 50 people signing up for this course. That would really be great. When we when we signed it\, when we had like registration open\, 700 people registered for the course\, 500 logged into the website. There’s always attrition with MOOCs. And out of the 500\, 293 finished the first week’s homework. That’s 5 to 8 hours of effort that they put in the first week doing our homework. From 293\, six weeks later\, 240\, which is an unbelievable retention rate for an online course completed the course. They did not pay a penny for their certificate\, but they stayed engaged because clearly they found some value in what it is that we were teaching. Our question was\, can we\, so we had several questions when we did this\, can we teach something like this? Can they learn and what can we learn from this process and what would we change? So we did the first thing. Conventional wisdom for MOOCs told us that you can’t have a long course. We wanted to do a 12 week course\, and so we split it into two parts and we said\, okay\, fine. If that’s the conventional wisdom\, we’ll split into two parts and have one part of six weeks and another one of eight weeks or six weeks. And what we found is you lose momentum. And I will tell you that we ended the course December 19th. So 240 people from around the world through like Christmas vacation\, etc.\, did all of their homework. I remember Matt coming to me saying\, how many people have done their homework? How many people submitted their homework? And we continued to be just shocked. Like what? Like don’t they have jobs? Like\, why are they doing this? But it was it was just tremendous for us to see. And so what we realized is when you split courses into parts\, you lose momentum\, you lose people. And we lost people from our 244\, the part two of the course. The other thing that we learned is. Our course is split between\, like the books\, the PDIA book\, which comes out in January. The course was structured very much around the book\, which has a conceptual part\, and then it has a practical part of how you actually do PDIA. So our expectation was you bring your problem to the table and we will give you our tools. And through the course you will work through your problem using our tools. And that was the practical part. And Matt’s question was always like\, How can we coexist conceptual and practical? Do we have enough people who can do both? And it was a good testing ground for us. And what we found is from our first pilot is the types of people who sit at the headquarters and the donor types\, etc.\, really struggled with the practical part because they had no understanding of authorization environment. They couldn’t do the homework on working through the problem and deconstructing it and looking for change space. We have like we have this our fishbone diagram\, which we then deconstruct and then we have a tool called the change space analysis\, which we use to identify. Okay\, so here’s my\, here’s my problem broken down. How do I know where I should actually enter from? And how do I find my entry point? And we found that they really struggled. And we found out later on that some of them actually did the whole problem statement on a retrospective problem\, and some of them actually just made up a problem. However\, the people who are in the field who had real problems did tremendous exercises. We looked at some of those fishbone diagrams and we were blown away. There was this one student in Kenya who wrote to me\, so problems we did in four modules because that’s how important breaking down and understanding your problem is. We spent four out of 12 weeks on just breaking down problems and there was this one student in Kenya who sent me an email and said\, Hey\, you know\, it’s week three and I just understood that this is so valuable. Can I change the problem I’ve been working on? Because I’m really working on how we dispose urban waste in Kenya. And I would love to do this. And I said\, sure\, just redo your homework for the past two weeks. And he was totally willing. He’s like\, Yeah\, yeah\, thank you so much for letting me continue this. And I’m thinking\, Really\, don’t you have other job? But they clearly saw tons of value in being able to do this. We had other students coming back to us and saying\, Oh\, I want to do can I use the videos to do a training in my office? And we’re like\, Sure\, they’re out as Creative Commons. They have a Creative Commons license. Do with it what you want. If you find it useful\, do it. And some of our exercises\, especially with breaking down the fishbone\, their assignment was to ask someone else that they work with to do the same exercise\, and they could compare and contrast fishbone diagrams. And the learnings they had in terms of everybody has a different perspective and that you you learn so much more from teams and understanding teams. So it was really we learn a lot from that. So our learning in terms of there’s two types of audiences like the donor type and then the implementer type led to our second iteration\, which we started in March of this year. We offer two courses. We offered a short eight week course and a 12 week course. The 12 week course was for implementers\, and we market it as if you have a problem that you really want to work on and you’re in the field and you can do something about it. You take the 12 week course if you just want to understand what PDIA is\, etc.\, then you take the eight week course. And that kind of helped us in terms of breaking out our audiences. But what we what we also learned is that PDIA is really effective when you have a group of people doing it together\, which is kind of how we work in-country. And so our next iteration\, which will likely be in in next year\, early next year\, we haven’t set dates yet are entry. They’re free\, our courses are always free and we’ve decided that that is always what we would like to do. We would like to offer our PDIA courses for free\, but our enrollment will be you need to be a group and you need to tell us the problem that you’re going to work on. Because some of the problems that people we’re working on\, like I said\, they made up others were\, you know\, you’d have some priest working on some other random problem and we thought this would be much more effective and we don’t really care to work with hundreds of people\, even if we have smaller groups of people. But people who are actually working on a problem that’s real\, we could probably have more change. So in the end\, in all of the three versions of the courses that we have\, two parts for the first pilot\, which Natalia took and then two other versions of principles course and a practice course. We had 356 graduates from 56 countries. That’s 34 weeks of instruction\, and everyone spent an average of 5 to 8 hours of per week on doing this. And we’re really excited. And what was tremendous for us is seeing the aha moments and we haven’t met many of those students and being able to be from foreign looking at their homework and what. Seeing them struggle. We have this great video that Lant has done. You can’t juggle without the struggle. And it was amazing to see them struggling through the problem until they got to the change space analysis and say\, oh\, my God\, I thought I could never\, ever do this. This was so intractable. But there is something I can do. I can actually increase authority\, I can increase ability\, I can increase acceptance. And it was just really it was really incredible for all of us sitting so far back\, but watching the students learn and joining their we were literally on their learning journey because we have like we’ve PDIAed the course. That’s about it. \n\n\nJonida Pone Hello\, I’m Jonida Pone and currently working at the Ministry of Urban Development in Albania. One of the priorities of the Albanian government in the field of social housing is a promotion of public private partnerships in order to ensure affordable and yet better quality of housing. In this regard\, an important initiative taken by the Ministry of Urban Development is to provide low cost housing for vulnerable groups while using BPP schemes\, an initiative which has not been implemented before in Albania. The ministry is working on different approaches to create and find out new and creative models that lead to find a sustainable long term solution for social housing by revitalizing internal surfaces\, reduction of construction costs\, ensuring energy efficiency and conservation. While it is beyond any doubt that the ideas of sustainable and livable housing requires an integrated decision making framework and a fundamental shift from traditional approaches. The current situation has deep roots and is strongly correlated with the past. As Albania moved in 1992 to the market economy for the first time after having closed economy for quite 45 years\, inheriting so many problems\, especially problems relating with land property issues. Other problems were territorial division\, informality\, spatial disparities\, legislation\, incompatibility\, lack of know how\, and engaging with foreign investors. Therefore\, the past has strongly\, strongly affected and influenced foreign investors. Climate and thorough analysis and research is necessary to clear that out. What are the weaknesses and threats for investors engagement nowadays? In this aspect\, there was a need to change the focus from corrective measures towards measures based on dissipation and prevention. Housing is one of the strategic priorities of the government of Albania. It is also a basic need of an individual as it affects the physical and psychological well-being of an individual in the public health\, in the implementation of the employment policies\, maintaining public order and security\, and therefore is essential in creating sustainable communities. Housing is also a sector that affects the economic development and increase of the investments. With respect to housing\, the main challenges are the need to ensure that a large proportion of the Albanian population has access to affordable housing and do not suffer from housing exclusion due to vulnerability factors. So what have we done in this aspect? About a year ago\, a team from Minister of Urban Development joined the Harvard Launchpad PDIA program\, along with other entities across the government to address and find a plot a plausible solution for this important initiative. When we started out\, the aim of the project was to construct 550 residential buildings in Tirana at an area called [unknown] in Albania\, which is located in the most northern eastern part of the Albanian territory and has a surface area of 16\,470 meter squares. And we want to offer optimal housing conditions while being affordable for citizens with low and middle income. That’s all we knew when the project started and we wanted to build this using the PPP schemes. During the coursework because our group work with Harvard launchpad program\, we gained ownership of land. The land was transferred from the Ministry of Urban Development\, from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Urban Development in order to create and define plausible solution for social housing buildings. So during the coursework\, several site visits were conducted to the site by the group for a visual evaluation of the area’s physical and social conditions. A survey by the group was also conducted to evaluate the social fabric of the neighborhood and including here the provision of certain basic services area that has to offer. After the site visit and gaining framework by which the project this project should be guided\, a set of principles were then identified by the group and these principles were always correlated and in collaboration with the Harvard team\, such as priority to energy efficiency\, social inclusion\, public participation\, and environmental friendliness. This\, in turn\, gave the group a direction in identifying the stakeholders that have been taken into consideration in order for this project to be successful. So during the first part of the group\, during the six months course work that we did with the Harvard team\, we were able the group was able to design and cost the project. This gave us a better idea of how this going to look like. Between the cooperation among the two institutions turned out to be very fruitful because during the first phase of this project\, we tackled many issues such as legislation gaps\, which in Albania is a very\, very important thing because the legislation itself has a lot of gaps. I’m sure other countries does too\, but and it leaves a lot of room for interpretation and some parts don’t even have legislation. So because Albania is developing right now\, so we’re trying to figure out different ways of of making this project work. We also did on team building of all of us\, work together to get this project going and get this started. We cooperated with Adeline Ministries because Adeline ministers\, because this is a project that affects not only the Ministry of Urban Development\, affects the municipalities as well. It affects other ministries\, other line ministries that can help with or with funding or the PPP schemes. We analyzed data from our survey that we gather information as far as social or physical in analyzing of the data. We dabbed a lot on the lid on marketing and finding investors. So during the first part of this project\, the first six months\, we work with a Harvard team. We now we’re proud owners of the land or Ministry of Urban Development is proud owners of 16\,470 meters squares where we want to build social housing using PPP schemes. What are we doing next? We haven’t left it to that. We’re following through with the Harvard team going through and engaging\, looking more into marketing and how to engage investors\, potential investors. Investor engagement is very important process. It’s all about a total interaction with foreign investors in understanding what they’re interested and what they don’t like. Why they should invest with. Will investment be feasible and profitable at all? What are the risks and how to mitigate those risks? How to make the investor decide to come. But also keeping at the same time all the standards are non-negotiable\, such as environmental quality\, spatial conditions and citizens right to proper housing standards. So evaluating or tackling problems such as marketing and how to engage while still looking at PPP schemes. This is our next steps into with along with the Harvard team and hopefully we’ll have the construction operation phases of this project further on down the line. And we hope the project going to be implemented. Actual housing and obviously there’s this other services that are needed for the neighborhood and to have a better neighborhood for the Albanian citizen population. Thank you.
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/doing-development-differently-london/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20141022T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20141023T235900
DTSTAMP:20260907T015404Z
CREATED:20230215T131639Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260907T015404Z
UID:13272-1413936000-1414108740@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:The Doing Development Differently (DDD) Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nA growing body of work shows that development interventions often have a limited impact\, especially when targeting improved governance and service delivery by the state. This observation has inspired many efforts to rethink the practice of development\, and a number of new strategies have emerged for designing\, implementing and even evaluating development projects and initiatives.  \n\n\n\nIn October 2014\, Building State Capability (BSC) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)\, with funding from the Governance Partnership Facility\, hosted a workshop titled ‘Doing Development Differently’\, bringing together practitioners and researchers trying these new development practices or carrying out thorough analytical work on them. These employ different tools but generally hold to some of the same core principles: being problem driven\, iterative with lots of learning\, and engaging teams and coalitions\, often producing hybrid solutions that are ‘fit to context’ and politically smart.  \n\n\n\nThis event was an opportunity to share practical lessons and insights\, country experience\, and to experiment firsthand with selected methodologies and design thinking. It was the second session of the Untying Development series hosted by BSC\, and the aim was to start building a shared community of practice\, and to crystallize what we were learning about what doing development differently really looks like in practice.  \n\n\n\nThe workshop ended with a strong call for developing a manifesto reflecting the common principles that cut across the cases that were presented. These principles were synthesized into The DDD Manifesto which was released in November 2014.  \n\n\n\n\nRelated Blogs\n\n\n\nDoing Development Differently 2014\n\n\n\nDoing Development Differently: Day 1 Summary\n\n\n\nDoing Development Differently: Day 2 Summary\n\n\n\nIf you want to do development differently\, but it sounds too hard…\n\n\n\nIntroducing the DDD Manifesto\n\n\n\n\n\nEvent Videos \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMatt Andrews\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMichael Woolcock\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nZack Brisson\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTim Williamson\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nKay Winning\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDuncan Green\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLeni Wild\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nJaimie Faustino\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDan Hymowitz\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNatalia Adler\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTaylor Brown\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVivek Srivastava\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHelen Derbyshire\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTom Gillhesby
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/doing-development-differently-workshop/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20131023T000000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20131023T235959
DTSTAMP:20260909T180541Z
CREATED:20230215T130840Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260909T180541Z
UID:13268-1382486400-1382572799@bsc.hks.harvard.edu
SUMMARY:Untying Development
DESCRIPTION:Harvard Kennedy School \n\n\n\n\nBSC hosted the Untying Development workshop to present examples of governance reforms that look better but do not produce better results and to ask if the governance agenda could have more impact. \n\n\n\nThe workshop brought together several voices\, including: Francis Fukuyama\, Merilee Grindle\, Jennifer Brinkerhoff and Jennifer Widner\, to discuss the challenge of creating a governance agenda that focuses on solving country-specific problems\, involves local people through flexible and context-fitted processes\, and emphasizes learning in the reform process.  \n\n\n\n\nEvent Videos \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGovernance with Impact\n\n\n\nModerator | Matt Andrews \n\n\n\nPanelists | Francis Fukuyama\, Merilee Grindle \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUnleashing Local Agents for Change\n\n\n\nModerator | Salimah Samji \n\n\n\nPanelists | Michael Woolcock\, Jennifer Brinkerhoff \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNew Practice in Action\n\n\n\nModerator | Alasdair Roberts \n\n\n\nPanelists | Peter Harrington\, Nadim Matta\, Jennifer Widner
URL:https://bsc.hks.harvard.edu/event/untying-development/
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